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The project inquires into Hannah Arendt's thinking of the political in 
order to develop from it a possible new thread towards a different 
philosophy beyond metaphysical legacy.
Arendt's notion of human existence as always necessary doing to the 
world rather than just being is read here from her understanding of 
man as beginning. I t  is argued that, as such, it uncovers the 
existentialist dimension of Arendt's work, by and large neglected in 
Arendtian literature, while also influencing Arendt's understanding of 
the political as working freedom out of necessity and taking up of 
existence. This ultimately constitutes the unexplored contribution by 
Arendt to contemporary ontology: I f  ontology if to overcome and move 
beyond its metaphysical roots, it must ask political questions as the 
fundamental philosophical questions since it concerns the being that is 
always necessarily (in) doing.
This reading of Arendt's project is founded upon the parallels of her 
thought with Heidegger's work that proceeds in the same philosophical 
direction.
In  order to understand and develop the implications of Arendt's thinking 
of the political in that direction, the project engages with Arendt's work 
on the source of action, which is interpreted here as a conceptual effort 
to overcome the metaphysical dualism of world. Arendt's theory of mind 
is analysed in relation to two fundamental principles of action, plurality 
and freedom, in order to argue that none of the three mind faculties -  
thinking, willing, judging -  can generate action. The theory is then  
expanded through reference to the fragments on imagination in 
Arendt's writing, elaborated and developed in dialogue with Heidegger's 
and Castoriadis' work on the concept of imagination.
Developing the concept of originary imagination as the source of action 
from these intuitions in Arendt's thought, the project uncovers the 
ontological fundament of opposition of Arendt's work to Heidegger's 
philosophy and establishes the ground to assert that Arendt's work  
offers an opening to post-metaphysical philosophy. While Heidegger's 
project is arrested by the notion of Dasein as being-in-the-world, 
unable to transcend givenness of existence and finally affirming it, 
Arendt puts forth the notion of human existence as primarily being to  
the world, always bringing about the new and resisting the givenness. 
This notion of human existence suggests that the fundamental 
questions of ontology ought to be political questions, the questions of 
doing rather than being.
w m m m m m m
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The romantic fascination produced in the pure state by the first sentences of the 
first chapter of many novels is soon lost in the continuation of the story: it is 
the promise of a time of reading that extends before us and can comprise all 
possible developments. I would like to be able to write a book that is only an 
i n c i p i t ,  that maintains for its whole duration the potentiality of the beginning, 
the expectation still not focused on an object. [Calvino, 1996:177]
That which is a dream of a novelist, translated by Calvino into a 
fascinating literary experiment, is however a curse of the student of 
philosophy in the present day, and perhaps has been so even since the  
beginnings of philosophy. To write a book that would not be only a 
promise of itself but its proper self, the book that would not always end 
at the beginning -  that is a fable of the Golden Age of philosophy, 
which of course may never have existed.
Hence the difficulty of writing an introduction to the books of 
beginnings, such as this one. For the reader, introduction is woven of 
those words before the  words; yet to the writer, those are the words 
that follow after the words proper, the substance, had been written. In  
the case of a book such as this one, that is a series of beginnings a t 
best, this means that a beginning needs to be written to  all those 
beginnings to follow, assuming them ended - a paradoxical situation  
indeed.
So perhaps the best beginning of the beginning to the beginnings m ay  
be to compare this manuscript to the cited Calvino's literary experim ent 
-  the book made of the beginnings of stories spiraling one from the  
other. The philosophical spiral here is woven of several narratives: the  
narrative of the political as action, the narrative of action as enactm ent 
of freedom through new beginning which in fact is taking up of 
existential givenness, the narrative of the source of action understood 
as beginning and, as a thread connecting all these narratives, the  
dialogue between Arendt and Heidegger on the meaning of existence. 
This dialogue culminates, somewhat unexpectedly, in the opening 
towards a different philosophy or philosophy beyond its metaphysical 
legacy.
It  could be argued therefore that the project has two pillars -  one 
philosophical and the other political, corresponding to two principal 
questions: W hat could be the  path fo r  ph ilosophy beyond m etaphys ics , 
and: W hat is th e  pos ition  o f  the p o lit ic a l in  hum an existence, which 
must also be read as: W hat is i t  th a t we do th ro u g h  the po litica l?  The
m
architrave that unites the two is Arendt's understanding of human 
existence through freedom to change (in) the world. This understanding 
pervades and underlies Arendt's notion of the political, pointing to the 
opening of philosophy towards political philosophy, which then ought to 
be considered the first philosophy or philosophy that poses the 
fundamental questions of contemporary hum an condition. The intention 
is not to explore in detail and in depth all the facets of Arendt's work 
and her engaging w ith various philosophical and historical sources of 
her own thinking, but to look at it by dwelling at the intersection 
between the philosophical plane and the political plane of her project.
In  a nuce , it is an a ttem pt to read, from the work of one thinker -  
Hannah Arendt, the meaning of the political as that which emerges 
from the meaning of human existence, which is defined as freedom to 
do to the world, and then to derive thereof a way to think philosophy 
anew by contrasting this reading of existential meaning with 
Heidegger's understanding of existence. Freedom is thus the notion 
central to both philosophy and the political, both thinking and acting, 
and is therefore central to this project as well. Freedom is here not 
understood in the sense of negative freedom [Berlin, 2 0 0 2 ]] but in the 
sense of freedom to do, which Berlin term s positive yet Arendt 
considers the only meaningful freedom in the context of political affairs.
To Arendt, the ultim ate political manifestation of this capacity is the 
'miracle of beginning', the act of founding a polity not as an edifice but 
as a living sphere of the in-between, the common space in the sense of 
experiencing plurality irreducible to solid institutional frameworks. 
Through the concept of the act of beginning there emerges Arendt's 
notion of com m unity-in-action, without assumption of any 
(transcendental) foundation to it, but also in denial of understanding its 
primary unit as sovereign self, the seif th at is the only m aster of his 
actions. Arendt's political world equals to men acting in common, 
exposed to the openendedness of action from which they cannot be 
shielded by the arrest of action but only through the institution of 
promise-action, as the word invested in the futurity of the common 
world. Arendt's understanding of polity as a living entity, dependant not 
so much upon the institutional structure as upon the continuing 
beginning, corresponds to the theory of the political thus defined.
Thereof follows Arendt's definition of the political based on 
understanding both political life/activity and institutions through 
freedom of men in the world and among other men. Such 
understanding of hum an plurality directly contradicts modem politico- 
theoretical conceptualization of political life as a consequence of 
constraints imposed upon men by (biological) necessity, the failing of 
nature to be remedied through political order. The political thus 
conceived by Arendt is inscribed in the existential potential of being as 
a human, and it is enacted in history through living together which 
takes the form of concern with and for the world, the concern which 
renders the world changed in ways unpredictable, uncontrollable, 
unexpected and ultim ately - infinitely diverse.
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7Freedom enacted through political acts is inscribed into men through 
the fact of birth, the appearance of the unnecessary that interrupts 
automatic processes in nature and breaks the silence of universe, to 
begin the new anew. By being an initiating insertion into the automatic 
movement of nature, man is endowed with the capacity to do  a 
beginning, to break into the course of events and do what could be but 
needn't have been. This constitutes the capacity for action, the  political 
mode of active life. Namely, through beginning, man who herself is a 
beginning takes up the fact/givenness of natality and reworks it into the 
act of beginning, which relates her to the world and other men not on 
the ground of passive commonality of shared origin or shared space or 
simply coexistence but through active commonality of the beginning 
begun commonly, among men. This is the idea of man as a being that 
is not created through his own will and whose being does not equal 
mere being, extending in time and occupying space: human being is in 
taking up of the givenness of being. As such, it resonates Heidegger's 
understanding of Dasein  or existence and reveals that Arendt's concept 
of action is unmistakably marked by its existentialist dimension, both in 
contrast and in addition to the Aristotelian and Nietzschean conceptual 
dimensions noted in Arendt's thought of action.
The debt to Heidegger's fundamental ontological dynamics of throwness 
and resoluteness of being also sets Arendt's political thinking aside from  
both classical and modern political theory, as it captures a deeply  
modern ambiguity of interplay between necessity and freedom: politics 
is neither about freedom only nor about necessity only, but about 
reworking of necessity into freedom since birth is both affirmed and 
taken up through the second birth in action. I f  therefore a genealogical 
niche is to be found for Arendt's political thinking in philosophy then it 
is German existentialism.1
1 The other side of the focus of the existentialist reading of Arendt on Heidegger's 
presence in her work is however the question of Jaspers' (conspicuous) absence. Both 
were her teachers and both are considered by Arendt to belong to German 
E x i s t e n z p h i i o s o p h i e  which is characterized by the idea of existence understood through 
freedom from the given yet within the given. In her early essay on philosophies of 
existence [EIU], Arendt explicitly rejected Heidegger's philosophy as yet another 
solipsistic philosophical dead-end and related the future of philosophy, if there was to be 
one, to Jaspers' Socratic concept of 'truth in communication,' attributing at the same time 
Heidegger's political fiasco to the inadequacy of his philosophy. It must therefore be 
asked, would it not be interpretatively (more) legitimate to read Arendt's 'political 
existentialism' or 'existentialist political' from her relating to Jaspers, rather than to 
Heidegger?
Arendt's ambivalent relationship with Heidegger's philosophy however cannot be resolved 
in either blunt rejection or blunt acceptance. It simply cannot be resolved, as the whole of 
Arendt's work constitutes a dialogue with Heidegger's work. To enter a dialogue means 
that a certain common ground is accepted, and this common ground -  such as the 
concepts of the world, throwness, essence in existence and others -  is used as the field 
of/for confrontation. This is not to say that there would not be any conceptual common 
ground between Arendt and Jaspers as well, just as there is that between Jaspers and 
Heidegger, given the common conceptual framework of existentialism. But while the 
ground between Jaspers and Arendt is rarely visited by Arendt, the ground between 
Arendt and Heidegger is the fundament of Arendt's entire project.
Arendt has over the years grown away from Jaspers through realization, as Canovan 
pointed out, that his concept of communication has a more developed private than public
m m m m
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Arendt's political philosophy is however not (only) about interpretation 
and appropriation of Heidegger's philosophy, although his thought is 
silently but intensely present, at times as a conceptual guide -  a t times 
as a contrastive reference. In a certain sense, and with extrem e  
philosophical precaution, this work attempts to situate Arendt's political 
thinking within the philosophical horizon opened by Heidegger's 
question of the Being of beings, against the background of exhausted 
metaphysical tradition. I t  is however primarily about Arendt's departure 
from Heidegger's a ttem pt at overcoming tradition, in the direction 
unforeseen and unforeseeable to Heidegger, the direction which goes 
beyond his horizon to open up a new one, erasing the borders between 
philosophy and thinking of human affairs. For this reason, this is not a 
project on Heidegger nor a project on Arendt as a 'political Heidegger' 
that would deny originality of Arendt's thinking.
At the same time, the manuscript here does offer a rather peculiar 
repositioning of political philosophy on the map of philosophical 
concerns as a whole, but also in relation to the sphere of inquiry 
understood as political philosophy proper. Since the rise of scientific 
approach to the study of political sphere,2 political philosophy has found 
itself in a somewhat awkward position with regard to its subject m atter, 
while the very subject m atter of its inquiries also placed it -  as Arendt 
believed - in an awkward position within the whole of philosophy,
potential while Heidegger's concept of the world is actually more useful for her project, 
which remained deeply political all throughout. [Canovan, 1995:263] Canovan also points 
out that, while Arendt's already mentioned early essay on philosophy of E x i s t e n z  (1946) 
foregrounded Jaspers as the philosopher whose thinking never ceased to dialogize with 
experience, in contrast to Heidegger whose philosophy got stranded on his inability to see 
Dasein beyond self, her later essay on the C o n c e r n  w i t h  P o l i t i c s  i n  R e c e n t  E u r o p e a n  
P o l i t i c a l  T h o u g h t  (1956) presented a radical retreat in Arendt's interpretation of German 
existentialism. There Arendt concluded that Heidegger's concept of the world and not 
Jaspers' concept of communication might be crucial for overcoming the divide between 
philosophy as a solitary activity and politics as predicated on plurality.
In other words, contrasting these two philosophies on the plane of the private/public 
dichtomy reveals that Jaspers might have been involved with philosophy in a way that 
brought him close to Arendt, away from the philosophical contempt for the manyness of 
men and towards celebration of plurality but his thinking developed in a direction more 
ethical than political. Arendt however moves in the political direction and hence 
Heidegger's concept of world as the public rather than interpersonal is a concept closer to 
her. In this movement, Heidegger's project for Arendt's project is both t h e  'friend' and t h e  
'foe,' as it itself encapsulates the most profound ambiguity of the state of contemporary 
philosophy: its fundamental self-doubt, its effort to overcome its own defining core - 
metaphysical tradition, and its continuous falling back upon that tradition in a series of 
failed attempts. Hence the dialogue between them, through Arendt's works, as any 
dialogue between rivals who however speak the same language proves much more lively 
and fruitful than the dialogue between, essentially, intellectual kins, such was the one 
between Jaspers and Arendt.
2 This development characterizes the whole of philosophy: "Since the 17th century, the 
real task of philosophy has been to mediate this new employment o man's cognitive and 
constructive capacities with the totality of our experience of life." [Gadamer, 1977:3] 
Jaspers also notes the need to distinguish the task of philosophy from that of science as 
"[pjhilosophy has from its very beginnings looked upon itself as science, indeed as 
science par excellence,* the position contested with the rise of modern science which 
"made their greatest strides in the nineteenth century, largely outside philosophy, often 
in opposition to philosophy, and finally in an atmosphere of indifference to it." [Jaspers, 
1951/2003:147]
9allocating it the place of a philosophy improper, or impure philosophy 
that concerns itself with the ephemera of human doing.3
That Hannah Arendt is taken for a guide in thinking the political through 
acting would not be contentious either for 'Arendtians' or for those 
unpersuaded by her works. Hannah Arendt is a thinker who thought the  
political as action in most of her works, action taken as that which is 
the essential of politics without being its essence, itself non-essential, 
the ultimate contingent. Arendt's theory of the political is in fact a 
theory of political action, the thought of the dynamism of politics. But to 
build the work on the renewal of the project of philosophy around 
Hannah Arendt's political theory begs questions on at least two  
accounts.
Firstly, It has been said that crucial for this project will be the notion of 
freedom , understood as central to the understanding of both thinking 
and acting. But it is clear already from the above brief outline of 
Arendt's critique of philosophical tradition that Arendt finds philosophy 
fundamentally hostile to both the notion and phenomenon of freedom. 
Secondly, and consequent to Arendt's understanding of her own project 
as directed towards redemption of political thinking from philosophy 
and retrieval of originary freedom, it appears counter-intuitive to read 
Arendt's work as a contribution to the project of philosophy.
Arguably therefore, this work violates Arendt's understanding of her 
own work as primarily concerning the political. This project can thus 
only partly be equated with the method of Gadamer's 'hermeneutic  
reflection' in "bringing of something to a conscious awareness." 
[1 9 7 7 :3 8 ] I f  it is to be considered valid however It is methodologically 
much more indebted to Heidegger's approach to understanding and 
Interpretation, articulated in his own interpretation of Kant: "Every
3 It must however be noted here that Arendt's reading of the tradition of political 
philosophy is not always entirely balanced. One cannot help observing that, rather than a 
battle between the thinkers of freedom and the thinkers of order, history of political 
philosophy can be depicted as a long line of attempts to define the dynamic relating of 
the two, freedom and order/necessity, often in attempt to devise the ideal order but 
against the background of specific historical situation which placed one or the other, 
freedom or order, into danger. This historicization of political thought, as proposed by 
Wagner [2001] in terms of oscillation between the norm and the challenge, affirmation 
and questioning, would correspond much better to Arendt's sensibility as an author who 
wrote of the political by writing of specific historical examples. But as many other authors 
who purport to challenge the existing or rather, the prevailing paradigm, Arendt 
overstates the critical interpretation in order to disclose the gravity of the problem which 
characterizes her own historical situation -  the situation of the endangered capacity for 
freedom, with the sphere of freedom ebbing away before the danger of totalitarianism. 
Arendt's reading of the historical course of political philosophy is thus deeply imbued with 
the drama of the political moment of her writing, the drama of the loss of freedom.
I have therefore followed the route of Arendt's interpretation closely and without much 
interference, allowing her criticisms to bring to light her own project, as the route itself is 
more telling of Arendt's direction than of the actual writings and ideas, that of course 
being more of a rule than exception in philosophy.
B
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interpretation must necessarily use violence." [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :141 ]4 W hat 
this violence means is reading philosophy not for what it says but where  
it points to:
But with any philosophical knowledge in general, what is
said in uttered propositions must not be decisive.
Instead, what must be decisive is w hat it sets before our
eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said.
[Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 4 0 ]
Heidegger hopes to rescue such 'violence of interpretation' from  
arbitrariness, on the ground o f 'th e  power of an idea that shines forth' 
when interpreter ventures beyond the said. W hat Heidegger is actually 
saying is that, while examining the propositions remains philosophically 
valid, interpretation truly happens only through the excursus into the 
implications of a work, by following them through and through to  read 
not what the work s ig n if ie d  but what it m e a n s . This is that 'audacious' 
task of which Heidegger speaks: "entrusting itself to the concealed 
inner passion of a work in order to  be able, through this, to place itself 
within the unsaid and force it into speech." [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 4 1 ]
Following this 'inner passion' of Arendt's work is the only possible route 
in this case, since Arendt never explicitly and systematically engaged in 
setting a new path for philosophy, as Heidegger had done in his early  
project of fundam ental ontology and then followed that task through to 
his later works concerning the task of philosophy and Investigation of 
thinking,5 Philosophy in other words has n e v e r  been Arendt's project. 
But it is the intention of this manuscript to investigate how, by reading 
and writing the political, Arendt opened up the limits of philosophy, the 
opening that would become particularly meaningful later on in the 
works of Nancy on freedom as the nonessential essence of existence 
[1988/1993] and ethics as the only possible fundament of ontology for 
a being whose existence is, in essence, p ra x is  as comportment and 
relating [2005].
This work therefore seeks to enlarge the ground that Arendt herself 
claimed for her discussions and explorations: relating of philosophy and 
politics as derived from  relating of thinking and acting. This venture, 
while its trails pervade all of Arendt's thought, judging by her early 
essays from 1940s,6 moves to the foreground of Arendt's late -  and last
4 For the sake of accurately following the historical development of Heidegger's thought, 
all bibliographical references to Heidegger's works here contain both the year of writing 
and the year of publishing of the copy used for quotations. Where it was possible, as in 
the case of B e i n g  a n d  T i m e ,  pages cited refer to the numbering in the original 
publications.
s The early works referred to here are primarily O n t o l o g y  - H e r m e n e u t i c s  o f  F a c t i c i t y  
[1923/1999], K a n t  a n d  t h e  P r o b l e m  o f  M e t a p h y s i c s  [1929/1997], T h e  F u n d a m e n t a l  
C o n c e p t s  o f  M e t a p h y s i c s  [1929/1995], T h e  B a s i c  P r o b l e m s  o f  P h e n o m e n o l o g y  
[1927/1982] and B e i n g  a n d  T i m e  [1927/1996].
6 "No sooner does she formulate either side of the dilemma, however, than she qualifies 
it and tries to find some way of mediating between two sides that will allow her to avoid 
choosing between them." These Canovan's words [1995 :264] testify to Arendt's life-long 
concern with the relation between philosophy and politics was Margaret Canovan.
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-  works, mostly but not exclusively in response to Eichmann trial and 
the question which Arendt took up in its afterm ath: the question of the  
source of political action in the 'life of the m in d /
In  this sense, one could speak of two principal experiences constitutive 
of these two (interconnected) strands in Arendt's thought, thinking and 
acting. In  the earlier period, this is totalitarianism, which generates the  
concern with the recovery of politics whose "raison d'etre is freedom, 
and field of experience action /' [BPF, 146] Namely, Arendt does not 
consider her age 'post-totalitarian,' which would imply that 
totalitarianism is exhausted and its disappearance from historical stage 
irreversible. Returning to  the phenomenon of totalitarianism, over and 
over again, for Arendt m eant the only way to avoid the trap of, or the  
fall into 'post-ness,' which assumes all that is behind closed, finished, 
depleted, while paradoxically, it continues to hold the present in 
captivity of that behind:
It is in the very nature of things human that every act that has once 
made its appearance and has been recorded in the history of mankind 
stays with mankind as a potentiality long after its actuality has become 
a thing of the past. [EJ, 273]
This passage suggests that when returning to antiquity, alongside 
critical revisiting of the roots of modernity and the landmarks of the  
Modern Age, Arendt is not involved in a nostalgic journey to some 
fictional Golden Age. Ultim ately, Arendt does not believe that she and 
her contemporaries, as well as those to follow them , will ever enjoy the  
luxury of one monolithic past upon which to rest hopes of return, 
recovery and restoration. There can be only pieces, many missing, 
some perhaps superfluous, so the recovery of such discontinuous past 
can only be a discovery, or disclosure, of the present to itself. Arendt's 
acceptance of her position as being placed within a gap is best 
explicated in the preface to the collection of essays Between Past and  
Future , a metaphorical title  that does not suggest a presence but simply 
a space or void in-between the two non-presences, thus strongly 
counter-arguing the criticisms put forth against Arendt's political 
thought as inspired and lyric prose, which however offers only nostalgic 
and unhelpful gazing into the past.7
Canovan's analysis follows Arendt's deepest dilemma from her earliest works to the last 
one which apparently signaled Arendt's return to philosophy: 'Could it be that there is 
some incompatibility between philosophy and politics built into the nature of each 
activity?" Canovan concludes that Arendt's own thinking, though continuously and 
infinitely uncertain on this specific matter, can be seen as an exercise in political thinking, 
a particular species of thinking that unites the opposites by remaining in the world and 
with experience, in understanding that thought was needed 'in  order to articulate and 
preserve [the] experience." [1995:274]
7 D. Villa discusses two of the most refined readings of Arendt's writings on modernity: 
Benhabib's T h e  R e l u c t a n t  M o d e r n i s m  o f  H a n n a h  A r e n d t  [2000] and Kateb's H a n n a h  
A r e n d t :  P o l i t i c s ,  C o n s c i e n c e ,  E v i l  [1984]. While the two critiques differ considerably, in 
correspondence to the different position which the two authors occupy in a wider debate 
between communitarians and liberals, they however share an important failure to grasp 




By contrast, the meaning of Arendt's communings with the past, the 
one remote as the one immediate, springs from her conviction stated 
above, that historical events do not die out but 'stay as a potentia lity / 
This urges her to th ink through totalitarianism , what brought it about, 
what allowed it, and how it may still be with us as an unobservable 
tendency to resign our freedom in favour of orderly, autom atic  
functioning of our world. How to retain the capacity to act and how to 
build the 'spaces of freedom ' that not only allow but also Inspire acting 
in its transformative and renovative dimensions, this induced what 
Arendt considered the most urgent task of all thinkers: the questioning 
of thinking and acting, the two fundamental modes of man's existence, 
in the light of those historical experiences which seemed to have 
rendered both thinking and doing meaningless.
Later on, however, Arendt's thinking enterprise is motivated by the 
insight into Eichmann trial, which drives Arendt to inquire into the 
relationship between faculties of mind and active life. The trial to 
Eichmann, whom Arendt finally and controversially diagnosed with near 
to absolute thoughtlessness, and the fact that the Final Solution did 
happen in many places but n o t  everywhere, brought home to Arendt 
the question of the sources of action in relation to mental faculties. In a  
certain sense, it is the same question as that which propelled the 
earlier, more explicitly political stage of her work, only now posed 
inwardly. 'Spaces of freedom ' external to us, placed in the world that is 
are essential for acting as changing of the world, although we owe our 
capacity for action to the existential fact of our birth: Is ft this paradox 
that can help us account for the cases when 'spaces of freedom' sink 
into the dark of suffocating, anti-political regimes, but the capacity itself 
is retained and, m ore importantly, employed? The capacity is a 
potential but it does not provide the impulse, and if the world does not 
encourage action either, where does the impulse to act come from? 
Following through this question, and understanding action in Arendt's 
terms as the bringing about of the new into the world, one reaches 
another question: How can the existing and present reality ever be 
broken through, w here does the new come from? Reversing the 
question, one finds oneself faced with the possibility that there can be 
nothing new, only reinterpretation of the existing. This is the inevitable 
question of what allows us to awaken our capacity for action freely, 
since to say that we act simply because we own this capacity to change 
and initiate, just because our birth has been such rupturous novelty, is 
almost like saying that we act out of necessity, that we are necessarily 
free. While this may be an existentially meaningful and indicative 
paradox, conceptually and analytically it is insufficient and empirically, 
in terms of political p ra x is  -  it is potentially perilous.
This is not relevant exclusively for the moments of political apocalypse 
such was the rule of the Third Reich. In  her insights, Arendt does speak 
of very particular, critical even, historical moments, seized or missed, 
the implication being of a moment coming out of nowhere, befalling 
upon an actor in the situation of crisis, when a decision has to be made 
to prevent the total eclipse of history. Yet, as it was to become clear to
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her during Eichmann trial, "great temptations are easier to recognize 
and thus to resist, for resistance comes in heroic terms. Contemporary 
dangers begin with trivial and insidious steps." [Neiman, 2 0 02 :3 0 1 ] 
Investigating human mind to discover what allows one to escape the  
dangers of everyday inertia that sedate man's capacity to change the  
world around her and immerse her into indifference, that inspires 
Arendt's last writings.
This side of Arendt's motivation is explicitly political, and the writings of 
which the Life o f  th e  M ind  is composed do constitute a legitimate part of 
Arendt's political thought. But there is also the other side, her 
conviction that life of the mind and life of action must be entwined if life 
in its entirety is to have any meaning, not per se but in relation to the  
world and for the world. The project of thinking thus must itself be 
restored in order to help restoration of the political as the sphere of 
active life. In other words, The Life o f  th e  M ind  is approaching the same 
problem of action but from a different angle, from the angle of thinking 
or from within m ind, rather than the world.
Yet the argument that validates this interpretation of Arendt does not 
necessarily justify the decision to base the project such as this one on 
Arendt entirely. One question cannot be escaped at the incipit: W hy 
Arendt, why not those other authors such as Nancy, also Castoriadis, 
Zizek and, inescapably, Derrida who trace the path into a different 
philosophy and then walk it as well? I t  seems like preferring an  
unnecessary detour to a direct route.
While the question is a valid one, it however does not invalidate the  
project. Namely, the specificum of Arendt's thought for an inquiry into 
new philosophy lies precisely in the emphasis of philosophical enquiry 
displaced, relocated, from subjectivity to the world or rather, to the  
most political preposition to  which relates and ties together man and 
the world. Subjectivity here must not be equated with individuality nor 
with the 'spectre of Cartesian subject/ as^  Zizek vividly depicts the 
central problem of all Western philosophy. [Zizek, 2000] I t  stands here 
for any entity of which it is spoken in terms of is-ness, as being, 
whether it is being-in or being-with or only being, by contrast to 
existence in terms of relating to the world in the form of doing to  it. In  
other words, this is about philosophy beyond being.
I f  philosophy as a thinking project is to acknowledge that its question, 
the  question, must now concern the sphere of becoming and that the  
question of becoming must not again be "subverted by being" [Caputo, 
1 9 8 7 :1 3 ], then thinking itself must be dislocated into the sphere o f 
becoming, of m ovem ent, away from the substantiveness of Being, o r  
being, and the necessity of absolutes, to the playground -  often also 
battleground -  of possibilities and contingencies, such is the sphere of 
the political.
This specificum of Arendt's thought thus becomes a wellspring of a 
different 'first' philosophy or ontology, inescapably political.
Ontologically, man is free and freedom is the meaning of human 
existence. But crucial for understanding how Arendt's project is 
different is the preposition to , which must always follow mentioning of 
ontological freedom, not only always attached to it but being an integral 
and inseparable part of freedom which brings into ontological horizon 
the thought of another existence, the world. I t  is freedom therefore not 
as a condition or state of subject but freedom as action by 'subject' to  
the world. Man is to be understood therefore not through his is -ness , 
his being, but through his doing. By bringing the new into the world, 
the new which just as well could have not appeared and yet it did 
through the act of freedom, man does and does-to, to the world, not 
only is. Arendt therefore constructs an ontological triangle which in its 
core is political, if/when the political is understood in terms of acting 
into the world.
That Arendt can be seen as offering a different wellspring of philosophy, 
political ontology that is, does not imply that Arendt entirely escapes 
the ontopolitical.8 Her thought of the political, her conceptualization of it 
is propped upon one fundamental ontological preposition -  Augustine's 
postulation that man is a beginning so that there can be a beginning, in 
other words: that man presents a newness to the world and is thus 
capacitated to do the new to the world. Following partly Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology, where tim e is ontologically the earliest and 
therefore a p r io r i to all beings, not in the sense a seed is prior to a tree, 
which would be ontic/phenomenal priority, but in the sense of tim e as 
the condition of and for understanding of all beings and relating to them  
[Heidegger, 1 9 7 5 /1 9 8 2 :3 2 5 ], Arendt reads the meaning of man from  
time. Yet the meaning of man is not located in any of the three modes 
of temporality, nor in their totality as a horizon nor in the perception of 
time, but in specific, active relating to tim e. This is embodied in the 
moment of rupture that is man's birth as well as man's doing. Man is 
not in time but time is from man who is a beginning that can begin, and 
beginning always spells change to the world and time course.
Arendt therefore may be making an ontological statement as part of her 
thinking of the political, insofar as one defines ontology not as „science 
of being" but the quest for the meaning of existence located by 
Heidegger within the very existence, yet at the same time she uncovers 
the political core of any such quest for meaning: the necessary 
presence of the world in and to which human existence does, even by 
bare appearance. The meaning is therefore not derived from relating of 
existence to itself (whatever the self -  singular/plural, 
individual/collective, one/other) and not from acting out either but in 
acting into  the world.
8 Though ontopolitical is here a dear reference to Connolly's term, it should not be 
understood as implying that of which "fundamental presumptions fix possibilities, 
distribute explanatory elements, generate parameters within which an ethic is elaborated, 
and center (or decenter) assessments of identity, legitimacy, and responsibility." 
[Connolly, 1999:2] Rather, it is a minimalist ontological fundament that inspires the 
reading of the meaning and significance of political experiences though it does not 
entirely pervade nor does it dictate them.
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This project thus travels from asking a political question of how to think  
the political, to  demonstrating that the only meaningful way to ask 
philosophical/ontologlcal questions today is to ask questions of the  
political. In other words, if the new philosophy is philosophy beginning 
and ending with the questions arising from the fact that human being 
exists in the world by changing it, then the proper foundation of such 
philosophy must be (the) political itself.
* * *
The uncovering of the philosophical layer of Arendt's thought proceeds 
here through several stages. First two chapters thus seek to portray the 
philosophical ambience and construct the genealogical tree of Arendt's 
Inquiry, positioning her work in relation to the tradition of philosophy 
while focussing especially on the relating between political philosophy 
and philosophy, which Arendt reads as a continuum of oblivion of the  
political.
The following stage is centred on Arendt's thinking of the political as 
principled on freedom, conditioned on plurality and manifested as action 
in the sense of novelty (Chapter 3). The persistent conceptualization of 
action as novelty out of nowhere, unpremeditated and bursting out of 
nothing already existing, however poses for Arendt a specific problem  
of the source of action. Thus Chapter 4 traces Arendt's inquiry into the  
life o f the mind, exploring what she found and what she could not find 
in the three mental capacities that form her Kantian-inspired scheme o f 
mind.
Contrary to most of Arendtian or Arendt-related scholarship that reads 
her final work on, tentatively speaking, philosophy of mind as a sort of 
build-up towards the climax in judgm ent, this project will attem pt to 
show that neither of the three mind faculties Identified -  thinking, 
willing, judging - generates action but that the source of action rests in 
the capacity that underlies, pervades and interconnects them, the  
capacity of imagination. To develop this argument however the  
interpretation in Chapter 5 moves beyond Arendt, following but feeble 
voices in a fragment of hers on imagination where, just as in the  
incomplete work on judgm ent, Arendt revisits Kant and in this revisiting 
of Kant's notion of imagination, implicitly revisits Heidegger's 
Interpretation of Kant's C ritique  o f  Pure Reason.
Heidegger's reading of Kant foregrounds imagination as the intrinsic 
bond between intuitions and concepts, between receiving the outside 
world and understanding it, the root and source of all knowledge but a t 
the same time a mysterious faculty, uncontrollable, sensory as much as 
intellectual and intellectual as much as sensory. Complementary, 
Arendt's fragment on imagination, also based on Kant, shows it to be a 
mediating faculty of representational power. The representational 
power of imagination enables the exercise of enlarged m entality, which 
is essential for the workings of judgment.
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However, separate and unreferred to in this fragment, there are 
Arendt's intimations of a different power of imagination, its originating 
power as the root of man's ability to overcome givenness without 
escaping the reality but seeing beyond it. This originary imagination, 
conceptually developed here from Arendt's intuitions and intimations in 
dialogue with Castoriadis who wrote extensively on imagination as 
political faculty, is the inward wellspring of man's freedom from  
givenness and from the dictate of reality, without the denial of that 
reality, the welispring from which Heidegger shunned away as did Kant.
In  Chapter 6, the roots of this m ental power of imagination are 
explored in the dialogue between Arendt and Heidegger. In  the writings 
of both thinkers, more explicitly in Heidegger's work, the root lies in 
temporality but the two conceptualizations of temporality are opposed: 
Heidegger's A ugenb lick  that affirms and beholds on the one hand, and 
on the other -  Arendt's m oment of beginning when the world changes. 
The latter is then (Chapter 7 ) interepreted as an opening to a different 
philosophy beyond metaphysics, philosophy that is grounded in 




The opening segment of this inquiry into Arendt's contribution to 
philosophy of the twentieth century recounts Arendt's dialogue with the 
prevalent tradition in philosophy, rooted in Plato's work. Her critical 
interpretation is firmly historically contextualized: she diagnoses 
philosophical tradition as inadequate for intellectual encounter with the  
historical situation of totalitarianism and its aftermath. Furthermore 
however, Arendt's critique purports that philosophy from its beginnings 
has been hostile to freedom and suggests that this may even be an 
intrinsic antagonism, rendering philosophy inherently incapable of 
conceiving of freedom without aspiring to suffocate it. Being such, 
philosophy could therefore give birth only to political philosophy which 
understands politics as instrumental activity, harnessed for non-political 
ends, the activity predicated on the principle of order as opposed to the 
one o f freedom.
A rend t's  h istorico-p h ilosop h ical m ilieu
The philosophical milieu of the European inter-war period in the 20 th 
century, when Hannah Arendt was entering philosophy as her area of 
study, was saturated with the air of uncertainty and change, while still 
lingering on the verge of chaos generated by the First World War, which 
did not seize to haunt the cultural and sociopolitical realities of post-war 
Germany. This was at least how the state of philosophy was 
communicated to the young student by her two mentors, Karl Jaspers 
and Martin Heidegger.
In the shadow of the traum atic experiences, there emerged a distinct 
new 'W eim ar Culture' which gave voice to the discontent of the 
generations that were staggering out of the First World War. This 
culture was marked by the "rejection of the vulgar, material, bourgeois 
pursuit of comfort and profit," [Bourdieu, 1991:9] echoing something of 
Rousseauean critique of civilization and feeding on the craving for 
action against the general apathy: "Any Action that displays an 
identifiable shape must be preferred over hesitation and
Irresoluteness." [Gumbrecht, 1997:258]
The a ir of change in philosophy however was felt much earlier: the 
post-war transformation(s) can therefore be traced to the 19th century 
when the role, place and method of philosophy were subjected to re­
examination and questioning by philosophers such as Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard and Marx, who, in Arendt's interpretation, probed the 
hitherto untouchable foundations of philosophical traditions. [BPF, 26 - 
27] In  Jaspers' reading, more than philosophical tradition was at stake:
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By the middle of the nineteenth century men began to 
feel that an end had come and to ask themselves 
whether philosophy was still possible... An extreme  
thinking becam e possible, which questioned everything in 
order to penetrate the profoundest source, which shook 
off all encumbrances in order to free the vision for an 
insight into existence... [Jaspers, 1 9 51 /2 0 03 :1 3 7 -1 3 8 ]
The shift of the focus in cognitive frameworks certainly contributed to 
this re-examining, finally culminating in challenge to the legitimate 
place of philosophy. Namely, modern scientific investigation, based on 
empirical methods and subjected to strict laws of verification, claimed 
the space traditionally occupied by philosophy, rendering its truths 
reached through reflection and contemplation feeble and unconvincing: 
The body o f professional thinkers, whose claims have 
been threatened since the end of the nineteenth century 
by the growing ability of the natural sciences to reflect 
upon their own processes, and by the emergence of 
social sciences aiming to appropriate the traditional 
objects of reflection, remains in a state of permanent 
alert against psychologism and, especially, positivism, 
which claims to  confine philosophy within the limits of an 
epistemology. [Bourdieu, 1991:43]
However, the roots of the crisis in philosophy reach even deeper in 
history of philosophy. While the First World W ar undermined the myths 
of Enlightenment and historical progress, Heidegger, not unlike other 
thinkers of the tim e, recognized in the events of the 20 th century not 
the actual causes of the collapse but historical occurrences which 
exposed the 'powerlessness of European mind' and the 'frailty of 
tradition' that for long had called for radical transformation of thinking 
frameworks. [Pöggeler, 2005:81 , translation from Bosnian by SN] In  a 
brief essay on E xis tenzph ilosoph ie , Arendt elaborates a similar 
argument and traces the crisis of philosophy and her contemporaneous 
attempts at reformation back to Kant, when the time-old fundament of 
philosophy was removed: the coincidence of essence and existence, of 
that which is thought as real and of that which appears. [EU, 168]
Kant's project of hum an autonomy in matters of pure as of practical 
reason and his denial of mind's capability to prove the existence of 
divine presence in the world left man "cut off from the absolute, 
rationally accessible realm of ideas and universal values and left in the 
midst of a world where he had nothing left to hold on to." [EU, 169] 
Just as modern European secularization undermined the foundation of 
the supreme political and ethical authority, so did philosophical system 
of Kant undo the grounds of transcendental philosophy within which it 
was placed. Paradoxically therefore, as Jaspers notes, though Kant's 
project was so deeply imbued with trust in human reason, it in effect 
marked the limits of reason and exposed in its very fundaments the 
locus  of mystery, [Jaspers, 1 9 35 /2 0 00 :1 0 5 ] suggesting thus that our 
reason is grounded in something unknowable to itself: "there are two
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sources of human reason (which probably spring from a common, but 
to us unknown root)..." [Kant, 2003:18 ]
This turbulence of foundations that came haunting the 19th century was 
well depicted in Hölderlin's poem In  S ocra tes ' Time, where the poet 
exposes how all pillars of judgment, that is -  all sources of authority, 
crumbled -  divinity, sovereigns, 'wise m e n / Men are left to themselves, 
who are nothing but a 'generation of vipers! cowardly and ly ing / W hat 
the poet calls for, what could bring guidance in such dark times is "a 
hero or wisdom." [Hölderlin, 1998:317]
While the turmoil therefore did start earlier on, it was the nineteenth 
century philosophy that disclosed the 'end of tradition' and inability of 
philosophy as it had been known hitherto to cope with 'new problems 
and perplexities' of the world. [BPF, 27 ] When Nietzsche exclaims that 
God is dead, he announces the death of the transcendental absolute 
that however is not only a core of European philosophical tradition but 
is also built into the foundations of European political and social order, 
as the source of political and ethical authority. Thereafter there  
remained only a gap in place of divinity, and philosophies of those three  
thinkers singled out by Arendt -  Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Marx, were  
therefore unfolding in awareness that the fundament on which the 
philosophical enterprise could rest could be found nowhere and in 
nothing. [Jaspers, 19 35 /2 0 00 :2 1 ]
Philosophy was thus brought to a dramatic encounter with itself, its 
position and its role, in the work of these three great thinkers of the  
nineteenth century. Clearly, although the historical and philosophical 
situation of these three thinkers was very similar, their responses w ere  
very different. Jaspers analyses more closely Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
as the negative of their age, arguing that their role was in exhausting 
that age in order to overcome it but they never did overcome it 
positively, by creating the new. [1 9 3 5 /2 0 0 0:15 ] Not only that they did 
not want followers, as Nietzsche Insisted, but they could not have any  
in that enterprise without a goal or direction. Of the three thinkers of 
the 'end of tradition,' it was only Marx who had a clear vision of the new 
project of philosophy and worked towards it.
But in fact, regardless of the presence or absence of specific 
programmes, irrespective of the difference in their approaches and 
directions of inquiry, all three philosophical enterprises transmitted to  
the twentieth century philosophy a new, unmediated comportment 
towards past or tradition and the focus on action. In  terms of tradition, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as much as Marx, urged questioning of the  
legacy in u n lim ited  re flec tion  [Jaspers, 1 9 35 /2000 :15 ] which performs 
radical return to the sources, radical questioning therefore of 'vehicles' 
of transmission of these sources to their age. And just as Marx's project 
most unphilosophically celebrated labour, the efforts of the other two  
philosophers culminated in the Other of contemplative thought -  in 
Kierkegaard's leap counter and despite reason, and in Nietzsche's will to  
power. Thus, unlike the quoted poet who calls for wisdom or hero,
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philosophy of the end of the tradition points to wisdom as coming only 
from a hero. In Nietzsche's words, this hero is a 'w arrior' and, in 
contrast to the tradition of truth acquired through either contemplation 
of ideas or meticulous scientific gathering of axioms, wisdom is to be 
conquered.9 The hero here however m ust not be understood as any 
superior individual but the one resisting and fighting against the 
givenness in all absurdity of existence.
In  his genealogy of radical hermeneutics, John Caputo recognizes in 
this movement of philosophy beyond its tradition an attem pt at 
restoring "the original difficulty of life, and not betray[ing] it with 
metaphysics." [1 9 8 7 :1 ] Lightness of metaphysics is the lightness of 
ordered, explicable and essentia lly  meaningful world, the consolation of 
the core of Being  undisturbed by the chaos of be com in g .10 Against this 
venerable philosophical tradition of "turning the world into a frozen 
eidos, stilling its m ovement, arresting its play, and thereby allaying our 
fe a r/' [Caputo, 1 9 8 7 :1 2 ] there is -  through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
primarily -g rav ity  of the new philosophical questioning, which begins 
and ends with historicity of human being, its irremediable 
incompleteness and infinite becoming, th at is -  infinite changing. The 
legacy of the nineteenth-century philosophy is therefore the 
understanding that the project of philosophy can continue only through 
overcoming of metaphysics and that this overcoming entails a return 
from obsession with contemplationf of essences to the thinking of 
historical existence. W ith the three thinkers of the nineteenth century, 
there finally ends the philosophical tradition which "from Plato to Hegel 
was 'not of this world'." [BPF, 23]
'T im e out o f jo in t '
Thus the new movements arising within philosophy in the twentieth  
century are not happening "in a vacuum... Thinking is no longer 
regarded as some neutral exercise in cognition but an intervention in 
the 'lived world' of history and society." [Kearney, 2 0 03 :4 ] W hat the 
philosophers of the interwar period were looking for, in responding to 
the new condition of disillusionment, was in fact philosophy itself, its 
renewal and revival through the retrieval o f its sources in the thinking 
of existence. [Poggeler, 2005:89] Philosophy in the afterm ath of the 
First World W ar thus started seeing itself as "a d iffe re n t th in k in g , a 
thinking that, in knowing, reminds me, awakens me, brings me to
9  "Carefree, mocking, violent - this is how wisdom wants us: she is a woman, all she 
ever loves is a warrior..." Nietzsche, 1994:72
10 Caputo's distinction between gravity and lightness of being is here employed as 
ontological derivation of Arendt's distinction between freedom and necessity. Arendt's 
critique of philosophy, as will be argued here, is based primarily on her reading of 
philosophical tradition as a continuum of attempts to either banish it altogether or at least 
subjugate it to perpetual order. Freedom thus understood spells peril of the unpredictable 
and uncontrollable, in that sense aggravating being. Lightness by contrast is the 
lightness of harmony and order in the world. Caputo's distinction is particularly valuable 
as it points to the link between Arendt's and Heidegger's understanding of the 
fundamental problem of philosophical tradition -  the oblivion of freedom that is essence 
of existence. [Nancy, 1988/1993:23]
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myself, transforms m e." [Jaspers, 1 9 3 7 /1 9 9 5 :1 2 ] It  is thinking that 
engages thinker, who thinks by interacting with that which is thought. 
Philosophizing happens in the state of'being gripped' by philosophizing: 
[W ]e shall never have comprehended these concepts and 
their conceptual rigor unless we have first been gripped 
by whatever they are supposed to comprehend. The 
fundamental concern of philosophizing pertains to such 
being gripped, to awakening and planting it. [Heidegger, 
1929 -1 9 3 0 /1 9 9 5:7 ]
The most influential school of thought in Germany in the interwar 
period that took up the two-fold task -  of overcoming tradition through 
involvement with existence or, In Heidegger's early terminology, 
facticity - was phenomenology that was by then developing in the 
existentialist direction through the teaching of Heidegger. Existentialist 
phenomenology was the school that originally shaped Arendt's 
philosophical milieu.
The defining them e of this predominant philosophical discourse was the  
theme of authenticity pursued at two levels -  as the authenticity in 
thinking existence, through uncovering of the sources from underneath  
the philosophical tradition and on the other hand, the authenticity of 
existence itself through seizure of its originary possibilités. Authenticity 
is defined through the dynamics or rather, tension between the  
limitations of human existence, embodied equally in the constraints of 
particular historical community upon being as in the constraints from  
within existence itself which is lived by an unchosen oneself in the  
unchosen world, and on the other hand - the potential, inscribed into 
human existence, to transcend those limits and retrieve the meaning of 
existence through resolute acting.11
The Second World W ar however brings about another turn in 
philosophy, a watershed as Jonas refers to it:
From the heaven of eternal thought, contemplation -  
unnerved -  descended to the Earth with its conflicting 
forces and intervened in the course of affairs. Noble 
abstention from events of the day was a thing of the  
past. Politics and society became the dual focus of 
philosophical interest. Moral engagement permeated 
theoretical investigation. [Jonas, 1 9 96 :49 -50 ]
11 The notion of resolute action in diverse ways relates to G r e n z s i t u a t i o n e n ,  ultimate or 
border-situations of human existence which embody both limitations on and potentials for 
authenticity. Although these ultimate situations cannot be reduced to death, they often 
are associated with death, n this sense the new philosophy communicates with the legacy 
of the First World War, visible also in artworks of the period, when the only meaning of 
existence was seen as emerging from the encounter with death. Death is interpreted as 
illuminating the meaning of life: "It had got me at last. At the same time as feeling I had 
been hit, I felt the bullet taking away my life, [...] As I came down heavily on the bottom 
of the trench, I was convinced it was all over. Strangely, that moment is one of very few 
in my life of which I am able to say they were utterly happy. I understood, as in a flash of 
lightning, the true inner purpose and form of my life." [lünger, 1920/2003:281]
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Though Jonas in this citation is not necessarily fair to the changing 
spirit of philosophy in the interwar period when he locates the 'fall from  
Paradise' of contemplative thought only in the aftermath of the horrors 
of the Second World War, he faithfully captures the shift of 
philosophical focus. In  the place of philosophical tradition, there  
remained nothing to challenge, except perhaps the roots of the 
challenge itself, that is - the interwar revision of philosophy, which at 
the time created an opening but also, through Heidegger as its most 
prominent representative, neared dangerously the ideological matrix of 
annihilation.
The difference between the interwar generation of philosophers and the 
post-war generation lies in the fact that the irreparable break with 
tradition for the latter came as a real event, not as a 'thought-event' 
but as a burst of historical reality, incarnated in the phenomenon of 
totalitarianism, which was the ultimate of experience and the 
incomprehensible for thought, unbecoming to any of the traditional 
philosophical frameworks. [BPF, 14]
In  the face of this truly alien experience -  properly so, as a not-worldly 
event, insofar the world in which it happened had no framework within 
which it could place w hat was happening to it, in order to understand it 
and deal with it -  Arendt may welt have been formulating the task of 
this new generation of thinkers when she wrote:
The destructive distortions of the tradition were all caused 
by men who had experienced something new which they 
tried almost instantaneously to overcome and resolve into 
something old. [BPF, 29]
Arendt reads in this situation impossibility of any return, as both 
political actors and political thinkers have entered the 'time out of jo in t.' 
[RJ, 28] The question is what happens at the time when the present 
can no longer rely on the experiences of the past, when the present 
becomes disconnected, floating, uprooted, which is what happens a t the 
'tim e out of jo in t /  In the tim e out of joint, a straight and meticulously 
paved path from the present into the past and back is no longer visible: 
once the bond to tradition has been broken, there remain only 
scattered fragments which the present would then read in the light of 
its own reality. [L M /I:2 1 2 ] The remaining past exists in fragments, the 
parts of which a t least some can be collected. There cannot be a return  
to  them but they can be brought forth into the present from the "sea- 
depths," to employ Arendt's metaphors, where they were buried. The 
process of "pearl-diving" for the fragments of the past reveals however 
that what can be recovered from the sea-depths is never that what 
sunk but something else. I t  is not the past as it was when it was the 
present but past as appearing in and to the present of the pearl-diver: 
[T]he process of decay is at the same time a process of 
crystallization, th at in the depth of the sea, into which 
sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some things 
'suffer a sea-change' and survive in new crystallized
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forms and shapes that remain immune to the elements, 
as though they waited only for the pearl diver who one 
day will come down to them and bring them up into the 
world of the living -  as 'thought fragm ents/ as something 
'rich and s trange / and perhaps even as everlasting 
Urphanom ene. [MDT, 206]
But the fact that the past, fragmented or not, continues to speak to the  
present cannot be equated with having a tradition. This having  does not 
correspond to possessing  but rather to bearing in order to hand over, 
as one is always a bearer rather than the owner of tradition. In  the  
tradition there rests the power of that which is underlying everything 
else, which is beneath all fluctuations and turbulence. But this beneath  
of the way things are in the world has been pulled from under the world 
at the time which slipped out of joint. Namely, Arendt's reading of this 
line from Shakespeare does not take her along the lines which drove 
Derrida's inquiry into tim e as temporality, but to time in the sense of 
the specific moment in history. [Derrida, 1994 :18 ] It  is clearly the  
world, in this age, stood on its head that she grapples with, the world in 
"this condition of being internally broken apart (disjointed) in the sense 
of being in disharmony with our own values, or off-center with regard 
to our own principles and institutions." [Brown, 2001:154]
W hat is therefore the t im e  o u t o f  jo in t?  The tim e that slips out of jo in t 
primarily connotes the state of chaos and disorder. However, while this 
first layer of interpretation does not run against the grain of Arendt's 
phrase, it tends to harden somewhat the fine fabric of meaning.
If  medical denotations of the phrase are to be followed, to be out of 
jo int indicates a state of a head slipped out of its socket, whereby the  
limb is left with the impulse of movement but no power to effect it, 
since the bonds got broken, and one part of the mechanism is cut off 
from another. One line of interpretation of this detachment could refer 
to the concept of modernity understood as rupture itself, the gap 
opening up when the bond to tradition has been broken and the past 
has ceased to instruct the present and foretell the future. In  this most 
basic interpretation, echoed in much exploited Koselleck's paradigm of 
the void gaping between 'spaces of experience' and 'horizon of 
expectations/ [Koselleck, 1985] modernity appears as a free-floating 
epoch, the age of transition from the past, to which it no longer relates, 
into the future which it cannot imagine, in the sense of imagining as not 
so much making present, planning, reckoning with that which is absent, 
but as envisioning. For, future is not or no longer simply absent 
present, future has become absolute absence, with no glow in the dark  
to suggest what may emerge from the unknown. When the past ceases 
to inform the present, it is as if one end of the joint is mortified, 
insensitivized, and there can be no movement of the joint as a whole.
The head has slipped from its socket but the limb and even the entire 
body dos not fall apart, and the time out of jo in t persists, twisted and 
cracked but lingering. On the one hand therefore, modernity is the case
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of certain malfunctioning, characteristic of any illness. To bring the 
condition of modernity into the same semiotic constellation with the 
condition of illness evokes Nietzsche's diagnostic writings, whence the 
late modern idea of the 'sickness' of mankind springs. But there the 
semblance between two frameworks, two critiques of modernity -  
Nietzsche's and Arendt's -  reaches its limits. For, in another possible 
dimension of interpretation, the slippage of the head out of the socket 
retains a certain quality of abruptness, it evokes a critical condition, 
suddenness of emergency demanding an instant and decisive response. 
By contrast, insisting on the tim e  out o f joint, Arendt retains the 
extensive character of this particular state of crisis; the critical m om ent 
persists, acquires lastingness, involving a certain habituation of the limb 
to its malfunctioning. In  other words, it is necessary to distinguish t im e  
o u t o f jo in t  from the state of crisis, which is what is done in Derrida's 
analysis of the same phrase:
[W]hat Derrida calls the out-of-jointness of tim e is 
crucially distinguished from a notion of a time in 'crisis.'
The form er indicates a more subtly corrosive condition 
than the latter; it suggests a time that is wearing badly: 
a time whose languages have grown thin or hypocritical, 
whose practices have grown hollow, whose ideals are 
neither realized nor perhaps any longer suited to the 
age. [Brown, 2001:154]
Modernity is thus caught in transition without power to actually transit 
out of the void between the two points it no longer touches, past and 
future. In  other words, after- or post-modernity is modernity that 
cannot transit outside itself nor can it render the flow of transit 
meaningful by resorting to available historical and philosophical 
frameworks of understanding:
The leftover of the past is historical consciousness itself; 
post-moderns understand themselves as dwellers in the 
prison house of our contemporaneity/history/historicity... 
Post-moderns inherited historical consciousness, but not 
the self-complacency of the grand narratives.12 [Heller, 
1 9 9 3 :V III]
Continuing this reading in the idiom of medicine, the response to the  
tim e out of jo in t would have to be swift but the healing process would 
necessarily be protracted, requiring immobilization and, most
intriguingly, starting with -  a return to the previous position, with the 
head pushed back into its socket forcefully and no less painfully than  
the slippage itself was. In  a way, healing itself involves another break. 
I t  is therefore not a reversal of modernity th at appeals to Arendt. That 
is for Arendt one option that must inevitably remain out of reach for the 
moderns not only because all that modernity is points to the broken 
thread o f'th e  continuity of past,' [L M /I:2 1 2 ] but because the return to 
tradition would imply 'much more than the re-ordering of a world that is
12 Heller's diagnosis remains valid although the accent can be placed equally strongly on 
m o d e r n s  as on p o s t .
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'out of jo int'; it implies the re-establishment of a world that is p a s t/ 
[EU, 4 3 5 ]
The way out therefore leads through the other, second break which is 
the disclosure of tradition in its harmfulness. Namely the possession of 
and by tradition has turned Into haunting by Derridian specters, the  
past that refuses to recede into nothingness. [Derrida, 1994] Only, it is 
not the fragments misunderstood, open, disturbed and disturbing that 
continue to wrinkle what could be the smooth surface of the present but 
the traditional understandings of the world which threaten to  
appropriate and subsume the new experiences totally, to force them  
into old moulds. And Arendt contends that old moulds of political 
philosophy are not only obsolete but are in themselves harmful. Against 
them, genuine experiences of the past, as those of the present, must 
be preserved. [GTNT, p.13]
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in 
the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the 
bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself 
time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of 
Western history has finally come to the surface and 
usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in 
which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from  
the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact 
past, into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are 
vain. [OT, IX ]
Encounter with the past was also the first step taken by Hamlet, to 
whom rightly belongs the phrase 'time out of jo in t' in the sense Arendt 
uses it, in setting his world 'right.' I t  meant both the disclosure of past 
and its recovery, neither of which entailed or could entail return.
In terms of philosophy therefore, 'time out of jo in t' is a challenge to  
traditional philosophy and an opening towards philosophy as thinking in 
the gap. The historical m oment thus understood is what Arendt 
considers her position proper, the gap in between past and future, not 
even to be called the present as it is a gap, therefore an absence, and 
that is where she locates her intellectual project. The project is not, or 
not only, in thinking about the gap, which could easily entail thinking 
towards the closure of the gap, but thinking in  the gap, acceptance of 
the gap as the proper place of living as a human in this particular 
historical window. As Villa observes, however, Arendt is not deceived by 
the potential of the opening, always already potentially self-destructive:
[S]he is keenly aware of how the energies of modernity, 
which initially open the possibility of a groundless politics, 
wind up intensifying the paradox inherent in every 
revolutionary founding or spontaneous political action, 
namely, that the m om ent of'clearing' In which a space of 
freedom emerges is also the beginning of its 
disappearance. [Villa, in Calhoun and McGowan, 
1997:200]
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In  this effort, Arendt can be associated with the generation of German 
thinkers such as Lowith, Levinas and Jonas, all educated within German 
academic circles in the interwar period and mostly driven into exile. 
This circle by and large revolved around Heidegger and his project, yet 
all of its members remained in a somewhat displaced condition 
throughout their life, and particularly so in their work. The displacement 
had as much to do with their physical departure from their homeland, 
language and culture as with this 'watershed' that opened an abyss 
where once the ground of their thinking stood.13 Though the similarity 
of their condition did not result in similar thinking projects, certain 
proximity in their primary and principal concerns cannot be overlooked. 
All these disciples of Heidegger, in contrast to their teacher, place 
Mitsein, not Dasein, a t the core of their inquiries. All of them engaged 
in constructive enterprises, their thought permeated with the 
awareness that all ground had been shattered by then and, unless they 
were to stand passively above the gaping abyss, they needed to build, 
anew.
Hannah Arendt however remains an odd one out in this group. Unlike 
the others, she never regarded herself as a philosopher and even 
specifically rejected affiliation to th at field,14 which she continuously 
critically scrutinized In her work, rarely restraining from expressing her 
uncompromising suspicion, even something of an irony, towards those 
'professional thinkers.' [LM /I:13] That led Taminiaux to liken her to the 
'Thracian' maid who ridiculed Thales' inability to "see what lay a t his 
feet" in his absorption by the abstract and transcendental. [1 9 9 7 :1 ]  
She was educated in theology and philosophy, yet she abandoned them  
for political theory. At the same tim e, her political theory holds m ore in 
common with historical observations and explorations of Machiavelli 
than with her contemporaries who pursue scientific methods in their 
inquiries. Finally, her own project openly cast into doubt not 
philosophical tradition but the very validity of philosophy as a project, 
diagnosing as she did totalitarian tendencies of philosophy in the 
lectures on Karl Marx and the Western philosophical tradition.
That been said, Arendt's thought of the political and of freedom is 
however pervaded w ith revisiting of the conceptual sources that defined 
the intellectual ambience of her studies: the philosophy proper in other 
words, and the thought of those 'professional th inkers/ most notably 
her teachers Heidegger and Jaspers but also her own academic
13 Validity however cannot be denied to the argument that this 'watershed* or break point 
may have been only a culmination or eruption of the defining feature of modernity, that 
"impossibility to give any one superior answer together with the inevitable persistence of 
the questions." [Wagner, P. 2001:10] The two readings of this event, in intellectual as 
well as political history, are however not in discord insofar philosophical modernity before 
the Second World War is dominated by the quest for t h e  answer, yet different 
understandings of philosophy only begin to flicker through the cracks in the canvas, while 
the Second World War disturbs this quest, bringing into the forefront of philosophical 
effort, arguably desperate and doomed, questioning with no hope for answers absolute 
and final.
14 From Arendt's interview with GünterGaus: "What Remains? The Language Remains," 
here quoted from Baehr, 2000: 3-4.
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generation. However historico-political reality is not a mere setting for 
Arendt's thinking, which results in the 'situated thought' [Kearney, 
2 0 0 3 :4 ], it is not a scenery in the background or an ambience but it 
must be th a t which is thought, in other words -  the material for 
thinking and the substance of thought.In that sense, her work owes 
more to Marx than to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The debt is more than  
a consequence of Arendt's and Marx's disciplinary affiliation.15 To Marx, 
overcoming of tradition is not an act of thinking, it is not at all a m atter 
of philosophy, but an action in historico-political reality.
T he continuum  o f trad ition  from  Plato to  Marx
For Arendt, however, the concern with Marx is wider than his thought 
and constitutes the point of entry into the whole of Western tradition of 
political philosophy, which can no longer be perceived as neutral and 
detached from historical motions. Of all her works concerning 
relationship between philosophy and politics,16 the piece on Marx puts 
forth the strongest claim: that there is a continuum of philosophical 
project from Plato to Marx with regard to politics and that this 
continuum of tradition can be related to  totalitarianism through Marx's 
contribution, which exposed the ultimate anti-political implications of 
the mainstream political philosophy from antiquity.
In  the essay K a rl Marx a n d  th e  W estern Philosophical T radition , a piece 
w ritten in the early 1950s ,17 Arendt explores Marx's vision and 
importance of Marx's project for the entire philosophical tradition 
insofar the project seeks to  re-direct philosophical concern with eternity 
of ideas towards examination of concrete historical reality. Marx's turn  
consists in his challenge to the traditional philosophical preference for 
contemplation. He was the first philosopher to concern himself with  
historical victory of a n im a l laborans  and the rise of labour, th at 
traditionally lowest of human activities. In  a nutshell, for the first tim e  
in history of philosophy, a form of active life was held in higher esteem  
to life in contemplation.
Arendt recognizes in the profound challenge of Marx' philosophy to  
traditional philosophical discrimination of vita active  an opening for the  
possibility of unguided thinking, whereby action came to be seen as not 
the opposite of thought but its 'real vehicle.' [KMTWPT, 318] This 
sparked off 'the great chance to look upon the past with eyes 
undistracted by any tradition, with a directness which has disappeared 
from Occidental reading and hearing ever since Roman civilization 
submitted to the authority of Greek thought.' [BPF, 28-29]
15 According to Arendt's reading, while all three thinkers stand at the end of the tradition, 
Marx marks the end in the field of political philosophy specifically.
16 See particularly the lecture P h i l o s o p h y  a n d  P o l i t i c s  (EIU), essay on T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  
H i s t o r y  (BPF) and T h e  H u m a n  C o n d i t i o n .
17 The essay was published only posthumously but Arendt's thoughts from this piece 
flowed directly into her arguments in T h e  H u m a n  C o n d i t i o n ,  contributing especially to the 
phenomenology of v i t a  a c t i v e .
Marx thus re-defines the task of philosophy, which no longer exhausts 
itself in contemplative interpretation of reality. Philosophy begins to 
liken the modern science insofar it equates knowing and m aking: the 
only valid understanding of reality is th at which is made through  
intervention into it. The meaning of historical reality is a product, it can 
only be fabricated not revealed. Through this turn, Marx performed the 
last reversal of hierarchy of active and contemplative life within the 
Occidental philosophical tradition, which started with Plato: "tradition  
[which] began with the philosopher's turning away from politics and 
then returning in order to impose his standards on human affairs. The 
end came when a philosopher turned away from philosophy so as to 
'realize' it in politics." [BPF, 18]
Why Marx is read by Arendt as the 'great chance' becomes enitrely 
comprehensible only in the light of her life-long problematization of 
Plato's philosophy and its threads, weaving their way through the entire  
fabric of Western philosophy, modern as classical. Arendt's 
understanding of Plato's legacy is partly informed by her insistence on 
certain historical dimension of his philosophy, its indebtedness to one 
particular event which marks the opening of the chasm between 
philosophy and politics and sets the dynamics of their relationship 
throughout the Western tradition. The event is the death of Socrates 
from the hand of Athenian polis in which Arendt recognizes the death of 
non-Platonic Socratic thought in philosophy.
Arendt's inquiry into the thought and life of Socrates does not concern 
so much the historical person of Socrates but Socrates as an exam p le , 
therefore neither particular nor general but the particular th at has 
acquired validity for other particulars, become something of a guide or, 
to employ Arendt's analogy, a schema.18 In  Arendt's interpretation, 
Socrates as an example is that Socrates before Plato's reinterpretation  
or Socrates outside Plato's thought, who never declares himself the 
knower of the truth but insistently keeps the position of 'm idwife' to  the 
opinions of others. His thinking moves in the historical realm of po lis , 
not in the sphere of eternals and absolutes, outside humanly instituted 
and shaped time and space for humans. Unlike Plato, Socrates or 
rather, Arendt's Socrates is not concerned with revealing the Truth  but 
trueness of diverse d o x a i to themselves. [PP, 81] While this Socrates 
appears to us solely through the writings o f Plato, Arendt contends that 
the death of Socrates the man heralds the death of the figure of 
philosopher in and of the public place, only this figure was destined to 
vanish not simply due to the doings of the foes to the historical
18 As a schema, the particular historical person acquires exemplary validity, loses as 
irrelevant the traits that defined it as a person, loses the depth and totality of an 
inhabitant of historical place and time, and becomes an epitome of one virtue or vice, 
something of a metaphor in flesh and blood of a principle or notion, allowing us to 
recognize through the relation of likeness or association in other events or persons, even 
without general rules, those principles and notions as such. Historical person that has 
crystallized into example is a material repository of a certain quality, trait, a paradigm 
therefore. [RJ, 143-144]
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Socrates but to the distorted memory of his horrified and disillusioned 
friends and disciples.
Arendt contends that the entire tradition of political philosophy thereof 
develops in the shadow of the conflict between philosopher and p o lis , 
the shadow thrown by the death of Socrates. But the conflict itself 
derives from elsewhere than the specific historical event, the  
'elsewhere' which is essential to classical philosophy as Arendt 
understands it. What Arendt Is trying to do by foregrounding the story 
of Socrates is therefore not 'psychologizing' of Platonic turn in 
philosophy. Nor is she explaining away a conceptual problem through 
reference to historical examples, irrespective of the scope of their  
bearing on the thought of the period. The example of Socrates here 
marks the climax of conceptual tension between philosophy and politics, 
an eruption of subterranean.
Arendt reads Plato's philosophy as inversion of Homeric architecture of 
the world, where men inhabited perhaps dramatic and perilous earth  
but only the souls of the dead dwelled in the most profound of all 
darknesses. With all the pain and suffering due to the mortals, life 
retained the light or the hope of it. To equate the world of senses with 
the world of shadows and to elevate the sky of ideas to the position o f 
the only true and real world, as Plato did, m eant to abandon th at 
fascination of pre-Socratic Hellas with deeds and concerns of humans. 
From then on, tradition instructed philosophers not to take seriously 
po lis , meaning in effect the world as a whole. [KMTWPT, 312-313] In  
Plato's words from the Republic, to be removed from politics was a 
precondition of all philosophy which seeks to near the absolute:
... The man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities 
has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty 
affaire of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be 
filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the 
things of the eternal and unchanging order. [500 c-d]
Arendt's lecture on relationship between philosophy and politics thus 
concludes with a portrait of philosopher in perennial retreat from po lis . 
But the same year however Arendt sketches out another lecture, for the 
American Political Science Association, published as Concern w ith  
Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought. Here Arendt 
attempts to understand why philosophers, despite their contempt for 
politics, continued to venture into the realm of human affairs and what 
answers philosophy has been offering in response to originally political 
problems.
The withdrawal m ay thus not be the withdrawal of philosopher from the  
world of human doings but rather the denial to polis  of entry into 
philosophy. The archetype of philosopher is not Heraclitus who 
withdraws from p o lis  altogether: I t  is Plato who withdraws from politics 
to recreate both politics and po lis . Philosopher is thus not a hermit but 
the one who creates "a political cosmos out of political chaos." 
[Wolin, 1960:8] Through philosopher as its creator, polis  constitutes the
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only bond between eternity  and human tim e, a historical incarnation of 
the divine idea. Platonic restoration is thus a restoration of the link 
between the eternal and the ephemeral and not a return to  the timeless 
unity among man or rather, men, cosmos and divinity. Vision of the 
political space as man-made cosmos thus became a vision of 
redemption from chaotic vibrations of history and return to what is 
imperishable in human being:
In  the early days, man's descent from the mythical 
timeless present is followed by the emergence of politics as 
an attem pt a t restoration of order among men through 
overcoming of historical existence, equated with disorder 
and chaos. [Gunnell, 1987:15]
Plato did depict the sphere of human affairs -  all that belongs to the 
living together of m en in a common world -  in terms of darkness, 
confusion, and deception, which those aspiring to true being must turn 
away from and abandon, if ever they are to reach the clear sky of 
eternal ideas. [BPF, 17] In  Plato's allegory, however, philosopher does 
return to the cave.
The return o f philosopher to the cave must take place for he is a man, 
born of men to  live among men, in Aristotelian understanding of m en as 
neither beasts nor gods, hence incapable of being unless being among 
their own kind. The figure of the returning philosopher is a tragic one: 
he is the one who has seen the light and can neither find his way in the 
darkness of the cave nor can he, being human himself, stand alone 
outside the cave, as light as it may be there. Nor, ultimately, can he 
convince the cave-dwellers of the shining brightness outside the 
confines of the cave. Although philosopher should bring the light of 
eternal ideas to the 'unw ise,1 Plato stronlgy advises against the illusion 
that the blind will ever see. That of which philosopher brings back 
merely a glimpse, an intuition, threatens his life when offered to  those 
who will never know and never understand, and whom this unattainable 
wisdom at best frightens, at worst -  enrages. The rage is more often 
than not directed against the bearer of wisdom, which was what 
unfortunate Socrates experienced.
Philosopher's existence among men is trapped in this paradox, which 
Plato attempts to resolve by submitting politics to philosophy. He 
refuses to renounce the chaotic space of public affairs in favour of the 
unwise yet does so not for the sake of the public realm itself, but for 
the sake of philosophers, in order to create a place where Socrates as 
the epitome of philosopher, "the man who is to care for the soul" could 
live. [Patocka, 1 9 9 6 :8 8 ] The gap which opens between those who have 
seen and those who have not seen cannot be but unbridgeable, and the 
only space remaining for philosophers is the space they create 
themselves by imposing their ideas upon the world as its measures and 
standards: "The ideas become the unwavering, 'absolute' standards for 
political and moral behavior and judgm ent." [BPF, 110] Ideas become a 
mold into which human world and human affairs must be compressed,
t
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to receive its shape and meaning from this mold as a piece of clay 
would.19
This 'shaping' of human doing and 'iron-casting' of political framework 
as creation of space for philosophy is, of course, a simplified though 
rather dramatic and lively account of Plato's philosophy. But what 
Arendt is endeavouring to communicate through this account is in fact 
the tim e old narrative of philosophy's fear of freedom. She further 
suggests that the fear must be traced back to Platonic distortion of the 
fundamental Hellenic experience of political doing. For "the purpose of 
eliminating the character of frailty from human affairs," [HC, 226] that 
is -  in order to arrest the mutability of historical reality by Introducing 
the lasting order, and in order to submit the uncontrollable in human 
doing to  perpetual control, Plato spells out a new task of philosophy in 
regard to politics: the making of order. Platonic political philosophy 
must therefore be understood in terms of designing a perfect model of 
relations and norms in a community and the imposition of this model 
upon a given historical community:
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity 
of quiet and order has In fact so much to recommend it 
that the greater part of political philosophy since Plato 
could easily be interpreted as various attempts to find 
theoretical foundations and practical ways for an escape 
from politics altogether. [HC, 222]
Hence if the tragedy of philosopher ever since Socrates' time has been 
the inescapable and dangerous misunderstanding by the polis, the  
tragedy of the political in philosophy lies in the ages long attempt of 
Western philosophical tradition to subsume all political action, in all its 
unpredictability and openness, and thus freedom itself, under absolute 
standards reachable and comprehensible only through philosophical 
contemplation.
The political project of classical or, as Arendt terms it, tra d itio n a l 
political philosophy therefore aims at containment of the political as 
embodiment of the principle of action and new beginning, in favour of 
the political as the principle of necessity of human sociability. Politics is 
born as a response to this 'unfortunate' necessity. To do politics implies 
to manage and administer, to execute and apply, while action originally 
defined in terms of new beginning, o f opening most unpredictable 
outcomes, is either altogether banished from this sphere or reserved for 
rulers only:
Traditional political philosophy, therefore, tends to derive 
the political side of human life from the necessity which 
compels the human animal to live together with others, 
rather than from the human capacity to act, and it tends
19 "Hence, philosophy was more than an intellectual endeavor in which certain Greek 
individuals excelled; it was a symbolic form which expressed definite experiences of order 
in opposition to the polis. The tension between the Hellas of the poets and philosophers, 
and the p o l i s  to which they were in opposition, was the very form of Hellenic civilization.'' 
[Voegelin, 1957/1980:169]
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to conclude w ith a theory about the conditions that would 
best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition of 
plurality and best enable the philosopher, at least, to  live 
undisturbed by it. [EIU, 1954 /1 9 94 :4 2 9 ]
Escaping, exiting, retreating (of philosophy) -  all paradoxes insofar 
they appear through not-appearing, they are not tied to the presence 
but paradoxically are-in-absence. In  this sense, the entry of philosophy 
into the sphere of politics as an escape from politics would constitute a 
paradox of escape that is. Philosophy however resolves the paradox of 
entering as exiting by reinterpreting what is entered, politics itself, so 
that it is not in the end philosophy that escapes but it is politics that 
retreats, through its re-conceptualisation and re-interpretation.
Contrary to the defining Hellenic experience, Hellenic philosophy after  
Socrates attempts to degrade politics to a response to the necessity of 
human condition, not that which is the space proper of human freedom , 
not the capacity for action but a direct effect of a biological fact, which 
compels men to share a certain space. The task of philosophy in this 
sphere becomes the design of the best order that will leave philosopher 
undisturbed in the true realm of freedom, the realm of contemplation.
In  modern philosophy, however, the notion of eternity and political 
order as an image of cosmic harmony crumbles irretrievably in the 
whirls of history. W hat comes to take the place of eternal political 
order, as Arendt reads modern political philosophy, is the idea of 
programmed future, or future as the play/battleground of politics, in 
the context of historical progress. [Koselleck, 1985:278-279] From 
chaos, there emerges the thought of political order in terms of perfectly 
controllable, automatic process. The reign of contemplation over life of 
action therefore collapses with Marx, who removes philosophy from  
contemplating into m aking. The Truth cannot be revealed to static and 
passive spectator but it lies in the power of actor to make it.
The idea of making the meaning drives Marx to re-conceptualise 
history, which he performs still in the vein of Hegel's philosophy of 
history as coherent, continuous and progressive process,20 but no 
longer does history appear as a process rushing Into the open, even if it 
is the openness of fulfillment. Marx's idea is the idea of finite history: 
[T]he process of history, as it shows itself in our 
calendar's stretching into the infinity of the past and the 
future, has been abandoned for the sake of an altogether 
different kind of process, that of making something which 
has a beginning as well as an end, whose laws of motion, 
therefore, can be determined... [BPF, 79] *29
20 "Marx's leap from theory into action, and from contemplation into labor, came after 
Hegel had transformed metaphysics into a philosophy of history and changed the 
philosopher into the historian to whose backward glance eventually, at the end of time, 
the meaning of becoming and motion, not of being and truth, would reveal itself." [BPF,
29]
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The historical flow of events retains nothing of its serendipitous 
trajectories, it is one grand pattern explicable only within the 
fram ework of the law of (dialectical) motion, the motion which is driven 
by the force of human labour, an activity defining of humanness of 
humans. W hatever appears in historical reality, argues Marx, appears 
according to the immutable laws of historical process: it appears 
because it had to  appear -  not because a man, any man, willed it so. I f  
history is subjected to law, then historical events are products of 
necessity not freedom. The events are made in harmony with the law 
and m ade to fit the predetermined design of history. History itself is 
therefore made in accord with the law, wherefrom it follows that Marx's 
intervention into history m ust be understood in terms of acting as 
making. To Arendt, that repeats in modern terms Platonic 
conceptualization of action that sought to rid it of its unpredictability, of 
the suspense of its unexpected, volatile, uncontrollable occurrence, only 
Marx gives it a distinctly modern turn by instrumentalizing human 
agency for the purposes of progressive historical process which, once 
fulfilled, will overcome the political altogether. [KMTWPT, 314]
This understanding of history in terms of unstoppable process In which 
every instant is allocated its proper place in the gradual ascent towards 
the final goal, motivates Arendt's discontent with Marx' thought and her 
argum ent that Marx does not break with tradition but simply declares 
its definite ending. Marx' thought opens a growing fracture in /w ith in  
philosophical tradition, signaling its incurable fatigue, but it is not itself 
a break, it does not generate a true new beginning from the end of 
tradition. Arendt offers a reading of Marx' challenge to Platonic legacy 
that rings with an undertone of 'missed possibility/ as the same old 
contempt for the discontinuous and rupturous of political action is 
uncovered. Marx' removal from Plato thus constitutes, at least partly, 
return to Plato.
Paradoxically therefore, the undesired surplus of history, as History, for 
modern philosophy is once again that which classical philosophical 
tradition sought to exterm inate: human action, which resists
subsumption under any preconceived design, being always more and 
less than established patterns, either tying men to temporality and 
occluding the light of eternity or transforming history into a flow of 
erratic events, interruptions, unintelligible single occurrences which do 
not m a ke  any sense -  fo r acting is precisely not about m a king , 
modeling, fabricating, argues Arendt. Nothing, including sense, is made 
through action, which belongs to the 'arena' or the 'stage' of prax is , not 
to the 'workshop' of poiesis. What Arendt breaks open therefore is the 
uninterrupted continuity of the philosophical tradition, from Plato to 
Marx, the tradition of fear before uncontrollability and unpredictability 
of human doing. To harness action in the service of higher ends of 
history is nothing but 'the  age-old attem pt to escape from the
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frustrations and fragility of human action by construing it in the image 
of m aking/21 [BPF, 79]
However, the fact that even Marx, who is ending Platonic tradition by 
reversing the hierarchy of action and contemplation, seeks to submit 
action to the telelology of historical process suggests to Arendt th at the 
problem between philosophy and politics runs deeper than its Platonic 
roots. Arendt therefore points to the possibility of "some incompatibility 
between philosophy and politics built into the nature of each activity." 
(Canovan, 1 9 90 :137 ) Arendt describes this incompatibility as the gap 
between "being in solitude and living together." [KMTWPT, 316] 
Margaret Canovan gives this statem ent a phenomenological 
interpretation by locating the source of incompatibility between 
philosophy and politics in the cond ition  of activities corresponding to 
them. (1990:153)The condition of philosophical thinking is solitude, 
withdrawal from public world into distanced contemplation. By contrast, 
political action, according to Arendt's phenomenology, emerges only in 
the condition of human plurality. I t  happens among many, to m any. To 
act alone or when alone must not be mistaken for acting in solitude as 
the former still implies a multitude of actions which preceded it and of 
actions that will respond to its call, to the call of a new action.
This gap however can be given also a different, more fundamental or 
primordial interpretation, which does not stand in opposition to the 
cited phenomenological interpretation but underlies it, while also 
explaining why Arendt finds it difficult to foresee overcoming of the gap 
and return to it only in her much later works, more specifically The Life  
o f  the  Mind. Namely, it is the 'em barrassm ent' of philosophy with 
freedom understood as bringing into the world something new, 
[L M /II:2 9 ] but also in the sense of its contrast with what has for long 
been the task of philosophy, the truth and the quest of it. In  
understanding hostility of philosopher to freedom, Arendt follows 
Jaspers' Christianity-inspired representation of relationship between 
truth and freedom: "For Jaspers, human freedom is guaranteed by our 
not having the truth; truth compels, and m an can be free only because 
he does not know the answer to the ultimate questions..." [L M /II:2 2 ]
An argument which could be brought against Arendt's construction of 
the continuum of tradition would refer to the emergence of modern 
liberal political philosophy, which recognized in freedom and rights of 
individual its main concern. Arendt however discovers in the concept of 
freedom at the core of modern political theory a fundamental confusion 
of freedom with sovereignty, which only perpetuates the gap between
21 This Arendt's effort can be rightly appreciated only if recognized that even nowadays, in 
the roots of various schools in political theory, one finds living the old flame of the effort 
to subsume the particularity of political phenomena under the universal laws, to conceive 
theoretically of ideal political order immune to the unpredictability of human actions. 
Political theory in one of its strands continues to be understood not as thinking of the 
political in the particularity of free action but as a meticulous construction of perfect 
political edifice, of ideal order that will prove resistant to all forces of change. (Friese and 
Wagner, 2 0 0 2 :3 4 3 )
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philosophy and politics. Namely, modern political thought equates 
freedom with sovereignty, with the ability of total and uncompromised 
control over one's own living. In  that case, the living, which is always 
living among others and not in isolation, is denied freedom since the 
presence of others in the world, over whom one can never exercise 
total control, is always a source of unpredictability. Consequently, living 
among others becomes an insurmountable constraint upon 'freedom / 
and politics must be understood as necessity of ordering relations 
among individuals on the one hand and on the other, those between 
individual and the collective, so as to ensure the highest possible 
degree of 'freedom' or rather, sovereignty to the individual. [HC, 234- 
235]
This produces the tension which defines one of the predominant 
debates in the modern political theory, between individualism and 
communitarianism, and of Arendt's stance in this regard more will be 
said in the next chapter. In  terms of relating of philosophy to politics, 
however, understanding freedom as sovereignty, fascination with 
controllability earns modern political theory a place in a long history of 
philosophical fear of action, as it corresponds closely to philosophical 
obsession with the 'first principles' that render everything meaningful 
and ensure that we are in control, the obsession which Caputo reads in 
endless attempts of the metaphysical artery in philosophy to cast over 
the world and human existence lightness or easiness of perfect order. 
[Caputo, 1987:1]
And vice versa, as Arendt understands action, it corresponds closely to 
what Caputo describes as ineradicable gravity of existence. To act is to 
choose fear, impotence to control the consequences, tragic awareness 
of the destructive in us but it is also to choose to break with unbearable 
condition of imprisonment in attending to one's needs, of living as a 
hostage to biological necessity as both means and end of life. In that 
sense, what philosophy in its insistence on ordering of existence may be 
letting slip through is that action in all its perilous openenededness and 
uncontrollability is the bearer of freedom in the world and, as it will 
argued in the chapters to follow, being human is about acting freely. 
This understanding locates Arendt firmly in the context of the 
twentieth-century philosophy which places freedom at the center of its 
concern, originally through Jaspers and Heidegger, in contrast to the 
traditional centredness of philosophy on truth.“  As her teachers, she is 
preoccupied with the theme of freedom but for Arendt the concern with 
freedom constitutes also the main political problem of her age, due to 
the events of the Second World War. 2
22 This should not be interpreted as suggesting that traditional philosophy is not 
concerned with freedom and neither is this Arendt's claim. It is rather that freedom is 
primarily a concern for traditional philosophy in the sense of a problem for the principle of 
absolute necessity, a tension which propels and perpetuates the incessant philosophical 
struggle for reconciliation of the two, which more than often takes the form of 
subsumption of freedom to necessity or containment of freedom.
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Arendt's critical engagem ent with the Western philosophical tradition 
draws directly and explicitly on her political experience, which was at 
the same tim e the defining political experience of the entire century: 
the event and the phenomenon of totalitarianism, the fact that it 
happened  equally as what it actually was. Hostility of philosophical 
tradition towards freedom is mirrored in historical reality by attempts at 
annihilation o f freedom which culminated in the institution of 
totalitarianism. In  her critical overview of modernity, Arendt argues that 
roots of totalitarianism as the ultimate loss of the political must be 
sought in the fundaments of modernity as a project.
Historical loss o f th e  po litica l
As Arendt portays m odernity, it is not an age of the political. I t  is the 
age when subsumption of political act in its uniqueness under automatic 
processes and procedures is desired and sought. But it must be 
observed however, before Arendt's radicalized image of modernity is 
recounted, that Arendt's critique of modernity is primarily driven by the 
ultimate experience of totalitarianism and its suffocation of freedom. 
While her reading of totalitarian tendencies from the entire motion of 
modernity m ay be seen as exaggerated, Arendt's narrative of 
modernity should be seen as part of her warning against dismissing 
Inquiry into totalitarianism  as a unique phenomenon, as a precedent 
that, being such an isolated occurrence, needs no explanation. Arendt 
refuses to conclude th a t totalitarianism should be taken as not having 
any further relevance but as the memory of incomprehensible tragedy, 
sicne it cannot be related to anything else th at the world is made of.
Through three narratives -  of science, religion as worldview and 
technology -  Arendt sought to expose how the stable world of objects, 
as a setting of human actions, melted into the unstoppable, automatic 
process in which no specific event, act and, ultimately, individual has 
any particular importance for the course o f the process, the state 
projected and executed by totalitarian regimes. What matters is not 
what is produced in the process but the perpetuation of the process 
itself.
Everything and everyone is in the function of process, which can be 
explained through the recourse to universal laws. The process gradually 
pervades all spheres o f human existence.23 The reality of stable beings 
and objects melts into the reality of constant change, sheer automatic 
flow. Thus the world of objects and beings has gradually given way to
23 Arendt argues that the disturbed property relations have never again recovered the 
stability of Middle Ages and its feudal economy, inherently dependent upon the fixed 
world, collapsed into the unstoppable flux of production and consumption, in which the 
end-product of one's work is lost to the infinite process of wealth accumulation. Just as 
life process came to be considered the highest good by exact sciences, so the process of 
wealth accumulation replaced the concern with property ownership as the primary 
economic activity. To engage in wealth accumulation may respond to the needs of the life 
process but its ultimate end is neither a satisfaction of a certain desire nor making of an 
object nor acquiring property, as  one's place in the world shared with others, but 
continuation of the process itself. [HC, 252-253]
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the "constant process of change." [HC, 252] The change - not the 
stable Being in itself, became the principle of the world: ” [u]nder 
modern condition, not destruction but conservation spells ru in ..." [HC, 
253] The world dissolved into motion without beginning and without 
visible ending, without purpose even but its own continuation, which 
though initiated by men for the purposes of men, no longer have the 
'willed beginning and definite end' but proceed automatically:
Automatism is inherent in all processes, no m atter what 
their origin may be... I t  is in the nature of the automatic 
processes to which man is subject, but within and against 
which he can assert himself through action, that they can 
only spell ruin to human life. Once man-made, historical 
processes have become automatic, they are no less 
ruinous than the natural life process that drives our 
organism and which in its own terms, that is biologically, 
leads from being to non-being, from birth to death. [BPF,
168]
This primarily biological duration, automatic and irresistible, possesses 
reliable permanence of a cyclical natural process: unless the species is 
extinguished, it will always inevitably continue. In  other words, its 
continuation does not depend on any individual action, any single 
event. Single actions by individual human beings are drowned in the 
process, thus becoming meaningless since the process remains the only 
bearer of meaning. There is nothing a t the end or beyond the process 
but the process itself.
Finally, the world itself loses worth as the standards of means and ends 
are relegated from the limited sphere of fabrication and employed to 
rule the world in its entirety, through "limitless i nstru menta liza t ion of 
everything that exists." [HC, 157] Ultimately, the process renders 
obsolete even the differentiation between means and ends. This is what 
Arendt reads in M arx' identification of meaning with end (-product): it 
does not empower men, and it does not make them the masters of 
their destiny by placing the fabrication of future into their hands, but 
slaves of the steam-engine of "an unending chain of purposes in whose 
progress the meaningfulness of all past achievements was constantly 
cancelled out by future goals and intentions." [BPF, 78]
When bare life becomes the only valuable property in the world of men, 
labour ascends to the position of principal activity with which men are  
preoccupied, since labour is what sustains the life process. Arendt 
therefore argues th at a n im a l labora ns, not hom o faber, prevails in the 
modern age. In the process therefore man takes part only as that which 
sustains its motion, as la b o u re r  given to automatism of the flow and 
irrelevant as a unique particularity that never before and never again to 
appears In the world. Labourer, an im a l laborans , does not act and 
makes nothing. Whereas the goal of fabrication by hom o fa b e r  was 
finished object, a n im a l laborans  is a servant to the process, which 
becomes the end in itself: " [W ]e  live in a society in which men consider 
their activities primarily as laboring activities, in the sense that their
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end is 'the preservation of individual life,' and themselves as primarily 
owners of labor force." [KMTWPT, 311] In  the continued duration 
unframed by any solid world, unanchored, not only is the concern with 
immortality of individual lost but a n im a l laborans  is deprived of birth 
and death as they blend with all other births and deaths in the function 
of process:
Birth and death presuppose a world which is not in 
constant m ovement, but whose durability and relative 
permanence makes appearance and disappearance 
possible, which existed before any one individual 
appeared into it and will survive his eventual departure.
Without a world into which men are born and from which 
they die, there would be nothing but changeless eternal 
recurrence, the deathless everlasting ness of the human 
as of all other animal species. [HC, 97 ]
By contrast to the narratives of modernity which focus on 
individualization and the emergence of individual autonomy as the 
features that, alongside with state sovereignty, m ark modernity, Arendt 
argues that in the contemporary stage of modern society, individual 
ceases to m atter, and everything is instrumentalised in the function of 
biological survival of human species: "the modern age continued to 
operate under the assumption that life, and not the world, is the 
highest good of m an." [HC, 318]
I f  men are not mortal, in the sense of 'a recognizable life-story from  
birth to death, [which] rises out of biological l ife / [HC, 19] they cannot 
be immortalized either. Life of an im at laborans  assumes the circularity 
of any other natural process, labourers that die merge with those who 
are born in their full functional equivalence, and the process continues 
uninterrupted. What remains of men's existence is nothing but 
sustenance of bare tem poral duration, the linear and continuous flow of 
their lives.
The last stage of the laboring society, the society of 
jobholders, demands of its members a sheer automatic 
functioning, as though individual life had actually been 
submerged in the over-all life process of the species and 
the only active decision still required of the individual 
were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his individuality, 
the still individually sensed pain and trouble of loving, 
and acquiesce in a dazed, 'tranquilized,' functional type of 
behavior. [HC, 3 2 2]
The uniformity of behaviour characterizes a new sphere which emerges 
a t the intersection of the public and the private and yet threatening 
both one and the other: society. Namely, the tide of the social -  as 
Arendt understands it, a synonym for conformism -  inevitably involves 
ebbing away of the political. Exposing herself to accusations for elitism, 
Arendt maintains that society reduces men to the uniformity of needs 
and behavioural formulas, extinguishing the diversity of human beings, 
their uniqueness in manifold. What is unique about individual human
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beings withdraws into shadow of intimacy, while in the places where 
men reveal themselves to one another, they do so as atoms -  separate 
entities of functional behaviour that can be both predicted and 
controlled.
In Arendt's interpretation, most serious political consequence of the  
world understood in terms of processes and men understood as a 
species is the shrinking of space for political action. As it is the case 
with all other activities, politics also becomes a m atter of a functional 
process, attending to certain needs of mankind, those needs by which 
the diversity of human beings is reduced to the smallest common 
denominator of biological uniformity.
The one reduced to needs is not free to act, as was well known to the 
citizens of po lis : men in need are absorbed by their constant struggle to 
maintain the life process going. Radical reduction to bare needs and 
consequent annihilation of capacity for action is encountered in its most 
extreme form in the example of concentration camps, where rebellions 
among interns were rare luxury of those who were not worried for their 
immediate, day-to-day survival:
In every instance they were planned and led by prisoners 
who were privileged in some way and, consequently, in 
better physical and spiritual condition than the average 
camp prisoner. This is not all that surprising: only at first 
glance does it seem paradoxical that people who rebel 
are those who suffer the least. Even outside the camps, 
struggles are waged by Lum penpro le taria t. People in rags 
do not revolt.24 (Levi, 1987:387)
This fragment of Levi's testimony resonates Arendt's main concern in 
relation to the new process-reality: the condition of freedom threatened  
by automatism, by the enchainment to necessity. I f  man's capacity of 
seizing an instant out of the flow to break and begin is forsaken at the 
altar of process -  be it wealth accumulation, life process or historical 
progress -  if men understand themselves not through resistance to 
automatism but in the function of process perpetuation, that would 
anyhow run its course, then the space of freedom retreats before 
necessity. As a result, the space for action withdraws before attending
24 Along the lines of reducing freedom to necessity runs also Arendt's argument that the 
French Revolution had been a failed revolution, freedom succumbing to the urgency of life 
necessities, compelling necessity of hunger and extrem e deprivation. [OR, 60) In Arendt's 
historical analysis, the process reign In the sphere of politics starts with the em ergence of 
the social question in the course of the French Revolution, with the poor entering the 
political stage and bringing in the issues of necessity. What came out of the French 
Revolution was a mechanism to contain the urgency of homogenous multitude, while it 
never produced a political realm where heterogeneous but equal actors appear to each 
other through their words and deeds. This is the moment when freedom, in Arendt's 
words, surrenders to the necessity of maintaining the life process, that 'overwhelming 
urgency' of staying alive which devours all that politics of antiquity embodied: assumption 
of the distance from biological humanness, liberation from the dictate of needs, in order 
to retrieve uniqueness and contingency of one's appearance in the world. [OR, 59-60]
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to the needs, administering, and we remain leveled and uniform in our 
shared biology.
I f  politics exhausts itself in the uninterrupted continuum of political 
process and in self-perpetuating perfect political system, all action is 
rendered superfluous or is monstrously transformed it into its antipode, 
the perfectly controllable behaviour. The ultim ate product of this reign 
of process appeared in the form of totalitarian state: a perfect 
mechanism of leveling of and mastery over m en, reduced to mutually 
replaceable units.
[W ]here all men have become One Man, where all action 
aims at the acceleration of the movement of nature or 
history,... that is, under conditions where terror can be 
completely relied upon to keep the movement in constant 
motion, no principle of action separate from its essence 
would be needed a t all. [OT, 4 6 7 ]
The reconciliation of men with the inevitable flow of events, seen as a 
product of supra human forces of historical necessity, renders all human 
action altogether pointless. Everything then becomes possible and at 
the same time justifiable within the fram ework of historical necessity, 
the condition which echoes not a gloomy possibility but a historical 
experience, very specific and very present to Arendt and her 
contemporaries, who observed how a bizarre Kafkian scene emerged in 
the place of their once stable world, as totalitarianism lifted the 
boundary between forces of nature and forces o f history. The two then  
blended into each other, and historical processes acquired the quality of 
necessity such as ones attributed only to the natural ones, whereas 
natural processess lost the certainty of their movement, subjected to 
randomness of human interference. The impossible became the  
possible, the possible -  the probable, the probable -  the actual as the 
law that used to  be a guarantee of stability, the pivotal arch of the 
political edifice, got perverted into "the expression of the motion itself." 
[OT, 464]
In  the light of the historical findings of the O rig ins o f  T o ta lita rian ism  
and the philosophical account in the Hum an C ondition , Arendt can 
conclude however that not totalitarian states but totalitarian tendencies 
are  the most damaging effect of this reign of process: spaces of 
freedom and acting of freedom  continue to shrink as political affairs are 
a d m in is te re d  and execu ted , and civic activity is pushed to the margins 
of political realm. [OV, 8 1 ] Political activity, hitherto propelled by the 
desire to leave behind something permanent in the only world that men 
had -  the one th at they themselves made, m ust consequently descend 
into mechanic procedures, directed at maintaining in function 
community, which emerged from sheer necessity of preservation. [HC, 
3 1 4 ] Political actor, once unpredictable in his freedom to act 
spontaneously, is transformed into an economic actor, replaceable by 
any other economic actor or even a mere symbol in statistical 
exercises.
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For Arendt, therefore, while totalitarianism materialized in historical 
reality of the world at a certain moment, as embodiment of annihilation 
of men in the function of Man, the reduction of men to the uniformity of 
masses continues to pervade our political reality.
The word p o litiko n  no longer meant a unique, outstanding 
way of life, of being-together, in which the truly human 
capacities of man, as distinguished from his mere animal 
characteristics, could show and prove themselves. It  had 
come to signify an all-embracing quality that men share 
with many animal species, which perhaps was best 
expressed in the Stoic concept of mankind as one 
gigantic herd under one superhuman shepherd. 
[KMTWPT, 295]
In  resistance to this modern degradation of the plurality of unique 
beings to the multitude of the same, Arendt's seeks to think the political 
in terms of freedom in action. What guides her inquiry through and 
through is not the effort to create a political order for eternity, in the 
sense of engineering upon a theoretical model. Nor is it the effort to 
perpetuate administrative, procedural continuum: continuum, a smooth 
uninterrupted flow but also con-tenere, holding things together, making 
sure everything fits in, nothing stands out, turns the political into a 
container, which 'holds things together' in an orderly manner. Arendt's 
concern however is precisely that which does not fit in, but 'towers 
over' everything else in its conspicuous greatness. [PP, 12]
Such thinking of the political has to be re-invented because the 
monolith of totalitarianism fell upon history, refracting any retrospective 
glance and exposing pre-totalitarian political thought as a not so 
reliable repository of concepts and ideas for understanding the world 
born in the shadow of totalitarianism. Thus Arendt's conversations with 
the tradition are partly aimed at loosening the grip of fossilized 
conceptual frameworks over new, unprecedented experiences of the 
present. Arendt begins her project with the work on the O rigins o f  
T o ta lita rian ism , therefore from the point in which the tradition finally 
exhausted itself to the point of unintelligibility and absolute muteness 
before the new experiences.
At the same time however this is the tradition that, as has been argued 
previously, reveals itself not only as inadequate in the face of 
totalitarianism but also as something of an accomplice. While Arendt is 
explicit in refusing to establish any causal chains from philosophical 
tradition to the phenomenon of totalitarianism,25 she did not hesitate to 
point to a certain 'crystallization of hidden 'elements' of modern 
European history and philosophy in totalitarianism. [Kohn, in Villa, 
2000 :118 ]
25 "To hold the thinkers of modern age, esp. the nineteenth-century rebels against the 
tradition, responsible for the structure and conditions of the twentieth century is even 
more dangerous than it is unjust. The implications apparent in the actual event of 
totalitarian domination go far beyond the most radical or most adventurous ideas of any 
of these thinkers..." [BPF, 27]
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Arendt's conversation with tradition thus bears a mark of her acute 
awareness that hers is not merely a discussion with something frozen in 
the times anterior to totalitarianism, and therefore inadequate for her 
task of understanding as thinking beyond. I t  is also a discussion with 
something that must not be accepted or recovered, only revisited, and 
even that with precaution. Precaution is due as, in order to revisit the 
tradition, the visitor will be lured by its language, even in the effort to 
engage with it critically, even radically critically, so if this engaging is to 
be in the function of the new reading of the political in recognition of 
the past but unburdened by its sins, the sins of the oblivion and the 
silencing of the political, the visitor must remain alerted and seek to 
maintain vigilance. Otherwise, uncritical translation of this tradition of 
thinking the political, even in bare employment of its concepts, would 
easily re-enact Procrustean coercion of political and historical 
experiences. How Arendt as herself a visitor o f tradition maintains her 
vigilance will be the them e of the following two chapters.
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Chapter Two:
ON THE WAY TO A DIFFERENT TH IN K IN G  OF THE POLITICAL
The previous chapter has demonstrated that Arendt's project emerges 
from both the constraints and the potentials of the 'tim e out of jo in t.' 
For Arendt's generation of thinkers, the idiom of transcendental 
philosophy was rendered meaningless as a path towards interpretation 
of historical reality. Meaninglessness of the idiom however did not entail 
meaninglessness of thinking as an effort at reading the meaning of the 
world from what passes in the world, from events and occurrences of 
the world itself. On the contrary, the decline of transcendental 
philosophy vacated hitherto rather crowded philosophical space where 
throughout history of philosophy ideas were worked out and reworked 
and refined -  almost as fishery nets are - for capturing reality, and that 
space opened up to the entry of political concerns into philosophy. W hat 
this means is not that the tradition of philosophy was not concerned 
with the Ufeworid  (tentatively speaking) but that its mode of concern 
was more the one of w ritin g , prescribing how the world should be, 
rather than reading  diverse meanings from it. Reading was reserved for 
reading of the Absolute, not for the world.
At the same time, the 'tim e out of joint' was a source of concern to 
Arendt. I t  is marked by the withdrawal of the political, the decline of 
the political, the vanishing of the political as the space of and for 
freedom. This was taking place either through the totalitarian  
annihilation of freedom or under the domination of economic forms of 
interaction which transformed the public sphere into relating of mere 
functions/roles, while other forms of relating between human beings 
were exiled into the private sphere. When the exhaustion of the 
philosophical tradition is brought in relation to these developments in 
the political reality, which is growing increasingly apolitical in Arendt's 
reading, it becomes clear that not only has the political declined but the 
ground for its recovery or retrieval has been undermined as well. W hat 
Arendt calls the 'Roman trinity' of religion, tradition and authority, 
which for long served as both the frame and the ground of polities as it 
both constituted laws and order and legitimized it at the same tim e, 
collapsed irremediably and together with it, all that brought and held 
communities together collapsed as well. So the collapse of the 
philosophical tradition is effecting the political on two levels, as 
unavailability of o u g h t -  the prescriptive dimension which philosophy 
provided for political concerns, and as the dissolution of the normative 
absolute -  the legitimating transcendental principle.
In  the context of the exhaustion of the philosophical tradition and the 
decline of the political, Arendt understands her project as an effort to 
retrieve what she considers the fundamental principle of the political:
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hum an  beings acting th eir freedom out in common. I t  is a search for 
new  forms of plurality, enacted and institutionalized, against the 
trad itio n  of repressing freedom which springs from plurality. The search 
also runs against the twofold modern process o f the homogenization of 
actors in the public sphere and on the other hand, the 'privatization' of 
th e ir  distinctness, that is -  the dislocation of their individuality to the 
p riv a te  sphere.
This search is however hindered by the inadequacy of the conceptual 
language in the modern political thought insofar "the prejudices that 
stand in the way of a theoretical understanding of what politics is really 
ab o u t involve nearly all the political categories in which we are 
accustom ed to think." More specifically, and for Arendt most 
im portan tly , the fundamental political categories are rendered in term s  
of b rute  force, domination and means/end logic. [PP2:152]
The passage where Arendt diagnoses this conceptual burden of the 
contem porary political thought intuits that Arendt will seek to contradict 
th e  contemporary political thought by developing a different conceptual 
language. It  would be such language that would open itself to the 
experience of the infinite, Ineradicable plurality of the human condition 
In negation of all possibility, theoretical as well as empirical, of 
sovereign domination; to power understood as property of action in 
plurality  only, and -  finally and fundamentally -  to the thinking of 
action as rooted in the principle of freedom beyond the instrumentality.
The previous chapter sought to put forth the argument that Arendt's 
p ro jec t in political thinking, while being associated and communicating 
explicitly  with political theory, cherishes also an important contribution 
to  philosophy. In  other words, when Arendt is writing what she 
considers her 'political theory' -  and which I  propose to renam e into 
political thinking26 - through her engagement w ith historical experiences 
and th e  philosophical tradition, she is in fact also redirecting 
philosophical inquiry and possibly, rad ica lly  so. This however entails a 
question what Arendt's vibrant narrating of political stories and her 
dialog ¡zing with diverse modes of understanding those stories means 
concretely, in term s of thinking the political. Only by answering that 
question , which more or less coincides with the question of the meaning 
of the political for Arendt, can the path be set for inquiring into the
26 T he term  is interesting (and hence employed here) precisely for the ambiguity that it 
co n n o tes: it is thinking of the political but also thinking politically. This ambiguity of the 
con cep t serves as a reminder that the two are essentially interconnected, though they 
m u st never be identified. At the sam e time, their dynamic relating -  thinking the political 
from  within the political is necessarily guided by the concerns of thinking politically - is 
not to  be confused with the automatic, causal relationship between theoretical models 
and policies. This term  is here also preferred to the term political thought, which resounds 
m ore with passivity and substantivity, though the two will occasionally be used 
interchangeably here for reasons of style or in reference to other writings.
It is how ever important to note that political thinking or thought in the sense of political 
philosophy here must be distinguished from political thinking which Arendt used to denote 
w hat in her last work will have finally be termed judging.
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ph ilosoph ica l meaning of her project, and setting the path precisely is 
the task of this and the following chapter.
A ren d t's  pro ject betw een  th e  political and the philosophical
On the one hand, Arendt places herself within the domain of political 
theory. On the other hand, her work can hardly be regarded as a typical 
exam ple of political theory. Some critics found it necessary to pose the 
question what it is that Arendt's political actors talked about in the 
political sphere as Arendt conceived of it, suggesting that Arendt's work 
could not be brought to bear upon politics as it is done in reality and as 
it should be of concern to all of us. Underlying this suggestion there is 
the implication that Arendt's project is about aestheticizing of political 
acitivity.27
In  contrast to most other political theorists, it is never clear and evident 
from Arendt's writings where she stands in relation to democracy or any 
other form of political order whereas her theory of institutions is 
confined to a brief and rather sketchy outline of local 'councils' as 
spaces of freedom. Arendt offers a critique of what politics is about 
nowadays and retrieves some of the political experiences from history 
as examples of what politics should be about but her engaging with 
these experiences as with contemporary politics is hardly of sound 
normative-theoretical character. Nor do her writings offer explanatory 
models of 'political behaviour' -  of the very phrase she would be most 
suspicious given her distinction between behaviour and action where 
only the latter can be associated with politics as Arendt understands it 
and her skepticism towards conclusions derived from the presumption 
of'statistical unformity'. [HC, 43 ]
In  addition, Arendt's own definition of her role as a theorist stands 
apart from the most common immanent understanding of this 
discipline. Thus L. Weissberg argues in the Introduction to Rahel 
V arnhagen :
Arendt's rejection o f the position of philosopher for 
herself rests not on the issue of the feminine, but on the 
definition of philosophy. She refers to Plato and Kant to 
draw a distinction between philosophy and political 
theory, and stakes out the latter field for herself. 
Philosophy, she explains, can claim political neutrality, 
and the philosopher can endeavor to speak in the name 
of humanity. Political science calls on a person to take a 
position, and for Arendt, who treats philosophy as an 
occupation of her past, it marks her not only as acting 
and active person, but also as one who has fallen from  
innocence. This fall from  innocence led to her emigration; 
for Arendt the political theorist, the search for knowledge
27 See particularly Kateb, G. Political Action: Its Nature and Advantages, in Villa, 
2 0 0 0 :1 3 0 -1 4 9 .
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led to a satisfaction, a feeling of being a t home, a 
Heim atgefühl. [RV, 25]
Weissberg here relates Arendt's notion of understanding to the  
condition of being at home. While not entirely inaccurate, this phrase 
'being at home' allows a subtle yet significant distinction to slip 
through, the distinction between becoming at home and being at home. 
The distinction elfegantly captures a tension of the human existence 
that never ceases to be strange to the world yet the world as it is - 
remains its world. Hence understanding does not bring about any cozy 
H e im a tge füh l but is a constant effort by man to place oneself in the 
world. This incompleteness of understanding distinguishes it from  
scientific knowledge, to which belong scientific theories, one which 
modern political theory has sought to become fo r the better part of its 
history.20
W hat Arendt understands as political theory, and that is also where her 
identification with that field comes from, is closely connected with the  
original meaning of the word theo ry , defined outside the confines of the 
theory-praxis dichotomy. Beyond that dichotomy, theory is the effort to 
understand the world and to position oneself towards it. Understanding 
is here concerned with meaning, it is the reading of the world th at 
cannot be equated either with the quest for tru th  or with the strife for 
control over the world. I t  places the 'reader' o f a  meaning in relation to 
the world, the world which shows itself through a specific situation or 
event or phenomenon, and through theorizing the 'reader' seeks to  
disclose what that specific situation or event or phenomenon 
communicates to her and how her position changes in relation to the 
communicated. Understanding is then this fine tuning to the waves of 
the movement of the world which cannot be either differentiated or 
segregated from the human existence:
Understanding is unending and therefore cannot produce 
final results. I t  is the specifically human way of being 
alive; for every single person needs to be reconciled to a 
world into which he was born a stranger and in which, to 
the extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a 
stranger. Understanding begins with birth and ends with 
death. [EIU, 308]
I f  understanding is about living, and if life, according to Arendt, can 
only be grasped in a story that outlives it, then  understanding m ust 
also be rendered in a form of story. I t  is no surprise then that Arendt 
seems to be most comfortable among those whom she calls 'writers' in 28
28 These words echo Heidegger's understanding of philosophy as the way to being home 
everyw here. The source of philosophical thinking is a certain hom esickness but there is no 
home proper to which this hom esickness can be directed. It is not a homesickness for any 
place in particular, for a somewhere, but for anywhere: "Rather, to be at home 
everywhere mean to be at once and at all times within the whole. We name this 'within 
the whole' and its character of wholeness the world. We are, and to the extent that we 
are, we are always waiting for something. We are always called upon by something as a 
whole. This 'as a whole' is the world." [Heidegger, 1929/ 1995 :5]
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distinction to 'thinkers' -  in the sense of professional thinkers, that is 
philosophers. The writers are those who "write out of political 
experiences and for the sake of politics." Unlike the writers, the 
thinkers are those who "write from the outside and they want to impose 
non-political standards," the implication being that political activity has 
no inherent value, only instrumental. By contrast, Arendt, like the 
writers among whom she singles out Montesquieu, Machiavelli, 
Tocqueville, also never asks "what is the end of politics, what is the end 
of government." So again, in distinction to theorists as much as to 
philosophers, Arendt finds herself in the company of those who do not 
build conceptual systems but think about what they see [FMM, 
1 /0 2 3 4 5 3 ] and seek to tell stories of what they observe, thus keeping 
that experience, event, occurrence, alive. [M ID , 97]
So if Arendt is not a philosopher, if she does not construct a theoretical 
system, what is it that she does? She defines her own project in 
painfully simple but not unambitious terms: "a re-examination of the 
whole realm of politics in the light of elementary human experiences 
within this realm itself." [EIU, 432] In  this re-examination, she warns 
her students in her lecture notes, there can be: "[n ]o  theories, forget 
all theories. We want to be confronted with direct experience, to relive 
this period vicariously." [PETC, 1 /023609] She adds quickly that 
abstaining from theories does not imply abstention from thought, but it 
does involve redirecting of thought, away from the prescriptive and the 
predictive, as from the descriptive projects of political theory, so that 
thinking can reach for the concrete experience, unbarred by the 
frameworks of scientific cognition. Scientific cognition involves 
subsumption of the particular under the universal and the incessant 
testing of validity of the principles of subsumption and of the universal 
categories. I t  stands therefore in sharp contrast to Arendt's insistence 
on the uniqueness of historical experiences and her effort to understand 
their interconnectedness without monistic reduction, for which she 
seems to rely more on imagination than on scientific rationality, that is 
-  on ability to project oneself outside one's own circumstances and 
grasp the meaning of phenomena from within. [PETC, 1 /023609]
Arendt's intention is thus not to tell us what politics should be like, but 
tries to understand what acting politically, in concrete instances, means 
to us. In  that attem pt, she collects the instances of difference, 
examples, but instructive as they may be -  Arendt herself is not the 
one who is instructing. She seems rather to tell stories insofar "[t]he  
story reveals the meaning of what otherwise would remain an 
unbearable sequence of sheer happenings." [MDT, 104] Unlike science 
or philosophy, "storytelling reveals meaning without committing the 
error of defining it." [MDT, 105]
But meaning as Arendt understands it is not the  meaning of traditional 
philosophical quest, not metaphysical Meaning, but the narrated 
meaning that assumes plurality of narrators, narratives and meanings 
and is in fact what one would today call a Derridian effect of the
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interlacing of stories, always confirmed and always challenged anew  
through other stories.
Why then Arendt's insistence on this labeling 'political theorist?' I t  is 
aimed more at distancing Arendt from philosophy than at nearing her to 
theory. There is something problematic in philosophy and Arendt seeks 
to take distance, to distinguish her project from philosophical horizons. 
That which is problematic in philosophy for Arendt concerns not so 
much the crisis of philosophy as philosophy's predominant 
understanding of itself and its role in terms of Truth. Arendt argues that 
Truth exerts a compulsive force, which closes off any space for 
discussion or negotiation, the space that is properly political. [BPF, 2 3 5 ]
By contrast, Arendt's work in its entirety is founded on the 
understanding that men are many and so must be the meanings of the  
world since they concern the many. In  that multitude, the meanings 
and their readings are mutually challenging, competing, contesting, 
occasionally coming into precarious balance, only to be disturbed anew. 
They may have equal bearing -  or not. But ultim ately, the world opens 
itself to understanding only through this irreducible multitude of what it 
is to mean, and that is irreconcilable with one single truth. Whereas the  
’ readings' of the world can be many as well as the meanings, the Truth  
is one or it is not.29
In  that sense, the traditional philosophy was no place for Arendt's 
project. But there also is a subtle intuition that Arendt is not ready to 
abandon philosophy to those who seek to replace meaning with Truth. 
That intuition suggest that Arendt considers her own approach, the  
search for meaning, to have a stronger right to philosophy defined as 
the exercise in thinking, than those approaches that led philosophy 
away from thinking and towards knowing. Thus there can be detected 
another, almost undercurrent strand of Arendt's thinking, which is re- 
co n s titu tive  of philosophy in the sense of building without foundation or 
even against what understood itself as a foundation, while unearthing 
within that very foundation-no-longer a potential for overcoming the 
fatigue of philosophy. Arendt's effort thus brings to the surface a 
deliberately submerged and marginalized connection between thinking, 
other than contemplation, and philosophy.
This perhaps explains why Arendt's sources, the interlocutors in her 
inquiries into the political are mainly drawn from what is historically 
demarcated as the region of philosophy. Her writings hardly ever open 
a dialogue with her contemporaries in the field of political theory or 
enter contemporaneous debates in the field. Nor is her engagement
29 At the same time, Arendt makes even a stronger claim when she argues against the 
quest for Truth -  that philosophers have misunderstood the main task of Reason and 
effectively reduced philosophy to science and cognition, because that is the proper place 
of truth, and thus eventually pushed philosophy into a hopeless battle for space with 
modern science: "The need o f reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the 
quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same." [LM/I:15]
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with phenomena an engagement by doing in the sense of the French 
existentialists after the Second World War.
Arendt does not believe that, in the face of the occurrences beyond all 
understanding such as the extermination camps, thought should be 
dismissed altogether. How strongly she rejects this is clear from her 
criticism of the French existentialist school, which contrary to the whole 
of philosophical tradition, looks "to politics for the solution of 
philosophic perplexities [...] I t  is as though that whole generation tried 
to escape from philosophy into politics..." [E IU , 4 3 7] There are 
undoubtedly certain sympathetic undertones to Arendt's critique of this 
m ovem ent, which evokes somewhat paradoxically the years following 
the First World War saturated with worshipping of the notion of resolute 
action. But Arendt dislocates it from both politics and philosophy and 
declares it 'utopian,' perhaps even dangerously so. She partly finds it 
problematic that their primary concern is, again, not with the world and 
changing it but with human subjectivity. This places the movement in a 
sinister affiliation to the tradition of philosophy, though it understands 
itself as a rebellion against all philosophy. But more importantly for 
Arendt's own project, there lurks peril in the leap into action. The peril 
struck Arendt in all its clarity a t the time of the Eichmann trial: it is the 
peril of action divorced from thought which can only lead to  the 
destruction of "validity and meaning fulness." [HC, 225]
This reveals that Arendt is not after an escape from thought into action, 
just as she did not accept the reverse movement, from action into 
thought. In  the essay quoted above, Arendt thus talks of a "new  
political philosophy," suggesting that there indeed is space, within 
philosophy, for a different thinking of the political. Her project does not 
take us to a model of politics but demonstrates how it is possible to 
think the political differently without abandoning action as freedom  
incarnate. In  that sense, it is not a political project but a project in 
thinking and towards thinking of the political.
Most simply put, in Arendt's words, she attempts to "think what we are 
doing." [HC, 5] She is not trying to grasp what or who we are o r why 
we are here or what caused us and our world, all o f those the time-old 
metaphysical concerns. Those questions border on impossibility since 
the events of the twentieth century, as well as the entire modern age 
with its restless movement forward, towards 'm ore' or 'better' or 
'stronger' without ever considering what is more or better or stronger 
and what it does for us, urge us to confront not our grand designs or 
projected effects/results of our actions but these actions themselves. 
Confrating here means to translate actions and events out of our 
schemes and plans, back into our world in order to understand what we 
are doing to the world and ourselves. I t  is a project that comes out of 
Arendt's diagnosis of modernity as the age of world-alienation, the 
diagnosis of a gap opening between men and the world to which men 
simply and inevitably belong. Moreover, as the world itself is threatened 
with dissolution into the flux of naturalized historical processes, 
understanding becomes not only an effort at world preservation but
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also at the recovery of the world and man's bond to it, in the sense of 
binding man to the world, disclosing to man how her doing necessarily 
falls into the world and how neither the world can escape her action nor 
she can escape the world.
Arendt considers the concern with the loss of the world as much more  
pressing than the concerns with any other forms of alienation, 
foregrounded by the discourses such as Marxism or French 
existentialism, which focus on collective or individual subject but not 
the world. The dark undertones of Arendt's concern should be read in 
the light of the historical situation of her generation that witnessed 
totalitarianism and its, never entirely uprooted, consequences:
Totalitarianism taught Arendt how absolutely
indispensable such a realm of stability was, and how 
destructive the principle of unlimited dynamism  
instantiated in the restless activism of the totalitarian  
movements themselves could be. [Villa, 187]
Arendt's work thus insists on reminding us of the weight, even gravity, 
not of our existence for the being that is a man, which is the intention 
that Caputo attributes to the philosophical effort of the twentieth  
century, [1987:1] but of our existence for the world. However, the  
movement of philosophy beyond metaphysics, which marks the turn  of 
the century, did create a radically new philosophical situation. To th ink  
philosophically ceases to be the dwelling in the nearness of the Eternal 
and the Absolute. These new currents in philosophy were driven by 
something echoing, at least remotely, the Socratic impulse of 
contesting and challenging all authorities, opening and holding in the  
open all norm, convention, the canon, through asking unanswerable 
questions.
Such philosophy is very remote from the philosophical tradition th at 
forced Arendt to seek refuge in 'theory,' much more welcoming to 
Arendt's efforts in the way that traditional philosophy could never have  
been. Arendt acknowledges this movement within philosophy:
... the philosopher has left behind him the claim to being 
'wise' and knowing eternal standards for the perishable 
affairs of the City of men, for such 'wisdom' could be 
justified only from a position outside the realm of human 
affairs and be thought legitimate only by virtue of the  
philosopher's proximity to the Absolute. [...] The  
abandonment of the position of 'wise m an' by the  
philosopher himself is politically perhaps the most 
important and the most fruitful result of new  
philosophical concern with politics. [EIU, 4 3 2 ]
W hat the tremor produced by these new philosophical currents would 
mean for political philosophy can be read from Arendt's own work. In  
fact, it could be argued th at Arendt's thinking itself constituted an 
opening or groundwork for a different political philosophy. In  the  
attem pt to seize a unique philosophical/thinking potential for recovering
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the principle of freedom, enacted in the moment of breaking through as 
opening on to rather than only rupturing, Arendt is involved in thinking 
which Nancy defines as "ho ld ing ] itself in leap as a discovery of 
existence in leap." [Nancy, 1988 /1993:58 ] Nancy's understanding of 
thinking captures the core of Arendt's project, in both its dimensions -  
political and philosophical, which emerge from Arendt's dialogue with 
tradition. These two levels are not unconnected and their connection is 
more than structural -  it is fundamental to Arendt's project in its 
entirety. Or rather, th at very connection is Arendt's project, the project 
of uncovering the potential for thinking the world and human condition 
from within and not from the elevated position of the contemplating 
philosopher.
Namely, political theory, albeit unanimously considered to be Arendt's 
main contribution to philosophy,30 is only the most visible layer of 
Arendt's philosophical project that, as will be argued, is devoted not 
only to redefining the philosophical approach to human action but also 
to re-defining the place of such re-constituted political philosophy as 
concern with freedom and action within philosophy, relocating it from  
the margins of philosophy into its very centre. It  is in that sense that it 
is peculiar to single out Arendt as an opening towards a different 
philosophy: in offering a renewal of philosophy, Arendt does not think 
philosophy but the political.
At the same time, Arendt however offers a solution to the odium of 
philosophy towards politics. I t  lies not in denial or defiance of 
philosophy but in "reformulation of the philosopher's attitude toward 
the political realm, or of the connection between man as a philosophical 
and as a political being, or of the relationship between thought and 
action." [EIU , 445] This seems to be what Arendt takes up as her 
project and that is how it again becomes meaningful to speak of Arendt 
as a philosopher or a thinker without violating her own understanding of 
her position and work.
I t  is therefore only a partial understanding of Arendt's work to look into 
what she says of the political. There also is the dimension of 
investigating the possibility o f political philosophy despite its inherent 
contradictions, as is evident in the essay on Philosophy and Politics  
[EIU]. The investigation is later additionally motivated by the concerns 
which haunted Arendt's reporting from the Eichmann trial, when it 
became clear to Arendt that action itself was at stake in the struggle for 
thinking beyond Absolutes.
O f the m ethod: A ren d t's  em bedded idiosyncrasies
Arendt's dialogue with the current of the philosophical tradition that was 
concerned with the living-together in the world as well as with historical
30 Almost all of the Arendt-related scholarship, with exception of Dana Villa's 
interpretations, focuses on Arendt as  a political theorist, following her own affiliation to 
that discipline as well as her persistent critique of philosophy.
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and contemporary political experiences, is therefore indebted much 
more to the German existentialist philosophy and particularly to  
Heidegger's thought. Arendt's inquiry is, in a certain sense, coming out 
of the possibilities opened up by Heidegger's inquiry into Being is the  
inquiry into Dasein that can be understood only as thrown and existing 
in the here and now, in the world, and whose essence is in its existence 
and the taking up of it. In  other words, Heidegger advances philosophy 
as a concern with the being that is of this world and in the world, not 
with the other of the world.
Entering the place occupied by the tradition in philosophical thinking is 
meaningful to Heidegger only insofar th at is a place of possibilities 
which, if explored, m ay lead to uncovering the sources of our questions. 
As Heidegger argues, any engagement with tradition that would not 
expose its illusions and dead-ends, that would fail to demarcate its 
limits, would entail only further e n tang lem en t of Dasein in the cobwebs 
of tradition, preventing not so much the glimpse of answers but 
silencing the questions.
The proper way to engage with tradition can therefore be only through 
destructuring which, although pervaded with negative tendencies 
"tacitly and indirectly," [Heidegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 3 ] cannot be equated 
with m ere negation of tradition since philosophy as mere negation of 
tradition can never lead beyond tradition. Negation remains similarly 
frozen and fossilized in the past concepts and (mis)understandings. 
Rather, by conversing with the history of philosophy, Heidegger is 
trying to speak with and to the today of philosophy, seizing the 
"positive possibilities" of the tradition by "fixing its boundaries." 
[Heidegger, 19 27 /1 9 96 :2 2 ]
To fully understand Arendt's sometimes retrospective inquiry Into 
philosophy and politics, therefore, one must not allow it to slip out of 
sight th at the critical interpretation of the philosophical tradition does 
not occupy a sovereign position within Arendt's project but constitutes a 
departure point for its own overcoming. In  the analysis of Kafka's 
parable (the Preface to Between Past and F u tu re ) Arendt states her own 
position of a thinker trying to think the contemporaneous historical 
reality, without the support of the tradition exhausted. The text, just as 
the opening pages of The H um an C ond ition , reveals Arendt as a thinker 
tied to modernity, and so not even or not only because she renounces 
the traditional philosophers' refuge in contemplation, that elevated 
position of the lover (and knower) of wisdom above the pandemonium  
of the things human, the renouncement which she, as other thinkers of 
the twentieth century, inherits from Marx and Nietzsche. Rather, the 
bond lies in the awareness that there can be no refuge, not any longer, 
and Arendt's appropriation of this absence of refuge as a potential. This 
thinking renounces the aspiration to absolute comprehension and 
aspires to seize the potentials of the age without resorting to covering 
up and without concealing the shadows of totalitarianism by 
pronouncing them unthinkable.
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The re-constitutive and re-constructive, as opposed to restorative, 
nature of Arendt's critical interpretation results in rather idiosyncratic 
insights into the work of the thinkers whom she singles out as 
landmarks. As it is not an exegetical intention that guides her, the 
interpretations more often than not seem to deviate from the main  
course of the thinker's work or to ignore the facets of thought other 
than those that serve Arendt to  substantiate her claims.
Arendt's inquiry should therefore not be read as a mapped route from  
the known departure point to the pre-defined destination point: it is 
rather an open-ended ex-cursion, out-o f-the-course  in the Heideggerian 
sense of the o f f  the  beaten tra cks , guided by occasional outbursts, dive 
into certain historical moments when the political was experienced in its 
rawness, as the 'sheer joy ' o f acting in concert [APH] in resistance to 
the automatism of events. Those for Arendt were the moments of the 
political felt as freedom, of which some traces entered the concurrent 
conceptualisations of the political, leaving them open to conceiving of 
the political outside the traditional philosophical discourses.
Similarly to Heidegger who reads the history of metaphysics as the 
story of deserted or even buried 'wellsprings,' the silencing of origins of 
philosophical questioning In existence and the covering-up of the 
irremediable groundlessness of all philosophy, [Heidegger, 
1927 /1996 :21 ] Arendt narrates political philosophy as the history of the 
fear of politics and the efforts to subdue it to the rule of ideas. I t  is the 
history of antipolitical tendencies, which obscured and obfuscated the 
meaning of doing politics, while at the same time conversing with those 
figures of the tradition that offered an opening into a different thinking 
of the political by thinking the political from within. Those Arendt 
considers to be the 'positive possibilities' in the tradition of political 
philosophy.
I t  falls beyond any need for argum ent that Arendt understands her own 
involvement with the political in this sense, never attempting to 
superimpose upon the deeds and events of the world but taking an 
active stance towards them. Equally so, she does not hesitate to take 
up the odd streams or traces placed within those philosophical systems 
which belong firmly in metaphysical tradition, such as that of Kant or 
Duns Scotus, but somehow out of place, unheim lich  there, allowing an 
alternative to the metaphysical grasp of the world to show through. 
These Arendt develops in an unexpected direction, the direction beyond 
both the metaphysical tradition and the auctorial intentions.
Arendt would thus agree with Benjamin that "in every era the attem pt 
must be m ade anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is 
about to overpower it." [Benjamin, 1999:24] It  is understandable that 
Arendt, Heidegger and the others, as all renovators, seek to disclose 
the ruined and exhausted core of tradition, the crumbling of insides 
behind the stone walls. Or even to reveal that there never were any 
interiors, only the walls or the shell, since Heidegger finds that the 
question of the meaning and hence also the question of Being has
1
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never been asked, and Arendt argues that the millennia long, dominant 
tradition of political philosophy has never even attempted to 
understand, only to capture, politics as a distinctly human mode of 
existence.
But, it could be asked why it is important, to both Arendt and Heidegger 
and not only them, to engage with this tradition, to uncover potential 
for the new "from the interior of our tradition," [Nancy, 
1988/1993:74]U ltim ately, why not do away with all that tradition in one 
stroke? Is it that, as Shklar reads Arendt, Arendt's project is modeled 
on "true Roman foundings [which] were not seen as original creations, 
but as returns to foundations?" [Shklar, 1 9 7 7 :8 4 ] And, implicitly, does 
Arendt believe that there is the  origin or th e  source which can be 
recovered through hermeneutical endeavour?
In a sense, to engage with the tradition exausted, as Arendt does, 
suggests that there is no source or origin but only various readings of 
the world and existence, even if some of those readings aspired to 
transcend the world and existence altogether. Im plicitly, to assume that 
tradition can be done away with, that it can be transcended, rather than  
overcome, implies that philosopher can still raise himself to an elevated 
position, that philosopher is free from the burden of tradition, distanced 
from it and honoured with a historical sight. Arendt's involvement with 
the tradition is in fact recognition, in all philosophical modesty, that the 
fabric of any conceptual thinking, even if claiming radical newness, is 
necessarily woven out of the old conceptual threads, hence this peculiar 
'dialectic' of "both inheriting and rejecting tradition." [Pitkin, 1998 :243 ]
The necessity of delving into tradition belongs to the core of the 
phenomenological method:
[ I] t  is precisely that with late Husserl we discover all the  
vital importance of tradition for tru th , nam ely that we can 
dwell by the source and ultim ately reach it in its true  
sense only through innumerable previous productions and 
achievements. [Vlaisavljevic, 2 0 0 3 :1 1 5 , transl. by SN]
(Re)visiting sources thus understood is not return to  the roots or origins 
but rather a referral to the beginnings, in the sense of Edward Said's 
distinction [Said, 1985:6 ] between beginnings as retention of open- 
ended ness, "a displacement into the present... [when/where] time's 
arrow begins to point forw ard," and origins that are the "embodiment of 
infinite regress to the past." [Sennet, 1 9 9 0 :1 9 5 ] This referral, in 
Arendt's work, is then informed by one of the three basic components 
of the phenomenological method as Heidegger defines it, 
deconstruc tion : "A critical process in which the traditional concepts, 
which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to 
the sources from which they were drawn." [1 9 2 7 /1 9 8 2 :2 3 ]
But Arendt's 'deconstruction,' taken here in the above sense of 
Heidegger's phenomenological method, is guided by her understanding 
of the sources as experiences, not as the sources of thinking. Arendt
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does hear and follow the phenomenological imperative: "To the things 
themselves!" [Heidegger, 19 27 /1 9 96 :2 8 ] In that sense, her 
methodology is indebted to the phenomenological teaching, but it must 
be noted that it is not Husserlian transcendental but Heidegger's 
existentialist phenomenology which insists on the historicity of Dasein. 
[Caputo, 1987:87]
For Heidegger, philosophical inquiry begins with and returns to the 
state of being gripped, [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 5 :7 ] the state which properly 
(cor)responds to philosophical, metaphysical questioning of the whole 
that always inescapably "comprehends within itself the questioner." 
[Heidegger, 1 9 29 /1 9 95 :1 4 ] For Arendt, thinking springs from the 'living 
incidents' and to those it must return, [BPF, 14] never allowing the 
thinker to rest upon a disinterested position. The methodological path 
for both Arendt and Heidegger therefore leads through re-examination 
of philosophical works in the light of experience, displacing philosophical 
inquiry from the heights of contemplation, bringing it back to the here 
and now with which one, any-one, is concerned.
What sets her apart from Heidegger's "positive return to the past... in 
the sense of its productive appropriation," [1927 /1996:22 ] is that 
Arendt engages not with existential experiences that arise from the 
human existential situation but with concrete, historical political 
experiences:31
[E]very political philosophy at first glance seems to face 
the alternative either of interpreting philosophical 
experience with categories which owe their origin to the 
realm of human affairs or, on the contrary, of claming 
priority for philosophic experience and judging all politics 
in its light. [PP, 92]
Arendt's own work testifies to her philosophic decision in this m atter 
insofar her political thought is interlaced with historical narratives. If  
there can therefore be any meaning to the discourse of the origins or 
sources for Arendt and if there is the sense in repeating the tradition, it 
is only insofar the notion of sources refers to the historical political life 
in all its diversity: Athens, Rome, Florentine Republic, perhaps above all 
for Arendt -  American Revolution as a political experience which 
historically belongs to past but politically remains the present.32
As Arendt's thinking is thinking that feeds on experience in the attem pt 
to render the specific historical situation meaningful, it is worth not
31 Indicatively, Arendt's first scholarly work was on S t. Augustine, the one thinker who 
evaded conversation with the likes of himself and instead reached into repository of his 
worldly experiences for guidance. [LM/II: 114]
32 The significance of American Revolution for the present, which Arendt never tired of 
reiterating, derives from the fact that revolutions epitomize the groundless condition of 
modernity and pose a problem for political thinking since "revolutions are the only 
political events which confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning,' 
[OR, 21] the problem peculiar to the modern age that is confronted with the radically new 
situation of beginning anew, in distinction to the situation of change within, the existing, 
which characterized the political thinking prior to modern revolutions.
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rushing on in order to dwell on Arendt's concept of experience a t this 
point. Arendt's concept of experience does not bear two of the habitual 
meanings. I t  has cut or shaken off its link to the empirical, retaining the 
connotations of a tte m p t but not the relation to the prefixed em - as en-, 
therefore pushing in(to). In that sense, instead of throwing the one who 
questions back onto the infinite, all-encompassing subject, it seeks to 
draw out, to pull out, to extricate and extract, and push into the open 
and expose.
Firstly, it removes itself from  the methodological understanding of 
experience as an analytical tool which, when presumed as "the origin of 
knowledge," allows "the vision of the individual subject... [to become] 
the bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is built." [Butler and 
Scott, 1992:25] In recourse to specific events, Arendt does not seek to 
objectify them into evidence, corpus  in the broadest sense, in order to 
support a theory. Namely, to theorize for Arendt involves saving, saving 
of what is observed from oblivion so that it can then be related to our 
own experiences in the attem pt to render the la tter understandable, 
inhabitable in a way. In  that sense, history is not a repository of dead 
evidence but a treasury of experiences to be related to and thus 
preserved against leveling into generalizations. To Arendt, experiences 
therefore do not serve  and they are not in fu nc tion , they are narratives 
that communicate directly w ith our own narratives, without mediation 
of theories and philosophies which no longer offer a home In the world. 
[GTNT, 12 -13]
It  is therefore not experience as wisdom, experience as 'gospel' to 
shield us from the very experience. [Benjamin, 1996:4] Rather, 
thinking from experience assumes venturing into the world through the 
concern with it. I t  abandons all claim to certainty and ground, 
embracing instead a leap into the open, not for the sake of gathering 
knowledge or penetrating into essence other than existence but 
following Heidegger's understanding of the essence of man and 
everything of man as existence, [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :4 3 ] which shares with 
experience the same perilous ex-.
An experience is first of all the encounter with an actual 
given, or rather, in a less simply positive vocabulary, it is 
the testing of something real... Also, according to the 
origin of the word "experience" in pe ira  and in ex-pe rir i, 
an experience is an a ttem pt executed without reserve, 
given over to the p e r il of its own lack of foundation and 
security in this 'object' of which it is not the subject but 
instead the passion, exposed like the pirate (pe ira tes) 
which freely tries his luck on the high seas. [Nancy, 
1 9 88 /1 9 93 :2 0 ]
In  other words, Arendt does not attem pt to read political/historical 
experiences through the prism of political philosophy but the other way 
around, instructed by Heidegger's destructuring as based upon the 
original experiences. [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 2 ]
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Arendt's venture will be approached here through the interpretation of 
two moments in Arendt's thinking, body politic and action, which as 
occurrences in historical reality, in Arendt's reading, embody plurality 
and freedom, two concepts crucial for understanding of Arendt's 
political thinking and for relating it to philosophy as a project. In 
Arendt's reading of the entire tradition of philosophy, including political 
philosophy or especially political philosophy, those two concepts are 
persistently placed in opposition.
Arendt however understands her task as revealing, through references 
to political experiences, that plurality and freedom do not appear as 
opposed in the world and that they should not be thought in opposition 
either. Arendt's thinking is fully imbued by the rejection of this 
opposition but its implications reach out, beyond conceptualization of 
the political. Though it is the observation of the interconnectedness of 
plurality and freedom in p ra x is , the interconnectedness which is not 
external but intrinsic to both, that informs Arendt's conceptualization of 
the political against the mainstream of tradition, the problematized 
opposition is not tackled merely through the empirical narratives but 
above all conceptually. Arendt's conceptual overcoming of the deadlock 
of modern political theory therefore constitutes a stepping stone for a 
different philosophy which will not seek to position itself out of the 
reach of contingencies generated by both human plurality and human 
freedom but will seek to draw its questions from inevitable interlacing 
of the two within the human existence, as will be argued in the final 
chapter.
In s titu tio n  as action
Arendt's inquiry Into the political as a sphere of sharing a part of the 
world with unfamiliar others should be understood in distinction to  the 
modern study of the political as a cognitive framework. The study o f the 
political as cognitive framework can be traced back to the origins of 
modern political theory, which is informed on the one hand by the 
historical developments in the political field and on the other -  by the 
rise of exact science in the cognitive sphere. These two factors in the 
rise and development of modern political theory are deeply 
interconnected.
The early modern age was marked by the turmoil in the politico- 
religious structures, which ordered relations within political entities, 
among political subjects. Though Middle Ages could hardly be described 
as peaceful, they were followed by the turbulent emergence o f the 
revolution-generated new political order in America and France, which 
radically transformed the old pattern of relations while also depriving 
the new order of legitimation within the venerated religious horizon. 
More succinctly, individuals and collectivities were rendered 
autonomous and in the place o f the strife for freedom, there emerged 
the prob lem  of freedom. As P. Wagner argues, in such political 
constellation "the social sciences are exactly a part of the response 
human beings gave to their new condition of [...] contingency and
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principled uncertainty." The emerging social sciences thus came to be 
understood as "a means to decrease contingency." [2001:39 ]
In the attempt to apprehend and m aster the new condition, exact 
sciences were taken as a model for social sciences, which accordingly 
focus on the discovery of the laws that would allow the construction of 
explanatory frameworks for events of the world and actions of human 
beings in the first instance and in the second -  lead to devising the  
patterns of predictability by means of which the events and actions 
could be subjected to efficient control: "In  modernity, the insistence 
upon taking charge of the world comes into its own. [...] Human and 
non-human nature become m aterial to work on." [Connolly, 1989:2 ]
This modeling of social sciences upon exact sciences, in their flight from 
contingency to the fascination with order, drives Arendt to locate 
modern political theory in what she perceives as continuum of 
philosophical tradition where "most political philosophies have their 
origin in the philosopher's negative and sometimes even hostile attitude  
toward the po lis  and the whole realm of human affairs." [EIU, 4 2 8 ]
It  is not that Arendt fails to recognize novelty in thinking of political 
affairs that modern political theory brings about. As Arendt points out, 
the ages abundant in political philosophies have of necessity been the 
same those torn by political crises and turmoil. [E IU , 430]Thus in the 
midst of chaotic and turbulent decades of the Late Middle Ages, a new 
intellectual approach to the political activity and sphere appears, 
granting the unprecedented status to political concerns. In  the 
continuum of philosophical tradition, a new space for political inquiry or 
rather, for philosophical inquiry into political affairs, however did open 
up with modern political theory, which responded to the immediate 
concerns of the new age and the conflicts between religious and secular 
authorities, seeking to understand the political from within:
[H]uman affairs pose authentic philosophic problems 
and... politics is a domain in which genuine philosophic 
questions arise, and not merely a sphere of life which 
ought to be ruled by precepts that owe their origin to 
altogether different experiences. [EIU , 4 30]
But despite this new, elevated status of political concerns as focus of 
philosophical inquiry, Arendt contends that the fear of spontaneity and 
uncontrollability of action, the understanding of action not as the 
political properly speaking but as the political p ro b le m , remains a motor 
of philosophical, or now rather theoretical involvem ent with the political 
sphere.33 31
31 Paradoxically, political philosophy would itself fall prey to this new movement towards 
scientific study of human interaction, which resulted in the transition from political 
philosophy to social sciences between 1750  and 1850. Wagner, 2 0 0 1 : 36.
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As Arendt observes, action -  witnessed in all its wild unpredictability by 
the contemporaries of the democratic revolutions -  failed the moderns 
on two accounts. Firstly, being perishable and fleeting as it is, it could 
not guarantee immortality to actors of the now secular political realm, 
that is -  a realm no longer venerated through recourse to 
transcendental authority. On the other hand, understood teleologically 
in the context of modern progressivist narratives through which the 
idea of the eternal political order was slowly being replaced by the idea 
of a programmed future as the playground of political projects, 
[Koselleck, 1985:278-279] it has proved to be an unreliable instrument 
which 'almost never fulfills its original intentions.' [BPF, 84] Neither 
Hobbes nor those before him nor those who followed in his footsteps to 
shape the modern liberal thinking conceived of the political as that 
which has to remain in the discontinuous that freedom is, which will 
have become the principal assumption of Arendt's political thought and 
which sets that thought apart from the mainstream political theory.
Underlying modern political theory, Arendt thus uncovers the same fear 
that marked the classical philosophy -  the fear of spontaneity and 
uncontrollability of action, the understanding of action not as the 
political properly speaking but as a or the  problem to which political 
institutions must respond by containing it. The method has been 
transformed - from that of the contemplation to the scientific pursuit of 
knowledge but the demand remains the same as that of Plato:
[W ]hat the philosophers almost unanimously have 
demanded of the political realm was a state of affairs 
where action, properly speaking (i.e ., not execution of 
laws or application of rules or any other managing 
activity, but the beginning of something new whose 
outcome is unpredictable), would be either altogether 
superfluous or remain the privilege of the few. [EIU, 
1 9 54 /1994 :429 ]
The modernist idea that human affairs can be (and need to be) 
rendered perfectly controllable once their laws are established, the 
same way that natural processes yield to the control by science once 
the mysteries of the nature are translated into axioms, to Arendt rings 
familiar tones of the ancient ambition of the classical philosophy: "When 
armed with the right method, and further armed with opportunity, man 
could construct a political order as timeless as a Euclidean theorem." 
[Wolin, 1960:243] Arendt's critique of modern political theory, although 
beginning with the praise of the new, elevated status of politics as a 
focus of philosophical inquiry, culminates therefore in uncovering of the 
continuity of the effort to dislocate action from the political sphere or, 
even more precisely, to detach action from the political.
It  follows thereof that, in Arendt's reading, modern theoretical study of 
the political understands itself as the search for the possibility of the 
political order embodied in a perfectly controllable, automatic course of 
political processes and procedures. The principal implication, arguably
u \\ ii u v  u v p i p H
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even explication, o f Arendt's understanding of modern political theory, 
apart from its innovative claim to autonomy and legitimacy of 
philosophical inquiry into political m atters, is the understanding that a 
certain continuity between the modern theory and the classical tradition 
is established through this predominant concept of politics as an 
instrument of control over (political) action. In  other words, modern 
political theory offers the concept of politics which centers on order 
understood in opposition to freedom.
According to Arendt, the concept of the political centred on order as 
opposed to freedom bars the sighting of the political but not only. 
Arendt's rejection o f thinking of the political that would be centred on 
political systems and political order in general, which are the 
undisputable focus of the main bulk of efforts by political philosophers 
and theorists throughout history, rests on her deep conviction that to 
center on order is not only to misunderstand what politics is about but 
also to get involved in annihilation of the political. This conviction 
pervades all of her works: not only is Arendt not interested In political 
systems but she considers any such effort ultimately anti-political 
insofar as the structures of political order seek to harness and control 
action which is the core of the political.
The question is, how can then Arendt's thought be regarded as political 
thought, given th at the political is concerned with living in community 
and community does form a certain normative framework o f. living 
together. Does Arendt then have anything to say about the political as 
lived within and through certain normative delimitations?
Arendt's understanding of meaningful thinking of the political 
corresponds closely with a tradition of political thought bordering on 
political philosophy, nevertheless outside it, those "modes of thought 
[...] particularly concerned with problems of political particularity, with 
what was intellectually possible when the particular political society was 
viewed as existing in time, when the particular contingency or event 
was viewed as arising in tim e, and when the particular society was 
viewed as a structure for absorbing and responding to the challenges 
posed by such events and as consisting, institutionally and historically, 
of the traces of such responses made in past tim e." [Pockok, 2003:9 ]
In that sense, Arendt's political thinking itself responds to her own 
particular-historical, which is the political life after the occurrence of the 
totalitarian states while responding to the fact that the aftermath of one 
totalitarian form is not necessarily an overcoming of totalitarianism. 
This uncertainty about overcoming of totalitarianism or 'totalitarian  
tendencies/ in Arendt's understanding, is the particular-historical that 
demands her attention as a thinker. The pervasion of all spaces of a 
community by the monstrous machinery that propagated collectivity yet 
executed homogenization, having moved towards total uniformity in 
aspiration towards perfect order, posed to the Arendt's generation the 
question of the political.
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Arendt's position as a thinker is therefore located between the historico- 
political threat of totalitarianism on the one hand and on the other - a 
certain conceptual void, an inability of modern political theory to 
conceive more than an impoverished notion of political community, 
rooted in the equation of the political with government, within the 
framework of individualist liberalism which is tied to and tied by "the 
rights-endowed individual [as] the only conceivable ontological as well 
as the methodological foundation." [Wagner, 2001 :43 ] To Arendt, both 
the threat and the void are related to the obsession with control and 
annihilation of contingencies, which spans centuries of political history 
as well as political thought.
In  the attem pt to respond to the threat of totalitarianism by moving 
beyond the liberalist paradigm in thinking of the political, Arendt seeks 
to retrieve a different notion of political community, the roots of which 
reach back to the ancient polis. Arendt's observations on the po lis  are 
written in an infinitely more sympathetic tone than her accounts of the 
modern state, which seems to be most interesting to Arendt in its 
totalitarian form. It  is indicative that whereas the totalization of politics 
by totalitarian regimes is depicted in the Origins o f  To ta lita rian ism  as 
something of the deviated or perverted political, totalitarian state is not 
considered a deformation of state. On the contrary, what pervades 
Arendt's writings would be the intuition that the modern state as such is 
itself a historical deformation of political community. Arendt could thus 
agree with Schmitt's critique o f Hobbes' concept of the state "as an 
essential factor in the four-hundred-year long process of 
mechanization" [Schmitt, 1 9 38 /1 9 96 :4 1 -4 2 ] although she would 
perhaps also assert that state is a mechanized political community. 
What Arendt would therefore consider lost is not the theological fabric 
of state's legitimacy,34 which rendered the state "hollow and already 
dead from within," [Schmitt, 1938 /1996 , 61] but of the political sphere 
as a 'space of appearance' [HC, 199], which means both the space for 
appearance of political actors and the space created by their 
appearance, therefore by definition non-substantive.
As mentioned, the absence of the term state is most conspicuous in 
Arendt's political thinking. Apart from the specific historical analyses in 
the O rig ins o f  To ta lita rian ism , Arendt very rarely -  if ever -  employs 
the term . Her distancing from this term and concept becomes clearer 
from her explanation of its origin in Machiavelli's writings. Machiavelli 
derived lo  sta to  from three terms -  status, estate and state/condition, 
all three entailing stability as immobility.35 Arendt however was looking
34 This is given in Schm itt's conceptual idiom, the fabric is political theology that rejects 
privatization of inner beliefs thus establishing and preserving a substantive bond between 
state and its subjects.
35 Machiavelli of course is not the first to employ the concept though the development of 
the modern concept of state should be attributed to him and other Renessaince political 
writers, according to Quentin Skinner's genealogy of the concept. Skinner also 
accentuates that, as other writers of the time, Machiavelli still associates institutions with 
the person of the ruler: "When he uses the term to refer to an apparatus of government, 
he is usually at pains to emphasize that it needs to remain in the hands of the prince: 
that lo stato, as he often puts it, rem ains equivalent to il suo stato, the prince's own state
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for a term that would encapsulate the dynamism of political bond and 
reject its substantivity, and she found the two entwined in the term  
b o d y  po litic . The logic behind the prevalence of b o d y  po litic  in Arendt's 
conceptual repository is rendering the political fram ework, not only its 
content, in dynamic terms. Despite its realness, m ateriality, 
substantivity, firmness, the ’body" necessarily entails motion, inside and 
outside. The potentiality of motion of the body is ever-present and 
always actualized. Absence of movement from body, by body, spells 
death as the absolute rest.
Body politic as a concept in political thought can be traced back to the  
organicist framework and the early modern fascination with analogies 
between the human world and the nature or rather, the semblance In 
functioning of human affairs to that of the natural processes. Arendt 
however cherishes a particular suspicion towards the tendency of 
modern science to draw parallels between these two worlds. Moreover, 
she is skeptical towards attempts to subjugate them  to, and judge them  
on the ground of, the same set of uniform standards. [HC, 262] All 
throughout, Arendt insists on the uniqueness of human life as a 
rectilinear and more often than not haphazard movement cutting into 
the perfect and self-perpetual cycles of nature, which is incessantly 
rotating along the same course, determined by the immutable laws of 
nature.
Furthermore, b ody  evokes the image of a perfectly functioning whole, 
not only a harmony but total unity of its parts, which derive their 
meaning and roles from the whole. I t  is a term  which seems to  
synthetize the notion of 'naturalized' politics and th e  idea of polity as an  
organism in which all parts function towards the same goal of keeping 
the organism alive. Ultimately, it is an image which seems to  evoke 
Rousseauean threads of political thought, or Arendt's reading of his 
thought, where body politic is indeed understood as a body, the decay 
of which would lie in the centrifugal tendencies of its parts, in other 
words -  the withdrawal of those parts into their particularities would 
spell death to the whole.36 Body politic in Rousseau's interpretation, 
pervaded with his idea of general will, thus runs against the core of 
Arendt's understanding of the political as that which happens not by th e  
peop le , the uniform singular of multitude absorbing all distance among 
unique beings, but among m en, a plural therefore that implies the 'web  
of human relationships' [HC, 183] in irreducible diversity o f human 
beings.
Notwithstanding the genealogy of the concept, which stands in 
contradiction with Arendt's understanding of the political as opposed to
or condition of rulership." [Ball, Farr and Hanson, 1 9 8 9 :9 7 ] This may be the root of 
Arendt's systematic rejection of the term  as founded on the premise of the gap between 
rulers and the ruled.
M In Arendt's interpretation, Rousseau responds to the question of establishing and 
maintaining a political bond by drawing a corporeal image of polity as a "multitude united 
in one body and driven by one will... a multiheaded monster, a mass that moves as one 
body." [OR, 94]
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the natural, Arendt's Insistence on the concept can be understood In 
light of her concern of circumventing the theoretical dead-ends in 
establishing the bond between citizens and their polity. I f  we think of 
political community and citizens separately, Arendt warns, we are not 
thinking the political but public administration or government, and we 
choose to remain under the spell of the Platonic dichotomy between the 
ruler and the ruled. The (Platonic) ruler is the knower of the course of 
action, the ruled are grown together into one, from plurality of m en  into 
singularity of Man, and theirs is to obey. This uniform mass behaves, 
executes orders but does not partake in political affairs.
In  that sense, Arendt's narrating of Hellenic p o lis -e xperience of doing 
the political or the political as doing is meant as a reminder of the 
historical possibility of political community understood outside of or 
contrary to the divide between individuals/citizens and collective/state. 
This different understanding for Arendt is based on the notion of 
political community as not some-th/ng other than its citizens and their 
interaction.
By referring to polity as body politic Arendt thus seeks to recover the 
forgotten meaning of the political and political community as res 
pub lica , which is not a 'business' of the ruling caste but a public m atter 
of concern to everyone insofar one lives among m en. Body politic in 
Arendt's economy of the term therefore suggests not that citizens are 
united into one single obedient entity but that polity is citizens, its 
inalienable fabric. To speak of the existence of body politic makes sense 
only In the sense of men acting in the common world. Only insofar men 
appear to each other is body politic real. To assume reality of polity in 
any other way entails the problem of the gap between the structure and 
those upon whom the structure is imposed. The gap is nothing but the 
crisis of legitimacy which a state that is not a body politic can overcome 
only if it (mis)takes governing for political activity.
The meaning of governing lies in the transformation of political 
community into a territorial-administrative unit, something like a frame 
without picture, reduced to and identified with its regulatory function. 
The stakes however are much higher than the loss of a certain historical 
form of the political sphere. Political community is the mediator 
between the world and hum an beings. While human beings are 
necessarily in the world, how they are in this world and how they 
receive the world is mediated through their political community that is 
the part of the world over which humans enjoy certain ownership, but 
ownership made up of responsibility to it. Alienation of the state 
institutions from the citizens, the divide between 'us' and 'them ' or 
rather, the 'I t '  of the state, renders citizens powerless. That is the 
problem of the Leviathan-state which Schmitt in the above cited 
interpretation failed to grasp: it is not that the state is hollow, but its 
'citizens' or more precisely, Leviathan's subjects are hollow.37
37 Bonnie Monig elaborates on Arendt's rejection of substantive grounding of political 
community as well as of substantivity of the bond between community and its members:
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At the same time, the powerlessness of citizens leaves a certain space 
unoccupied and the state structures move in. They acquire a life of their 
own, unbound by their rootedness in human interaction, a self-sufficient 
and self-contained, almost autistic mechanism. As such, the mechanism  
is threatened by human interaction, it is an unnecessary disturbance. 
Hence there always remains a possibility, which was actualized in the 
totalitarian states, that the mechanism would turn against this human 
disturbance. Once all men have been reduced to one and the same, 
even that one 'Man' becomes superfluous insofar no action is necessary 
to perpetuate the mechanism. [OR, 467]
The fear of political community that undergoes this metamorphosis into 
a mechanized state, as Arendt and her contemporaries witnessed, is 
what, more than any theoretical concern, drives Arendt to the 
republican33 notion of body politic. It  is a notion of political community 
which is not superior to, or in any other way alienated from, what is 
properly its corpus, the body of citizens in their mutual relating. As 
such, it seeks to recover the value of human agency for political affairs 
in order to counter the situation of "a collectivity of people by their own 
conduct rendering themselves helpless to deal effectively with problems 
resulting from that conduct." [Pitkin, 1998:239]
However Arendt's critique of modern political theory may be too 
informed by her own historical experiences to grasp that, for much of 
the modern political theory, the problem has always been not so much 
conceptualizing political community as unalienable, inseparable from  
human agency, as it has been the historical experience of the early 
modernity. Arendt's conceptualization of body politic may be opposed to 
the prevailing tradition but behind that tradition there is a history of 
political entities in collapse and a history of religious struggles over the 
transcendental source of legitimation of certain political form. The birth 
of the idea of Leviathan out of the English civil wars is thus a response 
to the concrete political problem for new political communities - how to 
establish a community and how to preserve it without a recourse to the 
transcendental. Leviathan in its neutrality is thus foreseen as a 
m ediator among citizens -  a peculiar, monstrous and alien body *38
"From Arendt’s perspective, a political community that constitutes itself on the basis of a 
prior, shared, and stable identity threatens to close the spaces of politics, to homogenize 
or repress the plurality and multiplicity that political action postulates.... protecting the 
spaces of politics in the nonidentity, the heterogeneity and discontinuity of political 
communities, and also in the resistances of the self to the normalizing constructions of 
subjectivity and the imposition of autonom y...1' [Butler and Scott, 199 2 :2 2 7 ]
38 Arendt is often associated with the tradition of civic republicanism "traced back to the 
political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract in 1743 where he 
argued for a radical conception of citizenship as popular participation in the polity.” 
[Delanty, 2 0 0 5 :8 1 ] M. Canovan points out an important distinction between Arendt and 
republican tradition insofar "she was, for example, much less interested than most of her 
predecessors both in military prowess and in the details of institutions, and much more 
interested in free discussion." Arendt however appropriates the classical republican notion 
of "political freedom [not as] som ething bestowed by nature or history" but something 
that requires acting and acting always anew by the citizens. [Canovan, 1995 :203]
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functions  as both a b u ffe r and a g lue between the m em bers  of a ce rta in  
c o m m u n ity .
In  th a t sense, if A rendt w ants to  reconceptualise p o litica l co m m un ity  in 
the  ligh t o f the  new h is to rica l circum stances and the  new po litica l 
s itu a tio n , she m ust e ith e r  take  in to  account th e  p rob lem s th a t gave rise 
to  the idea o f Leviathan or assum e th a t those p ro b le m s have been 
overcom e. The paradox o f the  contem pora ry  h is to rica l s itua tion  is 
how ever th a t new problem s have not replaced the old  b u t coincide w ith  
th em  in o u r political re a lity . Thus Arendt's  concept o f body politic  m us t 
em body a fo rm  o f toge therness o f citizens viab le  u n d e r the  m odern  
cond ition , o r  else her conceptua liza tion  o f po litica l c o m m u n ity  is equa lly  
detached fro m  the h is torica l re a lity  as any ph ilosoph ica l construc t th a t 
she critic ized  so pers is ten tly . In  o the r w ords, if  body po litic  is a bo u t 
hum an in te rac tion , A rend t m u s t find the  a nsw er to  th e  question  o f w ha t 
brings citizens to ge th e r, to g e th e r w ith  each o th e r and to g e th e r w ith  
th e ir  co m m un ity . W here does th is  toge therness a rise  from , w ha t 
generates acting in conce rt once the  public sphere is deprived b o th  o f 
its im m orta liz ing  function  (the  anc ien t G reece) and o f  th e  ru le r whose 
a u th o rity  is derived fro m  a transcenden ta l source?
The question  itse lf had haunted A rend t fro m  th e  v e ry  beginnings o f her 
scholarly w o rk : in her f irs t w ritin g , the d isse rta tio n  on  Augustine, she 
engages in a detailed in te rp re ta tio n  o f Augustine 's  read ing  o f 'lo ve  th y  
n e ig h b o u r/ Augustine is p a rticu la rly  in te resting  fo r  A re n d t as a R om an- 
C hristian th in k e r who experienced radical e s tra n g e m e n t from  the  w orld  
ye t preserved in his w o rk  th e  Hellenic legacy o f concern  w ith  'th is ' 
w orld . A ugustine 's question  o f  w hy  to  love one 's n e igh bo u r the re fo re  
corresponds closely w ith  A re nd t's  m odern, po litica l q u e s tio n  o f re la ting  
o f hum an beings to  the  w orld and those w ho inhab it it.
A ugustine 's  answ er is o n to -the o lo g ica l: W hat connects  m en to  one 
ano the r and to  th is w o rld , w ha t tu rn s  th row nness in to  rootedness is the  
co m m un ity  o f descent and fa te  w ith  all o the r sons o f  A dam . All o f them  
are bom , o u t o f the  o rig in a l s in, and all w ill d ie :
Rooted means th a t no one can escape from  th e  descent, 
and in th is  descent th e  m ost crucia l d e te rm in a n t o f 
hum an existence has been ins titu ted  once and fo r  all.
Thus, w hat un ited  a ll people is n o t an  accidenta l 
likeness.39 R ather, th e ir  likeness is necessarily  founded 
and h istorica lly  fixed  in th e ir  com m on descent fro m  Adam 
and in a kinship beyond any m ere likeness. T h is  kinship 
creates an e qu a lity  n e ith e r o f tra its  n o r ta le n ts , bu t o f 
s itu a tio n . All share  the  sam e fa te . The in d iv id u a l is not 
a lone in th is  w orld . He has co m p a n io n s -in -fa te , not 
m ere ly  in th is  s itu a tio n  o r th a t, but fo r a life tim e . His 
e n tire  life is regarded as a d is tinc t fa te fu l s itu a tio n , the 
s itu a tio n  o f m o rta lity . [LSA, 100]
39 T h e re fo re , n o t  in th e  s e n s e  of A ris to te lian  th ird  ty p e  o f f r ie n d s h ip  a s  b a s e d  on 
se m b la n c e  in v ir tu e . A risto tle , E th ics, 1 1 5 6 a 2 7 - b l7 .
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W hat speaks to  A re n d t across centu ries  fro m  Augustine, in h e r 
p a rtic u la r h is torica l, p o litica l and ph ilosophical s itu a tio n  is A ugustine 's  
und e rs ta nd in g  o f k insh ip  am ong m en  in re la tion  to  the  e qua lity  o f th e ir  
s itu a tio n , the  hum an cond ition  o f being born, passively appearing, 
s u ffe rin g  appearance, and being m o rta l, b o th  in th e  m uteness o f one 's 
ow n  w ill, there fore  m ade  an  in h a b ita n t o f  a w orld  u ltim a te ly  s tra n g e ,40 
and becom ing eve r s tra n g e r as one w itnesses th e  w orks o f m en and 
m en  them se lves c ru m b le  in to  no th ingness.41
B ut th e  k insh ip  o r com m onness o f past and fu tu re  fo r  th e  sons o f Adam  
c rys ta llizes  in to  love  only in d ire c tly , th ro u g h  th e  alchem ic w ork ing  o f 
d iv in e  grace. The source  o f  C hris tian  love fo r  n e igh bo u r in th is  w orld  
lies beyond th is  w o rld , in th e  d iv ine  c re a to r o f a ll beings who a re  loved 
fo r  th e  sake o f lo v in g  him  and th ro u g h  re la ting  to  h im .42 The bond 
am ong  th e  ne ighbours is th e re fo re  no t o f  th is  w orld  bu t is m edia ted 
th ro u g h  a transcenden ta l abso lu te , in  its o rig in  as in its destination.
In  th a t  sense, A re n d t's  deep ly , th o u g h  in th a t f ir s t  w ork s till on ly  
im p lic it, po litica l q u e s tio n  o f w h y  engage w ith  th e  w orld and h e r 
a tte m p te d  answ er w ith o u t recourse  to  the  transcenden ta l cannot 
rece ive  an answ er fro m  A ugustine 's  theo log ica l fram ew ork . A rend t's  
in q u iry  is a po litica l p ro je c t, a search fo r  th e  w ay o f  liv ing  to ge th e r a t 
the  tim e  w hen th a t w h ich  ke p t th e  w orld  to g e th e r, i.e . th e  re lig ious and 
re la te d /d e riv a tiv e  m o ra l and po litica l fram e w o rks , b roke  down. W hat is 
th e re fo re  fo regrounded  in A re nd t's  la te r, e x p lic it ly  po litica l w ritings  is 
the  re in te rp re ta tio n  o f  the  theo log ica l, 's ta t ic ' concept o f com m on o rig in  
in to  th e  po litica l, 'd y n a m ic ' concept o f com m on action  o r action in 
co nce rt w h ich  b inds c itizens o r  m em bers  o f  po litica l co m m un ity  
to g e th e r.
The pa rad igm atic  h is to rica l exam ple  o f th is  bond th ro u g h  action  is fo r  
A re n d t th e  A m erican  R evo lution  and th e  em ergence  o f the  United 
S ta tes  as a new b o d y  po litic . In  th a t sense, th e  Am erican R evolution 
was a rad ica lly  d if fe re n t expe rience  o f m od ern  revo lu tio ns  -  fo r  A re nd t, 
n o t th e  d es truc tio n  b u t the  fo u n d a tio n  o f th e  'space o f free do m ' was th e  
p rin c ip a l m eaning o f  th is  b reak ing  e ve n t. The R evo lu tion  is thus  the  
m o s t illu m in a tin g  e xa m p le  o f  A re n d t's  u nders tand ing  o f com m onness 
th ro u g h  beg inn ing , a c tive , b re ak in g , in -p e rfo rm a n ce . I t  pervades h e r 
th in k in g  in its e n tire ty . I t  te s tifie s  to  acting  in co nce rt o f men whoa re 
co n jo in ed  n o t by in te re s t -  n o r even by a rticu la te  in ten tions -  bu t by
40 " . . .  t o  b e  b o rn  m e a n s  a lw a y s  to  b e  b o rn  in to  a  w orld  p eo p led  w ith  m e n , to  b e  b o rn  fro m  
th e m , to  jo in  a  fam ily , a  p e o p le , a  c o m m o n w e a lth , e tc .  t h a t  w a s  th e r e  b efo re  a n d  w ith  
r e s p e c t  t o  w h ic h  w e  a r e  n e w c o m e rs ."  [P P 1 , p . 2 6 ]
41 "... t h e  g e n e ra l  n a tu r e  o f s a d n e s s  w h ich  n e e d s  n o  p r e te x t  b e c a u se  it c a n  rise  up  
u n p re d ic ta b ly  o u t  o f a n y o n e 's  in n e r  se lf , b e c a u s e  it is  d e e p ly  ro o te d  in th e  fa c t th a t  w e 
h a v e  n o t  g iv e n  life to  o u r s e lv e s  a n d  h a v e  n o t  c h o s e n  life f re e ly ."  [RV, 137]
42 "Y et t h e  b e lie v e r  r e la te s  in love to  th is  in d iv id u a l... on ly  in so fa r  a s  d iv ine g ra c e  can  be 
a t  w o rk  in h im . I n e v e r  lo v e  m y n e ig h b o r  fo r  h is  o w n  sa k e , o n ly  fo r th e  sa k e  o f  d ivine 
g ra c e ...  T h is  in d ire c tn e s s  t u r n s  m y  re la tio n  to  m y n e ig h b o r  in to  a  m e re  p a ssa g e  for th e  
d ire c t  r e la t io n  to  God h im se lf... T h is  in d ire c tn e s s  b r e a k s  up  so c ia l re la tio n s  by  tu rn in g  
th e m  in to  p ro v is io n a l o n e s .” [LSA, 1 1 1 ]
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th e  specific  h istorica l s itu a tio n , a particu lar m om en t and m om entum  o f 
even ts  and th e re o f derived  th e ir  com m on action.
The A m erican Founding Fathers inhabited a pecu lia r h is to rica l s itu a tio n , 
th e  fo un da tio n  o f the a bso lu te ly  new , a new body politic, which had to  
be le g itim a te d  in o rd e r to  be preserved and perpe tua ted . They w ere  
in s titu tin g  th e  new, aga ins t all established s truc tu res , and they w ere  
do ing  so w ith o u t ground in a n y th in g  o the r than  th e ir  ow n  actions.
As A rend t repeatedly observes, the  inevitab le  p roblem  o f every new 
beginning how ever has a lw ays been its arb itra riness, its  need to  ju s t ify  
its appearance, not s im p ly  appearance o f som ething d iffe re n t in the  
p lace o f som eth ing  old b u t e n tire ly  new space opening w here  there  was 
none. In  M achiavelli's w ords, "th e re  is noth ing m ore  d ifficu lt and 
dangerous, o r  m ore d o u b tfu l o f success, than an a tte m p t to  in troduce a 
new  o rd e r to  th ings in any s ta te ."  Machiavelli fu rth e r exp la ins th a t n o t 
o n ly  is it th e  problem  th a t th e re  are  always those  who p ro fited  from  the  
old o rd e r b u t also "the  in c re d u lity  o f men who have no fa ith  in anyth ing  
new  th a t is n o t the re su lt o f w ell-established expe rie nce ." [M achiavelli, 
Book V I:3 2 ]
W hat posed itse lf as a problem  in th a t s ituation  was n o t investing the  
people, th ro u g h  th e ir rep resen ta tives  in the leg is la tu res, w ith  leg is la tive  
pow ers b u t perceiving these v e ry  people, to  whom  th e  leaders o f the  
R evo lu tion  belonged, as the  sources o f 'h igh e r law ', and allow ing them  
to  perceive them selves as the  law tha t would bestow  both the  
ju s tif ic a tio n  and perm anence upon the  founded polity  and its new laws, 
b inding th e  citizens h ith e rto  know n to  them selves as a sheer m u ltitu d e  
o f 'th e  su b je c ts  of the  C row n ' in to  a new po litica l co m m u n ity  to  w hich 
th e y  w ere to  owe not loya lty  b u t com m itm ent in the sense o f partak ing  
in its  h is to ry . In  o the r w ords, th e  Founding Fathers w ere  em barrassed 
by the  ungrounded ness o f th e ir  own, unprecedented act. Such act 
a lw ays co ns titu te s  a p rob lem  fo r  th e  politics which J .B u tle r defines as 
"po litics  un th inkab le  w ith o u t a foundation, w ith o u t these  prem ises,” 
[B u tle r  and Scott, 1 9 9 2 :3 ] th a t is -  the  politics as it w as know n to  the  
A m erican revo lu tiona ries  w hen th e y  em barked upon th e ir  en te rp rise . 
T h e ir conceptua l language and th e ir  th ink ing , unlike th e ir  action, was 
b inding th e m  to  w ha t A re nd t considers the Judeo-C hris tlan  trad ition  o f 
law  as th e  d ivine co m m an dm e n t, there fore  leg itim a te d  by a 
tra n sce n d e n ta l a u th o rity .
Through  an  exhaustive  te x tu a l ana lysis o f Jefferson's p roc lam ation : "W e 
hold these  tru th s  to  be s e lf-e v id e n t,"  A rendt succeeds in  capturing o r 
ra th e r, open ing  up, b o th  a m b ig u ity  and am biva lence o f  the  h is to rica l 
m om en t o f th e  revo lu tion  and bu ild ing  o f a new po lity  in  response.43 On
4} “F ocusing  on  th e  fa m o u s  p h ra s e ,  ‘W e hold th e s e  t r u th s  to  be se lf -e v id e n t,’ A re n d t 
a r g u e s  th a t  th e  new  re g im e 's  p o w e r, a n d  u ltim ate ly  its  a u th o r i ty , de rive  fro m  th e  
p e r fo rm a tiv e  'w e  hold’ a n d  n o t  fro m  th e  c o n s ta tiv e  re fe re n c e  to  se lf -e v id e n t t r u th s .  Both 
d ra m a tic  a n d  n o n -re fe re n tia l, th e  p e r fo rm a tiv e  brings a  new  po litica l c o m m u n ity  in to  
b e in g ; it constitutes a  'w e .' T h is  s p e e c h  a c t ,  like all ac tio n , g iv es b ir th , a s  it w e re , to  th e  
a c to r ( s ) ,  in th e  m o m e n t(s )  o f i ts  u t te r a n c e  an d  re p e tit io n .! . . .]  For th e  s a k e  of po litics , fo r
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the  one hand, th e  reference to  th e  tru th s  by these m en  o f 
E n ligh tenm ent suggests th e  continu ing  presence o f  th e  transcenden ta l 
in th e  political. Being se lf-e v id e n t, these tru th s  re s is t any d ispu te  by 
m en, w ho  appear no t as th e ir  authors and hav ing  no pow er over 
a lte rin g  th a t which has n o t com e from  th e ir  ow n  w ill. On th e  o th e r 
hand, and fo r A rend t's  p ro ject m ore  im p o rta n tly , th e  phrase "w e  h o ld " 
is an  opening tow ards understand ing  th a t po litica l tru th s  cannot "posses 
the  sam e power to  com pel as th e  s ta te m e n t th a t tw o  tim es tw o  m ake 
fo u r ."  [OR, 193] I t  w as clear to  th e m , as acto rs , th a t the  new law  and 
new o rd e r  were em erging n e ith e r th ro ug h  th e  d iv in e  in te rve n tio n  nor 
th ro u g h  a neutral hand o f a law -m a ker a lien  to  th e  'polis* but th ro u g h  
th e ir  ow n doing. In  th a t sense, the  doing becom es th e  ground on w hich 
it its e lf stands.44
Thus A re nd t the politica l th in k e r, in co n tras t to  young  A rendt w ho read 
A ugustine  m ainly on his te rm s , w ill have rew orked  considerab ly  the 
idea o f the  com m on and com m onness o f co nd itio n  a t the  core o f the  
concern  w ith  the  w orld . From passiv ity o f th e  e x is te n tia l s itu a tio n  she 
m oves to  the  dynam ism  o f acting  to g e th e r, from  A ugustine 's  no tion  o f 
com m on  o rig in  as the  w ork ing  o f g o d -c re a to r - to  the A ris to te lian  
conception  o f civic friendsh ip  as engaging in a c tio n -p ro je c ts , th a t acting 
in co n ce rt which A rendt recognized in th e  s itu a tio n  o f A m erican  
founding  fa thers who were filled  w ith  'sh e e r jo y ' a t th e  decisive m o m e n t
th e  s a k e  o f f re e  political ac tio n , A re n d t c le a n s e s  th e  d e c la ra t io n  a n d  th e  fou n d in g  o f  th e ir  
v io len t, c o n s ta t iv e  m o m e n ts , of th e  irre s is tib le  a n c h o rs  of G od , se lf -e v id e n t t r u th ,  a n d  
n a tu ra l  law . T h ere  is to  be no  ’b e in g 1 b e h in d  th is  d o in g . T he d o in g , th e  p e rfo rm a n c e , is 
e v e ry th in g . On A ren d t’s  a c c o u n t t h e  re a l so u rc e  o f  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f th e  new ly fo u n d e d  
rep u b lic  w a s  th e  p e rfo rm a tiv e  no t t h e  su b s ta n tiv e  m o m e n t ,  t h e  a c tio n  in c o n c e r t  n o t th e  
iso la te d  a c q u ie sc e n c e , th e  ’w e ho ld ’ n o t  th e  s e lf -e v id e n t  t r u th .  A nd th e  re a l so u rc e  o f  
a u th o r i ty  in th e  repub lic , h e n c e fo r th , w ould  be th e  s ty le  o f  its  m a in te n a n c e ,  its  o p e n n e s s  
to  re fo u n d in g  and  re c o n s ti tu tio n .” [B u tle r  a n d  S c o t t ,  1 9 9 2 : 2 1 6 -2 1 7 ]  T his p a s s a g e  
r e c a p itu la te s  B. H onig 's re ad in g  o f  A re n d t 's  in te rp re ta tio n  w h ic h  b rin g s  to  lig h t its  
p e rfo rm a tiv e  d im en sio n . H ow ever, th e  read in g  d o e s  n o t  b a la n c e  t h a t  vein o f  A re n d t 's  
in te rp re ta t io n  a g a in s t its  c o u n te rp a r t ,  A re n d t 's  p ro fo u n d  a w a r e n e s s  o f  th e  a m b ig u ity  
su r ro u n d in g  th e  a c t  o f D e c la ra tio n , t h e  h e s ita tio n  o f t h e  F o u n d in g  F a th e rs  to  d e c la re  th e  
a b so lu te  n e w n e s s  o f  th e ir  a c t  -  a b s o lu te  a s  to ta lly  n e w , u n p re c e d e n te d ,  b u t a lso  a b s o lu te  
a s  a b so lv e d , in th is  c a se  o f  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  g ro u n d in g  -  b u t  a ls o  th e i r  c ap tiv ity  in th e  
c o n c e p tu a l  fram ew o rk  o f  tra d it io n a l  political p h ilo so p h y  a n d  i ts  in s tru m e n ta l  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of politics.
N e v e r th e le s s ,  w hile H o n ig 's  re a d in g  cou ld  b e n e fit  f ro m  in c o rp o ra tin g  th is  n o te  o f  
a m b ig u ity , th e  sp irit o f A re n d t 's  th o u g h t  in th e  g iv en  re a d in g  is n o t  v io la ted . By c o n tra s t ,  
th e  e m p lo y m e n t  o f  A re n d t 's  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  A m e ric an  R e v o lu tio n  in su p p o r t  o f  th e  
a r g u m e n t  fo r n e ce ss ity  o f  religion in t h e  m o m e n t o f  ' t h e  b irth  o f  a  new  political o rd e r ' in 
V iro li's n e w  book  c o n s t i tu te s  a  m is u n d e rs ta n d in g  of A re n d t 's  c o n c e p t  o f th e  political a s  o f  
h e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  A m erican  R e v o lu tio n  a s  th e  t ru ly  m o d e rn  political e v e n t  a n d  e x it 
fro m  th e  m ed iev a l tr a n s c e n d e n ta l  f r a m e w o rk  of p o litica l a ffa irs . T h e  m is rea d in g  is e v e n  
g r a v e r  if it is u n d e rs to o d  th a t  th e  A m e ric a n  R evo lu tion  is n o t  a n  e x a m p le  fo r illu s tra tio n  o f 
c o n c e p tu a l  a rg u m e n t to  A re n d t b u t  e s s e n tia l ly  in fo rm s  h e r  c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n  o f  th e  
p o litica l, c o m m u n ity  and  a c tio n . [V iroli, 2 0 0 5 ]
44 B e in e r  r e a d s  A re n d t 's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  m o m e n t  o f  po litical a c tin g  in th e  
illu m in a tin g  ligh t o f N ie tz sc h e 's  m o m e n t ,  th e  se lf -c o n ta in e d  m o m e n t  w hich  h o ld s  i ts  ow n 
m e a n in g . B e in e r  h e re  d ra w s  a n  im p o r ta n t  p ara lle l b e tw e e n  A re n d t a n d  N ie tz sch e , s trik in g  
a n  im p o r ta n t  cord  o f A re n d t 's  p o litica l p ro je c t,  th e  s e l f - c o n ta in e d e d n e s s  of b e g in n in g , 
w h e n  h e  a r g u e s  th a t  'c irc u la r ity ' s h o u ld  in fa c t b e  r e a d  a s  th e  e x is te n tia l  'a u to n o m y ' of 
m o m e n t:  'i t  h a s  no  p u rp o se  o u ts id e  its e lf , it lea d s  to  n o th in g  b u t  itse lf . Being is c ircu la r. 
T h e re fo re , n o th in g  o u ts id e  th e  m o m e n t c a n  s e rv e  to  ju s t if y  i t . . /  [LKPP, 148]
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o f co n s titu tin g  th e ir po litica l co m m u n ity  and th e  jo y  w as generated  by 
noth ing e lse  b u t partaking in th e  'pub lic  m a tte r ' w ith  o n e 's  fe llow s.45
45 Fellow ship  is p e rh a p s  th e  m o s t  a p p ro p r ia te  te rm  for th e  b o n d  a m o n g  p e rso n s  a c tin g  
to g e th e r ,  m o re  a p p ro p ria te  t h e n  fr ie n d sh ip  th o u g h  th e  la t te r  is  a ls o  fo u n d  in A re n d t 's  
e co n o m y . I f  th e  te rm  is to  b e  d raw n  fro m  h e r  e s s a y  o n  L essin g , t h e n  it w ould  s e e m  
log ica l th a t  t h e  te rm  is friendship b u t in th e  s e n se  o f th e  A ris to te lian  n o n -e ro tic  n o tio n  of 
frien d sh ip  fo r  t h e  w orld , w h e re  love, a s  th e  m o s t unw o rld ly  o f  a ll re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  
h u m a n s , a lm o s t  an ti-w orld ly , is  a b a n d o n e d  in fav o u r of r e s p e c t :  " R e s p e c t ,  n o t un like  th e  
A risto te lian  philia politikf, is  a  kind of 'friendsh ip*  w ith o u t in tim acy  a n d  w ith o u t c lo s e n e s s ;  
it is a  re g a rd  fo r  th e  p e rso n  f ro m  th e  d is ta n c e  w hich th e  s p a c e  o f t h e  w o rld  p u ts  b e tw e e n  
u s, a n d  th is  r e g a rd  is in d e p e n d e n t o f q u a litie s  w hich w e m a y  a d m ire  o r  o f  a c h ie v e m e n ts  
w h ich  w e m a y  h igh ly  e s te e m ."  [HC, 2 4 3 ]
F riendsh ip  a s  d isc u sse d  by A re n d t in th e  e s s a y  on  L essing  is o p p o se d  n o t  to  th e  p re se n c e  
o f m u ltitu d e  w h ich  'crow ds* s p a c e  bu t to  in tim acy , w hich  s e e k s  to  a r r e s t  a n d  to  b e h o ld , to  
su s p e n d  all m o tio n  since  it is a  p a ss iv e  cond ition , a se n sa tio n  o f  w a rm th  a n d  s h e l te r  
w h ich  can  b e  p e rp e tu a te d  o n ly  th ro u g h  u n d is tu rb e d  m o tio n le s s n e s s .  T h e  a s su m p tio n  is 
th a t  th e re  is  a  d iffe re n t kind o f  sp ace  b e tw e e n  m en , th e  sp a c e  w h ich  c o n n e c ts  a n d  r e la te s  
th e m  bu t is  still a  'sp a c e d  space* a n d  n o t th e  a b se n c e  o f s p a c e .  T h is  sp a c e d  s p a c e  
c h a ra c te r iz e s  a  p e cu lia r  politically  m ea n in g fu l c a te g o ry  o f fr ie n d sh ip  t h a t  d o e s  n o t e x tr a c t  
one  from  o n e 's  w orld  b u t in s e r ts  one  in to  th e  w orld , th e  frien d sh ip  fo r  a n d  in th e  w orld .
To u n d e rs ta n d  b e t t e r  w hy A re n d t in s is ts  on  sp ace  n e e d e d  fo r d is t in c tio n  o n e  c a n  tu rn  to  
h e r  a rg u m e n t  o n  freed o m  o f m o v e m e n t a s  th e  m o s t e le m e n ta ry  f r e e d o m , m o s t d irec tly  
fe lt a s  p re -c o n d itio n  fo r a c tin g , w hich In itse lf  is m o tio n , w h e re a s  m o tio n  is trad itio n a lly  
a s so c ia te d  w ith  m ea n in g  of b e in g s  w h o s e  /s is  in b eco m in g  an d  v a n is h in g , a s  p h ilo so p h y  
h a s  b e e n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  m an  e v e r  s in c e  i ts  b e g in n in g s. O n e  can  m o v e  f re e ly  only  if th e r e  
Is s p a c e , o n e  c a n  th e re fo re  a c t  a s  o n e  only  w h e re  sp a c e  Is n o t  e r a s e d ,  su ffo c a te d , o r 
s a tu r a te d .
A re n d t 's  d is c o n te n t  w ith  th e  In tim a te  frien d sh ip  p e rv a d e s  Rahel Varnhagen, h e r  ea rly  
s tu d y  of e x is tin g  on  th e  m a rg in s  o r  e v e n  o u ts id e  t h e  w orld , th e  c o n d itio n  o f  su ffe rin g  th e  
w orld  r a th e r  t h a n  re la ting  to  it, th e  co n d itio n  o f d e p riv a tio n  w hich  b e c o m e s  th e  c o n d itio n  
of th e  to ta l w ith d raw a l from  re a lity . T h e  in tim a te  fr ie n d sh ip  d e v e lo p s  a m o n g  th o s e  to  
w h o m  th e  w orld  is d en ied  a n d  w ho th e re fo re  fall on  e a c h  o t h e r  fo r  th e  s e n s e  of 
e m b e d d e d n e s s  in th e  w orld . [RV, 9 0 -9 1 ]  In  su c h  c o n d itio n , th e r e  is  a lw a y s  a  d a n g e r  of 
f ra te rn a l b ond  e m e rg in g  a s  a  s u b s ti tu te  fo r  th e  public re a lm .
A re n d t's  n o tio n  o f friendsh ip  m u s t  th e r e fo re  be s e e n  in d is tin c tio n  t o  t h e  19 th c e n tu ry  
m e ta m o rp h o s is  o f friendsh ip  fro m  a pub lic  to  a  p riv a te  r e la tio n s h ip , f ro m  th a t  w hich  
c o n c e rn s  th e  w orld  to  th a t  w h ich  c o n c e rn s  th e  individual. S u c h  w o rld ly  f r ien d sh ip  is b a s e d  
n o t o n  h a rm o n y  an d  'b ro th e r l in e s s , ' b u t  on  th e  p e rp e tu a te d  c o n te s t  a n d  p e rp e tu a tin g  of 
c o n te s ts ,  c h a lle n g e  a n d  d iffe re n ce  a s  it en ta ils  th o se  'u n p re d ic ta b le  h a z a r d s /  This 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  co n ce p t o f  f r ien d sh ip  is found  in P. B o w e n -M o o re 's  book  on A re n d t 
[1 9 8 9 :1 4 5 ] , a lso  d isc u sse d  in L. J. D isc h 's  Hannah Arendt and the Limits o f Philosophy 
[1 9 9 4 :1 8 7 ] .  T h e  la t te r  a u th o r  a lso  c ite s  t h e  friendsh ip  b e tw e e n  J a s p e r s  a n d  A ren d t a s  an  
e x am p le  o f th is  d iffe re n t kind o f  f r ien d sh ip , w hich re s is te d  c lo su re  o f  s p a c e s  for "d isc o u rse  
b e tw e e n  th in k e rs ."  [MDT, 30 ]
N e v e r th e le ss  fr ien d sh ip  is w h a t  h e lp s u s  d e a l w ith " th is  m e re  e x is te n c e ,  th a t  is, all th a t  
w hich  is m y s te r io u s ly  g iven to  u s  a t b irth  an d  w hich  in c lu d e s  th e  s h a p e  o f o u r b o d ie s  and  
th e  ta le n ts  of o u r  m in d s ."  [OT, 1 15] N am ely , th is  fr ien d sh ip  m a n ife s te d  in th e  u n e n d in g , 
u n reso lv in g , u n se ttl in g  d isc o u rse , is th a t  w hich  re n d e rs  th e  w orld  h u m a n . [MDT, 25 ] 
H ow ever, e v e n  in th e  e s sa y  w hich  is inter alia on  fr ien d sh ip , A re n d t e m p lo y s  th e  te rm  
fellows and  in On Revolution, w hich  p o r t r a y s  th e  h is to rica l in s ta n c e s  o f  ac tin g  to g e th e r ,  
frien d sh ip  is a b s e n t  - unlike fe llow sh ip . I f  th e  key to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th is  p e c u lia r  
a n d  n o n - in tim a te  co n ce p t o f fr ien d sh ip  is  th e re fo re  th e  d is ta n c e  t h a t  is th e  w orld a n d  if 
th e  w orld  is b o th  th e  sp a c in g  in -b e tw e e n  a n d  th e  c o n n ec tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  p e rso n s  re la tin g  
a s  (po litica l) 'f r i e n d s /  th e n  it is n o t a c c id e n ta lly  th a t  A re n d t m u ch  m o re  fre q u e n tly  an d  
co m fo rtab ly  u s e s  th e  te rm  fellows t h a n  friends. T hough  h e r  a n a ly s is  o f fr ien d sh ip  a s  a 
h isto rica l c a te g o ry  su g g e s ts  th a t  th e  c o n c e p t is b ro a d e r  th a n  th e  ro m a n tic iz e d  in tim a te  
re la tio n sh ip  im b u e d  w ith e r a s ,  it s e e m s  t h a t  A rend t is r e lu c ta n t  to  r e c o v e r  th e  old n o tio n  
of fr ien d sh ip  a n d  c o n fro n t a ll th e  im p lica tio n s o f its  g e n e a lo g ic a l h is to ry  a n d  c o m m o n  
u n d e rs ta n d in g . Even in its  a n c ie n t  m e a n in g , m o st n o ta b ly  in A r is to t le 's  Nicomachean 
Ethics, th e  n o tio n  of p e rfe c t f r ien d sh ip  is b a s e d  on th e  s e m b la n c e  o f v ir tu e ,  w h e re a s  w h a t 
is crucial for th is  re la tio n sh ip  in A re n d t 's  u n d e rs ta n d in g , a s  fo r th e  p u b lic  sp h e re  to  w h ich  
it b e lo n g s , is  n o t th e  co m m o n a lity  o f ind iv idual q u a litie s  o r  v ir tu e ,  in so fa r  th e  fe llow s
Through  action  in conce rt and n o t on the  g round o f  com m ona lity  o f 
cond ition  there  em erges the bond among c itizens o f body politic . The 
bond does no t precede action, and it does no t gen e ra te  action bu t is 
itse lf th ro u g h  action, renewed o r  re-estab lished th ro u g h  actions to  
fo llow .
A rend t has th e re fo re  developed a d yna m ic  concep t o f po litical 
co m m u n ity  ins titu ted  th ro ug h  a c tion  and ex is ting  th rough  a c ting .* 46 
Action is both  m an's bond to  th e  w orld  and a bond betw een m en. The 
co m m u n ity  em erg ing from  th e  m om en t o f  action  is, as Kharkhodin 
r ig h tly  po in ts  o u t, a co m m u n ity  o f  action, as opposed to  com m un ity  
th a t c la im s substan tive  g ro un d in g . [2 0 0 1 :4 7 1 ]
M oreover, the  co m m u n ity  o f a c tio n  is also a co m m u n ity  in action, it 
exis ts  th ro u g h  m ove m e n t o f ac tions. The is  o f co m m u n ity  lies no t in 
som e concealed Being b u t in its  acting  ou t, in its  ow n  becom ing; there  
is no m o re  sense in ta lk in g  a b o u t Being o f th e  co m m u n ity , only a bo u t it 
being, in th e  fo rm  o f ve rb  to  d en o te  exis tence  in a c tin g . Acting is the 
'm ode o f being to g e th e r,' [H P T/M ontesqu ieu , 3 ] m o re o v e r -  a politica l 
m ode, since "a  po litica l realm  does not a u to m a tic a lly  com e in to  being 
w he re ve r m en live to g e th e r."  [O R , 19] T h a t co m m u n ity  is n e ith e r a 
com m un ion  w here  s ing u la rity  d isappears n o r a su bs ta n tive  e n tity . And 
the  co m m u n ity  -  'founded  on ly  th ro u g h  and fo r  an in fin ite  resistance to  
every a pp ro p ria tio n  o f the essence, co llec tive  o r  ind iv idua l, o f its 
sharing , o r o f its fo u n d a tio n ' [N a ncy, 1 9 8 8 /1 9 9 3 :9 5 ] -  is not an entity 
o f co m m un a l Being, it is itse lf a m om en t, res is ting  ca p tu re , an even t o f 
b e ing -in -co m m o n  w hich  cannot be reduced to  the  state  as a s ta tic  
s tru c tu re .
A rendt co n tends  th a t body p o litic , as any body, necessarily is on ly  
th rough  change and m o ve m e n ts , its o w n  in n e r tran s fo rm ative  
processes o r  o u te r  in fluences. Th is  understand ing  o f th e  m ain princip le  
o f body p o litic  as m o ve m e n t and change fo r  A re nd t em erges from  the 
w ork  o f  M ontesqu ieu, a p o litica l th in k e r sing led o u t by A rendt fo r  his 
in te res t in  th e  p rinc ip les  o f m o tio n  and not th e  in s titu tio n s  th a t seek to  
conta in  it. A re n d t shares w ith  M ontesquieu th e  pro found understanding 
o f the te n s io n  inh e re n t to  e ve ry  p o litica l ed ifice , w h ich  is so unlike any 
p roducts o f  m en 's  hands and to o ls : " i t  does n o t su rv ive  the  a c tu a lity  o f 
the  m o v e m e n t w hich  b ro u g h t it in to  being, b u t d isappears not only w ith  
the  d isp ersa l o f men... b u t w ith  th e  d isappearance o r  a rrest o f the
w ithin  t h e  po litica l a re n a  a r e  n o t c h o s e n  o n  th e  sa m e  te r m s  a s  th o s e  in th e  in tim a te  
s p h e re . I t  is  r a th e r  c o m m o n a li ty  of t h e  w o rld  a s  “th e  sp a c e  b e tw e e n  th e m  th a t  u n ite s  
th e m , r a th e r  t h a n  so m e  q u a li ty  in side  e a c h  o f  th e m ,"  [C a n o v a n , 1 9 8 5 :6 3 4 ]  th e  sp a c e  
w hich  is e x p e r ie n c e d  a s  c o m m o n  only  th r o u g h  a c tin g  to g e th e r .  U nlike fr ien d s , fe llo w s do 
n o t r e la te  to  e a c h  o th e r  d ire c tly  b u t t h e i r  re la tin g  is m e d ia te d  by  th e  w orld  w ith  w hich  
th e y  a re  c o n c e rn e d .
46 A re n d tia n  p rin cip le  o f  c o m m u n ity  p e r v a d e s  c o n te m p o ra ry  po litica l th e o ry  o f a g o n is tic  
d e m o c ra c y : "T h is  m o d e rn  fo rm  of p o litica l c o m m u n ity  is h e ld  to g e th e r  no t by a 
su b s ta n tiv e  id e a  o f  th e  c o m m o n  g o o d  b u t  by a  c o m m o n  bond , a  pub lic  c o n ce rn . I t  is 
th e re fo re  a c o m m u n ity  w ith o u t a d e f in ite  s h a p e  o r  a  d e f in ite  id e n ti ty  a n d  in c o n tin u o u s  
r e - e n a c tm e n t ."  [M ouffe, 1 9 9 2 :2 3 3 ]
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a c tiv ities  th em se lve s ." [HC, 199] M ontesquieu's obse rva tion  on political 
co m m u n ity  as th a t which m oves instead o f th a t w hich a rres ts  is w hat 
A rend t reads as a m odern re in te rp re ta tio n  o f the  experience, perhaps 
also 'a d v e n t, ' o f polis , w h ich  cam e in to  being as fram e w o rk  fo r action  
and n o t a re fuge  from  it :  "a  'fo rm  o f g o ve rn m e n t' which provided m en 
w ith  a space o f appearances where th ey  could act..." [BPF, 154]
The question  how ever rem ains w h a t keeps th is 'space o f appearances' 
to g e th e r, and it is m ore  than  a theo re tica l question , equa lly  so fo r  
M ontesquieu and A rendt -  it  is a p rob lem  o f p a rticu la r g raveness fo r th e  
age m arked by the  w ithd ra w a l o r  decline o f the transcenden ta l 
a u th o rity  in the  politica l sphere. In  searching fo r rem edy, A rendt 
rem ains close to  the th ink ing  o f M ontesquieu w hom  she sees as th e  
on ly  one am ong the  th inke rs  ac tive  p rio r to  th e  m odern  revo lu tions, 
the re fo re  th e  o n ly  one w ith o u t an  im m edia te  experience  o f a radical 
b reak and n o ve lty  in his po litica l rep os ito ry , who does n o t w ithd ra w  in to  
the  refuge o f in troducing  "an  abso lu te , a d iv ine  o r a despotic  power, 
into  the  p o litica l rea lm ." [OR, 188]
The p ecu lia rity  o f M ontesquieu's so lu tion  lies in his no tion  o f th e  
d iffe re n t 'o rd e rs  o f law s' which o u g h t n o t in te rfe re  w ith  each o the r as 
they d iffe r " in  th e ir  o rig in , in th e ir  ob ject, and in th e ir  n a tu re ." 
[M on tesqu ieu , Book XX V I] The o rd e r o f hum an laws is historicized by 
M ontesquieu -  th e y  are su b jec t to  change unlike th e  re lig ious laws th a t 
com e from  e te rn ity  and a re  m eant fo r  e te rn ity . The hum an laws reta in  
re la tiona l q u a lity , M ontesquieu a rgues, and recovers Rom an Latin root 
o f th e  w ord law, accentua ting  a re la tio n a l d im ension inh e re n t to  the  
no tion  o f law and le g a lity , w h ich  renders a ny  re so rt to  absolute 
a u th o rity  m eaningless. The law is n o t about substance  bu t about 
re la tin g ,47 se pa ra ting , d is tingu ish ing  and dem arcating  w h ich  relates a t 
the  sam e tim e  th a t which is separa ted.
By renouncing the  im p o rt o f th e  transcenden ta l in to  th e  political, 
M ontesquieu's concern w ith  the p o litica l and its  in s titu tio n a l s truc tu re  
assum es a v e ry  d iffe re n t course th a n  th a t o f h is contem pora ries  bu t 
also th a t o f m a n y  o f those who com e a fte r h im . As A re n d t reads and 
appropria tes  his th o u g h t th rough  h e r understand ing  o f law  and po lity  as 
liv ing (and changing) e n titie s , M ontesquieu's princ ipal question  is the  
question  o f th e  spiritus movens o f  po litica l ac tion  w h ich  lives in the  
laws, ra th e r th a n  being conta ined, lim ite d , constrained by th e  laws:
The necessary m ove m e n t o f a body po litic  can never be 
found in its essence if on ly  because th is essence -  again 
since Plato -  has a lways been defined w ith  a v iew  to  its 
perm anence. D ura tion  seem ed one o f the  surest 
ya rds ticks  fo r the  goodness o f a governm ent... T here fo re  
w hat th e  de fin itio n  o f g ove rnm ents  a lw ays needed was
47 T he o p en in g  s e n te n c e  o f The Spirit o f the Laws d e fin e s  la w s  a s  ’n e c e s s a ry  relations.' 
F u r th e r  o n , M o n te sq u ie u  d e v e lo p s  no t o n ly  a  re la tio n a l c h a ra c te r  o f  law s, in th e  se n se  
th a t  th e y  th e m s e lv e s  a re  re la tio n s , b u t a ls o  th e ir  re la tive  n a tu re  -  t h a t  th e y  have  to  
re la te  to  v a rio u s  fa c to rs ,  su c h  a s  th e  c lim a te , p o p u la tio n , o th e r  law s, e tc .  of th e  polity. 
M o n tesq u ieu , B ook  I.
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w h a t M ontesquieu called a 'p rinc ip le  o f a c tio n ' which, 
d iffe re n t in each fo rm  o f gove rnm ent, w ou ld  inspire  
g ove rnm ent and citizens a like in th e ir  pub lic a c tiv ity  and 
serve  as a crite rion , beyond th e  m ere ly  negative  
ya rd s tick  o f law fu lness, fo r  judg ing  a ll a c tion  in public 
a ffa irs . [OT, 4 6 7 ]
U nderly ing  th is  search fo r  the 'p rin c ip le  o f a c tio n ' is th e  awareness th a t 
laws as a construc t o f hum an co m m u n ity  are  co n fron te d  w ith  the  m ost 
unp red ic tab le  and m ost ephem era l o f hum an a c tiv it ie s , hum an action . 
W hat laws are supposed to l im it,  w here lim ita tio n  presum es no t on ly  
co n tro lling  bu t also foresee ing , p red ic ting , p re -e m p tin g , is th is open- 
ended and rup turous event. O n th e  basis o f such understand ing  o f 
action , it  was clear to  A rendt as it was to M ontesqu ieu  th a t laws could 
no t be re lied  upon fo r, paradoxica lly , they  w ere  supposed to  lim it th a t 
w hich "h a s  an inh e re n t tendency to  force open a ll lim ita tio n s  and cu t 
across a ll boundaries ." I f  for n o th ing  else, th a n  fo r  th e  fa c t o f hum an 
n a ta lity , th e  pressure o f  each new  generation  com ing  in to  the  w orld  and 
m aking a c la im  upon it  to be accom m odated: "The fra ilty  o f hum an 
In s titu tion s  and laws and , g en era lly , o f all m a tte rs  pe rta in ing  to  m en 's  
liv ing to g e th e r, arises from  th e  hum an cond ition  o f n a ta lity  and is qu ite  
ind ep en d en t o f the  fra ilty  o f hum an  n a tu re ." [HC, 1 9 0 -1 9 1 ]
W hat fo llow s th e reo f is tha t one  cannot proceed to  c o n s tru c t a lasting  
body p o litic  on the  ground o f th e  assumed un ive rsa l hum an n a tu re  -  
w h ich  is precise ly w ha t early m od ern  theo ris ts  devo ted  them selves to  -  
and p resum e th a t the  laws w ou ld  p redict the  course o f  actions and thus 
p reserve  the  po lity  fro m  th e ir  destructive  d rive . A fte r  a ll, the  laws 
canno t be relied upon since "...o n  the one hand, p a rtic u la r in te llig e n t 
beings a re  o f a fin ite  nature, and consequently  liable to  e rro r; and on 
the  o th e r, th e ir na ture  requires them  to  be free  a g e n ts ." [M ontesqu ieu , 
Book 1 :2 ]
T h e re fo re , un like  nearly a ll o th e r m odern  p o litica l theo ris ts , 
M ontesqu ieu  does not depart fro m  a notion o f hum an n a tu re  to  devise  a 
co rrespond ing  se t o f norm s to  co n ta in  it but fro m  the basic p resum ption  
th a t o n ly  'p o w e r a rrests  pow er,' and th a t th e  c o n s titu tio n  o f a lasting  
body p o litic  m u s t be th o u g h t in these te rm s. The ro o t o f th is  th ink ing  
preserves the  orig ina l re la tion  o f power  to  m ovem ent. Power is not bu t 
pow er moves. I t  appears in th e  world th ro u g h  m ove m e n t, w here  
m o v e m e n t includes th e  m o v e m e n t in th e  sense o f becom ing -  
becom ing as such or becom ing d iffe re n t, changing th e re fo re . Therefore  
to  ax-rest pow er m eans precise ly to  hold, to  s top , to  bring  to  rest th a t 
w h ich  m oves. I f  body politic how ever is defined not only by its 
n o rm a tiv e - in s titu tio n a l s tru c tu re  b u t also th ro u g h  the  m o ve m e n t/a c tin g  
o f m en, m o re o ve r if " [a ] I I  p o litica l in s titu tio n s  are m an ifes ta tions  and 
m a te ria liza tio n s  o f pow er..." and th e re fo re  them se lves  em erge fro m  
m o v e m e n t, a r-resting power d ire c tly  co n trad ic ts  p reserva tion  o f the  
body p o litic  in th a t m otion  w ith o u t w hich  in s titu tio n s  "p e tr ify  and decay 
as soon as the  living power  [e m p ha s is  by a u th o r] o f th e  people ceases 
to  uphold  th e m ."  [OV, 4 1 ]
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From M ontesquieu's prem ise th a t on ly  'p o w e r checks p o w e r7 w ith o u t 
ann ih ila ting  it  a lto g e th e r and th e  prem ise th a t pow er em erges  on ly  
th rough  ac tion , A rendt derives th e  conclusion th a t th e  capacity to  
contro l action  m u s t lie in  action itse lf. I f  not, i t  would s u b m it action to  
som e o the r, 'h ig h e r ' capacity  o f m an  w hich w ould  e n ta il th a t action  was 
not th e  locus  o f freedom  and w ould  reduce it to  the e xe cu tio n  o f th e  
preconceived plans, su bm itting  it to  som ething e x te rna l to  it.
The question  is how to  generate  pow er w ith in  the  body p o litic  since 
hum an being does n o t posses pow er. N am ely, u n like  Hobbes, 
M ontesquieu does not contend th a t the  an im a lis tic  m an in th e  state o f 
nature , w hich  Is a c tua lly  the  s ta te  o f co n fron ta tion  w ith  nature , 
possesses any power, fo r  even th e  capacity to  kill is n o th ing  but th e  
a b ility  to  evade being k illed . M ontesquieu's p o rtraya l o f th e  p rim ord ia l 
hum an cond ition , not natu re , dep icts  m en in th e  s ta te  o f  nature  as 
weak and fe a rfu l but these tra its  o f m en are a p ro pe rty  o f co nd itio n , no t 
o f m en as such. Power how ever em erges not in a  m an, b u t o n ly  among 
m en, in action .
Arendt accepts M ontesquieu's basic proposition th a t p ow er is generated 
only among and by m any though  she does n o t develop and does n o t 
p u rpo rt to deve lop  any notion  o f p rim ord ia l hum an  n a tu re  b u t ra th e r 
insists on th e  non -essen tia lis t understand ing  o f  the  h um an  cond ition , 
w hich is defined  in th e  sense o f lim its  and po ten tia ls  a ris ing  from  th e  
fact o f being born  as a hum an. Hence it is m ean ing less fo r  A rendt, 
though she accepts M ontesquieu's conclusion, to  speak o f m a n  as weak, 
equally m eaningless to  po rtray ing  m an as s tron g . How and w h y  power 
is related to  p lu ra lity  in A rendt's  econom y stem s fro m  A rendt's  
understand ing o f m an as fin ite  (and here we find the  f irs t undertones o f 
the e x is te n tia lis t d im ension  o f A re nd t's  p ro jec t) and th e re fo re  non­
sovereign in the  sense th a t one can be an a u th o r o f a c tion  but not a 
m aste r o f its  consequences and u ltim a te ly , not a c rea to r o f th e  outcom e 
of one 's action.
Any action  has the  processual characte r, w hich  does n o t m ean  th a t 
action  should be equated w ith  th e  au tom atic  process b u t th a t action 
"has no e n d ." [HC, 2 33 ] The s to ry  o f action, as it w ill be elaborated in 
the next chap te r, is a s to ry  "o f being able to  beg in  so m e th in g  new and 
o f no t being able  to  co n tro l o r even fo re te ll its consequences.''[H C , 235 ] 
Since pow er is defined th ro ug h  th e  a b ility  to  e ffe c t s o m e -th in g , and 
man by h im se lf can on ly  e ffe c t a beginning tow ards  an e ffe c t o f som e­
th ing but n e ve r actua lly  achieve th a t so m e -th ing , p ow er is generated 
only by com m on action, n o t in oneness. Power as p o w e r-to  w ill em erge 
if  and only if  m en  act to g e th e r in to  th e ir  w orld , and th is  p ow er can be 
checked on ly  by  pow er, th e re fo re  -  th ro ug h  a c tion  again.
In  te rm s o f an  h is to rica l, p a rticu la r body politic , how ever, it m ay  seem 
th a t th is  conclusion leaves m uch w anting , and seem s less of a 
conclusion and m ore o f a seed o f m any an aporia, above  a ll -  how to  
transla te  it in to  v iable po litica l ins titu tions . I t  is the  q uestion  th a t
incessan tly  haunted M achiavelli as a s tu de n t o f change and innovation  
w hose inqu iries  were how ever d riven  by the  co nce rn  w ith  th e  
p e rm a ne n t and the stable . Nam ely, the  source o f M ach iave lli's  inq u iry  
in to  virtù as the  political response to  u np re d ic ta b ility  o f  Fortuna  is his 
a tte m p t to  endow the  po litica l ed ifice  w ith  ce rta in  s ta b ility  and 
lastingness th a t F lorentine Republic did not en joy, and his concerns are  
v e ry  close to  A rendt's  w ho never ceases to  believe th a t  "one  o f the  
po in ts  o f po litics is to  found in s titu tio n s  th a t w ill la s t.'7 [H onig, 
1 9 9 3 :1 1 2 ]
W hat A re nd t's  and M achiavelli's com m on concern  suggests  is th e  
in h e re n t and irresolvab le  tension  a t th e  hea rt o f th e  po litica l -  th e  
te ns io n  be tw een  order and freedom  m anifested  th ro u g h  a c tio n . A lready 
in h e r c r it iq u e  o f the  classical ph ilosophy, e laborated h ere  in C hapter 
O ne, A rend t argued th a t po litica l ph ilosophy has fro m  its  beg innings 
been ca ug h t in the  tension betw een the  conserv ing, s ta b iliz in g  role o f 
the  laws and ins titu tions , and th e  explosive  s p o n ta n e ity  o f hum an 
ac tions  w ith in  the  space o f freedom  delineated by th e  law s. Political 
ed ifice  is ine v itab ly  p ro jected  into fu tu re  and fo r  it, no t in  th e  sense o f 
ca lcu la ting  and planning the  fu tu re  as if there  w ere a p ro to type  to  
fo llow  in the  opera tion  o f m odeling  b u t in th e  sense o f h av ing  a world in 
th e  m o s t e le m e n ta ry  sense: " [B jo d ie s  po litic  have a lw ays been 
designed fo r  perm anence ../' [HC, 4 7 ] Body p o litic  is a trea su re r o f 
fu tu re  as a poss ib ility  fo r a certa in  c o m m u n ity  and m u s t be  understood 
no t o n ly  in sp a tia l te rm s, as a dem arca ted  te rr ito ry , b u t also as a 
c e rta in  te m p o ra l horizon, d u ra tio n  both  in th e  sense o f  tem pora l 
e x ten s ion  and o f perm anence, paradox ica lly  th e re fo re  e x is tin g  in tim e  
w h ile  c la im ing  resistance to  tim e , as a bu lw ark  aga ins t its ru inous flow : 
I f  th e  w orld  is to  co n ta in  a pub lic  space, it c a n n o t be 
erected  fo r  one g enera tion  and planned fo r  th e  liv ing  
o n ly ; it m u s t transcend th e  life -span  o f  m o rta l m en . 
W ith o u t th is  transcendence in to  a p o te n tia l e a rth ly  
im m o rta lity , no p o litics , s tr ic t ly  speaking, no co m m o n  
w orld  and no public rea lm , is possible... [T ]h e  co m m o n  
w orld  is w ha t we e n te r  w hen w e are born and w h a t we 
leave beh ind when w e  die. I t  transcends o u r life -sp a n  
in to  p a s t and fu tu re  a like ; it w as there  b e fo re  w e  cam e 
and it  w ill o u tla s t o u r  b rie f so jo u rn  in it. I t  is w h a t we 
have in com m on not o n ly  w ith  those  who live  w ith  us, b u t 
also w ith  those who w ere  here  before  and w ith  th ose  w ho 
w ill co m e  a fte r us. [H C , 55]
But th is  dem and  fo r  perm anence s ta nd s  in c o n tra d ic tio n  w ith  A rendt's  
a tte m p t to  conceptua lize  b od y  po litic  th ro u g h  c o n s ta n t m o ve m e n t. Body 
p o litic  appears te n s io n -rid d e n : the cessation  o f m o tio n  spe lls  ruin fo r 
th a t w hich  is defined th ro u g h  m o tio n ; on th e  o th e r  hand, the  
m o ve m e n t e n ta ils  change and  th re a te n s  the s ta b ility  and perm anence 
w h ich  body p o litic  should b o th  em b od y and gua ra n tee . In  o th e r  words, 
the  p rob lem  o f th e  perm anence o f b od y  po litic  is n o t ove rcom e.
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The a c t o f prom ise as institu tion
C ontrary  to th e  in s titu tio n a lis t approach  which opposes ins titu tio n s  to 
agency but a lso  c o n tra ry  to  th ose  theoretica l fram ew orks  which 
foreground a gency as opposed to  ins titu tio n s , A rend t's  response to  the 
problem  o f perm anence  o f body p o litic  is based on the p ropos ition  o f 
action as  in s titu tio n  th ro ug h  th e  a c t o f  prom ise. Promise is n o t a m odel 
fo r a fu tu re  w o rld  b u t a c o m m itm e n t to  the fu tu r ity  o f  the  w orld, 
opening o f th e  w orld  fo r  th ose  w ho  a re  ye t to  com e. Prom ise is not 
p red ictive  bu t it  becom es th e  g round  fo r  fu tu re . I t  is a c tion  not only 
among one's co n te m p o ra rie s  b u t a lso  am ong the succeeding inhab itan ts 
o f the w orld , w h e re fro m  responses to  th e  act o f prom ise w ill com e: 
There  is an  e lem en t o f the  w orld -bu ild ing  capacity o f  m an 
in  the h um an  fa cu lty  o f  m ak ing  and keeping prom ises.
Just as prom ises and agreem ents  deal w ith  the fu tu re  
and p rov ide  s ta b ility  in the  ocean o f fu tu re  u nce rta in ty  
w here  th e  u np re d ic ta b le  m ay b reak  in fro m  a ll s ides, so 
th e  c o n s titu tio n , fo un d in g , and w orld -bu ild ing  capacities 
o f m an concern  a lw ays no t so  m uch ourselves and o u r 
ow n tim e  on  e a rth  as o u r 'successor,' and 'p o s te r itie s .'
[OR, 1 7 5 ]48
The bond th a t is established am ong acting  men on the one hand, and 
on th e  o the r -  betw een th e m  and th e ir  p ro jected  body politic  is 
em bodied in th e  w ord  o f p rom ise , as th e  agreem ent to  guard  and 
pursue a ce rta in  jo in t  ente rp rise  a g a in s t the unpred ic tab le  odds o f 
fu ture  o v e r w h ich  m en have no pow er b u t th e ir  ow n w ord.
To prom ise, prom ittere , denotes p u ttin g  and sending fo rth , prom ise  is a 
word placed in to  th e  world w hich  is she lte red  by noth ing else b u t itself. 
Promises are o n ly  "iso la ted  islands o f ce rta in ty  In th e  ocean o f 
u n ce rta in ty " and to  a tte m p t " to  co ve r the  whole ground o f the  fu tu re  
and to  m ap o u t a path  secured in a ll d ire c tio n s " is a m isuse o f prom ise. 
Promises rem ain  o n ly  the  'g u id e p o s ts ,' to  which one can re tu rn  again 
and aga in , the tra c e  o f one's presence In terra incognita  th a t the  fu tu re  
is, w hich  h ow eve r is no less incognita  fo r  th a t, y e t the  ones who w ill 
inhabit it  can sa y  how th ey  w ill w an t to  live in it. [H C , 244 ] Promise is 
ne ither a firm  d e s tin a tio n  p o in t n o r a m apped rou te  but som eth ing  fo r 
which th e  ones b ro u g h t to g e th e r s tand  in the  present and fro m  where 
they a re  ready to  depart in to  a com m on  fu tu re . The  ones m aking the
48 This is how  A re n d t d e a ls  w ith o n e  of th e  tw o  ills of ac tion , i ts  u n p re d ic ta b ility . The 
o th er, its  irrev e rs ib ility  is  in A re n d t 's  p h e n o m e n o lo g y  o f a g e n c y  a lso  re m e d ie d  th ro u g h  a 
ty p e  o f ac tio n  - fo rg iv e n e s s , o n e  a c t  th a t  'b e t r a y s ' e x p e c ta t io n s  a n d  d is tu rb s  th e  
a u to m a tic  flow of e v e n t s ,  annu lling  th e  d is tu rb in g , e v e n  tra g ic , irrev e rsib ility  o f ac tio n s: 
"Forgiving... is th e  o n ly  re ac tio n  w h ich  d o e s  n o t m ere ly  r e - a c t  bu t a c ts  a n e w  and 
u n e x p e c te d ly , u n c o n d itio n e d  by th e  a c t  w hich  p ro v o k e d  it and  th e re fo re  f re e in g  from  its 
c o n se q u e n c e s  b o th  th e  o n e  w ho fo rg iv e s  a n d  th e  o n e  w ho is fo rg iv en ."  [HC, 2 4 1 ]  To 
re so rt to  v e n g e a n c e  m e a n s  to  ta k e  a n o th e r  s t e p  w ith in  th e  s a m e  c o u rse  o f e x p ec te d  
e v e n ts . To forgive h o w e v e r  is to  b re a k  th e  c h a in  a n d  s ta r t  a n  a l to g e th e r  n e w  c o u rse  of 
e v e n ts . [HC, 2 4 0 -2 4 1 ]  T h e re fo re , th e  r e m e d y  a g a in s t  th e  irrev e rs ib ility  and 
u n p red ic tab ility  of t h e  p ro c e s s  s t a r te d  by a c tin g  'd o e s  no t a r is e  ou t o f a n o th e r  and  
possibly h ig h e r  fa c u lty , b u t is one  o f  th e  p o te n tia l i t ie s  of ac tion  its e lf . ' [HC, 2 3 6 -2 3 7 ]
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prom ise  c o m m it them se lves , a lthough  they cannot fo re te ll a ll th a t  it 
en ta ils , hides, b rings a b o u t and w here , u lt im a te ly , it  m ay take  th e m . 
Future as the d u ra tio n  o f being to g e th e r, o f ex is ting  as a body p o litic  is 
a m iracle  w hich  on ly  m en can bring a bo u t. To  speak o f fu tu re  fo r m en  
in p lu ra lity  th e re fo re  is m eaningfu l o n ly  if one sees it as a p o te n tia l 
w h ich  actions o f those  m e n  trans la te  in to  rea lity .
W hat A rendt Is saying by focusing on the  concept o f prom ise Is th a t 
w h ile  the fu tu re  o f man  as a being is na tu ra lly  necessary -  it  is a fu tu re  
o f th a t w hich is and has to  not-be  a t a ce rta in  po in t, a fte r it has ru n  its  
course -  the re  is noth ing  n a tu ra l about the  course o f m en in the  w o rld . 
W ith  the  w orld  and all th in g s  and a ffa irs  hum an ce rta in ty  is a lways n o n ­
fu tu re  ra th e r th a n  the  fu tu re . Future fo r  m en in p lural w ho fo rm  a 
co m m u n ity  is n o t s im p ly  th a t w hich is y e t to  com e, it is n o t a g iven  
span o f tim e  ahead w h ich  m en and th e ir  a ffa irs  flow  into. I t  is o n ly  a 
p o te n tia l o f h um an  ac tions , a m a tte r  o f freedom  and action , n o t o f 
necessity and process, it weaves itse lf ou t o f hum an action. Prom ise in 
th a t sense is no th ing  b u t opening o f fu tu re , a ny  fu tu re  fo r the  w o rld , 
and the b inding o f those w ho  prom ise to  the  w orld .
In  th e  notion o f p rom ise , th e re fo re , it is th e  presen t th a t takes over th e  
ground  from  the  fu tu re , "d ip o s [in g ] o f the  fu tu re  as though it w ere  th e  
p resen t, th a t is, the  eno rm ous and tru ly  m iracu lous en la rgem ent o f th e  
v e ry  d im ension in w hich  the  power can be e ffe c tiv e ."  [HC, 245] I t  is 
th e re fo re  not a b o u t accepting  the  resp o n s ib ility  fo r  the  presen t as it 
com es ou t o f th e  fu tu re  b u t accepting th e  responsib ility  fo r  both  th e  
p resen t as now and the  p re sen t as th e  nest o f the  fu tu re  by acting  in 
th e  now.
I f  w ith  action  a new  series in tim e  beings, th ro u g h  prom ise m en  c o m m it 
them selves to  c o n tin u a tio n  -  w hile  no t necessarily co n tin u ity  -  o f th a t  
series. Paradoxica lly  th e  ru p tu re  here  rests in the  u np re d ic ta b le  
res is tance  to  th e  u n p re d ic ta b ility  o f m en  and th e  w o rld , the  resistance 
w h ich  does no t erode th e  w orld  bu t bu ilds it. In  th e  concept o f  prom ise  
as it  seem s, th e  reconc ilia tion  o f th e  d e s tru c tive  and th e  co ns truc tive  
po ten tia ls  o f a c tio n  is ach ieved, d isclosing th e  breaking e lem en t in 
a c tion  as b reaking  th ro u g h  and in to  th e  new, not s im p ly b reaking  as 
sh a tte rin g .
H ow ever to  in te rp re t A re nd t's  concep tua liza tion  o f prom ise as 
re co nc ilia to ry  is to  m isunders tand  her pecu lia r position  In re la tion  to  th e  
preva iling  tra d itio n  o f p o litica l ph ilosophy, w hich never ceased to  ins is t 
on  d ichotom ous th in k in g  o f th e  's p ir it  o f n o v e lty ' and politica l s ta b ility . 
[O R, 2 23 ] A re nd t con tends th a t no s tab le  po litica l edifice can be 
th o u g h t outs ide  action . S ta b ility  is estab lished and re -estab lished 
th ro u g h  action . I t  is th e re fo re  a q ue stion  no t o f establish ing a lasting  
in s titu tio n  w hich  w ould  em body th e  re vo lu tio n a ry  sp ir it bu t o f 
unders tand ing  th a t th is  s p ir it  is itse lf in s titu tin g  inso fa r the  p reserva tion  
o f  th e  w orld  is n o t in  a rres tin g  it bu t in changing it th ro ug h  aug m e n tin g  
and g iv ing  to  it, b ring ing  in to  it  th a t w hich is new, u lt im a te ly  -  
beg inn ing . The p o litica l fo rm  th a t A re nd t finds to  be the closest to
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grasping  th is  and m irro r in g  it is the  in s titu tio n  o f co ns titu tion a l 
a m endm ents , the  a ckno w le dg m e n t of m otion  as the  p rinc ip le  o f th e  
p o litica l. [OR, 2 0 0 -2 0 2 ]
The h is to rica l exam ple w h ich  inform ed A rend t's  conceptua liza tion  o f 
p rom ise  is the  Am erican R evo lu tion , w hich  cast a d iffe re n t lig h t on the  
opposition  o f change and lastingness in body p o litic : as philosophical o r 
conceptua l ca tegories, those  m ay  be opposed b u t no t so as occurences 
o f th e  w orld . In  the  w orld  th e y  are bu t the " tw o  sides o f the  same 
e v e n t"  [OR, 2 2 3 ] w here  th e y  in te rtw ine , p e rm e a te , even m erge 
th ro u g h  the  In s titu tion  o f co ns titu tion  and am e nd m e n ts , w h ich  a ffirm  
and p e rpe tua te  p o lity  by changing  it.
To m ake  a prom ise is to  'g iv e  one 's w ord ', and th e  w ord  is not the  Word 
o f th e  d iv ine  crea to r, but a w ord  from  m an to  m an  th ro u g h  w hich men 
com e to  te rm s  w ith  the  w orld  [M DT, 24] and equ a lly  so, endow  a w orld  
w ith  a particu la r fu tu r ity , the  one d iffe re n t to  th e  s ilt o f the  to rre n t o f 
tim e . The fu tu re  o f p rom ise  is som ething to  w hich  th e  m en behind the  
prom ise  bind them selves, a p ro je c t ra th e r than  th e  a u to m a tic  postness 
o f th e  present. T h rough  p rom ise  men are em pow ered  to  see th e ir  
p ro je c t th rough , to  ensure  its  lastingness by them se lves and w ith o u t 
anyone o r  anyth ing b u t th em se lve s  acting to g e th e r:
W hereas th e  act o f consent, accom plished by each 
Indiv idual person In his isolation, stands indeed on ly  " in  
the  presence o f G o d ,"  th e  act o f m utu a l p rom ise  is by 
d e fin itio n  enacted " in  th e  presence o f one a n o th e r ;"  it  is 
in princip le  ind ep en d en t o f relig ious sanction . M oreover, a 
body politic  w hich  is the  resu lt o f co ven an t and 
"co m b in a tio n " becom es th e  very source o f  p o w e r fo r  each 
ind iv idua l person w ho  outside th e  co n s titu te d  po litica l 
rea lm  rem ains im p o te n t; the  gove rnm ent w h ich , on th e  
co n tra ry , is the  re su lt o f  consent acquires a m on op o ly  o f 
pow er so th a t th e  g ove rn ed  are po litica lly  im p o ten t... [OR,
171 ]
The ac tua l contents o f  these  w ords  from  th e  w orld , to  th e  w orld , fo r  the  
w orld49 fo r A rendt m ust re m a in  beyond th e  confines o f (a n y ) politica l
49 N o t all w o rd s  a re  c re a tin g  o r  o p e n in g  th e  sp ace  o f  t o g e th e r n e s s  In t h e  w orld , A re n d t 
a rg u e s  a lre a d y  a t  th e  t im e  of w o rk  o n  Rahel Vamhagen, a  m in u te  s tu d y  o f  life lived 
a m o n g  p e o p le  y e t  o u ts id e  th e  p u b lic  w o rld . In tro sp e c tio n , c o n fe s s io n , w alk ing  th ro u g h  th e  
in side  o f  o n e  an d  th e  o th e r  in t h e  to ta l iz in g  in tim acy  o f  r e la tio n s h ip  re m o v in g  all d is ta n c e , 
a lm o s t  to  th e  p o in t of re m o v in g  d is tin c tio n , b e tw ee n  tw o  b e in g s  t o  a llow  full p e rm e a b ility  
o f  t h e i r  th o u g h ts  b u t p rim arily  f e e l in g s  -  all th a t  re m a in s  o u ts id e  t h e  w o rld , it  is politically  
in c o n se q u e n tia l.
T h o se  a r e  th e  w o rd s  p ro p e r  to  t h e  r e la tio n s h ip s  o f losing  o n e se lf , d ro w n in g  o n e s e lf  in th e  
o th e r ,  a n d  th e  o th e r  d ro w n in g  in u s  w h e re  it is n o t th a t  s o m e th in g  like a  't r u e  s e l f  is 
re v e a le d , b u t  o ne*se lf is  s tr ip p e d  o f  t h a t  o n e -, s ince  th is  in tim a te  c o n fess io n  a p p e a ls  to  
t h a t  in t h e  In te rlo cu to r t h a t  is  t h e  s a m e ,  a p p e a ls  to  th e  s a m e  's t o c k ' w h ich  h u m a n s  a re  
m a d e  o f  a n d  w hich  p ro d u c e s  c o m p a ss io n , th e  feeling  w h ich  id e n tif ie s  u s  w ith  th e  o th e r .  
Unlike t h e  w o rd s  o f co n fess io n , t h e  w o rd s  o f  p ro m ise  re la te  t o  th e  w orld  [MDT, 2 5 ] , th e y  
c o m e  n o t fro m  a n  in n e r feeling  o r  m o o d , th e y  a re  n o t e x -p re s s in g  th e  in n e rn e s s  a s  if
th e o ry  if the  tra p  o f  m e ta p h y s ic a l th in k in g  o f po litics  is to  be avo ided. 
For th is , A re nd t has o fte n  been accused o f  ce rta in  flu id ity , to  the p o in t 
o f denying h e r a th e o ry  o f  th e  p o litica l.50 B u t it is not a m a tte r  o f
p re s s in g  upon  th e  o u ts id e  t h e  m a rk  of th e  in s id e , b u t a r e  a lw a y s  a lre a d y  in -b e tw e e n , 
w h e re fro m  th e y  a r is e  a n d  w h e r e  th e y  re tu rn .  T h is  p a s s a g e  fro m  in -b e tw e e n  b a ck  to  in- 
b e tw e e n ,  th is  c irc u la tio n  c le a rly  r e q u ir e s  s p a c e , t h a t  w h ich  a b s o rb e d ,  c an c e lle d  d is ta n c e  o f 
in tim a c y  c a n n o t o ffe r . T h e  w o rd  o f  t h e  w orld  c o m e s  from  th e  w orld  a n d  r e q u ire s  th e  w orld  
to  m e d ia te  w h a t is b e in g  sa id , t o  g iv e  it a n d  to  re c e iv e  it a n d  g ive  it back  a g a in ,  re v e a lin g  
in th e  p ro c e ss  th e  u n iq u e  o n e ,  a llo w in g  o n e  to  b e (c o m e )  a s  o n e , an d  re v e a lin g  itse lf, th e  
w o rld .
I t  re q u ire s  a lso  t h a t  th o s e  w h o  e x c h a n g e  w o rd s  d o  n o t  lo se  th e m se lv e s  in th e ir  ta lk  
th ro u g h  in s tru m e n ta liz in g  c lic h é s  a n d  p h ra s e -w o rd s ,  th o s e  w o rd s  th a t  a r e  d e p r iv e d  of 
re la tio n  to  b o th  th e  s p e a k e r  a n d  th e  lis te n e r , in th e  s e n s e  o f th e  sp e a k e r  a n d  th e  l is te n e r  
b e in g  th e  w orld, a n d  w h ic h  s ig n ify  th e  a b se n c e  o f  th in k in g  in th e  o n e  w ho  a p p e a r s  in th e  
w o rld , w hich  is w h a t  A re n d t n o te d  in E ic h m an n 's  f r e q u e n t  o u tp o u r in g s  of e m p ty  ta lk , th e  
p r e te n s e  of ta lk . [E J, 4 8 - 4 9 ]
50 In  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f A re n d t 's  th o u g h t  of a c tio n  a s  in s titu tio n , w hich  is th e  co re  o f h e r  
th in k in g  of th e  p o litica l, h is to r ic a l a n a ly s is  o f re v o lu tio n s  is o f p a rtic u la r  im p o r ta n c e  a s  it 
c o n ta in s  a n  e m b ry o  o f  m o d e r  sp e c if ic  th e o ry  o f  in s t itu t io n s . As A ren d t o b s e rv e s  in h e r  
c o n c lu d in g  o b s e rv a t io n s  on  th e  A m e ric a n  R ev o lu tio n , th e  n ew  sp a c e  w a s  o p e n e d  th ro u g h  
a c tin g  fre e d o m  o u t  b u t  in th e  a f t e r m a th  it a lso  c lo s e d  off th e  's p a c e s  o f  f r e e d o m .' T h a t  is 
t h e  'lo s t  trea su re *  o f  re v o lu tio n  w h ich  A re n d t la m e n ts .  All political c o m m u n itie s  o r  
m o v e m e n ts  e m b o d y in g  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  fre e d o m  t h a t  A re n d t e v o k e s  a r e  e i th e r  s o m e w h a t  
flaw ed  (USA) o r  a b o r te d  (H u n g a ry , 1 9 5 6 )  o r  h is to rica lly  ir re tr ie v a b le  ( th e  A th e n ia n  potis) . 
T h e  c losing  p a g e s  o f  t h e  On Revolution a re  th e re fo re  d e d ic a te d  to  th e  lo ss  o f th e  
re v o lu tio n a ry  m o m e n tu m  an d  t h e  p ro b le m  of "h o w  to  p r e s e rv e  th e  re v o lu tio n a ry  sp ir it  
o n c e  t h e  re v o lu tio n  h a d  c o m e  t o  a n  e n d .*  [OR, 2 3 9 ]  A re n d t a t t e m p ts  to  o f fe r  a n  a n s w e r  
to  th e  p a ra d o x  o f  re v o lu tio n a ry  le g a c y  by e la b o ra t in g  on  c o u n c ils  a s  p o ss ib ly  in s t itu te d  
's p a c e s  o f  freed o m ,*  c o n tr a s t in g  -  in h a rm o n y  w ith  th e  w h o le  o f  h e r  po litica l th o u g h t  -  
th e s e  councils a s  in s t i tu t io n s  b u ilt  o n  a c tio n  a n d  p a r tic ip a tio n  to  th e  p a r t ie s  a s  p illa rs  o f 
s y s te m  founded  o n  r e p re s e n ta t io n .  [O R , 2 7 3 ]
A re n d t 's  th e o r iz a tio n  o f  c o u n c ils  a s  " o rg a n s  of o r d e r  a s  m u c h  a s  o rg a n s  o f  a c tio n ,"  [O R , 
2 6 3 ]  a rg u ab ly  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d ,  u l tim a te ly  r e a c h e s  b e y o n d  po litica l h isto ry , to w a rd s  p o e tic  
m e m o ry  and  e n d s  in a  fe e b le  e c h o  of th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f polis r a th e r  m e la n ch o lic a lly . 
A re n d t 's  th e o re tic a l  e x p lo ra tio n s  o f  c o u n c ils  a s  po litica l fo rm  fail to  o v e rp o w e r  h e r  tra g ic  
in s ig h t s ta te d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  h e r  a n a ly s is  of p o s t- re v o lu t io n a ry  d e v e lo p m e n ts :
[ I]f  fo u n d a tio n  w a s  t h e  a im  a n d  th e  e n d  of rev o lu tio n , th e n  th e  
re v o lu tio n a ry  sp ir it  w a s  n o t  m ere ly  th e  sp ir it  o f b eg in n in g  so m e th in g  
new  b u t o f s ta r t in g  so m e th in g  p e r m a n e n t  an d  e n d u r in g ;  a la s tin g  
in stlu tio n , e m b o d y in g  th is  sp irit a n d  e n c o u ra g in g  it to  n e w  
a c h ie v e m e n ts ,  w ould  b e  se lf -d e fe a tin g . F rom  w h ich  it u n fo r tu n a te ly  
s e e m s  to  fo llow  t h a t  n o th in g  th r e a te n s  th e  v e ry  a c h ie v e m e n ts  o f 
revo lu tion  m o re  d a n g e ro u s ly  a n d  m o re  a c u te ly  th a n  th e  sp irit w hich  h a s  
b ro u g h t th e m  a b o u t .  [O R , 2 3 2 ]
H ere , o n e  finds it im p o ss ib le  t o  r e s i s t  th e  te m p ta t io n  o f d ra w in g  a  p a ra lle l b e tw e e n  
A re n d t 's  tra g ic  a w a r e n e s s  o f t h e  in e s c a p a b le  w ith e rin g  a w ay  o f  f re e d o m  in t h e  's p a c e s  o f  
f re e d o m ' an d  H e id e g g e r 's  t h o u g h t  o f  th e  in e s c a p a b le  c o n c e a lm e n t of th e  B eing  w h o s e  
e v e ry  d isc lo su re  is n o th in g  b u t  c lo su re  a n e w . I t  m u s t  h o w e v e r  be n o te d  th a t  th e  
s ig n ifican ce  o f th is  a n a lo g y  in t h e  c o n te x t  of th is  w o rk  a n d  its  re le v a n c e  fo r th is  p ro je c t  
will b e c o m e  d e a r ( e r )  o n ly  la te r  in  in th e  c o u rse  o f exp lic it d isc u ss io n  of H e id e g g e r ia n  
t r a i t s  in A re n d t 's  c o n c e p t  o f a c t io n .  F o r th e  tim e  b e in g , le t it b e  o b se rv e d  th a t  H e id e g g e r 's  
tractatus on The Essence o f  Human Freedom r e v e a ls  th a t  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l  q u e s tio n  o f all 
p h ilo so p h y  fo r h im  is th e  q u e s t io n  o f f re e d o m  a ls o  g iven  a s  t r a n s c e n d e n c e .  In  o th e r  
w o rd s , th e  d isc u ss io n  o f  b e in g  a n d  t im e  is m e a n in g fu l only if lo ca ted  w ith in  t h e  q u e s tio n  
o f f r e e d o m . H e id e g g e r 's  e x p lo ra tio n  o f th e  Being o f  b e in g s  is  t h u s  in fa c t e x p lo ra tio n  o f 
f re e d o m .
I llu m in a tin g  th is  w o rd  b e h in d  th e  a b s e n t  n a m e  o f  t h e  B eing a ls o  m e a n s  illu m in a tin g  th e  
fu n d a m e n ta l  p a ra d o x  o f  H e id e g g e r 's  d isc u ss io n  o f B eing -  th e  c o n c e a lm e n t o f  th e  B eing 
th ro u g h  its  a p p e a ra n c e .  Every a p p e a r a n c e  of f r e e d o m  e n ta i ls  n o n -fre e d o m  in so fa r th e  
m o v e m e n t  in o n e  d ire c tio n  is t h e  n e g a tio n  of th e  po ss ib ility  o f m o v e m e n t in all o th e r  
d ire c tio n s . A re n d t 's  d isc u ss io n  a b o v e  re v e a ls  t h a t  t h e  po litica l is a lso  p e rv a d e d  by th i s
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evasiveness o r e lusiveness o f th ou gh t, i t  is a m a tte r  o f  th e  philosophical 
decision which d istanced A re n d t from  the  a lte rn a tive , com m un ita rian  
philosophical tra d itio n  o f th e  com m on (m ora l) good as the  defining 
characte ris tic  o f th e  po litica l, [D e lan ty , 2 0 0 5 :9 0 -9 1 ] ju s t  as her focus on 
action  in com m on d istanced her w o rk  from  the  libe ra lis t political 
concern. Nam ely, un like  th e  co m m un ita rian  vers ions o f the  republican 
th o u g h t which w ere  concerned w ith  the  substance o f the  political, 
A re nd t's  w ork leaves the  substance  to  be determ ined by specific  political 
actors im m ersed in th e ir  p a rticu la r h is to rico -po litica l s itu a tio n  and 
engages only w ith  the  c o n to u rs  o f the  political, w ith  de lineating  tha t 
w hich  is the po litica l as the  space w ith in  w hich  the  spec ific  concerns and 
events w ill appear as po litica l.
The bond betw een m en and th e ir  po lity , as am ong m en  -  m em bers o f 
the p o lity , th e re fo re  em erges fro m  this v e ry  speech and lis ten ing  act, it 
does n o t ex is t beforehand as substance bu t is estab lished as the  two 
d iffe re n t 'ones ' a re  estab lished  and m u tu a lly  con firm ed  in th e  words 
be tw een  th em , u nders tood , d is tingu ished and a ffirm e d  in th e  world 
th ro ug h  the  in te rp la y  o f is o la tio n -d is tin c tio n  and s itu a t io n .* 51
T hrough  the w orld -bu ild ing  w ords  o f prom ise, A re n d t argues, w e do not 
only re fe r  to  th a t w hich  is co m m on  and shared b u t appearing  to  each 
one o f  us d iffe re n tly . We p lace  th e  com m on in to  th e  w orld  in th e  fo rm  o f 
our co m m on  act o f found ing  anew. Living to g e th e r in th e  w orld is 
m an ifested  in o u r com m on re fe rring  to  th a t w hich  th u s  becom es th a t 
w hat is held in -com m on, as is m ain ta ined  by the  co m m u n ita ria n s  such 
as Haberm as and B enhabib  who define co m m u n ity  th rough  
com m un ica tive  exgange, b u t even m ore  im p o rta n tly  in the  com m on 
new th a t is placed into  th e  w orld  th ro ug h  the a c t o f prom ise  in the 
A rend tlan  sense o f found ing .
This b rie f insight in to  A re nd t's  th ink ing  o f po litical c o m m u n ity  therefore  
concludes on the  them e o f action. A rendt po in ts  to  the  way o f 
c ircum ven ting  the  deadlock o f th e  principal dua lism  in m odern  political 
th o u g h t, between c itiz e n /in d iv id u a l and p o lity /co lle c tive . The w ay is to 
th in k  politica l co m m un ity  as b od y  politic -  not as a sys tem  o f ru les and 
ins titu tio ns  separate  and e ven  a lien to  its civitas b u t as the  fine  net o f
p a ra d o x  -  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  f re e d o m  in t h e  w orld  h a p p e n s  th ro u g h  a c tio n . On th e  o n e  hand, 
one  a c t io n  is n e g a tio n  o f  all o th e r  p o ss ib le  ac tio n s . O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , po litica l action  is 
a b o u t in s titu tio n , a s  w e h a v e  s e e n ,  w h ic h  m e a n s  t h a t  it  b rin g s a b o u t  th e  v e ry  n e g a tio n  of 
itself, c o n tin u ity  and  s ta b ility  in p la c e  o f  ru p tu re  a n d  m u tab ility .
S1 In t h i s  ta lk ing  o f  t h e  c o m m o n , w h ic h  is a t  th e  sa m e  tim e  ta lk in g  from  a n d  o f  th e  
d if fe re n c e , each  one  o f  u s  is c o n f irm e d  a s  d is tin c t th ro u g h  th e  w o rd s ,  j u s t  a s  o n e  confirm s 
o n e 's  o w n  p re se n c e  in t h e  w orld  t h r o u g h  o n e 's  im a g e  in th e  pup il o f  th e  o th e r .  T h a t  is th e  
o rig inal an d  m o s t  e s s e n t ia l  c o n f irm a tio n  of o u r  p lac e  in th e  s h a re d  re a lity  an d  o u r 
u n d e rs ta n d in g , by  th e  o th e r ,  a s  a  d is t in c t  p a r t  of th e  co m m o n  w o rld  th ro u g h  th e  p re sen c e  
o f th is  w itn e s s  w ho  te s t i f ie s  to  t h e  re a lity  of u s  a s  u s  an d  o f  t h e  w orld  a s  o u rs: "I 
u n d e r s ta n d  so m e th in g  o r  so m e b o d y  d irec tly , if I u n d e rs ta n d  so m e th in g , I a lw ays 
u n d e r s ta n d  it w ith in  a  w id e r  h o rizo n  o f  th in g s  w hich I ta k e  fo r  g r a n te d .  I iso la te  t h e  th ing  I 
u n d e r s ta n d  an d  p u t m y se lf  in to  a  d i r e c t  re la tio n sh ip  to  it. I f  I u n d e r s ta n d  so m e b o d y , I 
u n d e rs ta n d  h im  in a  d ire c t  r e la tio n s h ip ,  w ith in  th e  f ram e w o rk  o f  th e  w o rld , b u t  still him  
d irec tly , iso la te d  from  o th e r s ."  [C l, p .3 /1 ]
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c iv ic  in te raction  in the  pub lic  sphere. In  o th e r w ords, A rendt is n o t 
ta k in g  sides be tw een  th e  in s titu tio n a lis t p o litica l theory and p o litica l 
th e o ry  focused on  hum an  agency b u t seeks to  dem onstrate  th a t 
in s titu tio n  is  a c tion  - th ro u g h  action  co m m u n ity  is ins titu ted  and 
m a in ta in ed , th ro u g h  a c tio n  the  bond am ong its  citizens is estab lished 
and th ro ug h  a c tion  it e x is ts .
S um m ing  th is  a rg u m e n t u p , action  is th u s  w ha t one  m ust th in k  if o ne  is 
th in k in g  the  p o litica l. By rooting  the  po litica l, as w o rld -fo rm a tive , 
in s titu tin g  and c o n s titu tin g , in action  A re n d t den ies th a t the po litica l can 
be reduced to  a ny  re g u la tive  fo rm  th a t living to g e th e r assum es in  a 
g ive n  h istorica l m o m e n t. W h a t she a im s to  d em on s tra te  instead is th a t 
th e  po litica l m us t be in te rp re te d  as th e  locus o f  freedom  in th e  w o rld . 
The ta sk  o f the  fo llo w in g  c h a p te r is to  show  how  freedom  is em bod ied  
o r  ra th e r, enacted in a c tio n  -  th ro ug h  in s titu tio n  o f the new in  th e  
w o rld .
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Chapter Three:
ACTION AS IN S T IT U T IO N  OF THE NEW
The in te rp re ta tiv e  reco ns tru c tion  o f A rendt's  p o litica l th ou gh t in th is 
ch ap te r is m eant n o t s im p ly  to  (re )in troduce  A re n d t's  th o u g h t bu t to  set 
the c o n te x t fo r fu r th e r  In qu iry  into  A rendt's  co n tr ib u tio n  to  philosophy 
by u ncovering  th e  m ean ing  o f the po litica l. T he  political here is 
understood  p rim a rily  as po litica l action w hich  is no t an ins trum enta l 
a c tiv ity  b u t tha t w h ich  "o ffe rs  a lasting source o f m eaning to  hum an 
a ffa irs ." [Beiner, 1 9 8 3 :1 3 ] I t  w ill be argued th a t, by placing action  as 
the core  o f her n o tio n  o f po litics, Arendt does n o t advance ye t a no the r 
p e rfo rm a tive , as opposed to  the in s tru m e n ta lis t understand ing o f 
po litica l a c tiv ity  b u t the  e x is ten tia lis t one, w hich  how ever has to  be 
conceived o f in o p p o s itio n  to  Schm ittean e x is te n tia l politics or, in 
A gam ben 's te rm s, (2 0 0 0 ) politics of zde  o r naked life. Nam ely, 
A rend tian  politics is not concerned w ith  bare life  b u t w ith  endow ing life 
w ith  a m eaning  th ro u g h  a c tion  th a t is the  e n a c tm e n t o f freedom , and as 
such is the  're aso n ' fo r  m an 's  appearance in th e  w o rld . Uncovering th is 
aspect o f A rendt's  th o u g h t constitu tes the  g u id in g  thread o f th is 
chap ter.
The ju s t if ia b ility  o f th is  herm eneutica l e ffo rt how eve r is no t based solely 
on the  fa c t that pe rhaps  th e  m ain debate  in A re nd tian  scholarship, 
betw een A ris to te lians and M achiavellians o r  N ietzscheans does not 
address the  e x is te n tia lis t line in A rendt's  p o litica l p ro je c t -  i f  fo r no 
o the r reason than because Dana Villa 's w o rk  on  the  dynam ics o f 
A rend t's  in te llec tua l engagem en t w ith  N ie tzsche, A ris to tle  and 
H eidegger [V illa, 1996  and 1 99 9 ] has p a rtly  b ro u g h t th is  to  ligh t. The 
in ten tion  is ra th e r to  a rgue  th a t fo r A re nd t's  p ro je c t as also a 
philosophical p ro je c t and n o t only p o litico -th e o re tica l, the  exis ten tia l 
d im ension  o f her n o tio n  o f ac tion  m ust be considered  crucia l.
In  th a t sense, th is  in te rp re ta tio n  o f A rendt's  th in k in g  o f action stands 
apart fro m  the 'b in a ry ' deb a te  between Benhabib 's and  Honig's readings 
o f A re nd t as d is tingu ished and mapped by M ary G. D ie tz :
Benhabib poses a (H aberm asian) co m m u n ica tive  concept 
o f 'associa tiona l p ub lic  space' as an a lte rn a tiv e  to  the 
(N ie tzschean) d is ru p tiv e  concept o f 'a g o n is tic  public 
s p a c e 'th a t Honig p u rp o rte d ly  supports. [H o n ig , 1 99 5 :3 7 ]
In  read ing  A rendt's  p o litica l th ou gh t, Benhabib places the  em phasis on 
the toge therness th a t characterizes political ac ting  w h ich  is m anifested 
in th e  discursive practices o f d e lib e ra tio n , discussion and 
a rg um en ta tion . Benhabib observes th a t these p ra c tices , which s tru c tu re  
A rend t's  concept o f ac tion  as speech-act, w ill o n ly  fin d  fu ll e laboration
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in H aberm as' m o d e l o f co m m un ica tive  action  and pub lic  sphere  
leg itim a ted  th ro u g h  the K antian  exercise o f pub lic reason. [2 0 0 0 :2 0 1 -  
202]
The roots o r ra th e r, the  g ro un d  o f th e  H aberm asian reading o f A re nd t 
lies p a rtly  in th e  A ris to te lia n  th re ad s  running th rough  A re nd t's  
conceptua liza tion  o f  action . V illa 's s tu dy  on A re nd t and H e idegger 
[1 9 9 6 ] explores in m ore d ep th  A rend t's  a m b iva len t re la tionsh ip  to  
A ris to tle , whose conceptua l language she em ploys while a lso  ta k ing  
d is tance  from  som eth ing  th a t, draw ing on her c r itiq u e  o f P lato, m ig h t 
be re fe rred  to  as P latonic undertones  o f A ris to tle 's  philosophy.
A ris to tle , as Plato, could n o t ignore the  experience  o f liv ing  in th e  polis, 
an experience d o m in a ting  th e  Greek h is to rica l rea lity  according to  
A re n d t, w hich ins truc ted  h im  to  associate household , the  p riva te  
sphere, w ith  necessity, w ith  a ttend ing  to  the dem ands placed upon 
social rea lity  by hum an b io log y , u lt im a te ly  -  the  sphere w here  m an is 
c losest to  anim al. By c o n tra s t, the  pub lic rea lm  is w here  hum anness 
d is tin c tly  appears:
W hat all G reek ph ilosophers, no m a tte r  how  opposed to  
polis, took fo r  g ran ted  is th a t freedom  is exc lus ive ly  located 
in the  po litica l rea lm , th a t necessity is p rim a rily  a p re ­
po litica l phenom enon. [BPF, 31 ]
This d is tinc tion  betw een th e  pub lic and th e  p riva te , ta ken  as 
corresponding  to  th e  d is tin c tio n  betw een freedom  and necessity, is one 
o f the  tw o  m ain d is tin c tio n s  th a t A rend t a pp ro p ria te s  from  A ris to tle  and 
also accepts the u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f pub lic life  as tru ly  hum an. N am ely, 
fo r A ris to tle , the po lis  is th e  place o f appearing  as hum an, th e re fo re  -  
being hum an, the  locus  o f 'g o o d  life ' a tta in a b le  n o t to  m en qua m en b u t 
to  m en as citizens. The good life  in the  polis  is lived in d iscussion w ith  
equals ove r com m on concerns, th e  d iscussion th a t is a b a ttle  o f  
op in ions and a rgum en ts  and w here  one is d is tingu ished no t th ro u g h  
force o r  s tren g th  o r  s ta tus , b u t th rough  th e  pow er o f  one 's phronesis , 
the  'em bod ied  p o litica l ju d g m e n t' o r 'ju d g m e n t consum m ated  in th e  
e fficacy  o f good p ra x is . ' [B e in e r, 1 9 8 3 :7 4 ] T he  s p ir it o f discussion is th e  
s p ir it o f  the  a lready d iscussed philia politike  o r  po litica l friendsh ip  w here  
e veryone  is requ ired  to  recogn ize  and respect a t th e  same tim e  both  
the  com m onness o f th e ir  w o rld  and the  d is tinc tness o f one ano the r.
In  th a t sense, the  good life  is achieved in th e  ve ry  liv ing , w hich m eans 
th a t po litics  m ust be d is tingu ished  from  poiesis, m aking  re lated to  a ll 
w o rk -re la te d  a c tiv it ie s , and a ffilia te d  w ith  praxis , w hich  includes a ll 
p e rfo rm a tive  a c tiv itie s  th a t d o  not resu lt in  p roduction  o f any o b jec t. 
The second im p o rta n t concep tua l d is tin c tio n  w hich  A re n d t accepts from  
A ris to tle 's  fra m e w o rk  is p rec ise ly  th is  one, betw een poiesis  and praxis.
Praxis  is closely tied  to  a n o th e r A ris to tle 's  concept, th a t o f energia o r  
a c tu a lity  inso far th e  final end o f any practica l a c tiv ity  is a lready 
inh e re n t to  it. In  th is  sense, liv ing  in polis  is the best liv ing as it is no t
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subdued to  any h ighe r e n d ,52 it is itse lf its ow n  end according to  
A ris to tle 's  a rg um en t m ade in Nicomachean Ethics: "W e call th a t which 
is pu rsued  as an end in its e lf m ore final than an end which is pursued 
fo r th e  sake o f som ething else..." (1097a) This n o n -in s tru m e n ta lity  o f 
p o litica l life is w ha t Villa describes as self-contained ness o f action  in 
w hich  'fre ed om  re s id e s / (2 0 0 0 :2 5 ) and it is a conceptua l poss ib ility  
seized by A rendt since 'A re n d t's  theory o f po litica l ac tion  should be read 
as th e  sustained a tte m p t to  th ink  o f praxis o u ts id e  the  te leo logica l 
fra m e w o rk . ' [V illa , 1 99 6 :4 7 ]
In  A ris to tle 's  conceptua liza tion  o f the good life in  good living, w hich  is 
underlied  by the  p e rfo rm a tive  notion o f action , A rendt detects a 
p o te n tia l fo r recovering  fro m  w ith in  philosophical tra d itio n  th e  non­
in s tru m e n ta l understand ing o f the political. I t  a llow s resto ra tion  o f 
action  as m ean ing fu l w ith o u t transcendental re fe rence, th a t is -  
m ea n in g fu l inso fa r it is freedom  incarnate. The understand ing  o f action 
as p resencing o f freedom  leads in A risto tle 's th o u g h t suggests to  A rendt 
th a t in  co n tra s t to  Plato, A ris to tle  retains a t least 'a  feeble echo o f the 
p re -ph ilosoph ica l G reek e x p e rie n c e / [HC, 2 0 7 ] There  rem ains in 
A ris to tle  som eth ing  th a t A re nd t never found in P la to 's  w ork, w hich  sets 
the tw o  a pa rt and flow s in to  A rendt's  theo ry  o f th e  p o litica l: 'A ris to tle ... 
is s till aw are  o f w h a t Is a t s take  in politics... th e  w o rk  o f m a n ../ [HC, 
206 ] T hro ug h  th is  'w o rk '53 o f  m an nothing is being fabrica ted  b u t there  
em erges m eaning o f being in the  world as hum an.
H ow ever, A ris to tle 's  th o u g h t fo r  A rendt co ns titu te s  only a partia l 
d is ru p tio n  o f Platonic tra d itio n  in philosophy. W hile m ore  o f the Socratic 
sp irit o f  'pub lic  square ' philosophy m ay have been preserved In 
A ris to tle 's  discussion o f th e  political than  in Plato's outspoken 
d ise nch an tm en t w ith  po litica l affairs [PP, 8 2 ], it is precise ly w ith  
A ris to tle  th a t, as A rend t believes, 'the  tim e  beg ins w hen philosophers 
no lo n g e r feel responsible fo r  the  city...' [PP, 91]
This m a y  not be an en tire ly  leg itim ate  obse rva tion  since both A ris to tle  
and Plato w ro te  po litica l philosophy, as A rendt h e rs e lf acknow ledged. 
A rend t is thus probab ly  c lose r to  the critica l d isc losure  o f th e  non­
“  Villa ( 2 0 0 0 )  n o te s  a c e r ta in  a m b ig u ity  in such read in g  of A r is to tle 's  d iscu ssio n  o f good 
life. He a r g u e s  th a t  A risto tle  in tro d u c e s  into good life o f c itize n  a c h a ra c te r- fo rm a tiv e  
d im e n s io n  w h e re b y  a c tio n  a s  a  se lf-co n ta in e d  a c tiv ity  t h a t  e n d o w s  th e  w orld  w ith 
m e a n in g  is r e in te rp re te d  a s  a p u rp o s iv e , e d u ca tio n a l a c tiv ity : "T he  m ain  c o n ce rn  of 
po litics is  to  e n g e n d e r  a  c e r ta in  c h a ra c te r  in th e  c itizen s a n d  to  m ak e  th e m  g ood  and 
d isp o se d  to  p e rfo rm  n o b le  a c t io n s .” [E thics, 1 0 9 9 b ; P o litics, 111.9] Villa fo re g ro u n d s  
A re n d t 's  in te rp re ta tio n  th a t  po litica l acting  is th ro u g h  A r is to t le 's  n o rm a tiv e  m ove 
h a r n e s s e d  in th e  fu n c tio n  o f  a p u rp o s iv e  p ro c ess  th ro u g h  w h ic h  m e n  a re  s h a p e d  in to  
v ir tu o u s  c itiz e n s : "A ris to tle 's  ideal polis h a s  its  raison d'etre l e s s  a s  a  field fo r a c tio n  th a n  
a s  a  school fo r  v ir tu e .” [Villa, 2 0 0 0 :5 1 ]
T he a m b iv a le n c e  o f  th e  m ea n in g  o f  praxis in A ris to tle 's  p h ilo so p h y  c a n n o t b e  a d d re s s e d  
h e re .  S u ffice  it to  sa y  h o w e v er t h a t  th e  su b tle tie s  o f  th e  m e rg in g  of g o o d n e s s  o r  v irtue  
w ith  praxis in A ris to tle 's  th o u g h t in d ica te  th a t  t h e  d y n a m ic s  c a n n o t  be r e d u c e d  to  
s u b ju g a tio n  o f  o n e  to  t h e  o th e r .
51 Work h e re  be in g  sy n o n y m o u s  to  d e e d  or doing, a n d  sh o u ld  n o t  be  e q u a te d  w ith  w ork  
a s  c a te g o ry  o f h u m an  ac tiv ity  w h ic h  A rend t d is tin g u ish e s  a n d ,  p a rtly , c o n tr a s ts  w ith 
a c tio n  in h e r  p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l a n a ly s is .
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po litica l underp inn ing  o f A ris to tle 's  p o litica l p h ilosophy when she  a rgues 
th a t th e  in te res t o f  th e  G reek ph ilosophers  in  th e  po litica l can be 
equated  w ith  th e ir  fa sc ina tion  w ith  leg is la tion . From this fa sc ina tion  
A re nd t reads P latonic p ro je c t o f escaping th e  open-endedness o f a c tion  
by su bs titu tion  o f m aking  fo r  a c ting , the  p ro je c t d rive n  by the 'susp ic ion  
o f a c t io n /  N am ely, A re n d t m a in ta in s  th a t th e  Greeks, the  c itizens 
invo lved in po litica l d o ing , considered law -m a k ing  a p re -p o litica l 
a c tiv ity , th a t w hich  estab lishes the  space fo r  th e  po litica l by sepa ra ting  
th e  n a tu ra l w orld  and n a tu ra l processes fro m  th e  hum an w orld  and its  
a ffa irs . Philosophers, by c o n tra s t, a re  d ra w n  to  law -m aking  by th is  
making, w hich is n o t o n ly  a n  a c it iv ity  p re d ic ta b le  and contro llab le  b u t it 
is also closest to  co n te m p la tio n  being gu ided  by a p re -estab lished 
m ode l, the  'id e a :'
To th em , leg is la ting  and  th e  e xe cu tio n  o f decis ions by v o te  
are  th e  m ost le g itim a te  po litica l a c tiv it ie s  because in th e m  
m en "a c t like  c ra fts m e n ": the  re s u lt o f th e ir  action is a 
tang ib le  p ro du c t, and its  process has a c lea rly  recognizable 
end... I t  is as th o u g h  th e y  had said th a t i f  m en o n ly  
renounce th e ir  ca pa c ity  fo r  a c tio n , w ith  its fu tility , 
boundlessness, and u n c e rta in ty  o f o u tco m e , th e re  could be 
a rem edy fo r  th e  fra ilty  o f hum an a ffa irs . [H C , 195]
The cen tra l concern  fo r A ris to tle  as fo r P la to  th us  becomes the concern  
w ith  o rd e r as opposed to  the  concern  w ith  free do m . For A re n d t's  
understand ing  o f th e  p o litica l as th e  sphe re  o f fre e d o m  th is  m ove .spe lls  
th e  su rrende r o f fre e d o m  fo r  the  sake  o f  th e  predictable  and 
co n tro lla b le  subm ission  to  th e  law , th e  su bm iss io n  w hich  ph ilosophers 
them se lves practiced  in re la tio n  to  th e  A b s o lu te .54
By c o n tra s t to  B enhabib 's A ris to te lia n  rea d in g , Honig acknowledges th e  
tens ion  in A rend t's  a p p ro p ria tio n  o f A ris tto le . She there fore  re la tes 
A rend t to  the  tra d itio n  o f v ir tu o s ic  po litics  th a t, in co u n te r-d is tin c tio n  to  
v irtu o u s  politics such  w ou ld  be c loser to  H aberm asian  concept o f th e  
po litics, defies a n y  a tte m p t to  con ta in  agon  unders tood  as fu nd am e n ta l 
and essentia l to  p o litics . As Honig a rg ue s , th e  v irtuo s ic  po litics , a 
tra d itio n  o f c o u n te r- tra d it io n  in p o litica l th o u g h t o rig ina ting  fro m  
M achiave lli, is the  po litics  o n , o f  and o ff  th e  m a rg in s , politics o f fissu res, 
residues, excep tions, im p e rfe c t so lu tio n s , perfo rm ance  in place o f 
rep re sen ta tion , absence in  th e  p lace o f  p resence. Honig a rgues th a t 
these fr ic tions , fra c tu re s  and  im p erfe c tion s  appears  not because th e  
e n te rp rise  o f found ing  th e  p e rfe c t p o litica l o rd e r w ou ld  be d iff ic u lt o r
54 T h is  r e m a in s  h o w e v e r  a  s o m e w h a t  c o n tro v e rs ia l  c r itic ism  o f t h e  p o sitio n  o f leg is la tio n  in 
re la tio n  to  th e  political in so fa r  A re n d t c e le b ra te s  t h e  a c t  o f  fo u n d a tio n  o f  political 
c o m m u n ity , th e  K an tian  id e a  o f  c o m m u n ity  g iv ing  o f  la w s  u n to  its e lf , e sp ec ia lly  t h e  Act o f 
C o n s titu tio n  in th e  A m e ric an  R e v o lu tio n  an d  its  's p a c e  o f f r e e d o m ' in th e  in s titu tio n  o f 
a m e n d m e n ts  a s  th e  o p e n n e s s  o f  t h e  C o n s titu tio n  t o  in e v ita b le  c h a n g e s  in t h e  life o f 
po litica l c o m m u n ity . T h is  cou ld  b e  a t t r ib u te d  t o  th e o re tic a l  c o n s is te n c y  had  it n o t  b e e n  fo r  
A re n d t 's  o b se rv a tio n  in t h e  e s s a y  o n  a u th o r i ty  [BPF] o n  th e  d is t in c tio n  b e tw e e n  G re e k  a n d  
R o m an  c o n c e p tio n s  o f le g is la tio n . W h a t  G re e k s  left o u ts id e  t h e  w a lls  o f polis, in tro d u c in g  
in to  p o litic s  a t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  e le m e n t  e m b o d ie d  in t h e  f ig u re  o f  a lien  leg is la to r , R o m an s 
in te g ra te d  in to  th e  po litica l a s  th e  c o n tin u in g  so u rc e  o f  in sp ira t io n  fo r  political d e e d s .
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because hum an n a tu re  was co rrup t but because inh e re n t to  politics is 
im p erfe c tion :
W hereas v ir tu e  th e o ris ts  assume th a t th e ir  favored 
ins titu tio ns  f i t  and express the  iden tities  o r the  
fo rm a tions o f su b jec ts , virtù theorists argue th a t no such 
f i t  is possible, th a t e v e ry  politics has its rem ainders , th a t 
resistances a re  engendered by every se ttle m e n t, even by 
those th a t a re  re la tive ly  enabling o r  em pow ering . 
[1 9 9 3 :3 ]
Honlg sing les M achiavelli o u t as one o f the  sources o f th is a lte rna tive  
th in k in g  o f the p o litica l and relates his th o u g h t to  A rend t's  in the 
som ew ha t d iscountious th re ad  o f this a lte rna tive  po litica l th in k in g .55 
A rendt was draw n to  M ach ia ve lli^  w ritings as a unique collection o f 
observa tions by a genuine  passionate observer, s tu de n t and a c to r o f 
po litics w ho did n o t re fra in  fro m  freedom  and a c tion  as both  th e  driv ing  
forces and princ ipal raison d'etre o f politics. M ach iave lli the  scholar 
never succum bed to  the  d o m in a n t am bition  in philosoph ica l re la ting  to  
politics -  su b jug a tio n  o f p o litica l doing to  n on -p o litica l ends. Reconciling 
in his ow n  life th in k in g  and doing o f politics, he s tood  fo r  A rend t as a 
rare e xam p le  o f the  th in k e r devoted to  the  greatness o f the  politica l as 
an a u tonom ous and a u to no m ou s ly  valuable sphere o f hum an existence.
In  M achiave lli's  und ers ta nd in g  and w riting  o f po litics  as v irtuo s ic , and 
th is p a rticu la rly  re fers to  The Prince , politics em erges fro m  the in terp lay 
betw een Fortuna and the  virtù o f one man, th e  ru ler, o f  w hom  
M achiavelli w rites :
[T ]h e y  had no o th e r fa v o u r from  fo rtune  b u t o p p o rtu n ity , 
w hich  gave th em  th e  m ate ria l w hich th e y  could m ould 
in to  w h a te ve r fo rm  seem ed to  th em  best; and w ith o u t 
such o p p o rtu n ity  th e  g re a t qualities o f th e ir  souls would 
have been w asted , w h ils t w itho u t those g re a t qua lities 
th e  o p p o rtu n itie s  w ou ld  have been in va in . [M ach iave lli,
Book V I]
This in te rla c ing  o f o p p o r tu n ity  and the doing o f m en , and the  notion  o f 
a c to r as the  one w h o  does n o t evade th e  co m m o tio n  o f h is to ry  but 
responds to  w ha t th e  w orld  and tim e o ffe r, is w h a t A re nd t found 
fasc ina ting  in c e rta in  m om en ts  o f h is to ry . One o f  those w as the 
'M achiave llian  m o m e n t' o r ra th e r, the  Florentine m o m e n t a longside th a t 
o f th e  Am erican R evo lu tion  o r Hungarian R evo lu tion  in 1956, the  
m om en ts  o f the  e ru p tio n  o f th e  politica l (do ing) in  h is to ry .
ss H onig a ls o  p o in ts  o u t  t h e  p ro x im ity  o f A re n d t's  a n d  N ie tz sc h e 's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f action  
an d , e sp e c ia l ly , th e  p o w e r  of ag o n  b u t  sh e  also  a ck n o w le d g e s  th a t ,  w hile  N ie tz sch e  and 
A rend t b e lo n g  to g e th e r  in th is  a g o n is tic  trad itio n  o f u n d e rs ta n d in g  politics, A re n d t's  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  and  w o rk in g  w ith  virtù is "m o re  political and  m o re  in s titu tio n a lly  lo ca ted ."  
[Honig, 1 9 9 3 :4 ]  H on ig 's  o b s e rv a t io n  on th is  m a t te r  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  so u rc e  of th e  
v irtu o s ic  a s p e c t  o f A re n d t 's  political th e o ry  should  be so u g h t in political th in k e rs  su ch  as 
M achiavelli, w ho w ere  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  in stitu ting  and  c o n s titu t in g  p o ten tia l o f action  
a s  w ith i ts  u n c o n ta in a b le  ru p tu ro u s  a n d  b o u n d less  c h a ra c te r .
The m eaning o f th is  in te rp la y  as A rend t reads it, w hich  m ay not be in 
exact correspondence w ith  the  way M achiavelli th o u g h t it -  th e  e le m e n t 
o f v io lence understood  as fo rce  had deep s ign ificance  fo r M ach iave lli,56 
defies any notion o f m a s te ry , o f ru ling , m a n ife s tin g  itse lf instead as 'a 
ha rm o ny  betw een m an and w orld -  p la y ing  w ith  each o th e r and 
succeeding to g e th e r /  [BPF, 1 3 7 ] By loca ting  her ow n  concept o f action  
a t th is  M achiavellian in te rsec tio n  o f o p p o rtu n ity  and  the  response to  it, 
A rend t dislocated her th e o ry  o f p o litica l a c tio n  away fro m  th e  
A ris to te lian  idea o f co g n itive , ra tiona l p o litics  o r po litics  o f d e libe ra tive  
w isdom  bound by, a rg u a b ly  te leo log ica l, fra m e w o rk  o f good life.
A t th e  same tim e , as A re n d t observes, th e  M achiavellian no tion  o f 
a c tion  escapes a n o th e r p ro b le m a tic  aspect o f A ris to te lian  action , th e  
idea o f political a c tion  as th e  vehicle  o f eth ical d em ands;
And it m us t be understood  th a t a prince... canno t perform  
all those th in g s  w h ich  cause m en  to  be esteemed as 
good; he being o fte n  obliged, fo r th e  sake o f m aintain ing 
his s ta te , to  act c o n tra ry  to  h u m a n ity , charity  and 
religion. And th e re fo re  is it necessary th a t he should have 
a versa tile  m ind... n o t to  sw erve  from  the  good if 
possible, b u t to  know  how to  re s o rt to  e v il if  necessity 
dem ands it. [M ach iave lli, Book X V II I ]
This te llin g , fu n d a m e n ta lly  'M a ch iave llia n ' M ach iave lli's  paragraph could 
be read as ce lebra tion  o f th e  u n e th ica lity  o f p o litica l doing. A re nd t 
how ever s trong ly  opposes a n y  such reading o f M achiave lli, a rgu ing  th a t 
n e ith e r good n o r ev il w e re  m ean ing fu l as te rm s , concepts and 
s tandards in M achiave lli's  unders tand ing  o f  po litics  and political ac ting . 
The po litica l is n e ith e r e th ica l no r u ne th ica l -  it  is s im ply n on -e th ica l 
in so fa r it  is concerned no t w ith  one m an and one so u l, be it the  One o r  
the  O the r, bu t w ith  the  w o rld , as A re nd t w ould  say [BPF,1 5 6 ], o r  
'successfu l m a in tenance  o f th e  s ta te ,' in M ach iave lli's  words.
In  th a t sense, ju d g in g  a po litica l action  is p red ica ted  on acknow ledging 
its in trins ic  value and im plies recognition  o f a u to n o m y  to  the rea lm S7 o f 
the  p o litica l. M achiavelli is th u s  crucia l fo r  A re n d t as a political th in k e r 
who d ivests  the  p o litica l o f th e  ra tio n a l- in s tru m e n ta l logic as fro m  the  
e th ica l crite ria  b u t a lso  th e  one w ho g ra sps  w he re  lies the  in trins ic  
va lue o f a deed: in its  ow n g rea tness. A re n d t associates th is greatness 
w ith  ex tra o rd in a rine ss  - th ose  w ho respond to  Fortuna, those m u s t be 
prepared to  e x it th e  s h e lte r o f  th e ir  p riv a te  ex is tence , o f concern w ith  
the kn ow n  and persona l, and  do w ha t is n o t done in o rd ina ry  life  [HC, 
3 5 ]:
[A ]c tio n  can be ju d g e d  only b y  th e  c r ite r io n  o f greatness 
because it is in  its n a tu re  to  b reak th ro u g h  th e  com m only
56"... fo r  fo r tu n e  is a w o m a n , and  if y o u  w ish  to  m a s te r  h e r , y o u  m u s t  s trik e  a n d  b e a t  he r, 
and  y o u  will s e e  th a t  s h e  a llo w s h e r s e l f  to  b e  m o re  e a s ily  v a n q u is h e d  by th e  ra sh  an d  th e  
v io len t th a n  by th o s e  w h o  p ro c e e d  m o re  slow ly  and  c o ld ly .” M achiavelli, The Prince, Book 
XXV.
57 In  t h a t  s e n s e ,  it is n o t a t  all su rp r is in g  th a t  A re n d t o f te n  u s e s  t h e  te rm  political realm, 
s u g g e s t iv e  o f a s o v e re ig n  s p h e re ,  t h e  s p h e re  t h a t  ru le s  an d  d e te r m in e s  itself.
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accepted and  reach in to  the e x tra o rd in a ry , where 
w ha te ve r is tru e  in com m on and everyday life  no longer 
app lies because every th ing  tha t exists is un ique  and sui 
generis. [HC, 2 05 ]
As Honig points o u t, "the  ta le n t o f Machiavelli's m an o f virtù is his 
capacity  to  cross uncrossable lines (between male and fem ale, m an  and 
n a tu re ), his w illingness to  take  risks fro m  w hich o rd ina ry  hum ans 
w ith d ra w ." (1 9 9 3 :1 6 ) M achiavellian dim ension o f A rend t's  concept o f 
action  is captured  v iv id ly  by this image o f acting  as crossing 
uncrossable  lines. 'C rossing th e  uncrossable' is defin ing  o f action as th a t 
which s tands a pa rt and  above o f the ord ina ry  Insofar it has "an  inherent 
tendency to  force open  all lim ita tions and cut across all boundaries." 
[HC, 1 9 0 ] W hile A re n d t rem ains indebted to  A ris to tle  fo r the  d im ension 
o f action  as the  fo rm  o f hum an being to ge th e r w h e re o f she develops 
this b e in g -to g e th e r as dynam ic doing in concert as opposed to  the 
vision o f po litica l co m m un ity  as a s ta tic  e n tity , a s ta tic  being, 
M achiavelli's no tion  o f v ir tu o s ity  which em erges fro m  the courage to  do 
the undoable , to  tre a d  where there  is no beaten p a th , allows A rend t to 
th ink  a c tio n  as a fo rm  o f concern  w ith the world th a t m en do p e rfo rm  in 
common  b u t it  m ay, and o fte n  does, take them  beyond the  borders of 
w hat is regarded as common in human in te rac tion . M oreover, this 
breaking in to  and th rough  th e  common as the o rd in a ry  and ventu ring  
into th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  becomes fo r Arendt the  defin ing  tra it  o f action , 
its 'in h e re n t te nd en cy  to  fo rce  open all lim ita tio n s  and cu t across all 
boundaries ." [HC, 1 9 0 ]
But on th e  po in t o f  ex traord inariness M achiavelli and A rend t in te rsec t 
only to  p a rt w ays. Nam ely, H onig 's in te rpre ta tion  suggests  and so does 
the e n tire  co n te x t o f  M achiavelli's discussion o f v ir tu o s ity  -  w hich is th a t 
o f the  d iscourse  on th e  qua lities o f the successful 'Principe '  as th e  m ain 
actor in th e  po litica l arena -  th a t extraord inariness o f action  is to  
M achiavelli tied  to  th e  extra  ord inariness o f certain m en . W hile A rendt 
does n o t spec ifica lly  deal w ith  th is  problem atic aspect o f M achiavelli's 
insistence on v irtu o s ity , h e r e laboration o f a c tio n  as a po ten tia l 
inscribed in to  th e  hum an cond ition  o f p lu ra lity  as bo th  e qua lity  and 
d is tinc tion , w here th e  d is tin c tion  is always in d is tin gu ish in g , [HC, 176] 
ind icates th a t M achiavelli's presence in h e r th o u g h t o f action , ju s t  as 
A ris to tle 's , is lim ite d .
The poles o f th is debate  thus perfectly com p lem ent each o th e r as both 
are m o s t vu lne rab le  to  the critic ism  th a t would d e p a rt precisely from  
the perspective  o f its  co u n te r-p a rt and would be b es t fo rtif ie d  if it could 
incorpora te  such c ritic ism : H onig 's in te rpre ta tion  w ou ld  thus need to  be 
com pounded w ith  the  associational and c o n s titu tive  e lem ents o f 
A rendt's  concept o f action, Benhabib's -  w ith  the  a gon is tic  d im ension. 
In  o th e r w ords, th ese  counter-posed in te rp re ta tio n s  correspond, a t 
least in w ide b ru sh -s troke s , to  the tw o  in te rlac ing  d im ensions of 
A rendt's  conceptua liza tion  o f action  -  the a ssoc ia tio na l-co n s titu tive  and
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the  agonistic, w h ich  genea log ica lly  can be trace d  to  A ris to tle  and  
M achiavelli.
In s o fa r  the  tw o in te rp re ta tio n s  correspond to  th e  A ris to te lian  in A re nd t 
and the  M achiavellian in A re nd t, th ey  a re  b o th  va lid . But A rend t's  
understand ing  o f a c tion  is not exhausted  in th e  in terp lay betw een 
A ris to te lian  and M ach iave llian  e lem ents -  the  in te rp la y  which is p resen t 
no t o n ly  in A rend t's  th o u g h t b u t w ith in  th e  th o u g h t o f A ris to tle  and  
M achiavelli as both  d iscuss both  the  c o n s titu tiv e  and the  p e rfo rm a tive  
m om en ts  o f ac tion . H ow ever n e ith e r o f th e  tw o  e x tre m e s  o f th e  debate  
n o r th e ir  possible m id d le -g ro u n d  th a t w ou ld  ba lance  th e  in te rp re ta tio n , 
succeeds in casting any  lig h t on one o th e r  bu t no less essentia l aspect 
o f A rend t's  concept o f  a c tio n : its e x is te n tia lity .
Action beyond te leo lo g y  and p e ri ornati vi ty
As show n, A rend t d raw s on and d e p a rts  fro m  both  A ris to te lian  
te leo log ica lly  fram ed p o litica l action  in co n ce rt and  fro m  M achiavellian 
v irtu o s ic  political ac tion  as generated by the  possession o f ce rta in  
personal qua lities. On the  one  hand, A ris to tle 's  understand ing  o f  action  
as th e  p rim ary  and o rig in a l fo rm  o f liv ing  In a hum an co m m un ity  is 
v is ib le  in A rendt's  concep t o f  ac tion  p red ica ted  on  hum an cond ition  o f 
p lu ra lity  -  th a t is, as the  w a y  o f  being o f  th is  p lu ra lity . On th e  o th e r, 
w h a t A rend t saw as a 's lip ' in  A ris to tle 's  th in k in g  o f  action , the re tu rn  to  
te leo lo gy  o f good life  to  w hich  the  p o litica l m u s t be su b jec ted , 
suggested to  A rend t th a t th e  fu ll a pp ro p ria tio n  o f  A ris to te lian ism  w ould  
co n tra d ic t her und ers ta nd in g  o f action  as fu n d a m e n ta lly  predicated on 
the  princip le  o f free do m . N am ely, te le o lo g y  o f good life -  as A rend t 
understands it -  rem oves th e  w e igh t o f  ac t, its  m eaning from  th e  
sphere  to  w hich th e  act be longs, the p o litica l, in to  the  sphere o f th e  
e th ica l. Action becom es a m eans to  the  end o f good life, in A rend t's  
reading o f A ris to tle , and ca nn o t incarna te  the  p rinc ip le  of freedom  
w hich A rendt considers c ruc ia l fo r  the  d is tin c tio n  o f a c tion  from  a ll o th e r 
fo rm s o f hum an a c tiv ity .
M achiavelli, by co n tra s t, u nders tands  p o litica l a c tio n  en tire ly  p o litica lly  
and au tonom ously  o f  all o th e r spheres. Action  spells freedom  fro m  
c ircum stances and v e n tu re  in to  the  new . But M ach iave lli^  action  
springs from  v ir tu o s ity  o f e x tra o rd in a ry  p e rso n a litie s , o r ra th e r -  it is 
preconditioned on th e  a c to r  being a m an o f virtù ra th e r than on th e  
m ere fact o f hum an p lu ra lity  as A rend t s tr iv e d  to  a rg ue . In  th a t sense, 
ju s t as A rendt had to  m ove beyond A ris to tle 's  th e o ry  o f action in o rder 
to  conceptua lize  a c tion  in re la tio n  to  free do m , so M achiavelti's th e o ry  o f  
po litica l agency rem ains too  constra ined  by ind iv id ua lism  of the  concept 
o f virtù.
W hat the  dynam ic o f A re n d t's  para lle l a p p ro p ria tio n  and overcom ing o f  
these tw o  theories o f a c tio n  how ever reveals a re  the  tw o  m ain  
conceptua l pillars o f h e r ow n  th e o ry  o f a c tio n : p lu ra lity , as cond ition , 
and freedom , as p rinc ip le . This fo rm s  the  ax is  o f A rend t's  
conceptua liza tion  o f a c tion .
........ .
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The p rob lem  o f freedom  and p lu ra lity58 o r  ra th e r, freedom  In p lu ra lity  is 
o f course  no t new  to  m od ern  politica l and e th ica l theo ry  w hich  is 
p rim a rily  defined th ro u g h  its  enterprise  o f n av iga ting  socie ty aw ay from  
the  co n flic t th a t w ould  necessarily arise  fro m  th e  doings o f m any 
d ive rse  ind iv idua ls  no t sub jected  to  one abso lu te  princip le  o f h a rm ony. 
[D a rw a ll (1 9 9 5 ):3 -4J In  co n te m p o ra ry  po litica l th e o ry  th is  debate  is 
m o s tly  cast in te rm s  o f th e  debate betw een lib e ra l ind iv idua lism  and 
com m un ita rian ism . The n ove lty  th a t A rend t o ffe rs  th ro ug h  h e r 
understand ing  o f  po litica l agency how ever takes h e r th ink ing  beyond 
the  debate  th a t co n te m p o ra rily  m ost o fte n  is cap tu red  as th e  debate 
betw een ind iv idua lis ts  and com m un ita rians. N am ely, A rend t re jects  
co n flic t betw een fre e d o m  and p lu ra lity , asserting  in  her 
phenom enolog ica l ana lyses th a t action  arises o n ly  in p lu ra lity  and 
th ro u g h  action  a change is effected in the  w orld  inhabited by th is  
p lu ra lity , th e  change th a t is incarnation  o f  free do m . In  o th e r w ords, the  
problem  is n o t e m p irica l. The question  is how ever w hat 
conceptua liza tion  o f ac tion  allows A rend t to  overcom e the tension 
betw een freedom  and p lu ra lity  if the lim its  o f one 's  freedom  are  draw n 
by th e  presence o f  m an y  and the  conflic t th a t a rises from  m u ltitu d e  and 
d iv e rs ity  o f d rives, inc lina tion s , m otives, In te rests .
The in te rp re ta tiv e  lite ra tu re  ju s tif ia b ly  focuses on A rend t's  
phenom enolog ica l ana lysis o f  action, w hich  proceeds th rough  a series o f 
d is tinc tions th a t de fine  th e  subcategories o f the sphe re  o f vita activa o r 
hum an a c tiv ity  in genera l, the  process th a t leads to  the  conceptua l 
c rys ta lliza tion  o f action  as one such su bca tego ry . Action is thus 
counterposed to  labou r and w ork, m ost e x p lic it ly , and som ew hat less 
e labora te ly  to  behaviour, w h ich  Arendt notes, re la tin g  it to  the  h is torica l 
occurrence o f so c ie ty  b u t leaving  it  conceptua lly  underdeve loped. [HC, 
40 ]
A rendt closely fo llow s d e fin itio n s  o f labou r in a n tiq u ity  when " to  labor 
m ean t to  be enslaved by necessity ." [HC, 8 3 ] Labour reduces the  
hum an life fo rm  to  its a n im a lis tic  roots, to  n a tu re  d ic ta te s  w hich are  the  
same not only to  a ll hum an  beings bu t to  all liv in g  beings. Labour is 
m an's in teg ra tion  in to  th e  cycles o f n a tu re , d rive n  by uncom prom is ing  
necessities o f hum an b io lo g y .
I t  o u g h t to  be noted h ow eve r th a t A rend t is n o t insens itive  to  th e  lure 
th a t th e  bare rh y th m  o f la b o u r e ffo rts  and co nsu m p tion  o f the  fru its  o f 
labour em anates, a ce rta in  m ag ic o f th e  s im p lic ity  o f being p a rt o f the  
whole o f nature , th e  liv ing  force  th a t runs th ro u g h  all beings liv ing.
58 T h is p ro b lem  is m o re  o ften  e n c o u n te r e d  a s  th e  p ro b lem  o f f r e e d o m  a n d  e q u a li ty . For 
A ren d t a s  well p lu ra lity  p r e s u m e s  m a n y n e s s  o f th e  e q u a ls ,  th e r e f o r e  -  p r e s u m e s  eq u a lity . 
H o w ev er A ren d t u n d e r s ta n d s  t h i s  e q u a lity  a s  e q u a lity  e m e rg in g  from  th e  s h a re d  
c o n d itio n s  o f  h u m an  e x is te n c e ,  a n  a rg u m e n t  a lre a d y  p re s e n t  in h e r  e a r ly  th e s is  on Love 
and St. Augustine. In  o th e r  w o rd s ,  p lu ra lity  a s s u m e s  e q u a li ty  in th e  e x is te n tia l r a th e r  
th a n  po litica l s e n s e .  T h e  s ta te d  p ro b le m  h o w e v er is  n o t r e so lv e d  -  how  is free  a g e n c y  to  
b e  e x e rc is e d  w ith in  t h e  lim its im p o s e d  by p lu ra lity  o f s o u rc e s  o f  f r e e  a g e n c y , p o ten tia lly  
conflic ting?
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H ow ever, in th a t p leasure o r  th e  "s h e e r bliss o f be ing a live " [HC, 1 0 6 ], 
th e re  rem ains n o th ing  o f  hum anness, n o th ing  d is tin c tly  hum an th a t 
se ts  us a p a rt fro m  o th e r n a tu ra l occurrences d riven  by the  same 
necess ity  o f preserv ing  them se lves  a live . For la b o u r is m im e tic  o f life in 
its  e lem enta l b io log ica l sense inso fa r i t  is a flow  o f p roduction , 
co n su m p tio n , re p ro d u c tio n , co nsu m p tion . To lab ou r, in the sense o f 
m a k in g  th e  e ffo rt to  p ro v id e  fo r  th e  needs o f m e ta bo lism  w ha te ve r the  
fo rm  o f th a t e ffo rt,  is e ssen tia lly  to  live  n o t as a d is tin c t being, as a 
p e rson , b u t to  live  as a p a rtic le  o f n a tu re  rep laceable  by any  such 
p a rtic le  in the  cha in  o f th e  re p ro d u c tio n  o f  n a tu re . Labour is thus th e  
b a re  exis tence  o f th e  h um an  corpus  w h ich  "co nce n tra te s  upon noth ing 
b u t its  ow n being a live , and  rem ains im prisoned  in  its m etabo lism  w ith  
n a tu re  w ith o u t e v e r transcend ing  o r free ing  its e lf from  the recurring  
cyc le  o f its own fu n c tio n in g ."  [HC, 115 ]
To free  oneself fro m  the  recurring  cycle  o f com ing  into  (b io log ica l) 
e x is ten ce  and then  van ish ing  by b lend ing in to  o th e r  fo rm s o f b io logical 
e x is ten ce  m eans to  ove rcom e  fu t i l ity  o f such  existence e n tire ly  
subsum ed by necessity "w h ic h  nobody can share and w hich nobody can 
fu lly  co m m un ica te " [HC, 1 1 9 ], m eaning  th a t m an absorbed by the  
fu lf illm e n t o f needs m ay be a na tu ra l being b u t is n o t e n tire ly  a hum an 
b e ing . Nam ely, th e  hum an being is characterized  by liv ing am ong o th e r 
h u m a n  beings, re la ting  to  th e m  and to  th e  w o rld . In  o the r w ords, it 
m eans th a t m an does not live in the  w orld  b u t in the  cycle o f natura l 
processes, like any o th e r b io log ica l e n tity .
To live  as a hum an, as opposed to  liv ing  as a be ing , involves g iving a 
m ea n in g  to  life o th e r than th e  process o f  p ro d u c tio n  and consum ption : 
The b irth  and d e a th  o f hum an beings a re  n o t s im ple 
na tu ra l occurrences, b u t are related to a world  in to  w hich  
single individuals, unique, unexchangeable, and  
unrepeatable entities, appear and fro m  w hich  th e y  
depart. B irth  and d e a th  presuppose a world  w hich  is n o t 
in constan t m o ve m e n t, b u t w hose d u ra b ility  and re la tive  
perm anence m akes appearance and d isappearance 
possible... W ith o u t a w orld  in to  w h ich  m en  a re  born and 
from  w hich they d ie , there  w ou ld  be noth ing  b u t 
changeless e te rna l recurrence , th e  deathless 
everlastingness o f th e  hum an as o f a ll o th e r anim al 
species. [HC, 97 ; em phasis  by SN]
The notions em phasized in th e  above paragraph  in tro du ce  im p lic itly  th e  
co n ce p t o f action in c o u n te r-d is tin c tio n  to  labour. U nlike labour, action  
concerns hum an beings as un ique  occurrences in th e ir  w orld , and it 
re la tes  these beings to  each o th e r and to  the  w o rld . Through action, 
h u m a n  life  becomes a n a rra tiv e  w ho le, th e  w hole  specific to  th a t and 
o n ly  th a t hum an being, b io g ra ph y  th a t is. Action th e re fo re  is re ve la to ry  





Action is firs t and fo re m o s t an activ ity  th a t d iscloses actor. T hrough 
action , th e  actor is know n as an unrepeatable  being in th e  w orld. To te ll 
the s to ry  o f who o ne  is o r  w as, m en always resort to  te lling  the  s to ry  o f 
w ha t one  does o r  has d one  o r d id. The s to ry  o f every  single who is 
th e re fo re  the s to ry  o f the  deeds, which involves both  the  one w ho  did 
them  and the w orld  in -to  w h ich  they  w ere  done and w hich is th e  only 
trea su ry  o f the  deeds once th e  actor is gone o r  the  deed has been 
done. Action thus em erges  fro m  the ta c it im p lica tions o f the  above 
paragraph  as the  bond be tw een  man and the w o rld , as opposed to  
labou r w hich  forces m an  In to  anonym ity  o f natu ra l urges and ins tinc ts :
I f  nature and  the  e a rth  generally co ns titu te  th e  condition 
o f hum an life, th en  th e  world and th e  th ing s  o f the  world 
constitu te  th e  c o n d itio n  under which th is  specifically 
hum an life  can be a t hom e on e a rth . [HC, 1 3 4 ]
The 'spec ifica lly  hum an  life ' is a t home on the e a rth  on ly  because there  
is th e  w orld , w hich  one could  portray as a th in  m em brane betw een 
natu re  and man, com posed o f  "th e  th ings o f the w o rld  [w h ich ] have the 
function  o f s tab iliz ing  hum an  life ."  [HC, 137] The m em brane is the  
rea lity  constructed by the  presence o f the  th ings durab le , th a t serve  as 
the source  of s ta b ility , and a lso  the  presence o f o th e r  m en to w hom  one 
re la tes: "W ithout a w orld  betw een men and n a tu re , there  is e te rna l 
m ovem ent, but no  o b je c t iv ity ."  [HC, 1 37 ] O b je c tiv ity  here is d ire c tly  
related to  the roo ts o f objectus -  it is about presentness, th ingness, 
about th a t which is o th e r th a n  the  sub ject and e x is ts  independently  o f 
it. H ow ever, while ob jec ts  m ay exist independen tly  o f the  sub ject, the 
sub jec t places th em  in the  w orld  th rough his w ork.
This tangible  unders tand ing  o f the  world th ro ug h  th e  m en 's  invo lvem ent 
w ith  m ate ria l and fa b rica tio n  is a very H eideggerian th read  in A rend t's  
phenom enology o f w o rk , a n o th e r form  o f  hum an a c tiv ity  o th e r than 
action , w hich produces th e  durab le  elem ents o f  hum an env ironm ent 
and th us  anchors th e  ve ry  hum an existence.
Unlike th e  circle o f labour, w h ich  consumes itse lf, w o rk  produces th ings 
th a t o u tlive  the process o f fabrica tion  b u t both th e  process and the  
p roduct are preceded and o u tlived  by the  m odel gu id ing  the fabrica tion . 
The w o rk  course can  be m o re  o r less easily  traced fro m  p o te n tia lity  to 
a c tu a lity  because its  p ro du c t, before it appears as th e  ob ject o f th is  
w orld , has a lready been p re se n t in the m ind  o f th e  w ork ing  m an, as a 
m odel o r  a t least an in tim a tio n  to  guide th e  hand.59
59 W ork in t h a t  s e n se  is  a n  a c tiv ity , A re n d t a rg u e s , a lm o s t p a ra d o x ic a lly  c lo se s t to  th e  
a c tiv ity  o f c o n te m p la tio n  a s  P la to  re c o g n iz e d  re la tin g  p h ilo so p h y  to  poiesis by b o rro w in g  
from  th e  la t te r  th e  te rm  eidos/ id e a  w h ich  d e n o te s  sh a p e  o r  fo rm . [HC, 142] B u t in so fa r 
fa b ric a tio n  is g o v e rn ed  e n tire ly  by  p re d e te rm in e d  m e a n s  an d  e n d , t h a t  is -  in a sm u c h  its  
p re d ic ta b le  an d  c o n tro lla b le  (o r, p re d ic te d  and  co n tro lled  a s  w e ll)  c o u rse  falls w ith in  th e  
u tilita r ian  fram ew o rk , it c lea rly  s t a n d s  a p a r t  from  c o n te m p la tio n  a s  u n b o u n d  e x p lo ra tio n  
o f id e a s , fo r  th e  * [ t]h o u g h t [...] h a s  n e ith e r  a n  end  n o r  an  a im  o u ts id e  itself, a n d  it d o e s  
n o t e v e n  p ro d u c e  re s u l ts ."  [HC, 1 7 0 ]
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In  th a t sense, w ork is as d is tin c t from  action  as labour: action  in 
A rend t's  understand ing is incom prehensib le  w ith in  th e  u tilita ria n  and 
in s tru m e n ta lis t fram ew orks. I t  serves n o th ing  and i t  places n o-th in g  in 
the  w orld  -  a pa rt from  placing m an  am ong o th e r m e n  in to  the w orld . As 
A rend t points out, th e  co nd itio n  o f w o rk  is iso la tion  o r, m ore p rec ise ly , 
the  p o litica l isolation. The invo lve m e n t is w ith  o b je c ts , not w ith  o th e r 
m en. By contrast, action  e x is ts  on ly  inso fa r it re la te s  m an to  m en  and 
thus to  the  world as a w ho le  and, as A re n d t ince ssan tly  argues, th is  
re la ting  generates th e  unexpected  fo r  it n e v e r can be prem edita ted  o r  
p rede te rm ined  -  un like  labou r, inev itab ly  d ic ta te d  by necessity, and 
un like  w o rk , guided by the  m ode l o f th e  p ro d u c t to  be -  because it fa lls 
in to  th e  'w eb  o f hum an re la tionsh ips7 [HC, 1 8 4 ] and provokes response: 
Since action acts upon beings w ho are capab le  o f th e ir 
own actions, reaction , a pa rt from  being a response, is 
a lw ays a new action  th a t s trikes  o u t on its  own and 
a ffects  o thers. [HC, 1 9 0 ]
An act o r a c tiv ity  w hich is a lin k  in the  chain  o f  o th e r a c tiv itie s , all 
harnessed fo r  the a tta in m e n t o f a ce rta in  p reconce ived  goal, is w ha t 
A rendt equates w ith  the  ca teg o ry  o f behaviou r, n o t action. A ction  by 
co n tra s t constitu tes a ru p tu re , breaking o f a p a tte rn , which A rend t 
po rtrays  as instantaneous, m om en to us, sudden, a nd  contrasts  i t  w ith  
th e  'e v e ry d a y 7, 'con tinuous ' and 'a u to m a t ic /  in  H. Friese 's w ords:
[ t ]h e  m eaningfu l, 'd e c is ive 7 m o m e n t, w h ich  tu rn s  the  fa te  o f 
th e  hum an being o r o f  h is to ry  a t one  s tro k e , defies a ny  
concept o f continuous progress. The m o m e n t becomes th e  
g u a ra n to r o f the  d issocia tion  fro m  th e  s te a d y  course o f 
th in g s  and the libe ra tion  fro m  th e  im p e ra tive s  o f social life . 
[S m ite k  and M ursic, 2 0 0 1 ]
W hat em erges from  action  can a lw ays rad ica lly  a lte r  the  course o f 
events and transfo rm  a ny  h is to rica l fra m e w o rk  in to  som eth ing  new th a t 
n e ith e r could have been envisaged n o r can it be reduced to  w hat 
preceded it. Peculiarity o f a c tion  is p recise ly  its opening  ( in )to  the 
unkn ow n :
W hoever begins to  a c t m u s t know th a t he has started 
som eth ing  whose end he can n eve r fo re te ll, i f  only 
because his ow n deed has a lready  changed every th ing  
and m ade Is even m ore  unp re d ic ta b le . [BPF, 8 4 ]
This ex trao rd ina riness  o f ac tion  is routed in u n ique  d is tinctness o f 
hum an be ings, the  un iqueness m an ifested  in o u r d is tin c t physical 
appearance b u t even m o re  so in d o ing . A c tion  is th e  m edium  o f th is  
'u n iq u e  d is tin c tn ess7 by w hich  i t  is reve a le d .60 [HC, 1 7 6 ] In  o the r w ords, 
th e  oneness o f one appears th ro u g h  action , w hich  im plies th a t m an 
m eans as one th rough  acting  am ong  o thers w ho  recogn ise  him  as one.
60 T h o u g h  th i s  t e r m  reveal m u s t  b e  t a k e n  w ith  so m e  r e s e rv a t io n  in s o fa r  A ren d t m a in ta in s  
t h a t  w h a t is re v e a le d  is n o t t h e r e ,  g iv e n , b u t  b e c o m e s  th ro u g h  th i s  re v e la tio n , th ro u g h  
a c tio n  th a t  is.
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61 Uniqueness o f each m an can on ly  be recognized in the  com pany o f 
equals. O nly in the  com pany o f equals can the  d is tinc tness o f who she 
is not be asserted , b u t it can in the  firs t place -  be th ro ug h  d o ing .61 2 63In  
th a t sense, action  bears im p orta nce  fo r th e  life o f m an  regardless o f its 
m otive s , goals o r consequences insofar its characte r is reve la to ry .
This uniqueness h o w eve r generates tension  w ith in  com m un ity , the 
tension  w hich co n te m p o ra ry  p o litica l theo ry  understands as the core  o f 
the  p o litics  o f agon}3 For A rend t, the p rim e  h is to rica l exam ple  o f 
po litics  pervaded by agon  w as Hellenic polls:
[T ]h e  public rea lm  its e lf, the polis, was perm eated  by a 
fie rce ly  agonal s p ir it, w he re  everybody had constan tly  to 
d is tingu ish  h im se lf fro m  all o the rs , to  show  th rough 
unique deeds o r ach ievem ents th a t he was the  best o f 
a ll. [HC, 4 1 ]
This p a rticu la r exam ple  is s tro n g ly  em bedded in the  h is to rica l con tex t o f 
G reek dem ocracy as th e  p u rs u it o f e a rth ly  im m o rta lity  th rough  g rea t 
deeds [HC, 19 ], the  p u rsu it w h ich  -  as A re n d t acknow ledges in th e  final 
c h a p te r o f The Human Condition -  does no t ou tlive  its h istorica l con text 
and does not m ark  th e  M odern Age. N everthe less, A rend t argues th a t 
there  is theore tica l g round ing  to  assum e the necessary conflic tual 
d im ension  of hum an re la tions in the pub lic  sphere . I t  lies in the 
unbreakable  but tense  connection  between e qu a lity  and d is tinc tion  as 
tw o  e lem ents  o f p lu ra lity  w hich  is the fundam enta l hum an condition.
On the  one hand, pub licness o f  action assum es openness o f the  acting 
one to  responses, cha llenges, ju d g m e n ts , o r  s im p le  silence o f ob liv ion , 
open as vu lnerable  y e t th ro w n  in to  the face o f  one 's peers. A t the sam e 
tim e , th e  process o f d is tin gu ish in g  always invo lves a ce rta in  decision, 
who one  is, and it im plies d iscrim ina ting  aga ins t th e  WHOs th a t one is 
not. T he re  always is a p oss ib ility  th a t who one  is w ill be understood as a 
cha llenge to  those w ho  are w h a t th is one is no t, th e  ones w ho are 
d iffe re n t. U ltim a te ly , th a t can lead to  one  w an ting  to  be no t on ly  
d iffe re n t b u t also b e tte r  and th e  best, which is w ha t th e  polis  was about 
-  being the  best am ong th e  equals [HC, 19 ] -  and w hy the Greek 
practica l philosophy ins is ted  on  the  w orth  o f m od era tio n . [HC, 191]
61 In  th e  Human Condition, A re n d t b rie f ly  d isc u sse s  o th e rn e s s ,  tra c in g  it b ack  to  m ed iev a l 
p h ilo so p h y  a s  th e  c o n c e p t o f  aiteritas, w h ich  is a q u a lity  p o s s e s se d  by e v e ry - th /n g . E v ery ­
th in g  is o th e r  to  e v e ry - th in g  e ls e , m e re ly  by e x is tin g . T h e re b y  it b e lo n g s  to  m an  a s  d o e s  
d is t in c tn e s s , th e  q u a lity  b e lo n g in g  to  e v e r y -body, e v e ry  living b e in g  a s  d iffe ren t t o  e v e ry  
o th e r  living b e in g . [HC, 1 7 6 ] O th e r n e s s  and  d is t in c tn e s s  a r e  im p o r ta n t  e le m e n ts  of 
p lu ra lity  b u t  th e  n o tio n  o f  p lu ra lity  c a n n o t  be re d u c e d  to  th e m  b e c a u s e  m an  is n o t  only 
o th e r  a n d  n o t only d is tin c t b u t  is u n iq u e .  W hat A ren d t is  try in g  to  p o in t to , th ro u g h  th e s e  
s e e m in g ly  p e d a n tic  d is tin c tio n s , is  t h a t  u n iq u e n e ss  is  n o t s im p ly  a  q u a lity  p o s s e s s e d ,  
so m e th in g  th a t  s ta tica lly  b e lo n g s  t o  m a n  qua m an , b u t  a lso  e n te r s  th e  w orld  th ro u g h  
m a n 's  a c t io n s ,  in o th e r  w o rd s  -  b o th  is  a n d  a p p e a rs  th ro u g h  a c tio n  a n d  n o t only  b e in g .
62 E quality  h e re  is no t to  b e  u n d e rs to o d  in any  n o rm a tiv e -p o litica l s e n s e  b u t ex is ten tia lly , 
in te rm s  o f  th e  e q u a lity  o f  h u m a n  c o n d it io n .
63 In th e  lite ra tu re  on A re n d t, D ana  V illa 's  [1 9 9 1 ] p a ra lle l re a d in g  o f  A re n d t a n d  N ie tzsche  
is b a se d  o n  th e  c o n ce p tu a liz a tio n  o f  p o litic s  a s  a g o n is tic .
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T he reo f a lso Kant's insistence on o u r u nso c ia b ility  as inextricab le  from  
o u r so c ia b ility : the  boundlessness o f o u r u rge  to  be d iffe re n t.
Po litica lly, th is trans la tes  in to  an e ve r-p re se n t dan ge r th a t m en w ill go 
too  fa r  in th e ir  d is tingu ish ing , and the  d is tance  th a t o the rw ise  a llows fo r  
in te ra c tio n  w ill becom e the  unbridgeab le  d e ta ch m e n t from  the com m on 
w orld . W hile  the  understand ing  o f re la tio n s  am ong m en  in a po litica l 
co m m u n ity  as a fe llow ship  based on respect seem s to  endow body 
po litic  w ith  ce rta in  s ta b ility  (C hap te r 2 ), th e  d is tin c tio n  as one o f th e  
m o to rs  o f the  po litica l reveals politics as pervaded by the  princip le  o f 
d issonance, rooted in d /s-stance, d /s -tin c tio n , d is -c rim in a tio n , de­
ta ch m e n t, rendering th e  po litica l edifice  vu ln e ra b le  to  centrifuga l forces 
o f its fa b ric , the  hum an re la tions.
U niqueness thus renders action  unp re d ic ta b le : in action , the who is 
revea led, th e  who th a t cannot be reduced to  any o th e r  who nor can it 
eve r be com prehended in to ta lity  u n til it is no longer. I t  is the who the  
p e cu lia rity  o f which is not exhausted in lis ting  o f  its a ttr ib u tes  and 
p ro p e rtie s , and the  who can thus  be rendered  in te llig ib le  (w h ile  no t 
g raspab le ) on ly  in th e  w holeness o f th e  life  s to ry .
But a c tio n  is not o n ly  unpred ic tab le , it  is also uncontro llab le  in the  
course o f  th e  events w hich  it in itia tes  o r ra th e r, se ts in  m otion .64 I t  is 
a n o th e r im p lica tion  o f  p lu ra lity  as th e  co nd itio n  o r  env iro n m e n t o f 
agency, and perhaps fo r A re nd t m ore  im p o rta n t th a n  the agon is tic  
d im ension  o f hum an a ffa irs65 - the  boundlessness, A rend t's  te rm , o f 
hum an a c tion , in o th e r words -  its uncontro llab le  openendedness. I t  is 
p lu ra lity  o f acting  beings, whose deeds com e from  u nkn ow n  orig ins and 
run  in u nkn ow n  d irec tio n s , a lw ays having th e ir  course changed by the 
deeds o f  o th e r acting  beings, like  a tom s in the m a tte r . This is the 
p rocess-cha rac te r o f a c tio n ,66 n o t action  as a step in th e  to ta lity  o f the 
d irec ted , de te rm ined  process fro m  beg inn ing  to  end, but action  as 
u ne nd in g , g row ing  th ro u g h  th e  series o f o th e r actions and reactions. 
[HC, 2 3 3 ]
64 I t  is o f c o u rs e  difficult to  s p e a k  of th e  in itial, original a c tio n  in t h e  w e b  o f c o n s ta n t 
a c tin g .
65 N a m ely , agon is  th r e a te n in g  fo r p o litica l c o m m u n ity  in so fa r it c a n  b re a k  it a p a r t  and 
f ra g m e n t  it.  B o u n d le s sn e ss  h o w e v e r is  a  p o te n tia l  peril for th e  e n t i r e  h u m an  w o rld , a s  
inter alia A re n d t 's  a n a ly s is  (in  th e  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p te r  o f th e  Human Condition) o f m o d ern  
sc ien tif ic  in te rv e n t io n s  in to  n a tu r e  a n d  u n fo re s e e n  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f s e r ie s  o f a c tio n s  and 
re a c tio n s ,  in d ic a te s .
66 A re n d t 's  t e r m  process-character u s e d  h e re  to  d e s c r ib e  ac tion  c a n  be con fusing , g iven 
t h a t  A re n d t c r itic ize s  th e  p e rv a d in g  logic  o f p ro c e s s  in m o d e rn ity . T he la t te r  critique  
h o w e v e r  r e f e r s  to  te le o lo g ica l p ro c e s s e s  of p ro g re s s  a n d  a u to m a tis m  of p ro c ess . In  th e  
c o n te x t  o f  a c t io n  by c o n tra s t  process is s u p p o s e d  to  s ign ify  a s e r ie s  o f  e v e n ts  th a t  action  
t r ig g e r s  off, t h e  e v e n ts  h o w e v e r  th a t  c a n n o t  b e  r e a d  fro m  th e  a c tio n  n o r  th e ir  c o u rse  can 
b e  p re d ic te d .  I f  in sp a tia l t e r m s  th e re fo re  a n y  a c tio n  is in se r te d  in to  'w e b  of re la tio n sh ip s ' 
[HC, 1 8 3 ]  t h a n  in te m p o ra l  te rm s ,  it is in se r te d  in to  s e r ie s  o f  e v e n t s  th a t  a c tio n s  of 
o th e r s .  I t  m u s t  be  o b se rv e d  h o w e v e r  th a t  th is  tw ofo ld  a n d  c o n tra d ic to ry  usag e  o f th e  
n o tio n  o f process  d o e s  n o t c o n tr ib u te  to  c o n c e p tu a l  c la r ity  of A re n d t 's  u n d e rs tan d in g  of 
a c tio n .
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The d iscussion  o f th e  d is tin g u ish in g  and boundless ch a rac te r o f action, 
both  a ris ing  from  p lu ra lity  as th e  condition  o f hum an existence, touched 
upon tw o  d im ensions o f a c tio n , the  dim ensions th a t one could grasp  by 
tw o  p repos itions th a t re la te  action  to  the  world in w h ich  it occurs: in 
and before . Nam ely, ac tion  is always done in the  w orld , th e re fo re  
am ong m en and in re a lity  by  th e m  constructed. T ha t is its  'c o n ta in e r / a 
ta ng ib le  shape can/ed out o f  th e  ind iffe ren t space and appropria ted  by 
piurality  o f m en. I t  is before  th e  w orld : in fron t o f, fac ing , those  w ho 
are th e  w orld , public  th e re fo re . Underlying these tw o  characte ris tics  o f 
action  is A rend t's  onto log ica l a rg um en t aga inst so ve re ig n ty  prem ised on 
se lf-su ffic ien cy  and s e lf-m a s te ry . The possib ility  o f  sovere ign ty  is 
denied by the  fundam enta l co n d itio n  o f action  -  h um an  p lu ra lity , w hich  
m eans th a t no one can e n jo y  abso lu te  contro l ove r th e  course o f one's 
action  and its fina l o u tcom e  unless others are a n n ih ila te d . [HC, 234 - 
2 3 5 ] I t  is from  and by one o f  th em  but i t  is never ow ned as one 's own 
to  be d isposed of, to  be hand led  a t to ta l d iscre tion , as i t  is th e  case w ith  
any o b je c t in one's possession. [HC, 182]
The th ird  defin ing ch a ra c te ris tic  o f action is re lated to  freedom  w hich 
appears in the  world th ro u g h  action , and th is  can be w e ll captured  by 
the  p re po s ition  to. Nam ely, a c tio n  happens to the  w o r ld : as vu lnerab le  
as action  is to  response b y  th e  world so is th e  w o rld  vu lnerab le  to  
a c tion , w h ich  never leaves it  unchanged. T ha t is th e  e le m e n t o f novelty 
in action , the  nove lty  w hich can  be undone on ly  th ro u g h  a no the r action , 
a n o th e r b ea re r o f nove lty  in a co un te r-m ovem en t to  change the  w orld  
back , to  reverse  the  change b u t the reby  again change  it.
The b ring ing  o f the  novel in to  th is  world does not fo llo w  A ris to tle 's  and 
A ris to te lia n  itin e ra ry  o f becom ing  from  p o te n tia lity  to  a c tu a lity , th a t is a 
causal p a tte rn  o f becom ing. By contrast to  any causa l fram e w o rk , 
action  in A rend t's  w orks is depicted th rough  re c u rre n t reference to 
m irac le , ra th e r pecu lia r te rm , w h ich  seems m ore fitte d  to  the  discourse 
o f m ys tic ism  than politica l th e o ry . But w ith  th is w ord , miracle, A rend t 
seeks to  re ite ra te  her u nders tand ing  o f action th ro u g h  freedom , th a t 
w hich  de fies  te leo logy and re s is ts  the  inertia  o f the  e x is tin g . Nam ely, 
free  a c t:
...is a m iracle  -  th a t is, som ething which could not be 
expected . I f  it is tru e  th a t action and beg inn ing  are 
essen tia lly  the  sam e, it fo llows th a t the  ca pa c ity  fo r 
perfo rm ing  m iracles m u s t likewise be w ith in  the  range o f 
hum an faculties. This sounds strange r than it a c tu a lly  is.
I t  is in the ve ry  n a tu re  o f every new beg inn ing  th a t it 
b reaks in to  the  w orld  as an 'in fin ite  im p ro b a b ility , ' and 
y e t it  is precisely th is  in fin ite ly  im probable w h ich  actua lly  
co nstitu te s  the  ve ry  te x tu re  o f every th ing  w e ca ll real.
[BPF, 1 69 -1 71 ]
Th is  co n s titu tio n  o f re a lity  b y  th e  im probable happens th ro u g h  th e  new 
as a beg inn ing, which is m an 's  investm ent in (to ) th e  w o rld , and it is so 
even in th e  extended, expanded  m eanings o f I ta lia n  investire, an
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a b ru p t m ovem ent o f m a tte r  in to  m a tte r, body in to  body, a b low  and 
crash, w hich  u rges unexpected, u np la nn e d , radical even, 
rea rrangem en t o f the  ex is ting  patterns to  accom m oda te  the new . The 
old p a tte rn  can no lon ge r be restored a fte r  th e  b eg inn ing , it has to  be 
undone by doing anew . I t  is in the a fte rm a th  o f  beg inning, as in its  
m iracu lous orig in , th a t one can sense th e  fu ll pow er o f A re nd t's  
m etaphorica l and conceptua l 'c o rd ' be tw een b irth  and beg inn ing: in  th e  
w orld , th e re  is never a place fo r  a new born, a new com er, any new , bu t 
place is m ade and n o t o n ly  in th e  sense o f 'r o o m  be ing  m ade.' And once 
the n e w /co m e r is th e re , th e re  can be no re tu rn  to  th e  condition  o f its  
non-presence, it can now  only be th e  co n d itio n  o f absence o f th a t w hich  
has been present, a vacancy fe lt  as vacancy.
In v e s tm e n t also in the  sense o f p u ttin g  s o m e th in g  in and e n trus tin g  
w ith , co m m ittin g  onese lf to  th a t w hich receives th ro u g h  tha t w h ich  is 
g iven, w here  c o m m itm e n t is n e ithe r re s p o n s ib ility /a cco u n ta b ility  n o r 
g u ilt (as it would be fo r  an investimento  o f  v io lence , fo r  breaking in to  
and undoing  the  p a tte rn ) bu t a bond th a t is in g iv in g  and rece iv ing. 
T hrough  th e  concept o f  n a ta lity  as th e  capacity  fo r  beg inning, A rend t 
th e re fo re  a rrives at a d iffe re n t re la tionsh ip  o f m en to  th e ir  w orld , the  
g roundless bond conta ined in the  ve ry  (p o litic a l)  a c t itse lf.67 The bond 
does no t precede the a c t, it is constitu ted  and re -co n s titu te d  th ro u g h  
e very  new  act. In  the sense o f th is  groundlessness o f m an 's  bond to  the  
w orld , ju s t  as A rend tian  action  could not be derived  from  A ris to te lian  
fra m e w o rk  o f p o te n tia lity  and a c tua lity , so it s tands in opposition  to  
neo-C atho lic  understand ing o f the  fo unda tion  o f p o litica l o rder as "an
67 B eg inn ing  a lw ay s  h o w e v e r  e n ta i ls  th e  peril o f c o n s e rv a t io n ,  a s  A ren d t o b se rv e d : 
"P sy ch o lo g ica lly  sp e a k in g , th e  e x p e r ie n c e  of fo u n d a tio n  c o m b in e d  w ith  th e  co n v ic tio n  th a t  
a  new  s to ry  is a b o u t to  u n fo ld  in h is to ry  will m a k e  m e n  'c o n s e rv a t iv e ' r a th e r  th a n  
'r e v o lu tio n a ry ',  e a g e r  to  p re s e rv e  w h a t h a s  b e e n  d o n e  a n d  to  a s s u r e  its  s ta b ility  r a th e r  
t h a n  o p e n  fo r  n ew  th in g s , n e w  d e v e lo p m e n ts ,  n ew  id e a s ."  [OR, 4 1 ]  B eg inn ing  a s  th e  new  
fa lls  p rey  to  th e  d e s tru c tiv e  d e s ire  o f th o s e  w ho  h av e  b ro u g h t  it a b o u t  to  p re se rv e  it, and  
th e  new  is th u s  an n ih ila ted  o r  o ss ified  in th e  a t te m p t  o f p re s e rv a t io n ,  su ch  a s  w a s  th e  
a sp ira t io n  o f A m erican  C o n s ti tu t io n a lis ts ;  "U nder th e  n e w  s y s te m , A m e ric an s  w e re  n e v e r  
a g a in  to  u n d e r ta k e  e x tra o rd in a ry  po litica l a c tio n s , b e c a u s e  from  t h a t  t im e  th e re  w e re ,  a t 
le a s t  in th e o ry ,  no  m o re  re v o lu tio n s  to  be fo u g h t a n d  n o  m o re  c o n s titu t io n s  to  be  m a d e .” 
[L ien esch , 1 9 8 8 :1 8 1 ]  But m o re  th a n  th a t  w hich  h a s  b e e n  b ro u g h t a b o u t  is a t  s ta k e  in th e  
f a te d  p ro c e s s  o f c o n se rv a tio n . T he p ro te c tiv e  e ffo r t o f  t h e  fo u n d e rs  sim iles th e  d rive  
w h ich  t h r u s t s  p a re n ts  into sac rifice  b e y o n d  c o m p re h e n s io n  fo r t h e i r  o ffsp ring , th e  sacrifice  
g r e a te r  th a n  th e  w orld itse lf. More o f te n  th a n  n o t, th e  fo u n d e rs  h a v e  b e en  p re p a re d  to  
p re fe r  th e i r  fo u n d a tio n  to  t h e  r e s t  o f  th e  w orld , p e r h a p s  e v e n  to  th e  w orld  itse lf. 
B eg inn ing  b e c o m e s  m o re  v a lu a b le  t h a n  th e  w orld  to  w h ic h  it is  b o rn  and  fro m  w h ich  it 
c a m e .
T h e  q u e s tio n  of th e  p o te n tia l c la s h  b e tw e e n  th e  p a tro n s  o r  fo u n d e rs  o f  a  b e g in n in g  and  
th e  w orld  c a n n o t  be e ith e r  so lv e d  o r  o v e rc o m e  o r  c ir c u m v e n te d  j u s t  a s  th e r e  is  no 
re m e d y  fo r  th e  conflict b e tw e e n  b e g in n in g  o r  n e w n e s s  a n d  th e  p r e s e n t .  A re n d t's  re sp o n se  
to  th e  l a t t e r  p ro b lem  is d e r iv e d  from  th e  te a c h in g  of Je f fe rs o n , a ls o  P a ine , w h o  le a rn e d  
f ro m  th e  a n c ie n t  R om e th a t  p re s e rv a t io n  is s e c u re d  o n ly  th o u g h  a u g m e n ta tio n , in o th e r  
w o rd s  -  b e g in n in g s  live on  th ro u g h  n e w  b e g in n in g s  o n ly . [OR, 2 3 3 ]  Equally so , th e  
a t t a c h m e n t  o f  fo u n d e rs  to  t h e i r  fo u n d a tio n  is c u re d  o r  c o n ta in e d  o n ly  by th e  new  fo u n d e rs  
o f  n e w  fo u n d a tio n s . Any m o re  sp ec ific  so lu tio n  o r  a n y  t ig h t e r  c lo s in g  o f  th is  c rev ice  w ould  
e n ta i l  t h a t  w h ich  A ren d t p e rs is te n ly  w a rn e d  a g a in s t  -  t h e  c lo su re  o f  t h e  sp a c e  o f a n d  for 
f r e e d o m  t h a t  is  th e  political.
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essay in w orld  c re a t io n / ' [Voegelin , 1 9 5 6 /2 0 0 1 :5 5 ] w hereby the  
po litica l act is d e rived  fro m  the  tran scen d en ta l idea o f  the  
m u n d a n e /te m p o ra l o rd e r.
A rg ua b ly , there  rem a ins  a ce rta in  tension in  A re nd t's  notion  o f ac tion  as 
d is ru p tive  beg inning in th e  lig h t o f her p ronounced ye t not e n tire ly  
w orked o u t d is tin c tio n  b e tw e en  action and v io lence . The tension springs 
fro m  a ce rta in  shared g round  betw een the  tw o , th e  d is rup tio n  th a t th ey  
cause, th e  dem and th a t th e y  place w ith o u t ju s tif ic a tio n . But w hile  
ac tion  is se lf-con ta ined  in s o fa r it  is the  locus  o f its own m eaning, 
v io lence  m ust a lw ays be understood  in in s tru m e n ta l te rm s. In  th is 
sense, action  is v io le n t as it  d isrupts the  e x is tin g , v io la tes  it, b u t it 
ca nn o t be equated w ith  v io lence , which is m ute  n o t because it  is not 
ve rb a l ( it  can ve ry  w e ll be s o ) bu t because it does n o t speak to  the  
w orld , it  does no t re la te  to  the  w orld , it is a piece o f too l w ith o u t 
m ean ing  inherent to  it, dependent fo r ju s t if ic a tio n  upon w ha te ve r 
genera ted  it.
There is also th e  q u e s tio n  o f  the  in itia to ry  d im ens ion  o f action  - 
w h e th e r an action  to w ards  conserva tion  can s till be understood  as 
action . A rend t's  phenom eno logy  o f action  w ould  suggest th a t noth ing  
a im ed a t preserving th e  p resen t o r  the past, a t a rres tin g  th e  now could 
be in te rp re ted  as action . H ow ever, one o u g h t to  be cautious n o t to  
equate  A rend t's  th e o ry  o f ac tion  w ith  th e  philosophies o f constan t 
m o tio n  and flux , ch a rac te ris tic  o f m o d e rn ity , by th is  narrow  
understand ing  o f a c tion . To preserve m ay w ell Im ply a resistance to  the  
flu x  in ce rta in  s itu a tio ns . T he key word here is there fore  n e ith e r 
dynam ic  flux  nor s ta tic  cond ition  but automatism  o f one or the  o the r, 
ine rtia  o f necessity o f e ith e r  m otion  or im m o b ility  derived fro m  it 
a lready being th e re , in the  w orld , which action  d is tu rbs  and aga inst it 
w h ich  places the  dem and o f free do m .68 Freedom  can, th rough  action , 
place in the  w orld  w h a t has never been the re , n o t even th ro u g h  
th o u g h t, and bases its  cla im  to  presence on its  ve ry  appearance.
N ove lty  as a d im ension  o f a c tion  begs an inev itab le  question  o f how  a 
being th a t is em bedded in th e  givenness o f its co nd itio n , som eone 
th ro w n  in to  the  w orld  w ith o u t having chosen o r w illed  it, can change 
a n y th in g .
E labora ting  on th is , A re nd t speaks o f our re la tionsh ip  to  the w orld , 
w h ich  is fo r the  w orld  and a ga in s t its ruin, in te rm s  o f love, and th a t is 
th e  on ly  po in t a t w h ich  she evokes the notion  o f love in the po litica l 
sense. N am ely, In The Human Condition love is s itua ted  in the  p riva te  
o r  even th e  in tim a te  rea lm , as th a t which is n o t on ly  apo litica l bu t a n ti-
68 In the essay on the crisis in education, Arendt actually explicitly addresses the 
difference between conservation in education, as the necessary element of transmitting 
our  world to the new generations, and conservatism in politics: "In politics this 
conservative attitude -  which accepts the world as it is, striving only to preserve the 
status quo -  can only lead to destruction, because the world, in gross and detail, is 
irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time unless human beings are determined to 
intervene, to alter, to create what is new.” [BPF, 192]
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p o litica l inso fa r it connects lovers  to  each o th e r, n o t th e  w orld , push ing 
th em  in to  to ta l fusion th a t "d e s tro ys  th e  in -b e tw e e n  w hich relates us to  
and separa tes us fro m  o th e rs ."  [HC, 2 4 2 ] By v ir tu e  o f th is  fus ion , o f 
to ta l m u tu a l absorp tion , love is d is tin c t fro m  respect, w hich  is re la ted  to  
looking  b a c k /a t and th e reb y  im p lies d is tance. The w o rld  how ever is not 
to  be respected bu t loved prec ise ly  because w e are  ins ide  it, one w ith  it 
as we a re  o f  it -  a g e n itive  n o t s im p ly  to  denote  possession b u t to  
ind ica te  th a t we are  made  o f  th e  w o r ld .69
This conception  o f th e  w orld  as co n s titu tiv e  o f  m an is s tro n g ly  
H e ideggerian . Nam ely, H eidegger's concept o f th e  w orld  and his 
und e rs ta nd in g  o f Dasein as inescapably b e in g -in -th e -w o rld  and being- 
w ith  opened a new ph ilosoph ica l horizon . One o f  th e  problem s o f 
p h ilosophy w ith  the  p o litica l, as A re nd t p o in ts  o u t and  as analysed in 
th e  p re v io u s  tw o  chap ters , is th e  p resupposition  o f  the  on to log ica l 
p rio r ity  o f s ing u la rity  in opposition  to  the  o n tic  (o n to lo g ica l-o n tic  being 
a d is tin c tio n  here borrow ed d ire c tly  fro m  H e idegger) p lu ra lity  o f m en  in 
th e  w o rld . In  th a t sense, to  be in  th e  w orld  is in te rp re te d  as a fa ll from  
th e  re a lity  o f Being, i t  is th e  a rg u m e n t o f  th e  'c o rru p tio n  o f hum an 
n a tu re ' w h ich  is cap tu red  by H eidegger's concept o f ina u th e n tic ity . 
[H e id eg ge r, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 ]
B ut th ro u g h  H eidegger's on to log ica l re in te rp re ta tio n  o f  the  w orld liness 
o f ex is tence  - going m uch fu r th e r  than  a ll o n tic  a rg u m e n ts  fo r m en 's 
so c ia b ility  w hich  draw  on  som e s o rt o f the  K antian  n o tio n  o f unsociable 
s o c ia b ility  o r  the  understand ing  o f m an  as e ssen tia lly  s ing u la r bu t 
forced in to  p lu ra lity  by (n a tu ra l)  necessity, p h ilosophy is com pelled to  
cons ider the  world as co n s titu tiv e  o f hum an being, on the  one hand, 
and on th e  o th e r - hum an being as e ssen tia lly  and fu n d a m e n ta lly  In the  
w orld .
I t  lies in the  na tu re  o f ph ilosophy to  dea l w ith  m an  in the 
s ing u la r, w hereas politics could not even  be conceived o f 
if m en  did not e x is t in th e  p lu ra l. [...] H e idegger's  concept 
o f th e  'w o rld ,' w h ich  in m any respects s ta nd s  at the 
c e n te r o f his p h ilosophy, co ns titu te s  a step  o u t o f th is 
d iff ic u lty . At any ra te , because H e idegger d e fin es  hum an 
ex is tence  as b e in g -in -th e -w o rld , he insists on  giving 
ph ilosoph ic s ign ificance to  s truc tu res  o f e ve ryd a y  life  tha t 
a re  com ple te ly  incom prehensib le  i f  m a n  is n o t p rim arily  
understood  as being to g e th e r w ith  o th e rs .70 [EU, 4 4 3 ]
69 This exposes the limits of Arendt's famous metaphor of the world as table that relates 
and separates men -  insofar the relationship among men in the world is concerned, the 
metaphor loses nothing of its power, but it does not incorporate the particular relationship 
between man and the world.
70 The above citation demonstrates that Heidegger's notion of the world is more useful for 
Arendt's thinking of the political than Jaspers' philosophy of communication, as already 
mentioned here. As Dana Villa observes, Arendt departs from Jaspers' model of 
understanding the world through the relationship between I/Thou in the Concern with 
Politics in the Recent European Philosophical Thought, and -  in contrast to her earlier 
counter-position of Jaspers to Heidegger -  moves to Heidegger's notion of the world as 
closer to the plural We of politics than dialogical communication between (any) two
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W hile i t  rem ains d iffic u lt, perhaps even dangerous, to  derive  any 
princ ip le  o f (p o litica l)  co m m u n ity  fro m  H eidegger, Heidegger's 
conceptua liza tion  o f th e  w o rld  and m an's re la ting  to  it  th rough  th e ir  
m u tu a l co nstitu tion  lays g round  fo r  A rend t's  und ers ta nd in g  o f m an and 
the hum an  condition.
Can Dasein be conce ived as a being w hose  being is 
concerned with p o te n tia lity  fo r being if  th is  being has (ost 
itse lf  precisely in its  everydayness and " liv e s "  away from 
itse lf in fa lling  prey? Falling prey to  the  w orld  is, however, 
phenom enal "e v id e n ce " against the  e x is te n tia lity  o f Dasein 
o n ly  if Dasein is pos ited  as an isolated I-s u b je c t, as a self- 
p o in t from  w h ich  it m oves away. Then th e  w orld  is an 
o b jec t. [...] H ow ever, if  we hold on to  th e  being o f Dasein 
in the co n s titu tio n  ind icated o f being-in-the-world, it 
becomes e v id e n t th a t fa lling  prey as  the k ind  o f  being o f  
this being-in ra th e r represents th e  m ost e le m e n ta l p roo f 
fo r  the  e x is te n tia lity  o f  Dasein. [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 , 1 7 9 ]
A rgu ing  th a t Dasein o r h um an  being can never be understood o r 
in te rp re ted  (w ith )o u t the  w o r ld ,71 H eidegger exposes the dead-end 
s tray  o f  the  tra d itio n a l o n to lo g y , which so ug h t to  understand the 
re la tionsh ip  between hum an being and th e  w orld  in  term s o f the  
s u b je c t-o b je c t re la tionsh ip . T he  trad itiona l o n to log ica l e ffo rt to  ren de r 
the  re la tionsh ip  betw een hum an  being and th e  w orld  in te llig ib le  in the  
su b je c t-o b je c t parad igm  enta iled  p rob lem atic  im p lica tions fo r 
understand ing  the  phenom enon  o f  being in  th e  w orld .
W hile th e  world is c o n s titu tiv e  o f hum an being, b o th  Heidegger and 
A rendt accentuate a ce rta in  strangeness o f m an  to  the w orld . 
S trangeness im plies a c e rta in  distance as w e ll as a feeling o f 
d isco m fo rt, to be a s tra n g e r som ew here m eans also th a t the  
somewhere  is s tran ge  to  th e  stranger, th a t it is unhom ely, in 
H eidegger's idiom. How can th e re fo re  m an be o f th e  w orld , love it in 
A re nd tian  term s, and y e t a lso be strange to  i t  and feel i t  strange?
subjects. [Villa, 1996:120] This interpretation points to an important aspect of Arendt's 
understanding of plurality insofar as it is qualitatively different from both simple 
enumeration or conglomeration of subjects on the one hand and homogenous 
entity/totality, in a sense a different or collective kind of subject but still a subject, on the 
other. To develop a notion of community from/through/in action, which Arendt holds as 
argued in the last chapter, Arendt conceptualizes plurality as underlying any 
understanding of the way man is and not preceded by singularity, be it individual or 
collective. Heidegger's conceptual move thus allows Arendt to surpass the entanglement 
of debates where singularity is opposed to plurality and the political is understood as 
coming out of the necessity to balance between the two, whereby the political is reduced 
to instrument of necessity.
71 This being within the whole, within which is neither with nor in, and the whole which is 
neither outside nor around, but both exist through mutual constitution, is what 
Heidegger's notion homesickness is directed at. Such homesickness is not driven by 
longing for a place that once was inhabited and is now lost, since Heidegger's 
understanding of the world inscribed into Being does not allow any objectification of their 
relationship in terms of possessing, owning, having. [Heidegger, 1927/1996:57]
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This is th e  tension o f hum an cond ition  th a t A rendt does not p u rp o rt to  
have so lved and does not even  aspire  to  do so. N am ely, A rendt sees 
th e  p rinc ip le  o f the  p o litica l as em erg ing  fro m  this v e ry  tension, w hich  is 
n o t the  tension  betw een the w orld  and m an  but is inscribed in to  the 
v e ry  hum an  cond ition  and in trin s ic  to  being as a m a n . Being as a m en 
en ta ils  b o th  being g ive n , inso fa r m an  never w ills  h e r appearance in  the  
w orld  th ro u g h  b irth , and being free , inso fa r one can s till take  th is  b irth  
up  and inse rt onese lf in to  th e  w orld  aga in  and aga in  th rough  the 
'second b ir th /  th a t is -  action  “ in w hich w e co n firm  and take  upon 
ourse lves the  naked fa c t o f o u r o rig in a l physical app ea ra nce ." [HC, 176 ]
Taking up o f the  g iven  ex istence  th ro u g h  a c tion  is th e  core o f A rend t's  
p rinc ip le  o f n a ta lity , as tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f b ir th  in to  beg inn ing, w hich  in 
tu rn  is the  fu nd a m e n t o f A re n d t's  understand ing  o f m an th ro ug h  
free do m . The connection  be tw een b irth  and action  is not m erely one o f 
ana logy b u t is fu n d a m e n ta l and th e re fo re  essentia l fo r the 
und e rs ta nd in g  o f m an.
The 'second b irth '
T he  connection  be tw een  a c tion  and b irth  appears in A rendt's  e a rly  
d ia logue  w ith  St. A ugustine  as a p recarious firs t s te p  o f the young 
scho la r in th e  search fo r  the  bond betw een m an and the  w orld whose 
f irs t  e n co u n te r comes o u t o f m an 's  unw illed  and undecided upon 
inse rtio n  in to  the  w o rld . The q u e s tio n  fo r A re nd t in th a t early w o rk  is, 
w h a t it is betw een m an and the  w orld , w h a t the connection  or ra th e r 
th e  re la tionsh ip  could be w hich  could not be reduced to  the  m ere link 
be tw een e x is te n t and th e  locus o f its  exis tence. One is inevitab ly  d raw n 
to  the  conc lus ion  th a t A re nd t a lrea d y  in her early  w o rk  established th a t 
th e  p ro b le m  o f m an 's being in the  w orld as being concerned w ith  the 
w orld  is the  question  o f questions fo r ph ilosophy, which cannot be 
e ith e r asked o r answ ered th ro u g h  flig h t o u t o f th e  w orld, in to  the 
abso lu te  and the  e te rna l.
Seen in th e  co n te x t o f th a t e a rly  w o rk , the  roo ts  o f A re nd t's  p rincip le  o f 
n a ta lity  seem  to  be e x p lic it ly  th eo log ica l inso fa r as h e r understand ing of 
hum an being as beg inn ing  is derived  fro m  Saint A ugustine 's : “ th a t 
th e re  be a beg inn ing, m an was created before w hom  there  was 
n o b o d y ." [HC, 177] In  part, the  m eaning o f  A ugustine 's  assertion  is 
th a t, ra th e r than  nobody, th e re  was 'n o -o n e ' before  the  c rea tion  o f 
m an , no being to  be s ing led o u t since on ly  m an ex is ts  as a unique and 
u n rep ea ta b le  nove lty . Man is th e  abso lu te  new, an unpredicted 
o ccurrence  capable o f u np re d ic ta b le  th a t no law can regu la te  o r p red ict.
A re nd t th u s  builds on A ugustine 's  para lle l betw een m an  and beginning 
in o rd e r to  construct an on to log ica l tr ia n g le  - m a n -n o ve lty -fre e d o m . 
A re nd t reads Augustine  in o rd e r to  assert th a t the m eaning of hum an 
ex is tence  lies in fre e d o m , w hich  is the  appearance o f the new in the  
w o rld , ju s t  as m an is th e  new in th e  w o rld : " th e  p rinc ip le  o f freedom  
w as crea ted  when m an was crea ted  but not b e fo re ."  [HC, 177] Man
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breaks the  e te rna l cycles o f  nature , m an  is n o t necessary -  
o n to lo g ica lly  th e re fo re , not a na lo g ica lly , action  breaks patterns fo r it is 
th a t w h ich  always could b u t d id  not have to  be. [L M /I I :1 6 ]  W ithou t 
m an , n a tu re  would be spared th e  unknow n and the unpred ictab le , there  
w ould  rem ain  no th ing  ou ts ide  th e  iron  g rip  o f  its law s. W ithout action  
b y  m an, th e  like lihood is th a t  a ll todays and to m o rro w s  would be no 
d iffe re n t th a n  yesterdays. [BPF, 170 ] I f  m en  w ere s im p ly  born to  be, 
th e re  w ould  be no princ ip le  o f  freedom , th e  sam eness would p reva il: 
" In  th is  sense, and to  the e x te n t th a t we s till live w ith  ourselves, w e  all 
change th e  hum an w orld  c o n s ta n tly , fo r b e tte r  and fo r  worse, even if  
w e  do n o t ac t a t a ll."  [EU, 8 8 ]  N ata lity  is th u s  th e  'b a s ic  co nd itio n ' o f 
p o litica l life  and all change in th e  w orld .
In  the  le c tu re  notes from  1 9 5 3 , th e  link betw een p o litics  and beginning 
is spelled o u t m ost su cc inc tly  and s tro n g ly : "W h a t co un ts  fo r po litics 
w hich  is in the  present and concerns present actions is th a t m an is a 
b eg inn ing . W ithou t th is  we cou ld  not act. For Politics th e  beginning [ is ] 
as im p o rta n t as the  end fo r h is to r ia n ."  In  p o litics , n a m e ly , we are a fte r 
th e  new, a fte r  bring ing  so m e th in g  new to  th e  w orld  -  "w h e th e r we like 
it o r n o t."  [GTNT, 2 ]
B u t in h e r la te r w orks A rendt problem atizes th is  idea o f  shee r existence 
as a change to  the w orld , d en y in g  it a po litica l re levance . A lready in 
Rahel Vamhagen  A rendt was concerned w ith  the  p o s itio n  o f pariah as 
th a t o f im potence  to  change one 's  own pos ition  in th e  w o rld .72 From 
th a t h is to rica l analysis o f R ahel's  exclusion th e re  em erged  A rend t's  
und ers ta nd in g  o f the  po litica l as th a t w hich changes th e  w orld , th a t 
w h ich  augm ents  the  w orld  th ro u g h  nove lty . By being a nove lty  to  the  
w orld , m an  can bring  n o v e lty  in to  it. This reconceptua lisa tion  
tra n s fo rm s  th e  f-act o f o rig in  in to  act  o f b eg inn ing , n o t the in fin ite  
fa llin g  upon  a partic le  o f n o n -tim e  but th e  e ve n t in  th e  p resent, 
genera ted  by hum an action , responding to  pas t and opening tow ards 
fu tu re :73
The b irth  and dea th  o f  hum an beings are  n o t sim ple 
n a tu ra l occurrences, b u t are  related to  a w orld  in to  w hich 
s ing le  ind iv idua ls, u n iqu e , unexchangab le , and 
unrepea tab le  e n titie s , appear and fro m  w h ich  they 
d e p a rt. [HC, 9 6 -9 7 ]
In  A rend t's  a pp ro pria tio n  o f th e  ancient G reek unders tand ing  o f the  
hum an co nd itio n , the  fact o f b ir th , ju s t  as the  fact o f d ea th , belongs in 
th e  p riva te  sphere o f life, w h ich  is concealed fro m  the  public and 
governed not by the  w ill o f m e n  but by the law s o f n a tu ra l cycle. [HV, *71
72 One could even draw a direct link between the inquiry into Rahel's unfortunate social 
position as an inquiry into action denied and, on the other hand, Arendt's 
uncompromising critique of Jewish leaders under Nazism as failing to act.
71 One must be cautious to avoid mistaking Arendt's understanding of action through the 
condition of natality as capacity to begin for the commemorative fossilization of arche, 
which is Habermas' misreading that Lisa Disch criticizes: "In sum, Habermas imputes to 
Arendt a reaffirmation of social contract theory and then concludes that it is by her return 
to the myth of the originary moment that she subverts the democratic possibilities of her 
work." Calhoun and McGowan, 1997: 149.
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6 2 ] The ground  o f th e  p rinc ip le  o f n a ta lity  lies in th e  fa c t o f b ir th , th a t 
a ll m en  a re  born, but its  m eaning is n o t exhausted  b y  the fact o f b irth . 
As a p rin c ip le , it co n jo ins  the  beg inning  and lasting  inso fa r the p rinc ip le  
is inexhaustib le , it m oves and preserves b y  m o v in g , i t  inspires a c tion , 
th e re fo re  begins, and lives th ro u g h  i t  to  insp ire  a ga in . [BPF, 1 5 2 ] I t  
fo llow s th a t the  p rinc ip le  o f n a ta lity  is the  am a lgam  o f the fac t o f  b irth  
and th e  a c t o f beg inn ing.
The p o litica l spring ing fro m  th e  princ ip le  o f n a ta lity  is there fore  d iffe re n t 
fro m  po litics  o f b irth  o r  politics o f life  as m uch as fro m  politics o f d ea th . 
I t  is po litics  th a t em erges from  m an 's  capacity  to  in it ia te  and to  change, 
no t fro m  the  fact th a t men a re  nata l o r m o rta l and require  to  be 
p ro tected  fro m  th e ir o w n , hum an cond ition . In  o th e r w ords, its u lt im a te  
orig in  res ts  in the  fa c t o f b ir th  as th a t w h ich  bestow s upon m an  the  
capacity  o f beginning b u t b ir th  is no t w ha t shapes o r  d irects o r  d rives 
po litica l do ing .
W hat is th e re fo re  the p o litica l to  A rendt?  I t  is a c e rta in  re la ting  to  the  
world b y  "p a rta k ing  in d iscourse  and e v e n ts " [PP1, 9 ],  w hich renders  
the  w orld  changed. T h a t is th e  e m b od im e n t o f free do m  -  no t in  the  
sense o f  licentia  as having so m e th in g  p e rm itte d , n o r as a lib e rty  o f 
choice (w ith in  the d e te rm ined  fra m e w o rk , th e re fo re )  b u t as b ring ing  
som eth ing  in (to ) the w orld  because one was b ro u g h t in to  the w orld  as a 
nove lty  onese lf. Freedom  is n o t a bo u t freedom  o f m o ve m e n t w ith in  set 
p aram eters  and fram ew orks b u t a bo u t abso lu te  n o v e lty : " th e  freedom  
to  call som eth ing  into  being w h ich  did not e x is t be fo re , w hich w as not 
g iven, n o t even as an o b jec t o f cogn ition  o r  im ag ina tion , and w hich  
th e re fo re , s tr ic tly  speaking, could n o t be k n o w n ." [BPF, 151]
From th e  understand ing  o f m an  as the  being in th e  w orld , A rend t has 
th e re fo re  m oved a step  fu rth e r, tow ards tra n s fo rm in g  the  co nd itio n  o f 
being th ro w n  in the w orld  in to  tak ing  up o f th is th row ness and being 
with and to  the  w orld, tu rn ing  th is  host o f ou rs , w ho never inv ited  us, 
in to  o u r concern . This m o ve m e n t o f the  reconceptua lisa tion  o f b irth  th a t 
A rendt p erfo rm s h ow ever is no t A ugustin ian  bu t fo llow s closely the 
schem e o f  Heidegger's rew ork ing  o f m o rta lity  from  a b io logica l fa c t in to  
a task to  be taken up by D ase in :74 "... n a ta lity  as a hum an co nd itio n  is 
th e  capacity  to  bring so m eth ing  p ro found ly  new in to  the  w orld ra th e r 
than  a s im p le  capacity to  p rocrea te ..." [K ha rkhod in , 2 0 0 1 :4 6 6 ] Dasein 
is not an existence th a t m ere ly  e x tends  bu t i t  exists th ro u g h  re la ting  to  
th e  w orld , fo r  H eidegger th ro u g h  care  -  fo r A re nd t, th ro u g h  action . As 
A rend t reads H eidegger: 'The n a tu re  o f Dasein is n o t th a t it s im p ly  is 
b u t, ra th e r, th a t in its being its  p rim a ry  concern  is its  being i ts e lf /  [EU, 
1 79 ] Or, in H eidegger's ow n  worlds:
D asein is a being th a t does n o t s im p ly occur am ong o th e r 
be ings. Rather it  is o n tica lly  d is tingu ished  by th e  fac t th a t
74 Just as his concern with temporality is not the concern with temporality of the physis, 
when Heidegger speaks of death as finitude, his concern is not with death as the fact of 
the physis, but with Dasein relating itself to the death "as the foundation of the being that 
we are." [Taminiaux, 1997:43]
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in its being th is being is concerned about its ve ry  being.
[1 9 2 7 :1 3 ]
A rend t's  m a in  a rgum ent is thus that freedom In action Is defining o f 
hum anness, therefore  belongs to being as a hum an. Men do not 
possess freedom , freedom  is not in man tha t appears but in the event 
o f appearance ju s t as it is not owned my men but is In action, as long 
as action lasts, " fo r  to  be free and to act are the sam e." [OR, 153] 
In s o fa r as to  act is to  exist as a human being, it cannot be argued tha t 
"fre e d o m  g ives hum anity, and not the inverse," [Nancy, 1988/1993 :73 ] 
b u t th a t freedom  and hum anity are born together and entw ined. Man 
m eans as a being endowed w ith  freedom, through action. While the 
im portance  o f dislocating action from teleological fram ew orks for A rendt 
is re la ted to  the preservation of the principle o f freedom this 
in te rp re ta tio n  would be incomplete if it would not be understood th a t 
w ha t is a t stake here fo r Arendt is the meaning of hum an existence, ye t 
no t in iso la tion  but in relation to  the world.
The p rinc ip le  o f nata lity a t the core of politics, as Arendt understands It, 
thus  po in ts  to  the existential dimension of the  Arendtian political, which 
suggests th a t the political cannot be reduced e ither to the 
in s titu tio n a lis t, norm ative fram ework and deliberative practices as 
ou tlined  in Benhabib's Aristotelian/Haberm asian in terpretation  or to  the 
p e rfo rm a tive , agonistic discourse o f political theory such as the one 
dom ina ting  Honig's Nietzschean/Machiavelllan reading of Arendt o r to  
any sort o f balance and dynamics between the two. Nam ely, a recourse 
to  the th ird  genealogical source of Arendt's thinking is inevitable: tha t 
is, H eidegger's philosophy.
The po litica l existentialism  or exlstentiality of the political?
The inev itab le  question that arises from this close parallel reading of 
th e  tw o th in ke rs  is the  question of the opposition between centra lity  of 
b irth  in A rend t's  thought and centrality o f death fo r Heidegger's 
philosophy. I t  could be argued that Heidegger's anticipatory 
reso lu teness and Arendt's act of beginning are fundam enta lly  
o n to log ica lly  d ifferent. The anticipatory resoluteness Is principled on 
death w hereas the core of the act o f beginning fo r Arendt is the 
princ ip le  o f  na ta lity , which is derived from the fact o f b irth , the fact th a t 
m en  are  m o rta l sim ply because they were firs t born. In  his parallel 
reading o f  A rendt and Heidegger, Taminiaux [1 9 9 7 :9 ] departs from  
A rend t's  e a rly  essay on existentialism  in philosophy - What Is 
Existential Philosophy? in 1948 [EU] - where she denounces en tire  
H eidegger's p ro ject as an heir to  the Platonic contem pt fo r  the w orld . I t  
is a m a tte r  o f the opposition between that which relates to  the world 
and tha t w hich  seeks to  flee from  it. Taminiaux fu rth e r argues th a t, 
w h ile  A re nd t w ill have later found even the words o f praise fo r 
H eidegger's contribu tion  to philosophy, her a ttitude to  his philosophy 
n eve r e ssen tia lly  changed: he remains the  philosopher of Being 
whereas h e r p rim ary concern remains the world and m en  in it.
I t  can fu r th e r  be observed  th a t m o rta lity  as a co n d itio n  o f being hum an 
does n o t constitu te  a m a tte r  fo r  A rend t's  conce rn  u n like  fo r H eidegger. 
N am ely , th e  necessity o f d e a th  and ru in  is the  law  o f nature . In  o th e r 
w ords , th e y  are th e  in e v ita b le  endings o f  a u to m a tic  processes, in th is  
case -  th e  life  process. The fu tu re  as d e a th , th e re fo re  non-be ing, can 
be rendered  in te rm s  o f  cause and e ffe c t as it  is governed by th e  laws 
o f n a tu ra l necessity. The fa c t th a t m an u n d e rs ta n d s  h im self as singled 
ou t, as un ique, does no t im p ly  th a t, as a being o f  na tu re , m an is n o t 
tied to  zoe.
I f  le ft to  th em se lve s , hum an a ffa irs  can o n ly  fo llow  the  
law  o f m o rta lity , w h ich  is the m o s t ce rta in  and the  on ly  
re liab le  law o f  a life  s p e n t betw een b irth  and  dea th . I t  is 
th e  facu lty  o f a c tion  th a t in te rfe re s  w ith  th is  law  because 
it in te rrup ts  th e  inexorab le  a u to m a tic  course o f daily life, 
w hich  in its tu rn , as w e  saw, in te rru p te d  and  in terfered  
w ith  the  cycle o f the  b io log ica l process. The life  span o f 
m an running tow ard  death  w ou ld  in e v ita b ly  carry 
every th ing  hum an  to  ru in  and d e s tru c tio n  i f  it were not 
fo r  the  facu lty  o f in te rru p tin g  it and beg inn ing  som ething 
new , a fa cu lty  w hich  is inherent in action  like  an ever­
p resen t re m in d e r th a t m en, th o u g h  th ey  m u s t die, are 
n o t born in o rd e r  to  d ie  but in o rd e r to  beg in . [HC, 246]
In  th a t  sense, H eidegger's notion  o f be ing free fo r  death w ould be 
noth ing  b u t a negation  o f free do m  and d e live ring  onese lf over to  the  
a u to m a tis m  o f n a tu ra l processes: " I t  is in the  n a tu re  o f a u to m a tic  
processes to  w hich m a n  is su b je c t, b u t w ith in  and a ga in s t which he can 
assert h im se lf th ro u g h  a c tion , th a t th e y  can spell ru in  to  hum an life ." 
[BPF, 1 6 8 ] The occurrence  o f  dea th  is n o t an in te rru p tio n  o f th e  life 
process b u t its , perhaps sudden and a b ru p t ye t c e rta in , expected and 
ine v itab le  ending. By c o n tra s t, actions as A re nd t understands them  
c o n s titu te  the  " in te rru p tio n s  o f  som e n a tu ra l series o f  events, o f som e 
a u to m a tic  process, in  w hose co n te x t th e y  c o n s titu te  the w ho lly  
u n e x p e c te d ."75 [BPF, 1 6 8 ] T he  ru in  is th e  n a tu ra l, w hereas every th ing  
new occurs  aga inst 'in f in ite  im p ro b a b ilit ie s / [BPF, 1 6 9 ] Death and ruin 
are  a c e rta in ty  th a t h o w e ve r do n o t belong to  th e  fu tu re  b u t are 
co n s ta n t shadows o v e r  the  p resen t, shadow s w h ich  o n ly  action  in the  
p re sen t, fo r  the fu tu re , can d isperse.
75 Arendt's analysis of death could be counterargued on the ground of both Hellenic and 
Christian understanding of death as actually setting man apart from the rest of the 
natural world. In nature there is no death or birth properly, only cycles. Just as man is 
born, unlike seeds that simply emerge, so man dies, she does not simply vanish to be 
replaced by the same. In that, man is part of nature, but also its most un-natural part. 
The tragic dimension of this un-naturality of man in universe struck a cord with Greeks as 
a civilization moving away from the mythic unity with kosmos  to the disturbing 
philosophical awareness of the gap: it is the condition of human mortality that contrasts 
man to the entire nature which, as a totality, is immortal. Rectilinearity of lifecourse was 
central to Christian teaching as well though Christianity, unlike Greek civilization, offered 
consolation for the suffering inflicted upon men by their uniqueness.
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I f  the a rg u m e n t is thus posed, being free fo r  death w ould paradoxica lly 
mean being free fo r  being unfree, surrendering o ne se lf to  the natu ra l 
flow. U n like  d ea th , which is necessary fo r all c rea tures born, b ir th  is 
always a m iracle , it is na tu ra l but a t the same tim e , there  is noth ing 
necessary a b o u t it. Death is no t m iraculous -  m irac le  always concerns 
life, be it  b ring ing  in life o r  bringing back to  life . Death is ne ithe r 
excep tiona l n o r pecu lia r b u t m ost natural fo r  every th ing  living. In  o the r 
words, d ea th  is not predicated on the principle of freedom .
A t the  sam e tim e , A rend t in the Human Condition  defines death 
a longside pain as th e  m ost p rivate  of all experiences, belonging to  no 
one e lse  bu t the  one dying. Death cannot appear in the  public w orld 
except once the one is deceased, when death becom es the fab ric  o f 
one's life s to ry  and is preserved in the m em ory o f the  w orld .
Death is th e  m ost p riva te  o f a ll experiences and th a t as such it  could 
correspond on ly  to  th e  cond ition  o f so litude: un like  b ir th  th a t places 
man a m o ng  m en and in the  w orld , death extracts  m a n  from  it. In  th a t 
sense, m o rta lity  is apo litica l, no notion o f toge therness can be extracted  
from  th e  fa c t o f m o rta lity . R ather, death as experience and m o rta lity  as 
phenom enolog ica l concept are related to  ph ilosophy th rough  the 
cond ition  o f  abso lu te  closure to  the world taken to  be th e  only p rope rly  
philosoph ica l, co n te m p la tive  m ode o f existence. C on tem p la tion , the 
cond ition  th ro ug h  w hich  m an approaches th e  e terna l, Is closest to  death 
insofar b o th  assum e a d istance and detachm ent fro m  the  w orld . [HC, 
20] In  th a t  sense, death  s tands in denial o f p lu ra lity  as In den ia l o f 
freedom , the  tw o  defin ing  features o f the  politica l as understood by 
A rendt. U nlike  b irth  th e re fo re , death stands in oppos ition  to  the politica l 
in hum an existence:
Speaking in te rm s  o f ex is ten tia l m odes o f th e  difference 
be tw een  o r opposition  o f Politics and Philosophy is 
iden tica l w ith  the d ifference  betw een o r oppos ition  of 
B irth  and D eath , o r conceptually speaking: N a ta lity  and 
M o rta lity . N ata lity  is the  basic condition o f  a ll living 
to g e th e r, and hence o f all politics; M orta lity  is the  basic 
co nd itio n  fo r th o u g h t in  the  sense th a t th in k in g  re lates to  
som eth ing  'u n re la tio n a l' to  som ething th a t Is as it is in 
and by itse lf. [PP1, 2 7 ]
This read ing  o f d ea th  by A re nd t suggests th a t the re  can be no paralle l 
betw een hers and H eidegger's understanding o f the  source  o f resistance 
to  the  lim ita tio n s  o f hum an existence, a claim  p e rfe c tly  va lid , inso far 
one is prepared to  claim  the  absence o f p ro fou n d  in te llectua l 
am biva lence  from  A rend t-H e idegger dia logue and A re n d t's  p ro je c t as a 
whole. One w ould also have to  argue th a t A re n d t considered 
H eidegger's philosophy as a com plete and rounded w hole  ra th e r than 
an in fin ite ly  open poss ib ility , w hile  also g rave ly  s im p lify in g  Heidegger's 
notion o f  d ea th  and m is in te rp re ting  the fundam ents  o f his inqu iry  into  
the m ean ing  o f Being. I f  how ever one aspires fo r a g re a te r  openness o f 
in te rp re ta tio n , then  one m u s t be ready to  read in A re n d t's  w orks w hat 
she seized as a p o te n tia l from  Heidegger and did so im p lic itly , th ro ug h
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h e r ow n  conceptua l language ra th e r th an  e x p lic it ly  in he r w ritin g s  on  
H e idegger spec ifica lly . In  th a t sense, w h a t is m u ch  m ore in te res tin g  
than  th e  n a tu ra lity  o f dea th  to  her as a th in k e r  o f political doing is 
H eidegger's notion  o f o n to log ica l fin itud e  o f D asein, rooted in th e  
concepts o f death and  th ro w nn ess, and e ssen tia lly  interconnected w ith  
the  concept o f unw holeness.
D eath  as the  o w n m o st and u ltim a te  p o te n tia lity  o f  being o f Dasein and 
the  b e in g -to w a rd s -d e a th  o f  Dasein in H eidegger's on to log ica l ana lys is  is 
no t to  be understood  as liv ing  fro m  b irth  to  d ea th , w hich  m akes it  seem  
th a t d ea th  is a goa l o f th e  being born. H e idegger's  understand ing  o f 
m an is centred on dea th  n o t as b io logica l fac t b u t as the  poss ib ility  o f 
the  w ho leness o f Dasein. H e idegger discusses th is  in  the  firs t section  o f 
the  Second D ivis ion  o f  Dasein on The Possible Being-a-Whole o f  Dasein 
and Being-toward-Death, w he re  dea th  is de fined  n o t as th e  fac t o f 
physis  b u t as th e  o w n m o st nonrelational p oss ib ility  o f D asein. 
[Tam  in la ux, 1 9 9 7 :8 ] B io logica l d ea th  happens o f  Its ow n accord, to  a ny  
being -  not on ly th e  one th a t H eidegger is concerned w ith . D eath  
on to log ica lly  in te rp re ted  as fin itu d e  how ever takes th e  fo rm  o f an e ve r­
p resen t possib ility  in th e  h um an  existence.
H e idegger would th e re fo re  a c tu a lly  agree w ith  A re n d t in deny ing  to  
dea th  as a b io logica l fa c t a ny  even tfu lness and in  associating it w ith  
m eaning less a u to m a tism . His in te res t lies In th e  onto log ica l fin itu d e  o f 
Dasein th a t is re la ted , th o u g h  no t to  reducib le  to  th e  fact o f d ea th , in 
w hich  it is how ever on to log ica lly  rooted. Equally so , th e  onto log ica l ro o t 
o f a c tio n , w hich is freedom  inca rn a te , lies in  the  fa c t o f b irth , accord ing 
to  A re n d t: " th e  fa c u lty  o f a c tio n  is o n to log ica lly  ro o te d . I t  is, in  o th e r 
w ords, the  b irth  o f new  m en and th e  new b e g in n in g , th e  action th e y  a re  
capable o f by  v irtu e  o f  being b o rn ."  [HC, 2 4 7 ]
F in itude  is no t con fined  to  th e  m om en t o f d e a th  b u t it 'h a un ts  a ll o u r  
e x is te n ce ,' [In w o o d , 2 0 0 4 :6 9 ] inasm uch th e  p resence o f dea th  in th e  
being o f Dasein is b o th  ce rta in  and inde fin ite  -  ce rta in  because th e  
being is m orta l, ind e fin ite  because death  m ay co m e  in every m o m e n t, 
bu t th e  exact when  is u nknow n. [H e id eg ge r, 1 9 2 7 :2 5 9 ] The 
om n ip resence  o f d e a th  is th e  o n tic  o r e x is te n tia l d im ension  o f fin itu d e , 
touched  by Heidegger's th in k in g  b u t not ce n tra l to  his a tte m p t to  o ffe r  
an o n to log ica l ana lysis o f f in itu d e .
A n o th e r d im ension o f  the  presence o f fin itu d e  is found  in the  Kantian  
idea o f the  necessary cogn itive  lim itedness o f a created being, the  
being th a t did not c rea te  its e lf as it did no t crea te  its  e nv iro n m e n t. A t 
the  sam e tim e  th a t being m u s t s trive  to  u nd e rs ta nd  the w orld  a lien  to  
h im . But the  being's re la tin g  to  the  w orld  m u s t rem ain  ind irec t and 
m ed ia ted  th rough  th e  process o f th ink ing  o f th e  g iven. H eidegger's 
d issa tis fa c tion  w ith  th e  ep is tem o log ica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f Kant's idea o f 
fin itu d e  w h ich  equates it w ith  fin ite  know ledge is c lea rly  expressed in 
the  D avos d iscussion be tw een  h im  and E. C assirer. [H e idegger, 
1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 , Appendix IV ]
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H eidegger o ffe rs  instead th e  onto logica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f fin itu d e  as the  
onto log ica l cond ition  o f th row ness. [Inw ood , 2 0 0 4 :6 9 -7 0 ]76 Before it 
becom es anyth ing  (e lse), Dasein is th ro w n  in to  th e  w orld  not created 
by it and th ro ug h  b irth  n o t w illed by it :  "D asein  ex is ts  as th ro w n , 
b rough t in to  its there  not o f its  own accord. I t  e x is ts  as a p o te n tia lity - 
o f-be ing  w hich belongs to  itse lf, and ye t has not g iv e n  itse lf to  itse lf. 
[H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 :2 8 4 ]
The concept o f fin itu d e  thus understood cannot be reduced to  m o rta lity  
but it com prises both  the  m o rta lity  and n a ta lity  o f hum an  being, no t as 
events - ju s t  as th row ness is no t an e ve n t77 - b u t as the  fabric  o f the  
ve ry  existence. This is w ha t m akes it in teresting  fo r  A re nd t and allows 
her a pp ro p ria tio n  and re in te rp re ta tio n  o f H eidegger's concept o f fin itude  
as incorpora ted  in b irth  as m uch  as death.
A rend t's  understand ing  m an th rough  the  concept o f  beg inning as the 
beg inner w ho h im se lf is begun is grounded in the  sam e notion  o f the 
on to log ica l unw holeness o f hum an existence. The fu tu re  is n o t open- 
ended and unpred ic tab le  because hum an cogn itive  a b ilities  are  lim ited 
but because one m an is n e ve r a m aster o f the  course o f events. W here 
the  beginning w ill go, does n o t depend on th e  beg inner. Man in s ingu la r 
is defined by the  capacity to  begin -  not the  ca pa c ity  to  end and to  
com ple te , w hich rem ains the  capacity o f m en  in p lu ra l. Man though  a 
fin ite  being can and does s ta r t an in fin ite  tim e  se ries  th rough  his act 
but m us t accept th a t he is unable  to  contro l and n av iga te  th e  course o f 
events to  fo llow  his ac tion :
the  im poss ib ility  o f fo re te lling  the  consequences o f an act 
w ith in  a co m m un ity  o f equals w here  e ve rybo dy  has the  
sam e capacity to  act... the im poss ib ility  o f rem ain ing 
unique m asters o f w ha t they do, o f know ing its 
consequences and re ly ing  upon the fu tu re , is th e  price they  
pay fo r  p lu ra lity ... [HC, 2 44 ]
This is the  core o f m an 's absolute, on to log ica l incapacity to  be 
sovere ign.
Thus H eidegger's no tion  o f unwholeness in form s A re n d t's  re fu ta tio n  o f 
id e n tity  as g iven  or su bs ta n tive . Heidegger understands being o f Dasein 
as becom ing. Dasein is a being whose being is in becom ing, as always 
com ing -in to -p resence  and s till always n o t-ye t. This unw ho leness is not 
a m a tte r o f a m issing part bu t, as Heidegger a rg ue s, the  being of 
Dasein, w h a t it is, is a lw ays n o t-ye t. I t  m ust also be d iffe re n tia te d  from  
'a n y  im perfec tion  o f cognitive faculties/  [H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 :2 3 6 ] I t  is 
unw ho le  n o t as a w hole th a t can be com pleted but th ro u g h  the  negation 
o f wholeness.
76 Inwood however speaks only of Heidegger's appropriation of Kant's notion of cognitive 
finitude, overlooking the connection between Heidegger's ontological meaning of 
throwness and ontological unwholeness of Dasein.
77 "But throwness does not lie behind it as an event which actually occurred, something 
that happened to it and was again separated from Dasein. Rather, as long as it is Dasein 
is  constantly its 'that' as care." Heidegger, 1927:284.
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For A re n d t also, w h o  one is can be to ld  o n ly  when one-is  tu rns  in to  one- 
was s ince  the  who appea rs  th ro u g h  action  on ly, and every  new action  is 
a new  s troke  on th e  p o r tra it.  The w hole  is a p ro p e rty , as H eidegger 
a rgues, o f  th e  b e tw e en  b ir th  and d ea th , th e  'co n ne c tion  o f life ' w hich 
ties to g e th e r th e  tw o  ends o f  existence. [1 9 2 7 :3 7 3 ] For th is  reason the  
re ve la to ry  ch a ra c te r o f a c tio n  in A re nd t's  ana lysis should n o t be 
unders tood  as th a t w h ich  expresses som eone a lre a d y  there  b u t the  
co incid ing  o f being and app ea rin g . In  o th e r w o rds , th a t m an  is a 
beg inn ing  m eans a lso  th a t m a n , w hile  a live , is n e ve r com ple te , never a 
told s to ry  o r as G u ignon says o f H eidegger's n o tio n  o f unw holeness: 
"W ho a person is  is defined  by the  e n tire  s to ry  o f his o r h e r life..." 
[D re y fu ss , 1 9 9 2 :1 3 2 ] I t  Is th e  price, as A rend t says, o f m an 's freedom  
[HC, 2 4 4 ] -  the  im p e rfe c tio n  o f an unfin ished fin ite  being th a t, th ro ug h  
ac tion , can always change  its e lf  and how it appears to  the  w o rld .78
From H eidegger's in q u iry  in to  dea th  no t o n ly  as a c e rta in ty  o f Dasein 
but a lso  its  p o te n tia lity , one a ttr ib u te  o f d e a th  has o fte n  been a m a tte r 
o f c r it ic is m : its n o n -re la tio n a lity , th e  a lleged g ro un d  o f Heidegger's 
ph ilosoph ica l and o n to lo g ic a l so lipsism . The n o n -re la tio n a l q u a lity  o f 
dea th  com es from  th e  im p o s s ib ility  o f tak ing  th e  dying  aw ay from  
Dasein -  Dasein m u s t d ie  fo r  itse lf. [H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 :2 4 0 ] A rend t does 
not d e n y  th is , as w as e v id e n t fro m  h e r obse rva tions  on th e  p rivacy o f 
dea th  e a rlie r quoted  here. H ow e ver Heidegger's concern  is n o t death 
per se  since death, as the  end o f  a ll possib ilities o f  Dasein, is noth ing 
but th e  end o f ex is tence , w h ich  is the  focus o f Heidegger's entire  
ana lys is  o f Dasein as the  be ing  th a t essen tia lly  e x is ts . H eidegger is 
th e re fo re  pursuing an e x is te n tia l and onto log ica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f death , 
dea th  th e re fo re  as p a r t o f th e  existence o f Dasein and  th a t existence is 
a lw ays in the  da o f D asein, in th e  w orld .
I t  fo llow s th a t H e idegger does no t seek th e  way fo r  Dasein to  escape 
the w orld  and the they  but to  e x is t in the  da w ith o u t negating th e  non- 
being, w hich  is one th e  ra re  ce rta in tie s  o f its  ex is tence. This suggests 
th a t th e  cited A re nd t's  early  c r it iq u e  o f H eidegger fo r  unw orld liness o f 
his ph ilosophy is n o t necessarily  va lid . According to  T am in iaux, the 
c e n tra lity  o f dea th  in  H e idegger's  ph ilosophy is in te rp re te d  by A re n d t as 
an a tte m p t, ye t a n o th e r, to  a sse rt the  fundam enta l so lipsism  o f Dasein, 
its o w n m o s t se lf found  on ly  in  the  denia l o r  even nega tion  o f be ing -in - 
th e -w o rld . [1 9 9 7 :1 6 ] As T a m in ia u x  fu rth e r argues, H eidegger's e ffo rt a t 
overcom ing  death  as a m a tte r  o f na tu re  and  tra n s fo rm in g  it in to  tha t 
w hich  re trieves  D asein  fro m  ina u th e n tic  ex is tence, as th a t w hich  can 
open th e  passageway to  th e  a u th e n tic  ex is tence, w ou ld  in th a t sense 
p re sen t a paradoxica l fo rm  o f  m ak ing  Dasein a t hom e in the  w orld while 
rem ov in g  it  from  th a t  b e in g -w ith , fro m  being in co m m on  w ith  o thers 
th ro u g h  w hom  th e  w o rld  appears  to  us.
78 Marked discusses, much more elaborately than possible here, the meaning of finitude in 
Arendt's political theory as that which is about having limits "imposed upon us by the 
openness and unpredictability of the future.” [Marked, 2003:5]
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C on tra ry  to  th is  c ritica l in te rp re ta tio n , however, Heidegger's answ er to  
the  q u e s tio n  o f th e  e x is ten tia l possibility o f w holeness In hum an 
ex istence  -  a n tic ip a to ry  reso lu teness79 -  does not separa te  Dasein and 
its w o rld , o r  da fro m  Sein b u t reveals to Dasein its w orld  and its e lf as 
being am o ng  beings in a d iffe re n t light, the ligh t cast by the awareness 
o f D ase in 's  fin itu d e . The they, despite its In au th e tic ity , the re fo re  
rem ains the  locus o f  being b u t also the locus o f possibilities fo r  the 
a u th e n tic  being o f D asein:
As authentic being a self, resoluteness does n o t detach 
Dasein from  its w o rld , no r does it  isolate it  as free 
floa ting  ego. How could  it, if resoluteness as au thentic  
d isclosed ness is, a fte r  all, noth ing o th e r  than 
authentically being-in-the-world?[...] Resolution does not 
escape from  're a lity , ' b u t f irs t discovers w ha t is factica lly  
possible  in such  a w ay th a t it grasps it as it  is possible as 
one 's  ow nm ost p o te n tia lity -o f-be ing  in th e  they. 
[H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 9 8 , 299]
In  the  quoted  passage fro m  Being and Time, H e idegger establishes 
reso lu teness as both  the  w ay  o f being in the  w orld , rem aining w ith in  
rea lity , and the w ay o f in te rp re tin g  rea lity  as the source  o f possibilities 
fo r Dasein. Resoluteness is th en  about w orking w ith  re a lity  as a horizon 
o f  p o te n tia ls , w hich a re  m ore  o fte n  than n o t the lim its  rew orked.
The a u th e n tic  ex is tence  unfo lds as a response to  th e  po tentia ls  o f 
rea lity , w here  the  p o te n tia ls  a re  no t there bu t m u s t be read from  the 
existing  and the  g ive n  by D asein. Heidegger's ex is ten tia lism , w hich he 
how ever neve r accepted as a philosophical niche o f  h is w ork, reveals 
itse lf th ro u g h  the und ers ta nd in g  o f the (a u th e n tic ) existence as a 
response to  the  g ivennes o f th e  exis ten tia l cond ition . In  the w ords o f 
ano the r G erm an e x is te n tia lis t and also Arendt's  te a ch e r, Jaspers: "To 
be a m an  is to  becom e a m a n ." [Jaspers, 1 9 5 1 /2 0 0 3 :7 3 ] As both 
Jaspers and H eidegger m a in ta in ed , man's being is n e v e r in ju s t  being 
but in th e  decision to  be.
D eparting  now from  H eidegger's economy o f the te rm s  resoluteness 
and resolution, w hat w ould  be the  practical m eaning o f reso lu tion  as an 
onto log ica l concept? In  The Essence o f Human Freedom, Heidegger 
explains th a t pe rson a lity  o f person lies in freedom  -  w h a t makes person 
a person, in on to log ica l -  no t in psychological sense, is freedom  
incarnated in a c tion . Resoluteness is H eidegger's  onto log ica l
79 Without ambition to offer a detailed interpretation of Heidegger's concept of 
anticipatory resoluteness, it should be pointed out here that anticipatory resoluteness 
cannot be reduced to the encounter of Dasein with its death: one must recall Heidegger's 
instruction for thinking as allowing to be gripped by the question. [Heidegger, 
1929/1995:7] Analogically, to anticipate is not to wait or to be aware to, not to forecast 
or envisage but it is about allowing that which is anticipated to permeate, to pervade the 
whole of existence. This pervasion of existence by the certainty of its non-existence and, 
at the same time, seizing existence from non-existence both as non-being and as being in 
discord with one's meaning, therefore not the mere passage of time which takes those 
born to their inevitable end in nothingness, is the meaning of being-towards-death of 
Dasein.
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in te rp re ta tio n  o f free do m  as a m ode o f be ing , not a s ta te  but th e  praxis 
o f e x is te n ce : "P rac tica l a c tio n  is the  w ay o f being o f the person. 
E xperience o f p ractica l freedom  is experience of th e  person as person. 
P e rsona lity  is the  p ro p e r essence o f m a n ." [H e idegger, 1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :1 8 8 ]
The fu n d a m e n ta l in H eidegger's concept o f free do m  fo r A rend t's  
concept o f freedom  is the  understand ing  th a t freedom  is a m ode o f 
being, the  o n to lo g ica l-e x is te n tia l notion o f freedom , as Villa points ou t. 
[1 9 9 6 :1 2 6 ] Freedom  as the  defin ing  p o te n tia l o f m an , ra th e r th a n  the  
no tion  o f lib e rty  rendered in te rm s  o f choice o r  decis ion  o r sovere ign ty , 
is w h a t A re n d t seeks to  reco ver fo r the  po litica l. I t  is the  p rim ord ia l 
free do m , abso lu te ly  unbound and underp inn ing  a ll o th e r, 'd e riv a tiv e ' 
freedom s.
A re nd t's  th in k in g  o f hum an agency here in te rsec ts  w ith  H eidegger's 
early w o rk  on the fu n d a m e n ta l on to logy a t the p o in t o f freedom  as 
transcendence, th e re fo re  free do m  th a t cu ts  th ro u g h  th e  d icho tom y o f 
negative  and positive  free do m . To be free from  th e  g ivenness ( th a t is, 
to  be free  n e g a tive ly ) m eans to  rem ain  w ith in  th e  g ivenness b u t give 
anew (fre e d o m  to ). I t  is free do m  em erg ing  from  spon tane ity  as the 
"p o w e r o f th e  se lf-o rig in a tio n  o f a s ta te ". [H e idegger, 1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :1 6 ] 
W hat A re n d t is a c tua lly  saying by re la ting  o n to log ica lly  defined 
free do m , freedom  w ith o u t and above all purposes and goals, w ith  the  
po litica l is th a t the p o te n tia l fo r  the  po litica l is bound up w ith  th e  ve ry  
ex is tence  o f m an.
W hile uncovering  th e  e x is ten tia l d im ension  o f po litics  in A re nd t's  
po litica l th e o ry  does not necessarily  suggest th a t A rendt is an 
e x is te n tia lis t herself, th e re  is an  im p orta n t caveat to  be in troduced in to  
such re a d in g . W h e the r A re nd t's  politica l th e o ry  is to  be considered 
e x is te n tia lis t o r  not, th e  th e o ry  is no t about "e x is te n tia lis m  po litic ize d ," 
[H inchm an  and H inchm an, 1 9 9 1 ] in o th e r w ords -  th e  e x is ten tia lism  is 
no t in  th e  fo re g ro u n d . For A re n d t, the  po litica l m u s t a lw ays rem a in  in 
th e  fo re g ro u n d . In  th a t sense, th is  is n o t a b o u t th e  po ten tia ls  o f 
e x is te n tia lism  as a ph ilosoph ica l school b u t about th e  po litica l g iven  an 
e x is te n tia l m ean ing . T h is  e x is te n tia l m eaning  as A re n d t reads it m u s t o f 
course be grounded in her understand ing  o f m an as p lu ra l and m u s t 
re fe r to  th e  s itu a tio n s  o f  p lu ra lity , since A rend t's  conce rn  a lm ost never 
was re la te d  to  th e  s itu a tio n s  w hich  stand a t th e  cen te r o f  the  
e x is te n tia lis t ph ilosophy, th e  s itua tions th a t are  o u r  ownmost, to  
em p loy  H eidegger's  te rm , b u t a lw ays those  th a t w e  encoun te r in  the  
w orld and th a t a lw ays again p lace us in th e  w orld and in re la tion  to  it. 
Those a re , in  A rend t's  id iom , t ru ly  po litica l s itu a tio n s  w here  it is not 
on ly  o u r  life  on its ow n  o r  o u r  life  w ith  those  close to  us is a t s take  but 
th e  w orld  itse lf.
Equally so , th e  uncovering  o f  th e  e x is te n tia l d im en s ion  o f po litics  by 
A rend t m u s t be d iffe re n tia te d  fro m  Hobbesian and S ch m ittea n  (d e a th - 
ce n tred ) e x is te n tia l po litics . As d iffe re n t as H obbesian and S chm ittean  
po litica l v is ion s  and p ro je c ts  a re , th e ir  source is com m on  -  it is the
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concern  w ith  bare life , w h ich  an tiqu ity  never considered a m a tte r  o f 
po litica l do ing :
Naked life (th e  hum an  being), w hich in a n tiq u ity  
belonged to  God and in the classical w orld  was clearly 
d is tin c t (as zoe) fro m  political life {bios), com es to  the  
fo re fro n t in th e  m anagem ent of the sta te  and becomes, 
so to  speak, its  e a rth ly  foundation. [A gam ben, 2 0 0 0 :2 0 - 
21]
N am ely, the  cen te r o f H obbes' and Schm itt's  po litica l p ro ject is the 
decision on life o r dea th . H obbes' envisages the abso lu te  su rren de r of 
the  ind iv id ua l pow er o f th is decision to  the  sovere ign, conceiving o f the 
politics as th a t w hich pro tects  bare life o f the  sub jects  while S ch m itt is 
concerned w ith  defin ing  po litics  through the  ve ry  sovere ign 's  decision, 
e x te rn a l and overrid ing  any legal o r o the r norm . The m ain  landm arks of 
these tw o  politica l theories a re  the concepts o f life  and death . W here 
th ey  co llide  w ith  A rend t's  no tion  o f politics is how ever not her centering 
on b irth  but her centering  on na ta lity  as a princip le  th a t arises fro m  the 
necessity o f b irth  rew orked in to  freedom  o f beg inn ing : "F reedom  is the 
capacity  o f beg in n in g ." [GTNT, 13]
Peculia rity  o f A rendt's  th e o ry  o f the politica l lies precisely in her 
rew ork ing  o f the  concept o f b irth  into p rincip le  o f na ta lity  as the 
p rinc ip le  of hum an freedom . In  o ther words, A re nd t's  politics -  while 
cente ring  on freedom  -  is actua lly  neither about free do m  on ly , which 
would be the  defin ing  characte ris tic  o f classical p o litica l ph ilosophy, nor 
a bo u t necessity on ly , the princ ip le  which prevails in  m odern  po litica l 
th e o ry , b u t about freedom  b orn  out o f necessity.80 N or is th is  a b o u t the 
d ia lectics o f necess ity -freedom , as Arendt had a lw ays been a 
pronounced opponent o f (H ege lian) d ia lectical f lu x , w hich  b lends the 
tw o th e re b y  negating free do m , but about the understand ing  o f the 
po litica l as th a t w hich  rew orks necessity in to  free do m , never th e  o the r 
w ay a ro un d .
E x is te n tia lity  o f A rend t's  n o tio n  o f politics th e re fo re  im plies a politica l 
doing as a response to  the irrem ediable  hum an co n d itio n  o f g ivenness 
by rew ork ing  th is g ivenness in to  free act:
W ith  word and deed w e  insert ourselves in to  th e  hum an 
w orld , and th is  inse rtio n  is like a second b ir th , in w hich 
we confirm  and take upon  ourselves the  naked fa c t o f our 
o rig ina l physical appearance. (HC, 1 7 6 -1 7 7 ]
In  the  notion  o f ta k ing  up o f  ex is ten tia l necessity, b o th  H eidegger and 
A rend t in troduce th e  no tion  o f  response. The p rinc ip le  o f n a ta lity  is 
m an ifested  in the im pulse th a t  "springs from  the beg inn ing  w hich came 
into  th e  w orld  when we w ere born and to  w hich w e respond  [ita lic s  by *79
80 Birth of freedom from necessity should not be understood in terms of dialectics in the 
sense of Arendt's understanding of dialectical movement as the process that 'has a 
beginning as well as an end, whose laws of motion, therefore, can be determined." [BPF,
79] As it will be argued, there is nothing necessary about reworking of necessity into 
freedom.
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S.N.] by beginning so m e th in g  new  on o u r  in it ia t iv e ."  [HC, 1 7 7 ] Man 
th e re fo re  responds to  the  'c a l l ' o f  b irth  in o n e se lf by  calling fo r th e  new 
b irth  in th e  fo rm  o f new b eg in n in g . H e idegger a lso  speaks o f call to  
Dasein and response  by D asein.
There  is th e re fo re  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l d iffe re n ce  betw een the 
p reoccupa tion  o f m od ern  p o litic a l th e o ry  w ith  th e  bare  fac t(s ) o f life  
and, o n  th e  o th e r h an d , A re n d t's  th ink ing  o f th e  p o litica l as delineated 
by th ose  facts  and th e  ine rad icab le  co n s tra in ts  o f  life  process, w hich  
h o w e ve r can never be th e  focus o f po litica l concern . Q uite  the c o n tra ry , 
A re nd t conce ives o f po litics  as ta k in g  up o f  these  lim its  and developing 
them  as capacities -  b irth  th u s  tra n s fo rm s  from  th e  fac t o f a rb itra ry  
th ro w n n e ss  in to  an a lien  w orld  to  th e  act o f  conscious engagem ent w ith  
the  w o rld  th ro u g h  n o v e lty  b ro u g h t in to  it b y  p o litica l action .
T hro ug h  th e  notion  o f  a c tion  as th e  'second  b ir th , ' A rend t perfo rm s a 
H e ideggerian  m ove o f tak ing  up th e  necess ity  o f th row nness. To th is , 
m en a re  n o t p rom pted  by n ecess ity , bu t " its  im pu lse  springs fro m  the 
beg inn ing  w h ich  cam e in to  th e  w orld  w hen  w e  w ere  born  and to  w hich  
we respond  by beg inn ing  so m e th in g  new  on  o u r o w n  in it ia tiv e ."  [HC, 
177]
This is th e  princ ipa l im p lica tio n  o f  A rend t's  co nn ec tio n  between th e  fact 
o f b irth  and m an 's ca pa c ity  to  a c t fo r  p o litica l th e o ry  -  th a t the po litica l 
m us t be understood  as a p o te n tia l inscribed in  hum an cond ition . A re nd t 
is no t sa y in g  th a t po litics  th u s  is  necessarily  n o r is she p u rpo rting  to  
deve lop a no tion  o f hum an n a tu re . In  the  re p ly  to  Eric Voegelin o n  the  
issues ta ke s  up from  th e  Orig ins o f Totalitarianism, A rendt e x p lic it ly  
d istances herse lf fro m  e ssen tia lis t conceptions o f hum an n a tu re : 
"H is to rica lly  we know o f m an 's  n a tu re  o n ly  inso fa r as it has existence, 
and no rea lm  o f e te rna l essences w ill e v e r conso le  us If m an loses his 
essen tia l ca p a b ilitie s ." [PHA, 1 6 3 ] The f irs t p a rt o f th is  s ta te m e n t is in 
h a rm o ny  w ith  H eidegger's u nd e rs ta n d in g  o f m an 's  essence th ro ug h  
e x is te n ce : "The w hatness (essentia) o f th is  being m u s t be understood 
in te rm s  o f its being (existentia ) . "  [1 9 2 7 :4 2 ] T he fina l segm ent 
suggests fu rth e r th a t re fu ta tio n  o f the  n o tio n  o f hum an natu re  fo r 
A rendt does n o t im p ly  the  d en ia l o f ce rta in  p o te n tia ls  th a t define being 
as h um a n . In  th is sense, th e  p o litica l is one o f th e  m an-defin ing  
po ten tia ls .
But th e re  is also a s ig n ific a n t ph ilosoph ica l im p lica tio n  o f A rend t's  
re la tin g  a c tio n  as freedom  to  b ir th . C o n tra ry  to  th e  centuries long 
ph ilosoph ica l tra d itio n , H e idegger and A re n d t o ffe r onto log ica l 
u n d e rs ta nd in g  o f m an n o t in te rm s  o f Reason, th e re fo re  m an's capacity 
to  th in k , o r  any  o the r in te rna lize d  capac ity , b u t in te rm s  o f freedom  and 
a c tion  in  th e  w orld as th e  d e fin in g  ca pa c ity  o f m a n : "m a n  achieves 
re a lity  o n ly  to  the  e x te n t th a t he acts  o u t o f  h is ow n freedom  roo ted  in 
s p o n ta n e ity ."  [EU, 1 83 ]
In  A re n d t's  as in H eidegger's th o u g h t fre e d o m  fro m  necessity shows 
its e lf on th e  horizon o f  tim e . T he  acting  o u t o f  free do m  occurs on  the
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horizon o f te m p o ra lity  inso fa r th e  orig inary freedom  o f m an is freedom  
from  tim e  though w ith in  tim e . In  o the r w ords, m an -  w h ile  th ro w n  into  
the  flow  o f nature  -  becom es free  by re-enacting  th e  ru p tu re  caused by 
his f irs t  appearance and thus  is not only in tim e b u t re la tes to  tim e  by 
in te rru p tin g , ever anew, th e  steady flow  o f in d is tin c t instan ts and 
estab lish ing  a new te m p ora l sequence woven th ro u g h  actions, the 
sequence to  which th e re  can be no m asters bu t fo r  w hich  th e re  are 
a u th o rs /a c to rs  to  w h ich  it can be traced back. The p o litica l act is th en  
th a t b y  w h ich  a po litica l be ing , therefore  a being am ong  and w ith  o th e r 
beings, becomes responsib le  fo r  the course o f e ve n ts  though  no t a 
m a s te r o ve r it.
In  action  which does no t ju s t  occur in tim e  b u t b reaks in to  it and opens 
a new sequence resisting  th e  autom atism  o f flow , t im e  is taken  up as 
resp on s ib ility . N am ely, A re nd t does not conceive o f  po litica l action  as 
m ere ly  situated  in an  in s ta n t but as being a m o m e n t o f beginning 
inso fa r the  world can never be reversed back to  w h a t it had been before  
the  a c tion  and inso fa r it  spells the  renewal o f the  w orld  w hich  o therw ise  
is destined  to  decay and ru in .
Because the w orld  is m ade by m orta ls  it w ears  o u t; and 
because it co n tin uo us ly  changes its inh ab itan ts  it  runs the  
risk  o f becom ing as m o rta l as they. To p reserve  the  w orld 
aga inst the m o rta lity  o f  its crea tors and inh ab itan ts  it 
m u s t be constan tly  se t r ig h t anew. [BPF, 1 9 2 ]
The necessity o f the  ruinous tim e  flow is th e re fo re  resisted n e ith e r by 
the  d is loca tion  nor b y  co n tro l b u t by its tak ing  up as respons ib ility , its 
flow  understood  not as a succession o f ind is tinc t in s ta n ts  bu t as sourced 
by m en, n o t only th ro u g h  th e ir  natura l b irth  bu t a lso  th e ir  'second b ir th '
in a c tio n .81
The q uestion  o f th a t freedom , which is hum an freedom  prope rly , is the  
fu nd am e n ta l question o f a ll philosophy, argues H eidegger: " th e  
question  concerning th e  essence o f hum an freedom  is th e  fundam enta l 
question  o f ph ilosophy, in w h ich  is rooted even th e  q ue stion  o f b e in g ." 
[H e idegger, 1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :2 0 6 ] For A rendt, equa lly  so, th e  question  o f 
freedom  as new beg inn ing , as bring ing in to  th e  w orld , is the  
fu nd am e n ta l question  o f a ny  inqu iry  purporting  to  be re le va n t fo r  m en 
and the  hum an co nd itio n , as she fig h ts  "a g a in s t illusions o f 
helplessness, the spurious natu ra liza tion  o f m a tte rs  th a t are in fact 
sub jec t to  hum an choice and a c tio n ." [P itk in , 1 9 9 8 :1 9 2 ]82
81 While this cannot be investigated here, it would be interesting to analyze how this 
Arendt's conceptual triangle, man-action-time would reflect on the old philosophical 
debate between the (Aristotelian) objective time and (Kantian) subjective time and 
whether it is within political thinking of time sequence as rendered meaningful through 
political action that this debate could be offered a re conciliatory path.
82 As further argued by Pitkin, the politico-historical (and also normative) context of 
Arendt's conceptual focus on freedom is the situation of the social as opposed to the 
political, the acceptance of the existing as unchangeable and oblivion of the possibility 
resistance to the flow of events and of change, which defines the political. Accepting and 
enacting freedom is what more often than not stands between disasters and averted 
disasters.
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The p rob lem  how ever rem a ins fo r  A rend t's  th in k in g  o f  the  politica l. The 
notion  o f m an as th e  beg inn ing  th a t was begun to  begin poses the  
q uestion  o f the  source o f a c tio n  as beg inn ing . I f  m o m e n t o f beginning is 
so m iracu lous , as th o u g h  it  com es fro m  n o -w h e re  and n o -tim e , 
em erg ing  from  the  bare  fa c t o f  m an 's  b ir th , w here  does this m om en t 
com e fro m ?  How can it be ca lled fo r  and n o t s im p ly  befa llen upon the 
a c to r b y  v irtu e  o f n a ta lity?  O r, s ta rtin g  fro m  a d if fe re n t d irection , how 
can an a c to r e ve r be responsib le  fo r  a m iracle?
This rem ains the  p ro b le m  o f  th e  connection  be tw een  th e  on to log ica l 
roo t o f  th e  hum an co n d itio n , th a t is -  the  co nd itio n  th a t  "w e  are always 
a lready fre e -to -b e c o m e -fre e " [P itk in , 1 9 9 8 :2 8 2 ] o r  a lw ays  free to  place 
o u r free do m  in the  w orld  th ro u g h  action , and on th e  o th e r hand -  
praxis : how is it e xa c tly  th a t th is  o n to lo g ica lly  rooted capacity  fo r  action 
is se t in  m otion?
W hile th in k in g  o f the  p o litica l as th e  dynam ics o f re la tin g  in the  public 
sphere, th e re fo re  the  d yna m ics  o f in te r-a c tin g , cuts th ro u g h  the kn o t o f 
the  in d iv id u a lis t-c o m m u n ita ria n  debates in m odern  p o litica l philosophy 
and th e o ry , it a t the  sam e tim e  renders its e lf vu ln e ra b le  to  a d iffe re n t 
dua lism , the  one n o t on ly  p rinc ip a l in h is to ry  o f philosophy b u t so 
en tw ined  w ith  the ro o ts  o f ph ilosophy th a t it cou ld  be considered 
fu nd am e n ta l w ere it n o t fo r th ose  voices o f d issent in philosophy th a t 
re jec t its  fu n d a m e n ta lity . I t  is the  m in d /b o d y  d u a lism , as the m irro r 
im age o f the  dua lism  betw een the  w orld  o f  ideas and the  w orld  o f 
phenom ena.
W hen A re n d t focuses her co nce p tu a liza tion  o f th e  p o litica l on action , 
w ha t is in the  focus is one o f th e  w o rld ly  occurrences re fu tes th is 
dua lism  o f th e  w orld and  th e  o ne  w h ich  m ost e v id e n tly  does so, y e t also 
the  one th a t has been m o s t d if f ic u lt  to  g rasp  co nce p tu a lly  as precise ly 
th a t, th e  re fu ta tion  o f d ua lism . W hen th e re fo re  a p o litic a l th o u g h t such 
as A re nd t's  focuses o n  a c tio n  defined  in te rm s  o f  m irac le , th u s  an 
occurrence  o f unknow n  o rig in  and in defiance  o f  causa lity  and 
ra tio na liza tion , it  begs a q u e s tio n  o f  th e  source  o f a c tio n : W here does it 
com e fro m , th is  action?  Are  w e to  assum e th a t A re n d t a llows the 
po litica l to  slide in to  irra tio n a l, ungrounded  p e rfo rm a tiv ity  w ith  th is 
concep tua liza tion  o f a c tio n  w h ich  precludes any  p re m e d ita te d  m odeling 
o f its course  and reckoning  w ith  th e  consequences? I f  so, can th e re  be 
a source o f action  o r  i t  is s im p ly  a m ysterious m o tio n  o f physis  in 
h is to rica l re a lity , w h ich  in fa c t pe rpe tua tes th e  m e ta ph ys ica l dua lism  o f 
m ind and body? Are w e  th e n  to  conclude th a t a c tion  is noth ing bu t a 
snap in re a lity , th e  m o m e n t w hen  the m in d  is b linded and the 
consciousness as well as conscience silenced?
These questions , to w h ich  th e  fo llow ing  chap ters  w ill seek an answ er, 
though  perhaps find ing  on ly  response, have e no rm ou s im portance  fo r 
th ink ing  o f th e  po litica l and th u s  fo r  the  in te rna l cons is tency  o f A rend t's  
p ro jec t w ith in  the sphe re  o f  p o litica l th in k in g , and  critics  and
115
in te rp re te rs  have indeed looked in to  them  from  th a t angle83 y e t the 
answ ers rem ain  open, ju s t  as Arendt's  inq u iry  in to  th e  source o f action  
rem ained open s ince h e r th e o ry  o f m ind is incom p le te . A t the  same 
tim e , the  bearing o f  A re n d t's  exp lora tions in th is  d irection  upon 
ph ilosophy as a w ho le  s tands hard ly  touched.




S IT U A T IN G  M IN D  IN  THE WORLD
Every beg inning  a ne w  is an abso lu te  beg inn ing  which is an 
irre m e d ia b le , irrepa rab le  fra c tu re  o f the  te m p ora l con tinuum  disclosing 
its fra ilty .  As such, it poses a p a rticu la r p rob lem  o f conceptua liza tion : 
How can it be e n tire ly  absolved o f all ties, does it assum e the erasure  o f 
e ve ry th in g  before? Is  it a negation  o f any m ea n in g fu l h is to rica l 
n a rra tive?  W here could  it com e from  if  it is abso lu te ly  new? I t  is c lea r to  
A rend t th a t a free a c t Is free  on ly  inso fa r it cannot be fitted  in to  the 
ex is ting  cha in  o f causes and consequences bu t its e lf 'im m e d ia te ly  turns 
into  a cause o f w h a te ve r fo llo w s ..." [L M /II :2 1 0 ] The answ er th a t she 
o ffers is to  place the  free  a c t, th e  abso lu te  beg inning  in the legendary 
hiatus , a 'gap  o f h is to rica l t im e ' th a t d isperses the  illusion o f 'a ll-  
pow erfu l t im e  co n tin u u m ', th e re fo re  itse lf a ca tegory  o f dislocated tim e . 
As such, it separates th e  old fro m  the  new, absolving the  new fro m  the 
a u to m a tis m  o f causa lity , w h e re o f fo llow s th a t 'th e  end o f the  old is not 
necessarily  the  beg inning o f th e  n e w .'[L M /II :2 0 4 ]
But by exposing  the  d is c o n tin u ity  o f th e  co n tin u u m , w h a t the  beginning 
brings a b o u t is also u n d e rm in e d . I t  is inexplicab le  th ro u g h  the locus  in 
'a  re liab le  cha in  o f cause and e ffe c t ... in  A ris to te lia n  categories o f 
p o te n tia lity  and a c tu a lity . In  th e  norm a l t im e  co n tinuum  every e ffect 
im m e d ia te ly  tu rn s  in to  a cause o f fu tu re  d eve lo pm e n ts , bu t w hen the 
causal cha in  is broken... th e re  is noth ing  le ft fo r  th e  'b e g in n e r' to  hold 
on to . "  [L M /II :2 0 7 -2 0 8 ] The beg inn ing  is g round less w h ile  a t the  same 
tim e  it  c a n n o t be tru s te d  to  g round  th e  new g ro u n d , to  crea te  'th e  
cond ition  fo r  all fu tu re  p o litic a l life  and h is to rica l d eve lopm ent' 
[L M /I I :2 0 9 ] since it explodes the  tim e  co n tin uu m . O vercom ing 
necessity deprives th e  new beg inn ing  o f any c e rta in ty , o f a safe s h e lte r 
th a t th e  causa l chains p rov ide .
W ith  n o ta b le  undertones o f d isa p p o in tm e n t, A rend t observes how the 
actors o f  th e  Am erican R evo lu tion  shunned aw ay fro m  the  newness o f 
th e ir  o w n  a c t and, ra th e r  th a n  face  th e  'abyss o f n o th ing ne ss ,' endowed 
th e ir  new  beginning w ith  th e  m eaning o f renaissance, th e  re- 
e n a c te m e n t o f the  g rea t p a s t and h is to ric  p o litica l exam ples. 
E veryw here  in h is to ry  th e y  loo ked , th e y  could not fin d  an exam ple  to 
help th e m  th in k  and recognize w h a t th e y  did in the sense o f m en acting 
in co nce rt and binding th em se lve s  to  ce rta in  princ ip les upon w hich they 
w ished to  see th e ir new p o litica l ed ifice  e rec ted . They could not ju s t ify  it 
n e ithe r to  them selves nor to  th e  o the rs  th a t this o u tb u rs t o f politica l 
freedom  in to  a new po litica l co m m u n ity  w as founded on noth ing else 
bu t itse lf, and th a t the  free a c t e n ta iled  its ow n g ro un d .
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A rend t traces th is ina b ility  to  th in k  the new as newness proper back to  
the  W e ste rn  philosophical legacy where, 'in  its o rig ina l in te g rity , 
freedom  survived... on ly  in u top ian  and unfounded prom ises o f a final 
're a lm  o f fre e d o m ." [L M /I I :2 1 6 ] In  her research th e re fo re , A rendt found 
th a t th e  on ly  tra il o f th in k in g  th a t could lead to  th in k in g  the  free act as 
g ro un d le ss ly  grounded in its e lf is the  th ink ing  rooted in the  Augustin ian  
conception  o f man as h im se lf a beginning, th e re fo re  b rough t in to  the 
world as the  abso lu te  n ove lty  th a t could not have been derived from  
a ny th ing  preceding it and had to  be jus tifie d  by the  v e ry  fact o f it  being 
the re . Such th ink ing  inva lida tes the  very question  o f ju s tif ia b ility  o f the 
new and grounds th e  new in the  existence o f m an as the abso lu te  
beg inn ing , related to  w hat w as before but n o t derived th e reo f.
This re la tes  Arendt's  conceptua liza tion  back to  the  genealogical roo ts  o f 
her ow n  understand ing  o f m an  as beginning in A ugustine 's  n o tio n  o f 
homo temporalis, w ho was created not as o the r beings to  perpe tuate  
the  sam e, its  own kind in th e  reproductive cycle, b u t to  be the  n ove lty . 
A rend t how ever is aware th a t th is is an on to log ica l answ er to  the 
po litica l question  o f the  source o f political action, w hereas her overa ll 
p ro je c t has all along been d irected  at find ing  a po litica l answ er to  the 
po litica l question , though  incorporating  as som eth ing  o f a co lla tera l 
benefit th e  response to  the philosophical problem  o f w orld  dua lism . One 
im p lica tio n  o f re la ting  the  capacity  fo r action  to  the  fact o f n a ta lity , 
w hich is beyond m an 's pow er, is th a t freedom  itse lf appears un free , a 
m a tte r  o f fa te . A rendt's  a rg u m e n t is there fore  in th e  danger o f fa lling  
back in to  the  p it o f Hegelian dia lectics o f necessity and freedom , which 
she has critic ized  a ll th ro u g h o u t. The fact o f b irth :
... seem s to te ll us no m ore  than th a t we a re  doomed  to  
be free  by v ir tu e  o f  being born, no m a tte r w h e th e r we 
like  freedom  o r  abhor its  a rb itra riness, are 'p le a se d ' w ith  
it  o r  p re fer to  escape its awesome resp on s ib ility  by 
e lecting  some fo rm  o f fa ta lism . [L M /II:2 1 7 ]
A rend t's  p ro je c t o f th ink ing  th e  new as a bso lu te ly  new is here 
co n fron ted  w ith  th e  danger o f a rb itra riness en ta iled  in e very  new 
beg inn ing . This is th e  question  o f the  m om ent th a t can be called fo r  by 
an a c to r and not o n ly  befa llen  upon the actor, w ho  th u s  consciously 
resists th e  au tom atism  w h ich  to  E ichm ann seem ed as the  
Insurm ountab le  sta te  o f "e v e ry th in g  always in a s ta te  o f continuous 
flu x , a s te ad y  s trea m ?" [EJ, 1 5 2 ] The question here is n o t the cause o f 
a cause, w hich  A rend t regards as the dead-end s tre e t o f the  in fin ite  
regress [L M /II :8 9 ] b u t the w a y  out o f the  a rb itra rin ess  o f beginning 
th a t w ou ld  both  preserve sp o n ta n e ity  and escape fa ta lis m .
The p rob lem  here is tw o fo ld . O r rather, it is the sam e problem  a t tw o 
levels. Po litica lly , it is the  p ro b le m  o f the source o f a c tion  o f the  acting  
being -  w here  does action  th ro u g h  which m an p a rtake s  o f the w orld  
rendering  it changed, w here does th is action com e fro m , w hat in  m an 
m akes h im  act in -to  the  w orld?  How is th is  inse rtio n  in to  tim e , the  
ra zo r-cu t th a t is the  m om en t o f action, to  be called fo r  and n o t on ly
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received by v irtu e  o f the  o n to log ica l re la tio n sh ip  betw een  the  hum an 
co nd itio n  o f n a ta lity  and hum an capacity  fo r  a c tion , between th e  sta te  
o f being born into  th e  w orld  as a un ique  n o ve lty  and the response to  
th is s ta te  th ro ug h  b ring ing  th e  new  in to  the  w orld? 84
Philosophically, it is th e  p ro b le m  re la ted  to  the  understand ing  o f  the 
w orld . The burden o f the  ph ilosoph ica l tra d itio n , in a ll its g ra v ity  as 
A rendt con tends, canno t be fu lly  grasped if one does not recognize th a t 
m etaphys ics , as suggested by its  v e ry  n a m e ,85 roo ted  a ll ph ilosophy in 
the  conception  of the  dual w o rld , separa ting  the  w orld  o f ideas, located 
in the  space o f meta~, from  th e  m a te ria l w o rld , o f physis. I f  ph ilosophy 
as a th o u g h t-p ro je c t is how ever to  be reco nstru c ted  on the ground 
o th e r th a n  m etaphysics, th e  fo u n d a tio n a l dua lism  m ust a lso be 
overcom e. But if A rend t understands m an as an a c ting  being, th e  being 
th e re fo re  fu nd am e n ta lly  e x is tin g  by appearing in the  phenom enal 
w orld , it  could be argued th a t she herse lf o n ly  p e rfo rm s  an overcom ing 
o f the  tra d itio n  th a t is a re p e tit io n  o f the  M arx ian  inversion o f the 
classical h ie ra rchy o f hum an a c tiv it ie s , w hich  placed vita activa above 
vita contemplativa , essen tia lly  leaving the  d ic h o to m y  its e lf in tact.
The p rob lem  o f the  source o f a c tion  and the p rob lem  o f dua lism  
how ever a re  on ly  tw o sides o f the  sam e coin. I f  a c tion  is understood  as 
A rend t understands i t  - m ore  th a n  a m e re  re -a c tio n  to  the  g iven 
s itu a tio n , a u to m a tica lly  tr igg e red  o ff  by c ircu m stan ces, bu t som eth ing  
th a t b rings  about som eth ing  g e n u in e ly  new w hile  revealing  the  a c to r - 
looking fo r  the  source o f action  e n ta ils  an in q u iry  in to  the  connection  
betw een the inner processes o f th e  hum an m ind and , on the  o the r 
hand, po litica l action w hich 'c o n s titu te s  a realm  o f a pp ea ra nce s / 
[B e iner, 1 9 8 3 :1 7 ] Speaking in te rm s  o f inside  and outside, o f  th a t 
w hich m akes appear w ith o u t a ppearing  and th a t w h ich  appears, is only 
one w a y  o f speaking o f the  w orld  in te rm s  o f ideas and m a tte r . I f
84 Arendt insists that "action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its 
intended goal as a predictable effect on the other... they are its determining factors, and 
action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend them." [BPF, 151] In that sense, 
"action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the 
dictate of the will... but springs from something altogether different... which I shall call a 
principle. Principles do not operate from within the self as motives do... but inspire, as it 
were, from without..." [BPF, 152] By relating action to principle as its inspiration, Arendt 
opposes internalist theories of human agencies and radically externalizes action. Not only 
is the agent not an owner of the consequences and effects of action but what inspires 
action belongs entirely to the world, it comes to the agent from the world and is returned 
to it through action since principles are "manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, 
no longer/ [BPF, 152]
However this discussion of principle does not entirely answer the question of the source of 
action. Arendt does not demonstrate here how all phases of this internal process of 
initiating action -  goal-setting by reason, decision of judgment, command of will- are 
interconnected with the guidance of principle. Nor is it clear from this brief exposition of 
the concept of principle how principle that is general and universal as Arendt argues 
inspires a particular action which is the break-through into newness: how does new come 
about from something that Arendt's conceptualization suggests to be perennial, such as 
principles of honour, glory, fear?
85 Though its name originally denoted merely Aristotle's book written after Physics, 
metaphysics as a term acquires a highly symbolic meaning, at least in the more recent 
philosophy and not least through the writings of Heidegger. It is to that symbolic meaning 
that this reference is directed.
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th e re fo re  one seeks to  lin k  th a t which appears in th e  w orld , like action, 
to  th a t w hich  rem ains h idden , like the w orkings o f  th e  hum an m in d , one 
is in fa c t asking th e  perenn ia l question o f the bridge betw een th e  world 
o f ideas and w orld  o f appearances.
But th a t  th is is the  'p e re n n ia l' philosophical question  is true  on ly  insofar 
it is accepted th a t the  understand ing  o f th is p rob lem  as the  principal 
and perenn ia l fo r p h ilosophy is a problem  in itse lf. In  o the r w ords, the  
new ly arisen po litica l and philosophical s itu a tio n  to  w hich A rendt 
con tinuous ly  responded, Im pels the p rob lem atiza tion  o f th is question  o f 
the b ridge  betw een the  tw o  worlds based on the p rob lem atiza tion  o f the 
conception  o f the  w orld  as dua l. In  th a t context, A re nd t's  concern w ith  
the  source  o f po litica l a c tio n  -  since the  princip le  o f na ta lity  is the 
predica te  o f the  m om en t o f beginning b u t not the  's p a rk ' -  m ay be read 
as an a tte m p t a t the  fin a l blow to  the  'm e tap hys ica l de lus ion .' 
[L M / I I : H O ]
A rend t's  ve n tu re  in to  the  ph ilosophy o f m ind m ust th e re fo re  be seen as 
a c o n s titu tiv e  e le m e n t o f h e r political though t, c r it ic a l o f both political 
ra tiona lism  and v o lu n ta r is m , but a t the  same tim e  -  her s trongest 
ph ilosophical s ta te m e n t a g a in s t both m ate ria lism  and idealism . This is 
so n o t s im p ly  because p lu ra lity  and w orldliness inh e re n t to  th e  m ind 
fa cu ltie s86 place in the  co re  o f the ve ry  being as hum an a ce rta in  
p o litica lity , d is tin c t from  a ny  'na tu ra l soc iab ility ' as possib ility  is d is tin c t 
from  a c tu a lity  and free do m  from  necessity. I t  is also because the  
princ ipa l concern th a t d rive s  A rendt's  inqu iry  is how  to  understand and 
how to  conceptua lize  th e  lin k  between th ink ing  and  acting, between 
ideas and phenom ena, w ith o u t contrad icting  the  p rinc ip le  o f freedom  as 
de fin ing  o f m an. Th is  is noth ing  less b u t the q u e s t to  captu re  the  
paradox: " o f  a liv ing  being th a t, though itse lf p a r t o f the w orld  o f 
appearances, is in possession o f a fa cu lty , th e  a b ility  to  th in k , th a t 
p e rm its  the  m ind to  w ith d ra w  from  the w orld  w ith o u t e ver being able to  
leave it  o r transcend it . "  [L M /I :4 5 ]
86 Arendt's three faculties of mind are inherently plural, in harmony with one of Arendt's 
principal philosophical claims: denial of the purity of singularity in anything related to 
men, anything of men or by men. In that sense, thinking splits one into two or joins two- 
in-One, willing is always also nilling and, ultimately, judgment is representative thinking, 
thinking by one in the place of many.
A terminological observation or caveat is due here. Arendt's terminology of mental 
faculties is adopted in this discussion since the text revolves primarily around 
interpretation and pursuit of the movement of her argument. The term faculties in 
Arendt's thinking of mind should not be understood in support of strict division of mind. 
In that sense, Arendt is close to Aristotle [De Anima, 9th chapter of 3"* book], where he 
states that there is no separation of soul into faculties. Namely, Arendt acknowledges that 
working of the mind is constant interaction of the three faculties but by using this term, 
she is trying to emphasize autonomy of faculties, while not arguing for their independence 
of each other. The term however may not necessarily be the most convenient in that 
sense however, for the sake of clarity, it has been retained here as have also been some 
other terms from Arendt's conceptual language.
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W illing
U ndoubted ly, and as m en tioned  also in C hapters One and Two, A re nd t's  
w orks th a t preceded the Eichm ann tr ia l, excep ting  perhaps the  earlies t 
on S a in t Augustine, could a ll be seen as parts  o f a m osaic of recovering  
the  po litica l, recovering  it fro m  the philosophical silencing and fro m  the  
ob liv ion  o f political expe riences which could lead to  an understand ing o f 
the  p o litica l d iffe re n t to  th e  prevailing  concern  w ith  governm ents and 
system s. They d ea lt w ith  th e  silenced p o litica l p ro je c t o f p h ilosophy 
(w orks la te r co llected in Essays in Understanding), the  phenom enology 
o f ac tion  (Human Condition ), th e  po litica l experiences illum inating  th e  
th re a t to  the  p o litica l in  a specific h is to rica l s itu a tio n  (Origins o f  
Totalitarianism ) as w e ll as d iffe re n t conceptua liza tions o f action and th e  
po litica l (On Revolution). I t  is as though  th is  e n tire  opus em anates fro m  
A rend t's  s ta te m e n t: "The ra ison  d 'ê tre  o f  p o litics  is freedom , and its 
field o f  experience is a c tio n ."  [BPF, 146]
W hat a t least p a rtly  p ro m p te d  A rendt to  look at th e  philosophical m a tte r  
o f dua l w orlds as th e  q uestion  o f h ighest p o litica l relevance, was the  
tr ia l to  Eichmann. In  the  Introduction  to  the  f irs t vo lum e of the  Life o f  
the Mind, Arendt m akes it c lea r th a t she is n o t abandoning po litica l 
th ink ing  fo r the  sake o f 'p u re ly  ph ilosoph ica l' m e d ita tio n s , but th a t she 
rem ains concerned w ith  the  questions w hich began to  haunt her during  
the  tr ia l to  E ichm ann.87
In  the  Introduction  to  th e  whole o f th e  book, A rendt s ta tes  h e r 
philosophic position as com ing  out o f th e  dea th  o f  m etaphysics and, 
inso fa r the  tw o had been equ a te d , ph ilosophy. In  th e  opening lines o f 
the  f ir s t  vo lum e, th is  p os ition  is g iven  a succ inct philosophical 
s ta te m e n t: 'Being and  Appearing coincide /  [L M /I:1 9 , italics b y  H .A .] 
The im p lica tion  o f th is  s ta te m e n t is th a t th e  p ro je c t behind The Life o f  
the M ind  cannot be a pure  ph ilosophy o f  hum an m ind  bu t m u s t have 
re la tion  and re levance to  th e  w o rld , in the  language o f the  philosophical 
tra d itio n  -  the w orld  o f appearances, ju s t  as a lth o u g h  " in  o u r w orld  
there  is no t c lea re r o r  m o re  radica l o pp os ition  th a n  tha t betw een 
th ink ing  and doing... th e  p rinc ip les  by w hich  we ju d g e  and conduct o u r 
lives depend u ltim a te ly  on th e  life  o f the  m in d ."  [L M / I :7 1 ]88
One o f  A rend t's  fu n d a m e n ta l propositions in  th e  in q u iry  in to  th e  m ind 
faculties is th a t w ill is the one  m en ta l fa c u lty  th a t  has the  p ow er to
87 Placing Arendt's last work in the context of her political theory against interpretations 
which see it as Arendt's return to the 'philosophical roots' in saturation with political 
issues, is justified also by the very design of the book: Namely, proceeding from thinking, 
via willing, to judging, Arendt's leaves off the discussion of one faculty to move to the 
other only when she concludes how that faculty relates to action. The trajectory is clearly 
from the least worldly to the most worldly or most political of the faculties.
88 This intertwining of active life and life of mind, of the two worlds is evident even in the 
morphology of the terms Arendt employs. Namely, active life is differentiated into three 
categories: labour, work, action -  all three straightforward and simple nouns, static 
substantives. On the other hand, mind faculties do not retain the names from the 
prevailing philosophical tradition -  reason, will, judgment but are given in the form of 
gerund, an active, verb-related noun, suggestive of motion, dynamic: thinking, willing, 
judging.
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m ove and th a t, n o t th ro u g h  the  re ten tion  o f the  th ings absent in the  
fo rm  as th e y  no lon ge r a re , b u t through the attention  to  the  th ings th a t 
never have been and m ay n eve r be, since they do no t have to  be. I t  is 
the  fa c u lty  the re fo re  th a t can m ake th ings happen, in o th e r w ords -  the 
fa cu lty  w h ich  belongs to  th e  invisibles but can e ffe c t appearance. 
[L M / I I : 110 ]
The q ue s tion  th e re fo re  is w he th e r it is in the fa cu lty  o f w ill th a t the  
source o f action  - as precise ly  th a t w hich appears in defiance o f 
necessity, spontaneously  and ex nihiio inso far som eth ing  e n te rs  the 
world w here  there  was n o th in g , not even an aw aiting  em pty  space -  
can be located.
A rend t's  engagem ent w ith  th e  philosophical tra d itio n  in th is  in q u iry  is 
how ever m ost d is illus ion ing . For the ancient Hellenic tra d itio n , will 
s im p ly  is not unless it can be though t as an o rg an  th a t helps men 
choose betw een g iven  possib ilities. Suspicious o f fu tu re  w hich they 
considered valid o n ly  in so fa r a m ere deriva te  o f th e  past th ro u g h  a 
causal cha in , the anc ien t philosophers, according to  A rend t, could not 
see a n y  va lue  in an  'o rg a n ' w h ich , even if i t  ex is ted , would be entangled 
in acc iden ts  and contingencies. [L M /II:  15] In  the  A ris to te lian  
understand ing  o f the  w o rld , the  new entered the  w orld in the  
m ove m e n t from  p o te n tia lity  to  actua lity , w h ich  reconciled the 
appearance o f th e  new w ith  continu ity , and th e  co n tin u ity , as tha t 
w hich lasts, was th e  on ly  va lid  philosophical concern.
In  m odern  philosophy, as preoccupied as it becam e w ith  the n o tio n  o f 
fu tu re  and progressive m ovem ent, A rendt how ever encoun te rs the 
same concern w ith  c o n tin u ity  and reluctance to  accept any 
understand ing  o f the  w orld  th a t would be based on freedom  and 
contingency and stand a p a rt from  teleological itine ra rie s . An in tim a tio n  
o f a d iffe re n t v iew  fo r A re nd t appears only in Kant's  philosophical 
system , em erg ing from  his 'uncond itiona l co m m itm e n t to  fre e d o m / the 
rea liza tion  -  noted w ith  som e surprise on his p a rt -  th a t o the r th a n  in 
th o u g h t, nowhere else can th e re  be absolute necessity, [L M /I I :1 4 6 ] an 
in tu itio n  the re fo re  th a t to  th in k  the world th ro u g h  freedom  and 
con tingency m ay be ph ilosoph ica lly  m ore valid th a n  to  th in k  it in  te rm s 
o f necessity, order, causa lity .
But K ant's  in tim a tio n  how eve r did not generate  a concept o f w ill th a t 
would be any m ore  usefu l fo r  A rendt's  inqu iry . Kant denies to  w ill 
anyth ing  b u t the s tr ic tly  execu tive  function  o f th e  law , th a t is the 
ca tegorica l im p era tive . On th e  basis o f th is , A rend t places him to g e th e r 
w ith  o th e r m odern ph ilosophers o f progress, w h ich  was believed to  
em body th e  final reco nc ilia tio n  o f necessity and free do m . The M oderns 
th e re fo re  no less th an  the  Ancients, a lthough look ing  a t the prob lem  
from  a v e ry  d iffe re n t ang le , preoccupy them se lves w ith  reading a 
'm a s te r p la n ' behind th e  chaos o f contingencies, even ts  and actions. 
W ill th e re , if  it a t a ll is, m u s t be seen as a m o to r  o f th is  m ovem ent, 
w hich m a y  be bring ing  a bo u t the  new but only the  necessary new th a t 
fits the  grand  schem e.
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A re nd t thus associates th e  'd isco ve ry ' o f  w illing  w ith  the C hristian  
philosophers and th e ir  rea liza tion  th a t I - w il l  and I-c a n  d iverge. Nam ely, 
A re nd t contends th a t a p h ilosophy g rounded  in th e  concept o f cyclical 
tim e , as she perceives the  philosophy o f a n tiq u ity , could not e n te rta in  
the idea o f the spon taneous action  w hich  b reaks the  old patterns and 
brings about the new . C onsequently , such p h iloso ph y would no t be ab le  
to  conceptua lise  w ill as a fa cu lty  re la ted  to  a c tio n . W ith  C hris tian ity  
h ow eve r the  cyclical concept o f tim e  is abandoned  in fa vou r o f th e  
linear tim e  flow, w hich  is based on th e  n o tio n  o f uniqueness and 
u n rep ea ta b ility  o f e ven ts . I t  in troduces th e  n o n -d e riv a tiv e  idea o f fu tu re  
as th a t  which n eve r before  has been. A re n d t th e re fo re  considers th e  
C hris tian  philosophers to  be th e  founders  o f  th e  th o u g h t o f w ill as an 
au tonom ous m enta l fa cu lty  th ro u g h  w h ich  m en  b ring  nove lty  to  th e  
w orld .
One o f  those th in ke rs  had gone  a s tep  fu r th e r, a t least in A rend t's  
read ing, when not shunn ing  aw ay from  th e  unleashed w ill, the  w ill free  
to  b ring  into life a n y th in g  and n o t ju s t  to  choose a m ids t the p resen tly  
'o ffe re d .' As Arendt reads h im , Duns S co tus re je c te d  as heresy any 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  w orld  th a t w ould be based o n  abso lu te  necessity, 
a ttr ib u tin g  the  m in d 's  in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  re a lity  as a resu lt o f th e  
w ork ing  o f necessity, to  the  in a b ility  o f m in d  to  th in k  aw ay w ha t a lready 
was th e re . This in a b ility  sp rings  from  th e  e x is te n ce  o f the  th ink ing  ego 
tha t ca nn o t th ink  its e lf aw ay. [L M /II :1 3 9 ]
Duns Scotus is im p o rta n t to  A re nd t fo r  tw o  reasons. F irstly, he 
understands the w orld  in te rm s  o f fre e d o m , n o t necessity . G iving the  
on to log ica l p rio rity  to  free do m , he clears fo r  A re n d t the  philosophical 
ground fo r her reco ns tru c tive  p ro je c t. In  o th e r w ords , his philosophy 
testifies  to  ph ilosoph ica lity  o f A rend t's  c r it iq u e  o f the  philosophical 
tra d itio n .
Secondly, and m ore im p o rta n tly , Duns Scotus deve lops a concept o f w ill 
which, on one level, is n o t founded on co m m an d  o r im position, the  
over-pow ering  th a t w ould im p ly  a sp ira tio n  to  sovere ign ty  and 
a nn ih ila tio n  o f free do m , bu t on  freedom  itse lf. On a no the r leve l, th is  
concept denies the  in s tru m e n ta lity  o f w ill, Its subo rd ina tion  to  the  
in te llec t, proposing instead th a t w illing  com es to  rest not in the 
accom plishm ent o f an  end th ro u g h  a c tion  b u t in  action  itse lf: "th e  
se re n ity  o f a se lf-con ta ined, s e lf- fu lfillin g , e v e r- la s tin g  m ovem ent... the 
s tillness o f an act res ting  in its  e n d ."  [L M / I I :1 2 4 ]89
89 Arendt's recourse in the direction of Ouns Scotus points to the limitations of narrow 
Aristotelian interpretation of Arendt's thought, even more obvious from her late works. 
The Life o f  The Mind -  as it will be argued, in all three of its parts -  constitutes an explicit 
statement by Arendt against teleological frameworks, and by divorcing will from executive 
function to it attributed in definitions of will as the instrument of choice, Arendt distances 
her initiatory notion of action from Aristotle's vision of praxis  and his solution to the 
problem of absolute novelty. Aristotle's solution namely resolves the problem of the 
interruption to continuity that the new poses by dissolving it into actuality which 
originates from always already present potentiality. [LM/II:30] The newness of the new is
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Such concep t o f w ill is key to  understanding man as fundam enta lly  free 
to decide on his do ings and life, hence also responsib le. [L M /II :1 8 ] 
Through th e  C hris tian  th o u g h t, there fore , A rendt finds th e  way to  place 
w ill In th e  con tex t o f free do m  and responsib ility  as opposed to  the  
con tex t o f execution  and in s tru m e n ta lity . This d ire c tly  responds to  the  
question  w hich th e  E icham ann tria l posed to  A re n d t: how to  endow  
agent w ith  the re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  action w ith o u t the  assum ption  o f 
so ve re ig n ty , th a t is th e  absolute contro l b y  agent o v e r the  
consequences and e ffects  o f  h is /h e r action.
By c o n tra s t, to  A re nd t, w ill is the  facu lty  o f  th a t w h ich  could o ccu r ye t 
could a lso  rem ain unacted , th a t it is o r i t  is not happens th ro ug h  w ill. 
[L M / I I :6 -7 ]  Will is th e  fa c u lty  o f the  yes o r  no  decision aga inst 
necessities, the fa cu lty  th ro u g h  which m en  renounce a ll presentness, 
which m oves and changes. The m om ent o f th e  decision to  a c t is 
un ique: it could be -  bu t it  does not have to  be. T he  o rig in  o f a c tion  is 
the re fo re  in the  princ ip le  o f freedom , w hich the  W ill em bodies -  com ing 
from  freedom  of th e  W ill, each and every action cou ld  ju s t as w e ll not 
have happened. T he reo f em erges the  concept o f responsib ility  as the  
burden o f freedom .
The w ill w ills and n ills, a rgues Arendt, to  w ill is a lw ays and a lready  to  
nill. W hile  w illing , we are n illing un til we take a decision and  act. 
Drawing on A ugustine, A re n d t argues th a t th is co n flic t w ith in  w ill is 
resolved no t th ro ug h  a n o th e r vo lition  but th rough  action  itse lf. Action 
only redeem s w ill from  the  w h ir l o f w illing and n illin g . Action in te rru p ts  
the a c tiv ity  o f w ill by closing o ff  a ll o the r options th ro u g h  the  enactm en t 
o f the  chosen one. T hrough  the  yes and no, the  p rinc ip le  o f freedom  is 
acted o u t but once th e  yes o r  the  no has been said, w ill cancels its e lf as 
action is located no t in th e  space o f w illing  and n illing  bu t in th e  space 
o f either/or. [L M /II:1 0 2 ]
While A re nd t does n o t e la bo ra te  th is, the  decision o f  w ill to  say no  is 
where action  comes fro m . N am ely, w ill can say yes, and th is w as the 
core o f N ietzsche's yes-say ing  to  life o r th e  a ffirm a tiv e  w ill, bu t fro m  its 
no to  the  present and th e  e x is tin g , there  em erges th e  new th a t could 
have ju s t  as well rem ained  non -ex is ten t. I t  is th e  specific capacity  o f 
will to  m ake  th ings happen. O n th is  g round, A rend t can there fore  argue 
th a t a c tio n  is com ing o u t o f  noth ing  because th e re  appears som eth ing  
where th e re  was no th ing  b u t also in th e  sense th a t w ha t precedes 
action is th e  act o f W ill, an a c t s till residing on ly  in th e  m ind and does 
not e x is t as th ing o f/ in  the  w o rld .
thus dissolved into the return of the old, leaving intact the overall idea of time as a cycle 
that always only brings back, not anew.
In this light, the Aristotelian readings of Arendt's phenomenology of vita activa could be 
re-read in a more balanced manner to acknowledge Arendt's Aristotelian and Kantian 
threads insofar Arendt's guiding intention is to preserve "Kant's ideas of free agency as an 
end in itself and of human dignity as grounded in the strict autonomy of spontaneous 
action.” [Beiner, 1983:31]
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This how ever poses th e  p rob lem  o f a p p ro p ria tin g  a theo log ica l 
fra m e w o rk  fo r p o litica l a c tio n . [L M /I I :1 9 ]  The C hris tian  d im ension  o f 
S co tu s ' though t d ic ta tes  a so lu tio n  to  th e  restlessness o f w ill, w h ich  
end lessly  oscillates betw een w illing  and n illing : th e  stillness o f a s e lf-  
fu lfille d  act. This a c t is th e  a c t o f love o f the  w o rld  as it is [L M /II :1 4 4 -  
1 4 5 ], in acceptance and a ffirm a tio n . Political a c tio n  as the m ed ium  o f 
p o litica l freedom , in co n tra s t to  re lig ious o r ph ilosoph ica l o r freedom  o f 
be ing , is however m eaning less if detached fro m  th e  pow er to  do as th e  
p o w e r to  change th e  w orld . I t  is the  freedom  o f do ing  not o f being th a t 
appears th rough  po litica l a c tio n .
I t  w ould  there fore  appear th a t  A re nd t's  recourse  to  Scotus and o th e r 
C hris tian  th inkers was n o t m uch  m ore  than  a genealogical d e to u r 
unless how ever the  notion  o f s e lf-fu lfille d  a c t as love  could be re lated to  
A re n d t's  notion o f p rincip les as d riv ing  fo rces o f action . To understand  
th e  ro le  o f princip les in A re n d t's  co nce p tu a liza tion  o f action, it m ust be 
noted th a t Arendt d iffe re n tia te s  betw een tw o  d im ensions o f action , th e  
d e te rm ine d  and the  free. In s o fa r  as the  e le m e n t o f d e te rm ina tion  is 
p re sen t, it is m eaningfu l to  speak o f m otives  and a im s. The a im  is w ha t 
is g iven  in the  in te llec t and to w a rd s  w hich  then  th e  in te llec t d irects  w ill 
th a t 'd ic ta tes  a c t io n / [BPF, 1 5 1 ] In asm uch  an a c t is free  how ever it  is 
'n e ith e r under the guidance o f th e  in te lle c t nor u n d e r  th e  d ic ta te  o f th e  
w ill... b u t springs fro m  so m e th in g  a lto g e th e r d if fe r e n t /  [BPF, 1 5 2 ] T h a t 
som eth ing  'a lto g e th e r d if fe re n t' is p rinc ip le , th e  n o tio n  o f w hich A rend t 
receives from  M ontesquieu.
Free act is inspired b y  p rinc ip les  from  w ith o u t. T he  im p lica tion  o f th is  
without is negation o f  so lips ism  b u t a lso  o f transcenden ta lism  fo r th e  
p rinc ip les are p ro p e rty  o f th e  w orld . T he y  re fe r to  m en living am ong 
m en. T h e ir role is n o t re g u la tiv e  b u t in it ia to ry , th e y  m ove to  action  
th ro u g h  which th e y  w ill be m ade  m a n ife s t. [BPF, 1 52 ] W hile th ey  
include honor, v irtu e , g lo ry , th e  p rinc ip le  o f fre e d o m  is m ost re leva n t 
fo r A re nd t given h e r und e rs ta nd in g  o f m an  and his m ode o f  being 
th ro u g h  free act.
To be m oved to  a c tion  by th e  princ ip le  o f  fre e d o m , she deduces fro m  
ana lyz ing  Am erican and H un garian  revo lu tio ns , is to  a c t o u t o f love o f  
free do m . Loving, in A re nd t's  A ugustin ian  u n d e rs ta nd in g , is w illing  
som eth ing  o r som eone to  be. I t  fo llow s th e re o f th a t  to  love freedom  is 
to  w a n t freedom  to  be, and fre e d o m  on ly is th ro u g h  action  th a t brings 
in to  being the new. D raw ing on Scotus ' no tion  o f  w ill s tilled  in  love, 
A re nd t there fore  finds  a p o litic a l answ er to  the  restlessness and inner 
c o n flic tu a lity  o f w ill, the  answ er opposed to  the  philosoph ica l le ttin g -b e , 
th ro u g h  le tting  be as letting becom e.
This reso lu tion  o f th e  w ill, w h ich  reconciles w ill and free act, while 
indebted  to  Scotus' co nce p tu a liza tion  o f w ill and A ugustine 's  no tion  o f 
love, cou ld  not how ever com e fro m  pure ly  ph ilosoph ica l m ed ita tions. In  
o rd e r to  grasp the p o ten tia l reso lu tio n , A re nd t had to  engage w ith  the 
h is to ry  o f political e xpe riences, th e  doings o f: 'm e n  o f action, who 
o ug h t to  be com m itted  to  fre e d o m  because o f the  v e ry  nature o f th e ir
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a c tiv ity , w hich consists in ’changing the w orld ,' and not in in te rpre ting  
o r know ing  it, w hereas:
Professional th inke rs ... have not been pleased w ith  
freedom  and its ine luctab le  randomness; th e y  have been 
unw illing  to  pay th e  price o f contingency fo r the  
questionab le  g ift o f  spon tane ity . [L M /II:1 9 8 ]
As A re nd t p o rtrays  it, h e r tu rn  to  political h is to ry  is a tu rn  from  
philosoph ic to  po litica l free do m . The question  how ever th a t seems 
unavo idab le  a t th is  s tage  o f Arendt's inqu iry  is w h y  she ever to o k  the 
step in to  h is to ry  o f  ph ilosophy in the pursu it of th e  conceptua liza tion  o f 
w ill th a t could be re lated to  political action. A fte r a ll, it could seem  th a t 
the in q u iry  m e a n t n o th ing  but revisiting h e r early  c ritiq ue  o f 
philosophical tra d itio n  da ting  back to the  Human Condition in 1958  or 
even e a rlie r, to  th e  lectu res from  1954, and th e  conclusion th a t 
philosophy cannot deal w ith  hum an action and freedom  em bodied in  it.
The stakes are how ever d iffe re n t insofar ph ilosophical genealogy allows 
Arendt to  p rob lem atize  th e  tra d itio n  o f vo lu n ta rism  in political th eo ry , 
which though  focusing on w ill nevertheless perpe tua tes philosophical 
m isconception  o f w ill. S u rp ris in g ly  therefore  fo r som eone who is looking 
fo r a concept o f w ill th a t would support the c la im  th a t w ill is the 
’m ainspring  o f a c tio n ,' h idden  in A rendt's  c r itica l genealogy o f the  
concept the re  lies A re nd t's  critique o f vo lu n ta rism , ju s t as her 
de libe ra tions on th in k in g  treasure  critique o f po litica l ra tiona lism , as we 
shall see in the  rem a in de r o f th is  chapter.
U ncovering one laye r a fte r  a no the r o f ph ilosophical trad ition , A rendt 
exposes the u n s u ita b ility , fo r th ink ing  o f th e  political, o f the 
philosophical concept o f w ill, insofar it can a t a ll be found, as a concept 
o f e ith e r  blind in s tru m e n t o r  o f a m ental fa cu lty  th a t exhausts its e lf in 
"the  inev itab le  reco il on its e lf o f the w illing  e g o ."  [L M /II:2 1 6 ] The 
fo rm e r, as was argued, is related to  both H ellen ic philosophy and 
m odern  progressiv ism , b o th  equally re luctan t " to  pay the price o f 
contingency fo r the  g ift o f  freedom  -  the  m enta l endow m ent w e  have 
fo r beginning som ething new , o f which we know th a t it  could ju s t  as 
w ell n o t be. No d ou b t the philosophers have a lw ays been m ore ’p leased' 
w ith  necessity th a n  w ith  fre e d o m ..."  [L M /II:  195 ] The la tte r how ever 
o rig ina tes from  m odern  philosophies, such as N ietzsche's, born  in 
response to  and in c ritiq u e  o f  p rogressiv ist ph ilosoph ical fram ew orks.
Arendt's  genealogica l c r it iq u e  in that sense is m ost indebted to  
H eidegger's c ritique  o f w ill, w h ich  constitu tes an e lem en t o f his c ritiq ue  
o f su b je c tiv ity  as the  u nderly ing  them e o f his in q u iry  into  the m eaning 
o f the  Being o f be ing. I t  is th rough w ill th a t th e  sub ject seeks to  
o verpow er th a t w h e re fro m  the  subject its e lf em erged , to  subdue and 
sub juga te , to absorb  all th a t ’ th e re -is '. T ha t is ’abso lu te  s u b je c tiv ity ': 
The transcenden ta l reduction  to  abso lu te  su b jec tiv ity  
g ives and secures th e  possibility  o f g round ing  the  
o b je c tiv ity  o f a ll o b je c ts  (the  Being o f these  beings) in
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th e ir  valid s tru c tu re  and consistency, th a t is, in th e ir  
constitu tion , in and th rough  s u b je c t iv ity . [H e idegger, 
1993 :440 ]
A re nd t's  critique o f w ill is a p ractica l, p o litica l c r it iq u e  o f the  assum ption  
o f sovere ign  's u b je c tiv ity ' b u t th e  'd is c o n te n ts ' behind her p ractica l 
c r it iq u e  resonate th e  o n to log ica l c r itiq u e  th a t underlies H eidegger's 
s ilencing o f w ill in h is w ork. T hrough  w ill, an  I  is ind iv idua ted , th e  I  th a t 
is th e  a u th o r o f vo litio ns  g en e ra tin g  a c tion . But th a t se lf-c rea ted  w illing  
I  is "iso la ted  from  e veryone  e lse" in its  respons ib ility  fo r  itse lf. 
[L M /I I :1 9 6 ] Enclosed in itse lf, in  a ll its s tr ife  fo r  pow er, it is pow erless 
because the w orld  bends no t to  the  s e lf  b u t to  th e  m any acting  
to g e th e r. Just as H e idegger is a tte m p tin g  to  u nders tand  the  Being in 
the 'c le a rin g ', the  c learing  o f su b jec t th a t is, beyond o r beneath th e  
su b jec t-ce n tre d  sphere  o f co g n itio n , so A re n d t seeks to  rem ove the  
po litica l from  the g rip  o f th e  fa cu lty  w h ich  ind iv id ua te s , secludes and 
g ives rise  to  perilous y e t u to p ia n  asp ira tions  to  so ve re ig n ty .
The u ltim a te  po litica l express ion  o f th is  a ll-d e fia n t I  th a t w ills itse lf in 
iso la tion  from  the w orld  is u n lim ite d  fre e d o m , w h ich  in the  po litica l 
sphere paradoxica lly  equals -  th e  den ia l o f fre e d o m . [BPF, 1 6 4 ] The 
po litica l concept th a t em bod ies radica l and a bso lu te  freedom  w hich 
a nn ih ila te s  itse lf, is s o ve re ig n ty . N am ely, to  be sovere ign  enta ils  th a t 
e very  I-w il l  coincides w ith  o r  incorpora tes I-c a n , ignoring  th e re fo re  th a t 
e very  I-w ill o f th is  I ,  as a be ing  born  n o t o f  its e lf and by its e lf but by 
o the rs  and among o the rs , is a lw ays am ong th e  T h e y 90 w here th e  I-w ill 
m ay e n co u n te r the I-n il l o f som e  o th e r I .  In  th a t case, m y I-w ill and I -  
can w ill coincide i f  and o n ly  if  the  o th e r  I ,  o r  all the  They, is 
subord ina ted  o r a nn ih ila ted . In  o th e r w ords , so ve re ig n ty  o f th is  I  'can  
be purchased only a t the  p rice  o f the  fre e d o m , i.e . th e  sovere ign ty , o f 
all th e  o th e rs /  [BPF, 164]
Paradoxically, A rend t is here in a g ree m e n t w ith  one  political th e o ris t 
who b u ilt his politica l th e o ry  on the  v o lu n ta r is t g ro un d . Nam ely, Carl 
S ch m itt, whom  A re n d t dec la res a cham pion  o f so vere ign ty  in the  
h is to ry  o f political th e o ry  [H C ], never m en tion s  freedom  in his 
theo riz ing  o f po litica l so ve re ig n ty  and sovere ign  decis ion. On the  part o f 
su b jec ts , sovere ignty assum es obedience. On the p a rt o f the  sovere ign, 
so ve re ig n ty  is not th e  q ue s tion  o f his free do m  b u t o f his rig h t and d u ty  
in the  face o f e x is ten tia l th re a t, in o the r w o rds  -  his sovereign decision 
is n o t a m a tte r  o f free  w ill b u t sheer necessity to  w h ich  all, subjects and 
sovere ign  equally, m u s t succum b. [S c h m itt, 1 9 3 2 /1 9 9 6 :3 8 ]
So i f  a m an  w ere to  be considered  sovere ign , the  m a n  w ould have to  be 
in fin ite ly  sovereign, fo r  so ve re ig n ty  is m ea n in g fu l o n ly  i f  in fin ite  -  fin ite  
s o ve re ig n ty  is se lf-deny ing . B u t, as it w as argued in C hapter Three, 
from  A re nd t's  H eideggerian conception  o f fin itu d e  o f m an, sovere ign ty  
cannot be an a ttr ib u te  o f a fin ite  being, th e re fo re  a being not g iven  by 
itse lf and not se lf-con ta ined. I f  so ve re ig n ty  was equated  w ith  freedom ,
90 'Plurality is the law of earth.' [LM/I:19]
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then  th e  conclusion w ould  have to  be th a t m an is n o t free  a t all fo r  man 
n eve r is by him self.
The I - w il l  th a t A rend t co n tra s ts  w ith  I-can  is a sovere ign , non-po litica l 
decision th a t m ost c losely corresponds w ith  com m and. I t  seeks to  m ake 
appear th rough fo rc ing . A contrario, I-can  is a lw ays negotia ted and 
lim ited  by the I-can  of o th e rs . I t  is conditioned by th em . I-can  stands in 
the  d ire c t link w ith  H eidegger's le tting -be  a lthough  not in the  sense o f 
the  unconditioned a ffirm a tio n  o f everyth ing  tha t is b u t in acceptance o f 
tha t w hich  is the fram e  fo r  action  tha t can-be. S overe ign ty  im plies the 
un lim itedness o f su b jec t's  w ill whereas freedom , in th e  sense o f po litical 
freedom  which appears th ro u g h  political ac tion , springs fro m  the 
co ns ta n t w hirling o f po ten tia ls  w ith in  hum an co m m u n ity . A rend t's  te rm  
fo r th is  process is 'c o n s e n t,' [L M /2 :2 0 1 ] derived fro m  Latin con-sentire, 
th in k in g -w ith  w hich is m ore  then  being in h a rm ony o r th ink ing  the 
same as it im plies active  a rr iv a l to  the com m on ground w hich spells 
boundaries as m uch as p o te n tia ls .
For A re nd t, there fore , w ill as understood by the p o litica l theoris ts  o f the 
v o lu n ta r is t tra d itio n  and philosophers is a n o th e r dead-lock o f the 
'p ro fess iona l th in ke rs .' I t  com e fro m  th e ir p rofound ina b ility  to  th in k  the 
tension  inherent to  m an as a being that is fin ite  in its  p lu ra lity , th a t has 
boundaries drawn by o th e r s in g u la r beings, w hile  it  rem ains free  w ith in  
these confines is neverthe less free, no t desp ite  th em  b u t precise ly 
th ro ug h  them . The confines are like the boundaries o f o u r se lves tha t 
are a t the  same tim e  the lines w here we touch th e  o thers , as Nancy 
suggests by the idea o f th e  o u te r  edge th a t a lw ays is exposed to  the 
outs ide  and never separa tes fro m  but con tinues to  com m un ica te  w ith  
the  ou ts id e . [N ancy, 1 9 9 1 :4 ] A long these lines free do m  as a political 
phenom enon is negotia ted .
T h ro ug ho u t h is to ry  o f p o litica l th o u g h t, po litica l th in k e rs  have so ug h t to  
respond to the dyad ic  p ro b le m  o f action and resp on s ib ility  by exp loring  
a n o th e r m enta l fa cu lty , th e  Reason, as th e  ru le r o f th e  w ill and the 
source o f ideas w he re from  acts are derived and in  reference to  which 
they a re  ju s tifie d . As it  w ill be show n, A rendt's  c r it iq u e  o f vo lun ta rism  
how ever does not com pel h e r to  em brace ra tio na lism .
Thinking
A rend t's  principal c la im  in h e r inqu iry  in to  th ink ing  is th a t a c tion  can 
never com e from  th in k in g . T h in k in g  by its e lf can n e v e r generate  action. 
The assum ption  o f th e  causa l re lation  betw een th in k in g  and acting 
A rend t equates w ith  the  a u to m a tic  trans la tion  o f  th o u g h t in to  action. 
N am ely, th e  idea o r  the  'm o d e l' o f  action would th e n  be shaped by the 
m ind, w hich and action  w ou ld  be reduced to  an in s tru m e n t o f 
execu tion , a m ere vehicle  o f ideas. W hat is at s ta k e  is ann ih ila tion  o f 
the differentia specified  o f m an  as a being -  freedom , w hich  depends on 
action no t being d ic ta te d , ca lcu lab le , p lanned and th e re fo re  predictable .
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In  th e  sense o f th is  gu id ing  idea, A rendt on th in k in g  can also be read as 
A re nd t aga inst th e  tra d itio n  o f political ph ilosophy th a t has up to  th e  
p resen t day revo lved  around  the  question  o f a pp ly in g  the products o r  
resu lts  o f th ink ing  to  e ve ryda y  w orld . N am ely, a position co n tra ry  to  
A re n d t's  constitu tes  the  tra d itio n  o f p o litica l ra tio na lism  in m any o f its  
v a rie tie s . As rem ote  as S traussian  're v ive d  classical po litica l ra tio n a lism ' 
w here  the  po litica l doing is d irected by th e  e th ica l notion o f good 
[S tra u ss , 1 98 9 ] m a y  seem  fro m  A m erican  p ra gm atism  th a t denies 
abso lu teness o f ends, and th e n  both  o f th e m  fro m  Plato's no tion  o f 
p h iloso ph er-k in g , a ll th re e  o f  them  are underla in  by the  conception o f 
p o litics  w hich su bo rd ina tes  a c tio n  to  th in k in g  and equates th ink ing  w ith  
kn ow ing .
On th e  one hand, m ak ing  po litics  a func tion  o f  cogn itive  th ink ing  
understood  in te rm s  o f in s tru m e n ta l ra tio n a lity  places politics 'beyond  
the  com petence o f  the  o rd in a ry  in d iv id u a l/  [Beiner, 1 9 8 3 :1 ] 
pro fessiona liz ing  o r  techn ic iz ing  po litica l do ing and eroding th e  
resp on s ib ility  o f c itizen .
On a n o th e r level, h ow eve r consequences are even  g raver. T h inking  
understood  as know ing is uncom prom is ing  in its dem and fo r  
cons is tency and lo g ica lity , in o th e r w ords -  tru th . I f  a po litica l 
e q u iva le n t were to  be sough t fo r tru th , it w ould have  been noth ing else 
b u t d ic ta to rsh ip , A re n d t a rgues, fo r tru th  is a bso lu te , hence com pelling , 
o ve r t ru th  the re  can be no a rg u m e n t. I f  th e re fo re  a c tion  were to  flow  
d ire c tly  from  th o u g h t th a t is tru th , bo th  th e  q u a lity  o f  spon tane ity  and 
un iqueness o f action  w ould be los t: sp on tan e ity  because action w ould 
be reduced to  th e  e xecu tion  o f o rders , based on the p a tte rn  
p reconceived by th e  m in d ; uniqueness - since th e  laws o f th ink ing  do 
n o t d if fe r  bu t are  u n ive rsa l fo r  a ll, each and e very  one  o f us w ould  a c t 
in th e  sam e w ay u n d e r the sam e c ircum stances.
The loss o f s p o n ta n e ity  and uniqueness in ac tion  is coupled by th e  loss 
o f s p o n ta n e ity  and un iqueness in th o u g h t understood  as know ledge 
since th e  pred ica tes o f know ledge  a re  p rec ise ly  necessity and 
u n iv e rs a lity . The u lt im a te  consequence is th a t e ve ry th in g  tha t happens, 
th ro u g h  the  w ork ing  o f  a c to r, flow s as a rea liza tion  o f th a t which, being 
a bso lu te  and u n ive rsa l, is v a lid  fo r  a ll. This necessity  does not s im p ly  
abo lish  con tingency and acc iden ts , as it is o fte n  understood, bu t 
a nn ih ila te s  its rad ica l o pp os ite , w hich  is free do m . [L M /I:6 1 ] The 
in s tru m e n ta lis t u nd e rs ta nd in g  o f th e  re la tion  be tw een  th ink ing  and 
acting  th e re fo re  reduces a c tio n  to  the t ig h t fra m e  o f m eans-ends 
ca teg ories , in a kind o f  rev ived  P latonic p ro je c t o f  su bstitu ting  m aking  
fo r  a c ting  [HC, 2 2 5 ], w hich  w ou ld  en ta il n o th ing  less b u t ann ih ila tion  o f 
th e  d is t in c tly  hum an ca pa c ity  fo r  new beg inn ings, th a t is the d is tin c t 
m ean ing  o f hum an e x is ten ce  on  earth  in A rend t's  th o u g h t-p ro je c t. 
[L M /I I :2 1 7 ]
The ye a rs  o f to ta lita r ia n is m  as the  years o f e ven ts  eng ineered, o f 
m ode ling  hum an agency on one , p re -de te rm ined  p ro to typ e , sensitized 
A re n d t e xcep tiona lly  to  any p o ss ib ility  o f such loss. For A rendt, keeping
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action  a pa rt from  th ink ing  is therefore  not m ean t to  perpe tuate  the 
classical Platonic d ich o tom y between vita activa and vita contemplative 
but to  respond to  the  h is to rica l s ituation  o f to ta lita ria n ism . I f  ac tion  is 
d irected by the  m in d , the  au tom atism  o f trans la ting  ideas in to  acts 
spells ann ih ila tion  o f the  'm ira c u lo u s / the  'un exp ecte d ' in our lives, tha t 
w hich  she equates w ith  the  appearance o f freedom  in the w orld. This is 
why, as Villa argues, A re nd t saw it as not only a philosophical b u t also a 
po litica l p ro je c t to  keep th in k in g  and acting a p a rt.91 In  o the r w ords, it is 
a po litica l m a tte r  to  a ffirm  conceptua lly  the  d is tin c tion  between th e  tw o 
in the  function  o f a ffirm in g  th e  principle o f freedom .
A rend t's  inqu iry  in to  th in k in g  m ust the re fo re  develop a conceptua l 
construction  th a t would su p p o rt both the  a u to no m y and m utua l 
re iatedness o f th ink ing  and acting w itho u t in te rfe ring  w ith  the hum an 
capacity to  rad ica lly  a lte r the  course o f events and tran s fo rm  any 
h is torica l fram e w o rk  in to  som ething new th a t could not have been 
envisaged nor, once a pp aren t, can it be reduced to  w ha t preceded it. 
For th is , A rendt w orks her w ay th rough  by m oving aw ay from  cogn itive , 
Platonic th ink ing  to  the concept o f Socratic th ink ing  th a t is based on 
incessant question ing .
In  a phenom enolog ical analysis, A rend t iden tifies  the  m ain 
characteris tics o f all th in k in g  which allow h e r to  assert her 
understand ing  o f th ink ing  as co un te r-d is tinc tive  to  ac ting . T h ink ing , as 
all m en ta l ac tiv ities , is engaged w ith  the  invis ib les, w ith  th a t w h ich  does 
not appear and is th e re fo re  not presented b u t re -presented  by the 
m ind. [LM /I.-51 ] The fact th a t the 'm a tte r ' o f th in k in g  is not e x is te n t in 
the m ate ria l rea lity  is the  fu nd am e n t o f th e  m ain p ow er o f the th ink ing  
capacity : the  pow er to  transcend the g iven, to  deal away w ith  it. 
[LM /1 :7 3 -7 4 ]
W hile transcending the w orld  does not have to  im p ly  abandoning it, it  
o ften  was understood as such by philosophers, w ho took  fo r th e ir  task 
precise ly the  d isappearance from  the w orld . [L M /I:8 3 ] C ontem plation  
was likened to  the  s ta te  o f dea th , which e x tra c ts  m an from  the  w orld . 
Not to  be in the  w orld  was thus taken fo r the  co nd itio n  in w h ich  the 
Eternal would reveal itse lf to  the  hum an s igh t, the  s ig h t th a t w h ile  man 
rem ains in the  w orld  is b lu rred  by chaotic, c ircu s -like  com m otion  o f 
everyday life. [L M /I:7 3 ]
That m an 's vis ion is b lu rred  by the  living itse lf and th a t death  as an 
absolute w ithd ra w a l is c lose r to  th ink ing  suggests th a t th ink ing  is
91 Villa is one voice, ra ther singular, among Arendt's critics who insists that any attem pt 
at overcoming the profound tension between thinking and acting in Arendt's thought 
represents a serious misinterpretation of the guiding intuition of tha t work as a whole. He 
reads Arendt's distinction not only in phenomenological but also in normative term s on 
the ground of Arendt's critique of philosophical tradition and substitution of making for 
acting, whereby w hatever appears in the world does not em erge from man's capacity for 
freedom but from an idea or model preconceived in mind, in isolation and in disregard for 
the fact that the world em erges and lasts through the plurality of actors and actions. [ 
1999:103]
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reserved  fo r  the  co nd itio n  o f so litude . Being by o ne se lf is essentia l fo r  
th in k in g  ju s t  as being am ong th e  m any is essentia l fo r  action:
A ction , in w h ich  a We is a lways engaged in changing o u r 
com m on w o rld , s tands in  the  sharpest possib le  opposition 
to  th e  s o lita ry  business o f th o u g h t, w h ich  operates in a 
d ia logue be tw een  m e  and m yse lf. [L M /I I :2 0 0 ]
The d ia logue  in th e  above fra g m e n t re fe rs to  th e  inevitab le  re flex ive  
n a tu re  o f  m en ta l a c tiv it ie s : th a t m an is le ft by h im s e lf in th ink ing  does 
not m ea n  th a t A re nd t now  co n trad ic ts  the  understand ing  o f hum an 
co n d itio n , fu nd am e n ta l to  h e r w o rk , as ine rad icab ly  p lura l. Man in th e  
co nd itio n  o f th ink ing  m ay be s o lita ry  b u t is not s ing u la r, fo r eve ry -o ne  
is a lw ays tw o , the  I  and th e  se lf. This o bse rva tion  led the  philosophical 
tra d itio n  to  the  n o tio n  o f consciousness, w hich  e n ta ils  know ing -w ith , 
con~scientia. [L M /I:7 4 ] H ow e ver d ua lity  c a n n o t be equated w ith  
p lu ra lity  because th e  m ain  p rinc ip le  o f th is  in n e r d ia logue  which unfo lds 
in th in k in g  is the  p rinc ip le  o f non -co n tra d ic tio n . T h is  princip le is ta ken  
by A re n d t from  S ocratic  p rinc ip le  th a t " liv in g  to g e th e r w ith  o the rs  
begins w ith  living to g e th e r w ith  o n e se lf." [EU, 8 6 ] Living w ith  oneself is 
h ow eve r radica lly d iffe re n t fro m  living w ith  o th e rs  insofar liv ing  w ith  
onese lf, regardless o f d u a lity  in th ink ing  o ne -se lf, rests  on the  Socratic 
p rinc ip le  o f non -co n tra d ic tin g  o ne se lf -  "be ing  a t peace w ith  onese lf."
H ow ever, as rem ote  as liv in g  w ith  onese lf m ay be from  liv ing  w ith  
o th e rs , th e  tw o a re  s till c lo s e r th a n  the  p rinc ip le  o f  non-contrad ic tion  
and th e  princip le  o f tru th . T he  la tte r  is th e  P latonic princ ip le  fro m  w hom  
derives th e  tra d itio n  o f ph ilosoph ica l th ink ing  as th e  quest fo r th e  tru th , 
w h ich  fo r  A rendt how ever equals know ing. A re n d t invokes Kant's 
d is tin c tio n  betw een in te llec t and reason to  a rgue  th a t th ink ing  cannot 
be e qua ted  w ith  know ing . Know ing is concerned w ith  its e nd -p roduct 
and th e re fo re  d irected  by th e  th irs t  fo r the  once w isdom  and now , w ith  
the  rise o f sciences, know ledge  o f the  w orld . [L M /I:5 7 ] I t  is an 
a ccum u la tive  process which estab lishes a com pe lling  correspondence 
be tw een  m an 's apprehension  o f the  w orld  and the  w orld  phenom ena.
Unlike know ing o r c o g n itive  th in k in g , w hich seeks to  near the Absolute 
behind and above th e  w orld  so  as to  con tro l and m aste r, th ink ing  is 
d riven  by the  m an 's urge to  read w ha t is g iven  in  th e  world in re la tion  
to  h im  w ho is a m an . T h is  read ing, close to  A rend t's  concept o f 
u nd e rs ta n d in g , is a n o th e r w a y  o f  'becom ing a t h o m e ' in the  w orld , not 
by se iz ing  the  A rch im edean p o in t, th a t is -  g rasp ing  the  laws to  which 
the  w orld  can be sub jected  in  o rd e r to  be rendered  predictable  and 
ce rta in  to  us but by in te rp re tin g  w ha t th a t w hich  is means to  and fo r  
m en. In  o th e r w ords -  A re n d t defines th in k in g  as an open-ended 
p u rsu it o f m eaning. [L M /I:6 2 ]
M eanings as readings o f the  w orld  how ever have no com pelling force. 
They a re  not denied by e v id en ce  bu t a re  re in te rp re te d  th ro ug h  the  
e nco un te rs  w ith  o th e r read ings and o th e r m ean ings . In  th a t sense, 
m ean ing  is o f no use in e v e ry d a y  life  -  n e ith e r c e rta in  nor ve rifiab le , 
n o th ing  can  be bu ilt on such a non -found ing  fo u n d a tio n . M oreover, it is
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not o n ly  non-p roductive  in  th e  u tilita rian  sense b u t it is a lso self- 
d e s tru c tive , because it a lw ays starts anew by doubting  its own th o u g h t, 
tea ring  its  very ow n fabric. [L M /I:8 8 ]
A c ruc ia l po litical and e th ica l im plication o f th is  se lf-des truc tive  
ch a ra c te r o f th ink ing  is the  n ih ilis tic  undercurren t o f a ll th ink ing  -  th a t 
th in k in g  cannot a rr ive  at anyth ing certa in  and beyond doubt fo r it 
a lways s ta rts  anew  th ro u g h  doubting and question ing m eans th a t 
noth ing can be safe from  it -  no creeds and no princip les and no hab its. 
This is the  inheren t transcendenta lism  o f all m en ta l faculties th a t in 
th in k in g  takes the  fo rm  o f denying givenness to  every th ing  g iven . And 
ye t it itse lf, o f itse lf, o ffe rs  no substitu te , fo r "w h a t was m ean ing fu l 
while you  were th in k in g  dissolves the m om ent you  w ant to  a pp ly  it to  
e veryday  w orld ." [L M /I:1 7 7 ]
But th is  d estructive  and se lf-destructive  charac te r o f th in k in g , its 
ina b ility  to  generate  o r m ove  and its capacity fo r  undoing o f pa tte rns  
deriv ing  from  the source o f a ll th ink ing , th a t source being question , 
conta ins a seed o f practica l relevance. The paralyzing e ffect o f th ink ing  
tha t likens it to  dea th  m a y  have m eant the  transcendence o f the 
phenom enal world in the  con tex t o f th e  Platonic and Heideggerian 
conceptua liza tions o f th in k in g  but Arendt sharp ly d istingu ishes betw een 
those and the Socratic w ay o f th ink ing , w here  the  m eaning of 
para lyzing e ffect involves an e th ico-po litica l d im ension . N am ely, all 
th in k in g  'in te rru p ts  any do ing , any ord inary a c tiv itie s , no m a tte r  w hat 
they happen to  be. A ll th in k in g  demands a stop-and-think.' [L M /I:7 8 ] In  
the s itu a tio n s  when the  w orld  is in ruin, argues A rend t, th is in te rru p tio n  
is precious.
A rend t's  observa tions from  th e  Eichmann tr ia l m ade h e r re -cons ider the  
case fo r  the  political im portance  o f th inking as a s ilen t, internal d ia logue 
betw een I  and m yse lf. D uring  the tr ia l to  E ichm ann, A rend t thus 
developed a precious ins ig h t:
Politically speaking, it is that under cond itions o f te rro r  
m os t people w ill co m p ly  but some people w ill not, ju s t as 
th e  lesson o f the  co un tries  to  the w hich  th e  Final So lution  
was proposed is th a t ' i t  could happen' in m o s t places b u t 
it did not happen everywhere. [EJ, 233 ]
The conclud ing re flections on the  tr ia l and 'b a n a lity  o f e v il' w h ich  was 
generated  not by s tu p id ity  - nor by w ickedness - b u t by
thoughtlessness opened w a y  to  the  la te r inqu iry  in to  th ink ing  and its 
re levance fo r the w orld . [L M /I:4 -5 ] A rendt found th a t, as m uch  as 
th ink ing  is a s o lita ry  a c tiv ity  tied to  the  inner w orld , its d is ru p tive  
d im ension  and its  para lyz ing  effect m ay p re ve n t o r p re -e m p t
ca tastrophes in th e  com m on w orld . In  the  m om en ts  w hen the ch ips  are 
dow n, w hen the to rre n t o f even ts  threatens to  sw eep away e ve ry th in g  
and everyone , th ink ing  m ay be one single path to w ards  'rea liz ing  w ha t 
one is d o in g ,'
In  o th e r w ords, each and v e ry  hum an is in  th e  possession o f th a t could 
p re ve n t a collapse o f  the  w o rld . T ha t so m eth ing  is th e  th in k in g  capacity  
w h ich , when exercised, a llow s m en to  see "w h a t th e y  a re  d o in g ,"  
som eth ing  Arendt was ins is ting  on e v e r s ince th e  w ork  on  Human 
Condition. C onsequently, th in k in g  is re le va n t fo r  action  In th ose  
ca tastroph ic  s itua tions  w hen the  world is c rum b ling  and the  a c to r is 
u lt im a te ly  im poten t, and th e  last reso rt is th in k in g , w hich  m ay save 
h im /h e r from  taking  p art in th e  sh a tte ring  o f the  w o rld . [RJ, 1 0 6 ]
This m om ent, when th in k in g  and acting to u ch , is perhaps best captu red  
in A re nd t's  much loved and m uch  rev is ited  phrase 'w h en  the chips a re  
d o w n ,' the  decisive m om en t, th e  m om en t w hen a s to rm  is in th e  a ir  o r  
has even already s ta rte d , th e  m o m e n t the  com ing  o f w hich  can 
som etim es be heard like  tick in g  o f th e  t im e -b o m b  th a t is the  fu tu re  in 
the  presen t. [OV, 1 8 ] In  one  o f the  m o s t e x p lic it and m ost suggestive  
passages on w hat th is  m o m e n t m ean t, a t th e  end o f th e  firs t vo lum e  o f 
The Life o f the Mind, the  phrase  u n fo rtu n a te ly  fe ll p rey to  th e  o ve r­
sens itive  editing pen o f M ary M cCarthy. M cC arthy accounts fo r th is  
in te rv e n tio n  th ro ug h  an  a es th e tica lly  g rounded  ju s t if ic a t io n :92
I  cannot sa y  w hy th e  phrase g ra tes  on m e, and 
particu la rly  com ing fro m  her, w ho, I  d ou b t, e v e r handled 
a poker ch ip . But I  can see h e r (c ig a re tte  perched in 
holder) co n tem p la ting  th e  rou le tte  ta b le  o r  chem in de fer, 
so it is now 'w hen  th e  stakes are  on  th e  ta b le ' -  m ore  
fitt in g , m ore in ch a ra c te r. [L M /II :2 4 8 ]
I t  is d iffic u lt to  a rg u e  w ith  such close fr ien d  o f A rend t's  o v e r th is , 
p rim a rily  in tim ate  im age, fo r  w h a t rem ains a fte r  th e  deceased is a 
crysta llized  m em ory, in A re n d t's  own w ords : " i t  is as though a il non- 
essentia l qualities perished w ith  th e  d isappearance o f the  body in which 
th ey  w ere  incarnated . The dead are 'e n s h rin e d ' in rem em brance  like 
precious relics o f th e m s e lv e s ."  [L M / I I : 1 8 2 ] But w h ile  the  im age o f th e  
stakes on the  table m ay  d en o te  the  sam e gam bling  s itu a tio n , th e  same 
e n tra p m e n t o f m en In the  w ork ing s  o f Fortuna w h ich  is the  hum an 
cond ition  in the un iverse  ru led  by a 'G od w ho p lays d ice ',93 A rend t's  
o rig ina l choice connotes so m e th in g  m ore. The ch ips em body, o r  stand 
fo r, the  stakes in th e  gam e b u t th e ir  convers ion  back in to  th e  stakes 
reta ins an e lem ent o f su rp rise , o f u n p re d ic ta b ility : w ha t in itia lly  w ent 
into  th e  chips m ay not be the  same th a t w ill com e o u t. More 
im p o rta n tly , when the  chips a re  on the  ta b le , F ortuna  is not th e  only 
force a t w ork. Around the tab le ,94 there  are seated m en, w ith  p laying 
cards in th e ir hands, as th e y  have been d e a lt to  th em  but a lso  w ith  
th e ir  sk ills , th e ir p rinc ip les, a n d , fo r A re nd t perhaps m os t im p o rta n tly ,
92 In the earlier series of lectures Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, much of which 
constitutes the core of the volume on thinking, the phrase was retained. See p. 40 and p. 
78 of RJ.
93 Einstein's allegoric phrase occasionally quoted by A rendt. [LM/II: 196]
94 Table is a very significant Arendt's m etaphor, one th a t she found to fit perfectly her 
understanding of the common world as bringing together men, while not allowing them  to 
encroach upon the distance which protects their unique individuality. [HC, 54]
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th e ir  ow n ju d g m e n t o f th e  s itu a tio n  and capacity to  decide upon th e ir 
action .
To d ra w  fu rth e r on th e  in itia l ins ight in to  the  phrase 'w hen  the ch ips are 
d o w n / th e  stakes conta ined  in the  chips are neve r c lear -  the re  is no 
lim it to  w hat they m ay tu rn  in to . They deceive o r  delude -  the  chips 
rep resen t the  absent s takes bu t they m ay under-rep resen t o r  o ver­
rep resen t. And it is easily  overlooked th a t they are  the  stakes, b u t it is 
an asym m etrica l re la tionsh ip  o f identity , the stakes are not chips. In  
paradoxica l tw is ts  and tu rn s  o f the gam e, the  o n ly  constant is th is 
openness o f the ch ips. T h e ir vastness, th e ir  vo lum e is un lim ited , ju s t  as 
outcom es o f ca tastrophes are  boundless and po ten tia lly , w orld- 
sh a tte rin g . H owever, how  p layers respond to  th is  d es truc tive  openness 
o f the  gam e is linked to  th e ir  capacity fo r  th in k in g , a capacity inherent 
to  a ll m en  but not em p loyed  by a ll.
T h inking  th a t, as A thens argued against Socrates, dissolves a ll norm s 
and conventions is w ha t lim its  the  conduct o f those caught in the  w h irl 
o f h is to rica l c ircum stances, w hen the on ly  rem ain ing  rule is th a t all 
rules are perverted a n d /o r  abandoned. A rendt m a in ta ins  th a t those who 
always act on ly upon the  ru les, those th a t a llow  to  be guided th rough  
and th ro u g h  by conventions absorbed w itho u t q uestion ing , are the  firs t 
ones to  unlearn the  rules o f hum ane re lating  to  th e ir  fellows. There  is 
noth ing to  te ll them  th a t the  ch ips are dow n and w h a t is a t stake in the 
chips. In  absence o r in d isso lu tion  o f the  ex te rna l constra in ts , th e re  are 
then no lim its  to  w ha t th e y  can do. Those w ho are  n o t used to  listening 
to  the  voice w ith in  th em  a re  capable o f doing v ir tu a lly  anyth ing , since 
the vo ice  th a t would m ake th e m  face in a ll the  c la r ity  th e ir  past deeds, 
th e re b y  confron ting  th em  w ith  th e  one th a t is th e  u ltim a te  o th e r to  the 
se lf - th e  past self, th e  s e lf o f the  past s im ple tense  th a t cannot be 
undone.
By co n tras t, the  ones used to  question ing are th e  ones w ho never re ly  
on th e  exte rna l s tandards and who w ill take  th e  s ta te  o f n o -ru le  w ith  
the sam e gra in  o f sa lt as th e  s ta te  o f rule. To understand  how th is  is to 
p reven t one from  doing h a rm , it m ust be rem em bered  th a t A rendt 
defined th ink ing  as e n co u n te r w ith  oneself. W hen the world is le ft 
outside, as it happens in th in k in g , the re  em erges m y-se lf, th e  one 
person th a t I cannot escape and I cannot hide fro m  when alone. As 
challenging as the appearance  in the  public m ay be, one appears as one 
wishes to  be seen. But to  o ne se lf one appears o n ly  as one is o r one 
does no t appear a t a ll, one rem ains concealed in th e  inner silence o r 
covered up by the pub licness. The encoun te r is th a n  an encoun te r w ith  
som eone who is the  one because she has become  such th ro ug h  her 
personal h istory. The one th a t we m eet is not o u r essence, it is not a 
given one but the w itness o f o u r past. The m y s e lf th a t we find in 
so litude  is the se lf rem em be rin g  our deeds. So w h a te v e r we have p u t in 
the s e lf th rough  liv ing , is w h a t we shall find w h e n  we re tre a t in to  
th ink ing . T ha t one is th e  one th a t awaits us on a rr iv a l home fro m  the  
w orld, argues Arendt, and asks w he th er we w ould w a n t to  be aw aited 
by a m u rd e re r o r a th ie f.
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A re nd t likens the  o n to lo g ica l p rincip le  o f, and dem and fo r the  u n ity  o f 
se lf, to  th e  ph ilosoph ica l dem and fo r tru th  and being in tru th . In  o th e r 
w ords , the  fo rm e r  is the  on to log ica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  
e p is tem o log ica l and log ical p rincip le  o f n on -co n tra d ic ito n . W hat d rives 
th in k in g  is th e re fo re  not th e  p u rsu it o f d u a lity , w hich  how ever is its  
p re co n d itio n , b u t th e  p u rsu it o f s in g u la rity  via d u a lity  o f the  in te rna l 
vo ices. [BPF, 2 4 4 -2 4 6 ] T h ink ing  m ay be undoing the  patterns but it is 
u lt im a te ly  in fu n c tio n  o f ty in g  the  th reads o f one p a tte rn , the p a tte rn  o f  
the  se lf, in to  one, th e  fo rtre ss  o f one w hich m ay be placed in th e  w orld  
but is concerned o n ly  w ith  p reserv ing  itse lf, un like  action  th a t a lw ays is 
in th e  w orld , im m ersed  in p lu ra lity : 'th e  p resupposition  is th a t I  live  
to g e th e r not on ly  w ith  o th e rs  but also w ith  m y  se lf, and th a t th is  
to ge th e rne ss , as it w e re , has precedence o ve r a ll o th e rs . ' [RJ, 153 ]
In  o th e r  w ords, the  concern  o f th ink ing  is n o t a liveab le  world b u t liv ing  
w ith  onese lf. The t r u ly  po litica l question  w ould  be th e  question  w h e th e r 
the  w orld  in h a rm o ny  w ith  o u t actions w ou ld  be a w orld  fo r m en , in a ll 
th e ir  d iv e rs ity  and d iscord , o r  fo r  one m an o n ly . Seen fro m  th e  
p e rspective  o f these  o th e r m en , o u r actions are  a lw ays, ove r and aga in , 
read as answ ers to  th e  q uestion  w h e th e r th e  w orld  can be shared w ith  
us o r  n o t, the  q ue s tion  th a t lead E ichm ann to  d ea th  as the  v e rd ic t read: 
" [W ]e  fin d  th a t no one , th a t is no m e m b e r o f th e  hum an race, can be 
expected  to  w an t to  share th e  e a rth  w ith  y o u ."  [EJ, 2 7 9 ]
But to  A re n d t th is  is an  e th ica l s itu a tio n  inso fa r th in k in g  in th is s itu a tio n  
leads n o t to  a c tion  but to  non -ac tion , re s tra in t fro m  ac tion . The 
appearance o f th in k in g  in th e  w orld  happens th ro u g h  th e  absence o f  
action , a rgues A re n d t. N am ely, in te rru p tio n  o f all o th e r activ ities  w hich  
A re nd t describes as th e  e le m e n ta ry  sta te  o f  th in k in g , th a t is - 'to  s top  
and th in k , ' renders th in k in g  and acting  m u tu a lly  exclus ive. [RJ, 105 ] 
M ora lly  the  o n ly  re liab le  people w hen the  ch ips are dow n 
a re  those w h o  say '1 c a n 't /  The d isa dva n tag e  o f th is 
com p le te  adequacy o f  th e  alleged se lf-e v id e nce  o r m oral 
t ru th  is th a t it m u s t rem ain  e n tire ly  nega tive . I t  has 
no th ing  w h a tso e ve r to  do w ith  action... Politically 
speaking -  th a t  is, fro m  the v iew p o in t o f th e  co m m un ity  
o r  o f the  w orld  we live  in  -  it is irresponsib le ; its standard 
is the  se lf and  no t th e  w orld , n e ith e r its  im p rove m e n t n o r 
change. [RJ, 7 8 -7 9 ]
W h e th e r th is  p o te n tia l fo r th e  po litica l ever deve lops into  the  h is to rica l 
po litica l fo r  A rendt is not a m a tte r  o f th e  g ivenness o f the  hum an 
co n d itio n , as it is n o t a m a tte r  o f running som e te leo log ica l course o f 
the  w o rld  h is to ry .
A re n d t's  fu r th e r  e laborates th a t the  s itu a tio n  o f the  s e lf in d ia logue w ith  
the  s e lf is th e  s itu a tio n  o f com ing to  te rm s  w ith  onese lf and one's 
actions in th e  w orld . The w o rld  is p resent b u t u lt im a te ly  -  irre le van t. 
W ith in  th e  fra m e w o rk  o f C h ris tia n ity , th is s till m ea n t som ething m ore 
than  co m m un ing s  w ith  oneself. The d ia logue was betw een  the se lf and
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conscience w hich was understood  "as an organ th ro ug h  which mean 
hears th e  word o f G od." [RJ, 8 9 ] The word o f God o ffe rs  m ore than  a 
d is tu rb in g  te s tim o n y  to  one 's  deeds, it judges b u t it also guides to 
action . In  the  un fo rg iv ing  and uncom prom ising d ia logue w ith  th e  self, 
the  d ia log ue  w hich a llows fo r  no concealm ent and silencing, noth ing 
m oves and noth ing in itia tes  m ovem ent:
Conflicts o f conscience in secular term s... a re  actua lly  
noth ing  b u t d e libe ra tion s  between me and m yse lf; they  
are not resolved th ro u g h  feeling but th ro u g h  th ink ing . 
In so fa r, how ever, as conscience means no m ore  than  th is 
being a t peace w ith  m yse lf, which is the  cond ition  sine 
qua non o f th in k in g , it is indeed a rea lity ; b u t th is , as we 
know now, w ill on ly  say, I can't and I w o n 't. Since it is 
re lated to  one's ow n  self, no im pulse to  a c t can be 
expected fro m  it. [RJ, 108 ]
In  th is  th ink ing  o f the  im pulse  to  acting, the  source o f action, as it will 
be re fe rre d  to  here, A rend t is com m unicating an h is to rica l p roblem , the 
prob lem  hidden in the  a lm o s t unnoticeable, the  inserted  'as we know 
now ' in the  above passage. Th is  now  refers to  the  s itu a tio n  o f th e  world 
em erg ing  from  the  abso lu te  m ora l collapse o f the  W orld W ar I I ,  when 
po litica l tragedy ensued fro m  an unacknowledged e th ica l void and the 
po litica l im p lica tions o f the  philosophical s itua tion  exploded the w orld . I t  
is th e re fo re  not on ly  th ink ing  o f the  source of action  but th ink ing  it in 
the  s itu a tio n  when no fra m e w o rk  o f action is ava ilab le , no guidance out 
o f unp red ic tab le  and a rb itra ry , erratic  m otions o f th e  w ill was to  be 
found w ith in  boundaries de lineated  by e ithe r re lig ion  as the  w orldv iew  
o r m o ra lity  as the  set o f cu s tom ary  conventions o r Reason, once the 
u ltim a te  guide.
As benefic ia l as it m ay be in som e s ituations, th e  clearing done  by 
th in k in g  is necessarily confined to  the  negative, th e  des truc tive , i t  is a 
po in t o f break, a pause, n o t th e  point o f som ething new  born. Certa in  
s itu a tio ns  m ay indeed be th e  situations o f insu rm oun tab le  im potence, 
when n on -p a rtic ip a tio n  o r n on -a c tion  is actua lly  th e  o n ly  path to  action. 
But w rit in g  in 1 9 6 5 /6 6 , A re n d t makes it c lea r th a t, w hile  m o ra lly  
ju s tif ia b le , the act th ro ug h  n o n -a c t is politically irresponsib le  "sh irk in g  
one's du ties  tow ards the w orld  we share w ith  one  a no the r and the 
co m m u n ity  we belong to ."  [RJ, 155 ] And the  m eaning  o f the  po litica l, 
w hile perhaps acting e th ica lly  is crucial in the s itu a tio n s  o f breakdow n, 
is n o t exhausted in p re -e m p tio n  o f ca tastrophes. M om ents o f 
em ergency  are only one side o f  th e  coin: " th e  com m on  and the o rd in a ry  
m ust rem a in  our p rim ary  concern , the daily  food o f o u r th o u g h t -  if  
only because it is fro m  th em  th a t th e  uncom m on and th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  
em erge..."95
In  th a t sense, even when th e  th ink ing  comes closest to  action th ro u g h  
p re -e m p tin g  catastrophes, it is confined to  e th ica l a c t, it relates s e lf to  
itse lf. A rend t's  in te res t as a po litica l th in ke r is n o t th e  ethical and the
95 Arendt, quoted in Kohn, 1990:118.
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se lf b u t the p o litica l and th e  w orld . The p rob lem  o f  both  w illing  and 
th in k in g  can thus be described  as the p rob lem  o f so lipsism . Both w illing  
and th ink ing  resem ble  th e  m otion  o f a w h ir l, w h ich  is the  se lf th a t  
p ow erfu lly  draws e v e ry th in g  around it as w ell as its e lf back in to  th e  
v e ry  sam e po in t w h e re fro m  its m o tio n  is genera ted . Thus th e  
phenom eno log ica lly  posed problem s o f th e  ’ im passe o f free do m ' o r th e  
co n flic tu a l nature  o f  w illing  and , on the  o th e r hand, o f the  para lyz ing  
e ffe c t o f th ink ing , resona te  in fact the  deeper p rob lem  fo r a po litica l 
th in k e r  such as A re nd t -  th ink ing  action  ou ts ide  the  so lips is tic  
fra m e w o rk  o f hum an agency. In  o the r w ords , the  concept o f th e  source 
o f a c tion  in A rend t's  conceptua l fram e w o rk  m us t be b rough t in ha rm o ny  
w ith  the  tw o p ivo ta l p rinc ip les o f the e n tire  fra m e w o rk  -  the  p rinc ip les  
o f p lu ra lity  and fre e d o m . N e ith e r th ink ing  nor w illing  how ever can be 
harm onized  w ith  th e  p rinc ip le  o f p lu ra lity  as th e y  th ro w  the s e lf back 
o n to  itse lf.
A re nd t's  answ er to  th is  p ro b le m  is in tu ite d  in the  concluding w ords o f 
the  second vo lum e o f  the  Life o f the M ind  w ith  "a n  appeal to  a n o th e r 
m e n ta l facu lty , no less m ys te riou s  th an  th e  fa c u lty  o f beg inn ing , th e  
fa cu lty  o f Judgm ent..." [L M /I I :2 1 7 ] Ju dg m e n t is b ro ug h t in  as th e  
m e n ta l capacity w h ich  shou ld  be able to  p reserve  th e  n o n -in s tru m e n ta l 
ch a rac te r o f action, its  sp o n ta n e ity , in a w ord  - th e  princ ip le  o f free do m  
em bod ied  in the a c tiv ity  o f  w ill, bu t also to  in troduce  respons ib ility  in to  
the  n a rra tive  o f free  a c t th a t arises fro m  being and acting  in p lu ra lity .
Judging
The las t stage o f A re n d t's  In q u iry  in to  the  connection  between th e  life o f  
the  m ind  and the life  o f ac tion  is dedicated to  b ridg ing  a conceptua l gap  
th a t would a llow  to  conce ive  o f action  and a c to r in te rm s  o f 
a ccou n ta b ility  and re s p o n s ib ility  o f a c to r w h ile  not e n ta ilin g  the  princ ip le  
o f so ve re ig n ty  and a c to r 's  m aste ry  o v e r consequences. For A re nd t 
th e re fo re , overcom ing  the  im passe o f w illing  and th ink ing  is no t a 
m a tte r  o f try ing  to  exerc ise  m aste ry  o ver goals and  consequences, to  
co n tro l th e  course o f  a c tion , b u t it is an a tte m p t to  conceptua lise  action  
as predicated on fre e d o m , th e  a b ility  to  b reak th ro u g h  th e  e n tra p m e n t 
by in e rtia  and a u to m a tism , and p lu ra lity , w h ile  not a llow ing  the  a c to r to  
escape the burden o f resp on s ib ility .
K irs tie  M. McClure r ig h tly  w a rn s  against a ttr ib u tin g  A rend t's  In te res t in 
ju d g m e n t en tire ly  to  h e r re p o rtin g  on tr ia l to  E ichm ann.96 [C alhoun and 
M cGowan, 1 99 7 :5 9 ] W hile  th e  tr ia l m ay have  helped Arendt to  see in 
the  m o s t devastating  c la r ity  th e  consequences o f th e  p a rticu la r kind o f 
thoughtlessness, th a t is -  th e  inab ility  to  see the w orld  perspectiva lly , 
her ins igh ts  into ’p o litic a l' o r  ’ rep re sen ta tion a l' th in k in g  can be traced 
back to  the  early  1950s essay  on Socrates. Also in th e  essay on the  
crisis in  cu ltu re , A re n d t in troduces the  concept o f ta s te , the basis o f
96 McClure's observation is reaffirmed by recently published A rendt's lecture Introduction 
into Politics, dated back to  the second half of 1950s, where A rendt discusses judgm ent 
and refers to  Aristotle and Kant as th e  only figures in the history of philosophy to  grasp 
the u tm ost political im portance of th is mental faculty. [PP2:168-169]
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aesthe tic  ju d g m e n t, as laden w ith  politica l re levance. On th e  o the r 
hand, the  tr ia l to  Eichmann is one o f c o n s titu tive  experiences fo r 
A re nd t's  th ough t, m atched in im portance on ly  by to ta lita ria n is m  and 
A m erican  R evo lu tion.97
In  th e  re p o rt on Eichm ann tr ia l,  the p resen ta tion  o f th e  docum entary  
evidence as well as A rendt's  observations on the  tr ia l a re  pervaded by 
the m a in  and m ost e laborated postulate o f w hat could  be regarded as 
A re nd t's , som ew hat rud im e n ta ry  ethical ph ilosophy -  the  a b ility  to  tell 
righ t fro m  wrong Is based on the ab ility  to  th in k . On th is  account, 
A rend t diagnosed E ichm ann's condition as the  one o f  thoughtlessness, 
to ta l subm ission to  the hab its  and rou tine  n eve r scru tin ized , never 
tested aga inst th e  p a rticu la rity  o f the  h is to rica l s itu a tio n , b lindly 
fo llow ed th rough . [LM /1:13 ] But w hat cam e out o f th e  Eichm ann tr ia l is 
not o n ly  the  idea o f im portance  o f th ink ing  fo r te llin g  r ig h t fro m  wrong 
but th e  idea th a t such th ink ing  th a t determ ines r ig h t fro m  w rong is not 
a sub -ca te g o ry  o f th ink ing  fa c u lty  but an au tonom ous m en ta l facu lty  
itse lf, w hich  is not m a tte r o f e th ica lity  b u t o f th e  po litica l as well. 
N am ely, the phenom enolog ica l analysis o f th in k in g  in the  Life o f  the 
Mind on  the  one hand and, on the o th e r hand, the  ins ig h t into  
E ichm ann's thoughtlessness do not co incide. W hereas the  
phenom enological analysis is rooted in Socratic in n e r d ia logue o f ’me 
w ith  m y s e lf, ' thoughtlessness o f Eichmann was d iagnosed as the 
ina b ility  to  see th e  world fro m  the perspectives o f  the  o the rs , to  
rep resen t to  h im se lf how o the rs  saw the w orld , th e ir  ow n positions in it 
and, u lt im a te ly , E ichmann's own doing. [EJ, 4 9 ] In  th e  Postscript, 
w ritte n  in the a fte rm a th  o f th e  debate w hich  the book had generated , 
A rend t how ever re fe rs  again to  Eichm ann's though tlessness b u t now 
in troduces it as a problem  o f hum an ju d g m e n t.98 [EJ, 2 87 ]
As she reached the fina l vo lu m e  o f The Life o f the M ind , A rendt sh ifted  
irre ve rs ib ly  the conceptua l course.99 H er e a rlie r reading o f Kant's 
aesthetics and po litica l appropria tion  of his concept o f ta s te  in the  essay 
on Crisis in Culture [BPF, 1 97 -2 2 6 ] now m erges w ith  her a tte m p t at 
understand ing  a p a rticu la r kind o f evil, w h ich  canno t be fitted  in to  the 
'co rru p tio n  o f hum an n a tu re ' and w ickedness bu t seem s to  reside in
97 Constitutive experiences are defined in contrast to derivative experiences, such as Little 
Rock controversy or Zionism. The latter are here regarded as derivative insofar Arendt's 
thinking can help their understanding but they them selves do not constitute examples in 
the sence of guide to thought, thought-generating.
96 The difficulty of tracing Arendt's conceptual m ovem ents has given rise to the 
argum ents of some Arendt-scholars tha t there are two theories of judgm ent in Arendt's 
political theory. This view has predom inated Passerin D 'Entreves' interpretation, who 
distinguishes between one theory or one strand in Arendt's theory  which relates to 
thinking in emergency, exceptional moments, and the  other which refers to political 
thinking in general, as representative thinking. [Villa, 2000:250] Such approach does 
succeed in capturing Arendt's own ambivalent approach to thinking but does not account 
for Arendt's final philosophical decision to separate judging from thinking, the making of 
decisive distinctions in everyday situations from responding to the  extraordinary.
99 Some ambiguity does remain insofar the term  thinking in the  sense of denoting the 
process of judgm ent still occurs throughout The Life of the Mind but m ust be 
distinguished as mental activity from m ental faculty of thinking or Reason.
138
ce rta in  blindness to  th e  m eaning  o f one's own a c ts . In  The Life o f the 
Mind , the  though tlessness  o f Eichmann is fin a lly  re in te rpre ted  as th e  
fa ilu re  o r  absence o f judgm ent, the  fa ilu re  to  e m p lo y  the  th ird  fa cu lty  o f 
m in d . Judging as a fa c u lty  o f m ind au tonom ous w ith  regard to  b o th  
th in k in g  and w illing  is w ha t A re nd t in troduced a t th e  end o f th e  second 
vo lu m e  on w illing  b u t n e v e r w ro te . The m ost de ta iled  e laboration  is 
found in her lec tu res  on K ant's  politica l p h ilosophy th a t w ould have 
p robab ly  co nstitu te d  th e  m a tr ix  fo r  the  th ird  and fin a l vo lum e o f The 
Life o f  the Mind. Fo llow ing  A re n d t in th is in q u iry  in to  th e  life o f th e  m ind  
thus m eans to  a ccep t th a t it is an un fin ished  ente rp rise . Though 
inco m p le te , a su b s ta n tia l te x tu a l corpus rem ains to  te s tify  th a t A re nd t's  
p ro je c t on the  life  o f  th e  m ind  would c u lm in a te  in the th e o ry  o f 
ju d g m e n t.
Ju dg m e n t in th e  c o n te x t o f  b o th  Arendt's re fle c tion s  on the E ichm ann 
tr ia l and  her e a rlie r e n c o u n te r w ith  the  b reak  w ith  tra d itio n  re la tes to  a 
specific  h is torica l s itu a tio n  o f  th e  devasta tion  o f  m o ra l precepts, the  
courses o f action  d irec ted  by w h a t A rend t ca lls, w ith  th e  undertones 
th a t w ou ld  have been iron ic  had she not been haunted  by th e  tra g ic  
sense o f  the  w orld  pushed o v e r th e  edge o f p recip ice , 'good so c ie ty .' 
The co n d itio n  o f these  fra m e s  c rum b ling , d is in te g ra tin g , w ith o u t 
how eve r any u nm ed ia te d  and  una llev ia ted  facing w ith  th e ir  irrevers ib le  
decom pos ition , th a t w as a t th e  core  o f the  tu rn in g  o f the  world upside 
dow n, w h ich  m ust be d iffe re n tia te d  from  m ere  abandoning its  tim e - 
honoured rules and m u s t be seen fo r  w ha t it  w as: th e  perversion o f a ll 
m ora l and po litica l va lues  th a t defined  the past.
Such co nd itio n  is v iv id ly  dep ic ted  in E ichm ann's w o rds  th a t "e ve ry th ing  
was a lw ays  in a s ta te  o f co n tin uo us  flux , a s te ad y  s tre a m ," [EJ, 152] 
and to  th is  flu x  he found h im s e lf unable to  re s is t.100 As A rend t was 
w arn ing  a lready in  th e  Human Condition, m an 's  a b ility  to  g rasp  the  
m ean ing  o f  one 's a c tion s , ju s t  as his a b ility  to  a c t, easily falls prey to  
th is p rocessual re a lity , o f 'g o in g  w ith  the f lo w : '
In  the  u n like ly  case th a t someone should com e  and te ll us 
th a t he w ou ld  p re fe r Bluebeard fo r  co m p an y , and hence 
ta ke  h im  as h is  e xa m p le , th e  only th ing  w e  could do is to  
m ake sure  th a t  n eve r com es near us . But th e  likelihood th a t 
som eone w ou ld  com e and te ll us th a t he does no t m ind and 
th a t any co m p a n y  w ill be good enough fo r  h im  is, I  fear, by 
fa r  g rea te r. M ora lly  and even p o litic a lly  speaking, th is  
ind iffe rence , th ou gh  com m on enough, is th e  g rea test 
danger. And connected  to  th is , on ly a b it less dangerous, is 
a n o th e r ve ry  co m m on  m odern  phenom enon, th e  w idespread
100 While it cannot be m ade a m atte r of discussion here , there  rem ains a question which 
Arendt never could entirely answ er and close off: how much w as th is image of Eichmann 
as a 'cog in the wheel' genuine and how much of it w as a product of careful crafting on 
the part of Eichmann himself, the effort "to strike his audience a s  a dedicated professional 
'above' personal m otives” but also his effort to  persuade himself of his own goodness? 
[Vetlesen, 2006:96-97]. For the sake of th e  inquiry here , this question must be left aside 
in order to see  where A rendt's interpretation of Eichmann, right or wrong, took her 
thought-project on the life of the mind.
[ L i *
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te nd en cy  to  refuse to  jud ge  a t a ll. O ut o f th e  unw illingness 
o r  ina b ility  to  choose one's exam ples and one's com pany, 
and o u t o f th e  unw illingness or ina b ility  to  re late  to  o thers 
th ro u g h  ju d g m e n t, arise the real skandala, the real 
s tu m b lin g  blocks... [RJ, 146]
N on -d is tingu ish ing , b lending fo r A rendt is re la ted to  a certa in  
ind iffe re nce  to  the  w orld . Refusal to ju d g e  is a danger o f equating 
e v e ry th in g  w ith  e ve ry th in g , which transform s o r  ra th e r, degrades the 
w orld shared  by un ique  hum an beings in to  the  m arshes inhabited by 
in d is tin c t crea tures th a t are not persons -  and fo r  w hom  there  is no 
lim it to  w h a t they m ay  do, as they "skid o n ly  over th e  surface o f events, 
w here th e y  p e rm it them selves to  be carried  away w itho u t ever 
p en e tra ting  into  w ha tever depth  they may be capable o f."  [RJ, 101 ]
In  th a t sense, ju d g m e n t in A rend t's  work o rig ina tes from  the a tte m p t to 
find th e  w ay to  live in the w orld  and to be concerned w ith  the  world 
beyond absolutes, w hich w ere  them selves co n tin ge n t products as 
A re nd t's  own h is to rica l experience had show n. Judgm ent in th a t sense 
is an a tte m p t to  th in k  anew, rooted in the  fu nd am e n ta l understanding 
o f m an as a beginning th a t there fore  can begin. Beginning th a t a man 
is, is th e re fo re  not on ly  a potentia fo r acting as beg inning anew bu t fo r 
ju d g m e n t as well inso fa r ju d g m e n t is 'th in k in g ' anew.
Even though  we have lost yardsticks by which to 
m easure, and rules under which to  subsum e the 
pa rticu la r, a being whose essence is beg inning  m ay have 
enough  o f o rig in  w ith in  h im self to  understand  w ith o u t 
preconceived categories and to  ju d g e  w ith o u t the  set o f 
cu s tom ary  ru les which is m ora lity . [UP, 3 2 1 ]
In  a considerab le  p ortion  o f th e  in te rp re ta tive  lite ra tu re , one finds the 
same a rg u m e n t p re do m in a tin g : no tw ithstand ing  th e  fa c t th a t any 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f A rend t's  th e o ry  o f ju d g m e n t m u s t conta in  traces o f 
specu la tions since h e r w ork  rem ained u n fin ished , her concept o f 
ju d g m e n t as an autonom ous m en ta l facu lty  is ta ken  fo r a path  tow ards 
reconc ilia tion  o f th e  m ain  con flic ting  strand in he r th o u g h t, the  tension 
betw een acting  and th in k in g .101 Judgm ent is a ttr ib u te d  the  role o f the 
bridge o v e r the  gap between th ink ing  in so litude  and acting in p lu ra lity , 
overcom ing  both the  paralysis o f th inking and rav ing  boundlessness of 
action . Judgm ent, w h ich  A re nd t considered a p a rticu la r s trength  o f  her 
th e o ry  o f  po litica l action , is b ro ug h t in to  resolve the  problem  o f the 
dangerous sp on tan e ity  o f ac tion  w ithou t endangering  freedom .
By in tro d u c in g  the  concept o f ju d g m e n t, A re n d t is ce rta in ly  concerned 
w ith  w h a t is considered a gap  in her own th e o ry  be tw een  th ink ing  and 
ac ting , betw een th e  in te rio r o f  m an th a t can do a w a y  w ith  rea lity  and 
the  appearance o f m an  in th e  world tha t is a lw ays e n tang lem en t w ith  
the  w o rld , w ith o u t a ny  o b jec tify in g  d istance.
101 See Beiner's essay in LKPP and Kohn's introduction to  RJ.
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H ow ever, as A rend t also recognizes, th is  is m a tte r  o f a w ide r p ro b le m  In 
th e  genera l, ph ilosoph ica l co n te x t o f th in k in g  th e  po litica l: in th a t  
sense , A rend t's  concern  is n o t w ith  reconciling  b u t w ith  o ve rcom ing , 
w ith  escaping th e  tra p  o f  d icho tom y w h ich  w ou ld  d ic ta te  th a t e ith e r  
m an  in his (dangerous) s p o n ta n e ity  and e x is te n tia l unp re d ic ta b ility  be 
su b ju g a te d  to  ratio , o r th a t  every th ing  p o litica l is resolved in to  th e  
ra v in g  boundlessness o f w ille d  but m eaningless a c tion , rendering  th u s  
th e  v e ry  concept o f  resp on s ib ility  void o f any substance  and u lt im a te ly  
p e rve rtin g  unbound freedom  in to  necessity o f in s tin c tive  d rives. A re n d t 
th u s  endorses th e  M achiave llian  dem and th a t "p o litica l actors kn ow  
w h a t th e y  are d o in g , even i f  and indeed because th e y  canno t kn ow  
w h a t th e ir  actions m ig h t u lt im a te ly  bring a b o u t."  [H ansen, 1 9 9 3 :2 2 7 ]
At th e  sam e tim e , ju d g m e n t constitu tes  a p a rt o f A rendt's  ( la rg e r) 
co n fro n ta tio n  w ith  th e  e n tire  philosophical legacy o f d icho tom ous 
conceptua liza tions. From th e  beg inning, A re nd t has m ade it he r p ro je c t 
n o t to  patch up th e  holes in  th e  fabric  o f  th e  sam e tra d itio n  w h ich  she, 
in h e r  profound and rad ica l c ritiq ue , denounced as m eaningless and 
m u te  in th e  clash w ith  h is to rica l rea lity , b u t to  fin d  a w ay o u t o f th e  
m aze o f narrow , dead-end s tre e ts . One o f such s tree ts  is also Kant's  
gap be tw een  th eo re tica l and practical p h ilosophy w h ich  coincides w ith  
th e  b a tt le  betw een Reason and  Passion, be tw een  ra tio n a lity  o f necess ity  
and irra tio n a lity  o f  free do m , fundam enta l to  th e  understand ing  and 
th in k in g  o f th e  p o litica l fo r  ce n tu rie s . A t th e  sam e tim e , Kant o ffe rs  a 
g lim pse  o f the  e x it fro m  th e  tra p .
W h ile  it can easily be argued th a t A rend t's  th e o ry  o f po litica l ac tion  and 
a c tive  life in genera l is s tro n g ly  influenced b y  A ris to tle , A rend t's  th e o ry  
o f ju d g m e n t is p rim a rily  K antian , and even based exclusive ly on 
K a n t.102 I t  could seem th a t A ris to te lian  n o tio n  o f phronesis  as
102 It may seem  peculiar that A rendt's only reference in the theory of judgm ent is Kant. 
Accepting th a t the theory  is incom plete, it stilt m ust be observed tha t, in her o ther 
references to judgm ent, she does not seem  interested in any o ther source but Kant and 
even then , only for his concept of aesthetic judgm ent. Any reference to th e  entire 
tradition of British moralists is missing although they anticipate Kant's thinking [Darwall, 
1995:13], and despite the  resem blance of their historical situation to Arendt's. Namely, 
British moralists responded to the situation of the dissolution of theological-metaphysical 
framework, which dictated ethical conduct on the basis of universal conception of good. 
[Darwall, 1995:4] Similarly, Arendt responds to the normative void left behind the  horror 
of exterm ination camps, exploring the  possibility of differentiating between right and 
wrong in the state of dissipated morality and, ultimately, the collapse of the world as the 
fram ew ork and ground of morality.
However Arendt does not place herself in relation to th is tradition of moral philosophy. It 
is hard to say whether a complete theory of judgm ent would bring her thought any closer 
to th e  thought of British moralists, especially since as a rule Arendt is not system atic in 
her dialogues with tradition. Yet som ething in Arendt's thought suggests that the tradition 
of m oral philosophy is not a horizon of her thinking on judgm ent. Firstly, Kant's 
architecture of mind is closely followed by Arendt, in affirmation as in opposition to ir. 
More im portantly for the specific deba te  on judgm ent, the  focus of Arendt's attention is 
Kant's aesthetic judgm ent, not his concept of moral judgm ent precisely because she is 
preoccupied with judgm ent that is not grounded in taws or imperatives, internal or 
external. In contrast to British m oralists, Arendt seeks neither a universal formula of 
judgm ent nor universal conditions for good judgm ent but the concept of judgm ent tha t 
responds to the  uniqueness of an historical situation, particularity of a moral and political 
dilemma.
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'em bodied  a c tion ' [B e ine r, 1 98 3 :7 4 ] would be c loser to  A rend t's  
understand ing  o f a c tion  as both  speech and a c t. B u t th e  concep t o f 
ju d g m e n t o f concern  to  A rend t is p ronounced ly rem oved fro m  the  
A ris to te lian  te leo logica l fra m e w o rk  w here  p o litica l th ink ing  invo lves, 
inter alia, reasoning about objectives and in te res ts . The connection  to  
Kant how ever suggests th a t A rendt pursued th e  concept o f ju d g m e n t 
com patib le  w ith  h e r concept o f action as an end in  its e lf and w ith  
hum an d ign ity  confirm ed in  au tonom y o f decis ion  to  ac t. [B e ine r, 
1 9 8 3 :3 1 ] Where it could aid her in m ain ta in ing  th e  n o n -in s tru m e n ta l 
ch a ra c te r o f ac tion , A rend t did no t hesita te  to  fo llo w  the  A ris to te lian  
tra il. But the conceptua liza tion  o f ju d g m e n t in th e  sam e, non­
ins tru m e n ta l ve in  could n o t have been derive d  fro m  A ris to tle 's  
philosophy, as A rend t read it .
In  th a t sense, K ant also could be seen as a pecu lia r genealog ica l 
source: his en tire  ph ilosophy is a g rand  te leo log ica l n a rra tiv e  o f 
en ligh ten m en t (and  the  E n lig h te n m e n t). The essence o f his idea o f 
p ractica l reason is th e  concept o f du ty  and the  co re  o f Kant's  idea o f 
e th ica l action is its  g round ing  in the im pera tive  n a tu re  o f  th e  e th ica l 
law. N oth ing in K ant's  Critique o f Practical Reason  leaves room  fo r  the 
fa cu lty  o f ju d g m e n t as A re nd t understands it -  th e  m ed ia tion  betw een 
the un iversa l and the  p a rticu la r as the  ground o f th e  a u to n o m y  o f 
a c to r's  decision.
A rend t was not unaware o f  th a t and her d ia logue  w ith  Kant is 
m eticu lous ly  weaved around Kant's Critique o f Judgm ent, w hich  relates 
only to  aesthetics, leaving o u t ethics as the re ign  o f law , th e re fo re  
necessity, not o f ju d g m e n t. A rendt's  ow n  ph ilosoph ica l exercise  in 
overcom ing  the d u a lity  o f w orlds  thus finds in K a n t o f  the  Critique o f  
Judgm ent a surpris ing  w e llsp ing . In  Kant's  system , ju d g m e n t is given 
an e x p lic it ly  reconcilia to ry ro le , standing betw een U nderstand ing  and 
Reason as a bridge o ve r the  gap separating th eo re tica l ph ilosophy from  
p ractica l ph ilosophy, ph ilosophy o f nature  from  ph ilosophy concerned 
w ith  freedom . [K an t, 2 0 0 0 :2 , 13, 33, 39] D is locating i t  from  the  narrow  
realm  o f aesthetics, A rendt derives from  Kant's a ssertion  o f m an's 
a u to no m y the  ground fo r freedom  o f m an, w h ich  w ould n o t allow 
m is tak ing  freedom  fo r  so ve re ig n ty .
C entra l to  Kant's understand ing  o f how we app ro p ria te  beauty , how  we 
see it as beauty, is the  concept o f taste , and he in itia lly  p lanned to  
w rite  a Critique o f Moral Taste  ra th e r th a n  ju d g m e n t [LKPP, 1 0 ] Kant 
deve lops the  concept o f ju d g m e n t as the  m o ra l ta s te  in close 
connection  w ith  the  princip le  o f freedom . A t the  sa m e  tim e  it s tands in 
sharp co n tras t to  U nderstand ing  and Reason, w hich  bo th  m us t conform  
to  law , and to  the com m anding  force o f desire :
An ob ject o f inc lina tion , and one th a t is p roposed to  o u r 
desire by a law o f Reason, leave us no freedom  in 
form ing fo r ourselves anyw here an o b jec t o f p leasure. All 
in te rest presupposes o r  generates a w a n t; and , as the
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de te rm in ing  g round  o f assent, it leaves th e  ju d g m e n t 
about the  o b je c t no  lo n g e r free. [K a n t, 2 0 0 0 :5 4 ]
Ju dg m e nt, th a t is -  re fle c tiv e  ju d g m e n t103 th a t A re n d t is in terested  in 
K an t's  aesthetics , is th e re fo re  free on tw o  a ccounts . On the  one  hand, 
ju d g m e n ts  o f ta s te  are  fre e  o f  th e  d ic ta te  o f concepts  -  to  ju d g e  th e  
p a rtic u la r beautifu l is n o t p red ica ted  u pon  any concep t o r u n iversa l 
s tandard  w hich w ou ld  p re m e d ita te  ju d g m e n t b u t flows w ith o u t 
m e d ia tio n  from  th e  rep re se n ta tio n  o f th e  b e a u tifu l ob ject. T he reo f 
fo llow s th a t ju d g m e n t is n o t u n ive rsa l; th e  p ro d u c t o f jud g in g  is no t a 
u n ive rsa lly  va lid  t ru th  b u t an  op in ion  o f  a p a rtic u la r m an in th e  
p a rtic u la r c ircum stances o f  a h is to rica l c o m m u n ity  fo r  which the re  can 
be no  abso lu te  ru les. J u d g m e n t, argues A re nd t, is w h a t helps us to  dea l 
w ith  p a rticu la r s itu a tio n s , th e  s itu a tio ns  w hich  cannot be s im p ly  
subsum ed under u n ive rsa l p rinc ip les, and such are a ll s ituations o f 
hum an  in te rac tion  because a ll hum an actions a re  generated by th e  
p a rtic u la rity  o f each in d iv id u a l, corresponding  to  w h a t is m ost un ique  
a bo u t each and e very  one o f  us.
In  th e  sense o f dea ling  w ith  th e  p a rticu la r and th e  im perfect th e re fo re  
ju d g m e n t itse lf can cla im  no perfection  because -  ju s t as action  is 
a bo u t d iscrim in a tin g  a ll o th e r  poss ib ilities in fa v o u r o f one -  ju d g m e n t 
is d isc rim in a tive : it opens up  one gate  closing o ff a ll th e  o ther.
This ju d g m e n t th a t know s no s tandards can  appeal to  
noth ing  but th e  e v idence  o f w ha t is being ju d g e d , and its  
sole p re requ is ite  is th e  fa cu lty  o f ju d g m e n t, w h ich  has fa r  
m ore  to  do  w ith  m a n 's  a b ility  to  m ake d is tin c tio n s  than  
w ith  his a b ility  to  o rg a n ize  and subsum e. [P P 2 :10 2 ]
Precisely because o f  th is  unbounded  ness to  any ru le , ju d g m e n t is a 
m a tte r  o f resp on s ib ility . I t  invo lves a decis ion  o n  how to  re la te  th e  
p a rtic u la r to  th e  u n ive rsa l, and as such, ju d g m e n t te lls  a lm ost m ore 
a b o u t th e  one w ho  ju d g e s  th a n  a bo u t th a t w hich  is ju d g e d :
We m u s t 'l iv e  w ith ' o u r  having ju d g e d  x as w e d id , fo r it 
w ill characte rize  us  as being p en e tra tin g  o r shallow , 
ins ig h tfu l o r  b a n a l; i t  is th is  enduring  p ro pe rty  o f 
respons ib ility  co n ta ine d  in o u r ju d g m e n ts  th a t  we m ust 
'liv e  w ith . ' [B e in e r, 1 9 8 3 :1 3 8 ]
The fre e d o m  o f ju d g m e n t fro m  the  un ive rsa l and its  pred ica tion  on th e  
p a rtic u la r is tuned in w ith  th e  sens ib ility  o f A re n d t w ho is a th in k e r 
deeply indebted to  h is to ry  as the  co nsta n t engagem en t w ith  the  
e xcep tion a l and the un ique  as opposed to  th e  n o rm a l, the  o rd ina ry  and 
the  g en e ra l. W hile one  w ou ld  n o t dare to  argue th a t Kant had som e 
pre ference  fo r p a rtic u la rity  o v e r u n ive rsa lity , i t  is c lea r th a t in his 
aes the tic  ju d g m e n t A re nd t finds a m en ta l a c tiv ity  ak in  to  the  hum an
103 Reflective judgm ent is distinguished from determ inant judgm ent which subsum es the 
particular under the given universal: "But if only the  particular be given for which the 
universal has to  be found, th e  Judgm ent is merely reflective." [Kant, 2000:17]
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capac ity  fo r a c tio n  w hich  celebrates th e  p a rtic u la r precise ly fo r  its  
p a rticu la rity .
A t th e  sam e tim e , th e  e le m e n t o f respons ib ility  involved in  non­
cog n it iv e  po litica l ju d g m e n ts  as deprived o f th e  safe guidance by the 
e x is tin g  rules is w ha t A re n d t finds m issing in politics reduced to  
p ro fession. Ju dg m e n t c a n n o t be ta u g h t and learned th ro u g h  the 
know ledge o f th e  se t o f ru les. I t  does no t depend on a ny  expertise , 
w h ich  is th e  co nd itio n  o f fo rm a l equality  o f a ll in  ju d g in g . [Beiner, 
1 9 8 3 :6 2 ]
On th e  o th e r hand, the  ju d g in g  subject is no t com pelled  by any rap po rt 
o f a tta c h m e n t to  th e  o b je c t -  the ju d g m e n t o f  beauty Is passed 
"h o w e ve r in d iffe re n t I  m a y  be as regards the  exis tence  o f  the  o b je c t o f 
th is re p re s e n ta tio n ." [K a n t, 2 0 0 0 :4 7 ] W hat is asked o f the  judg ing  
su b je c t is no t d is in te re s t such  as to  assum e th a t th e  o b jec t in concern 
is n o t a m a tte r o f  inter-est, as Arendt exp la ins -  th a t which is in- 
betw een o f the  m em be rs  o f  political co m m u n ity , since th e  basic 
presupposition  o f ju d g in g  is n o t being ind iffe re n t to  a certa in  p rob lem , 
issue o r  concern. I t  is h o w e ve r d is in terest in th e  sense o f the freedom  
from  s tr ic tly  p riv a te  in te re s t, th e  m odern in te rp re ta tio n  o f inter-est as 
intra-est, w ha t Is a t  s take fo r  one ind iv idua l in h e r p a rticu la rity  and In 
co llis ion  w ith  intra-ests  o f  o th e r ind ividuals. The lack o f a tta chm en t 
presupposes th a t th e  o b je c t o f ju d g m e n t is rem oved from  the judg ing  
su b je c t in to  th e  in -b e tw e e n  o f the jud g in g  su b jec ts  th a t fo rm  up a 
co m m u n ity  and th a t the  ju d g in g  subject can re la te  to  the  o b jec t w itho u t 
Ins trum enta liz ing  it fo r  one 's  ow n  purposes.
This problem  is noth ing  b u t the  perennial p rob lem  o f a c to r and 
sp ecta to r th a t neve r seem  to  u n ite  in one person. The sp ecta to r in this 
c o n te x t would th u s  be the  d is in terested one, capable o f ju d g in g  by 
v irtu e  o f being fre e  o f a tta c h m e n t whereas the  a c to r in the  same 
co n te x t would be incapable o f judg ing  due to  his invo lvem en t w ith  the 
o b jec t. This d is tin c tio n  could be translated into  the  d is tin c tion  between 
the e th ica l and po litica l d im ensions o f action , the  d is tin c tion  w hich does 
not necessarily assum e se pa ra tion , a lthough A re n d t insisted on the 
d iv is ion  between e th ics  and politics, as has been pointed o u t in the 
e a rlie r discussion o f th in k in g . W hat her in tim a tio n s  on m erg ing  o f 
sp e c ta to r and a c to r th ro u g h  ju d g m e n t suggest how ever is th a t her 
th eo re tica l e ffo rts  have been d irected  at estab lish ing and preserv ing  the 
a u to no m y o f p o litica l sp he re  but tha t she is n o t unaware o f the 
in te rlac ing  o f e th ica l and p o litic a l dim ensions in all ac tions.
In  a sh o rt essay on  co lle c tive  responsib ility  [RJ, 1 4 7 -1 5 8 ], where 
A rend t draw s a line betw een responsib ility  in po litica l te rm s and legally 
and m o ra lly  estab lished g u ilt ,  ju d ic ia ry  is defined as th e  in s titu tio n  o f 
ind iv idua liza tion  and  persona liza tion  o f action , o f singling o u t the 
specific a c to r beh ind a spec ific  action  in the  sea o f actions which hum an 
a ffa irs  a lw ays are . A s im ila r func tion  is peform ed by ju d g m e n t in its 
e th ica l d im ension . Accord ing to  Arendt, m an is in  possession o f 
ju d g m e n t, the  one  m en ta l fa c u lty  tha t places h im  In th e  position  o f
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ju d g e , w ho  is the  one th a t  can read th e  m eaning  o f  actions. A re nd t 
ins is ts  th a t one is one th ro u g h  action, n e ith e r in th in k in g  nor in w illing , 
but one assum es shape as one th rough  a c tion  and to  th is , one m ay be 
re tu rned  th ro ug h  ju d g m e n t. A t the  sam e tim e , A re n d t a tte m p ts  to  g ive  
a p rospective  d im ension  to  th is  facu lty , in  o th e r w ords  -  to  fo reground  
its p o litica l d im ension , lin k in g  it thus to  th e  course  o f action th a t th e  
a c to r ta kes , w hich allows to  speak o f the  responsib ility  o f a c to r, 
a ltho ug h  th e  a c to r n e v e r 'o w n s ' her act in  a ll its consequences.
The p rob lem  of re la ting  and m erging th e  s p e c ta to r-a c to r positions is 
responded to  th ro u g h  ta s te  as a concept cen tra l to  A rendt's  Kantian  
u nders tand ing  o f ju d g m e n t. Taste is n o t a m a tte r  o f a so lita ry  th in k e r 
but th e  idea o f a m an , any m a n , living am ong m en  and aspiring to  w in  
th e ir  a p p ro va l. W hen an o p in io n  is being fo rm e d, w he n  the b ea u tifu l is 
being d is tingu ished  from  th e  ug ly , it is no t th e  laws o f t ru th  th a t 
concern  u s104 but th e  accord w ith  those am ong w ho m  we live and upon  
w hom  w e are  m aking  a c la im  to  agree w ith  o u r o p in io n . The c rite rio n  o f 
a cce p ta b ility  w ill th e re fo re  be co m m u n ica b ility  o r  publicness o f 
ju d g m e n t. [LKPP, 6 9 ] A re n d t's  p re ference  fo r  th e  concept o f  
co m m u n ica b ility  o v e r the  concep t o f t ru th  reaches back to h e r e a rly  
essays on Existenz-philosophie  and also on  Socrates [E IU ], w he re  th e  
fo rm e r c le a rly  tes tifies  to  h e r  indebtedness to  Jaspers fo r  th is .105 This is 
a d d itio n a lly  con firm ed  and b ro u g h t in re la tio n  spec ifica lly  to  h e r Kant 
e xp lo ra tio n s  by A rend t's  le tte rs  to  Jaspers. [B e in e r and N edelsky, 
2 0 0 1 :1 0 0 ] C om m un ica b ility  is m ore th a n  th e  a b ility  to  ren de r a 
s ta te m e n t in te llig ib le . I t  is based on th e  ’com m on U nderstand ing o f 
m e n " w hich  is "th e  least to  be expected from  any one cla im ing th e  
nam e o f m a n ."  [K a n t, 2 0 0 0 :1 7 0 ]
This co m m o n  u nders tand ing  m u s t be p re -supposed  fo r  all m en , it is 
w h a t is com m on to  a ll m e n  in all th e ir  p lu ra lity  and w hat m akes it 
possible th a t such unique beings com m un ica te  to  each o the r. Kant's 
notion  o f  sensus communis  th e re fo re  com bines com m on  sense w ith  the  
sense o f the  com m on, o f be ing in the  w orld . Sensus communis appears 
in e n la rged  m e n ta lity  so th a t,  when decid ing  on p a rtic u la r s itu a tio ns , 
we re -p re s e n t to  ourse lves o the rs  am ong w hom  w e necessarily are  
since b ir th .
This is done  th ro u g h  a n o th e r facu lty , c lose ly linked  w ith  th a t o f 
ju d g m e n t, th e  fa cu lty  o f im a g in a tio n , w h ich  enables us to  ta k e  the  
place o f  th e  o thers and on th a t basis c la im  th e ir  a ssen t to  the  op in ion  
we in te rn a lly  fo rm u la te . [RJ, 1 3 9 -1 4 0 ] Judgm ent is passed in 
c o m m u n ity : "Ju dg m en t, and  especially ju d g m e n ts  o f taste , a lw ays 
re flec ts  u po n  o the rs  and th e ir  ta s te , takes th e ir  possib le  ju d g m e n ts  in to
104 *[N]o empirical ground of proof... would force a judgm ent of tas te  upon an y o n e .' 
[Kant, 2000: 157]
los In th e  essay  on existential philosophy, Arendt develops an account of Jaspers ' idea of 
communication as the "pre-em inent form of philosophical participation .' Socrates, whom 
she explicitly relates to  Jaspers in th e  quoted essay, in counter-distinction to  Plato is 
central to  both Jaspers' and Arendt's source of dialogical or discursive notion of thinking. 
[EIU, 183]
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account... I  judge  as a m e m b e r o f this com m un ity  and not as a m em be r 
o f a supersensib le  w orld ... "  [LKPP, 67 ] The key to  th e  understand ing o f 
w ha t it  m eans to ju d g e  as a m em ber o f com m un ity  is th is  'ta k in g  into  
a cco u n t' o f o thers and th e ir  ju d g m e n t. The one w ho  judges represents 
to  h e rs e lf possible ju d g m e n ts  o f the  o the r m em bers o f her co m m un ity , 
not in  o rd e r to  c o n tra s t th e m  w ith  her (p re )fo rm ed  ju d g m e n t b u t in 
fo rm ing  th e  very ju d g m e n t.
On th e  one hand, it does m ean th a t o u r com m on sense is th e  sense 
co n s titu te d  by being am ong o thers and by the ir positions, which is w hat 
m ost o f psychologica l theo ries  o f socialization m a in ta in , though  some 
corners o f ph ilosophy m ay n o t have been so com fortab le  w ith  it. But it 
also m eans th a t we are n o t only am algam s o f positions, w hich have 
fo rm ed o u r position  but th a t we active ly seek to  bring into the  jud g in g  
process the  positions and perspectives o f the  o thers .
C onstitu ted  o f th is looking a t the  world from  d iffe re n t perspectives, 
ju d g m e n t is the  m o s t po litica l o f th ree m ind faculties, Arendt a rgues. I t  
is w h a t a llows us to  be o u r unique selves but be so in com m un ity  w ith  
o the rs , on the  basis o f a ce rta in  com m on understand ing  th a t is both 
m ade possible  by the  ex is tence  o f com m un ity  and perpetuates the 
ex is tence  o f co m m un ity . In  judg ing  there fore , A re nd t d iscovers, one 
'th in k s  in c o m p a n y /106 w h ich  assumes not so m uch a decision on 
th in k in g -w ith  and th in k in g -a g a in s t, which would be ve ry  Schm ittean, 
but ra th e r  m oving like  a pendu lum  betw een one and the o th e r. W ith 
ju d g m e n t, A rendt infers m an 's  inab ility  to be sovereign as both 
e x is te n tia lly  and on to log ica lly  determ ined -  even if  once there  was no 
w orld a ny  longer, n o t th a t it would be im possible fo r  m an to  e x is t in 
abso lu te  s in g u la rity , bu t th a t m an never can be s in g u la r so long as he 
exercises his sensus communis.
Nor is ju d g in g  about know ing som ething " in  the lig h t o f the p a rticu la r 
c o n te x t."  [S te in be rg e r, 1 9 9 3 :6 8 ] The po in t here is n o t ju s t the co n te x t 
and especia lly  n o t co gn itio n  as prem ised on som e sort o f techne, 
th e re fo re  no t ava ilab le  to  a ll, b u t being able to  place oneself in  the 
world as others w ould  be placed there and then see the  world as they 
would see it, w ith o u t h ow eve r drow ning oneself in th is p lu ra lity  o f 
perspectives. To th in k  in place o f others draws no t so m uch on th e m  as 
they a re  bu t on th e ir  s itu a tio n  w ith in  th e  com m on space, w ith in  the 
world w here  we e nco un te r th e m . I t  does n o t p u rp o rt to  some in n e r self, 
one's ow n  o r  th a t o f the  o th e rs , but to  the  being in the  w orld under 
ce rta in  conditions.
In  ju d g m e n t th e re fo re , u n like  in th ink ing , man rem ains in the  w orld . 
Judging is co nstitu ted  by im ag in ing  the o the rs , and th is  is the ground  o f
106 Singling out the specificity of Arendt's idea of 'thinking in company,' Diana Taylor 
points to  Arendt's relationship to K ant's philosophy as one of strong influence but not that 
of follower or disciple: "While impartiality for Kant requires the existence of other 
persons, it does not require their 'com pany' in the strong sense of which Arendt speaks," 
[Taylor, 2002]
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the  in te rsu b je c tive  c h a ra c te r o f ju d g m e n t w hich  g ives it the r ig h t to  
c la im  un iversa l a p p ro va l: " I t  does no t say th a t e v e ry  one will agree w ith  
m y ju d g m e n t, but th a t  he ought."  [K ant, 2 0 0 0 :9 5 ]
For understand ing  A re n d t's  idea o f ju d g m e n t as in te rsub jec tive , it is 
cruc ia l to  d is tin gu ish  assum ing  the place of th e  o the rs  from  co m ­
passion, e m -pa th y , s y m -p a th y , all o f th e m  perm eated  w ith  th e  n o tio n  
o f pass ion /pa thos as s u ffe rin g : "You are n o t supposed to  feel as th e y  
fe lt b u t to  im agine th ro u g h  learn ing o f th e ir  " fe e lin g s ,"  " th in k in g ,"  e tc . 
how you  would have fe lt, th o u g h t, e tc ." [PE, 2 ] T he  idea o f s u ffe rin g - 
w ith  fo r A rendt is deeply a po litica l and even a n ti-p o lit ica l, as she 
revea ls in her ana lys is  of th e  French R evo lution  in On Revolution. H er 
res is tance  to  the  c o m m o n a lity  o f pathos and th ro u g h  it, passion does 
not o rig in a te  from  th e  fe a r o f th e  co rrup tion  o f hum an nature, easily  
traced  to  the  E n lig h te n m e n t p ro jec t o f e le va tin g  m ankind th ro u g h  
Reason aga inst the  irra tio n a lity  o f desires and passion, b u t fro m  
A re n d t's  insistence on  m an as un ique  occurrence. H er a rg um en t is th a t 
the  e m p a th ic  feeling  reduces m en to  the  sam eness o f hum an na tu re  
w hile  a lso assum ing a ce rta in  cogn itive  abso lu te  in em o tions : b y  
suggesting  th a t we feel like  ano the r, we p resum e o u r  own a b ility  to  
know  th is  ano ther, to  be th is  a no the r, deny ing  h is /h e r  uniqueness b u t 
laso o u r own.
By exerc is ing  o u r ju d g m e n t, th e re fo re , w e  reach n o t on ly  inside, in to  
ourse lves, we reach also to w ards  o thers , im agined  o r re -presented  
o the rs  and instead o f  con fin ing  o u r th in k in g  to  o u r  in n e r se lf, we g o  
v is itin g . We take  d is tance  fro m  ourselves and th ro u g h  this en larged 
m e n ta lity , we fo rm  o u r p o s itio n , we pass a ju d g m e n t, w hich is n o t 
o b je c tive  bu t is no lon ge r s u b je c tiv e  e ithe r -  it is in te rs u b je c tiv e ,107 [RJ, 
141 ] ra th e r  like a r iv e r  th a t is n o t a ll its tr ib u te s  b u t, once th e y  have 
flo w n  in to  it, it no longe r is th e  orig ina l s trea m  fro m  the m o u n ta in  
spring e ithe r. This th e n  is th e  m easure  o f r ig h t and w ro n g , the m easure  
o f one 's  conduct:
Political th o u g h t is rep re sen ta tive . I  fo rm  an  opin ion by 
considering a g iven  issue from  d iffe re n t v iew po in ts , by 
m aking  p re sen t to  m y  m ind  the  s ta nd po in ts  o f  those  w ho are  
a bse n t; th a t is, I  represent th e m . Th is  process o f 
rep re sen ta tion  does n o t b lind ly a do p t th e  ac tua l view s o f 
those  who s tand  so m ew here  else, and hence look upon the 
w orld  from  a d iffe re n t perspective ; th is  is a q ue stion  n e ith e r 
o f em pathy... n o r o f co u n tin g  noses and jo in in g  a m a jo r ity  but
107 It should be noted th a t in th e  lines where Arendt uses the specific term , 
Intersubjective, she couples it with an o th er term  -  representative, which was employed in 
her earlier thinking of judgm ent. I t  could be argued th a t precisely Arendt's discomfort 
about th e  term  subject drove her closer towards the  latter. Namely, Arendt explicitly 
denies validity to the political term s subject as suggestive of a particular understanding of 
politics in te rm s of ruling and subordination. In ontological te rm s on the other hand, its 
em ebdedness in this sub, this being-(thrown)-under, ties it too  closely to the notion of 
self as a  hidden substance of man, entailing a being of m an opposed to the appearance of 
man, against which Arendt posited his understanding of man a s  primarily a persona in the  
world. In th a t sense, representative or interpersonal thinking speaks directly from the  
center of her political- and thought-project.
147
o f being and th ink ing  in m y own iden tity  w here  actua lly  I  am  
not. [BPF, 241 ]
A t th e  sam e tim e , enlarged m en ta lity  does not e n ta il on ly  'v is i t in g /  it 
also e n ta ils  certa in  cleavages, certa in d is turbance to  the  com fo rting  
feeling  o f being w ith  oneself, a certa in u n res t th a t comes from  opening 
one 's ow n  house to  those  w ho  are not us, who are  strangers, a lways 
and necessarily so by v ir tu e  o f being extraneous, th a t is -  com ing from  
the o u ts id e .108 To ju d g e  does no t mean ju s t  com ing ou t o f onese lf to  
understand  the  w orld  fro m  w ith in  it, it a lso means being w ith  th e  world 
w hen being w ith  onese lf, being oneself as being w ith  the  w o rld .109
In  th is  com ing and go ing , in th is bringing in the  w orld  w hich is a t the 
sam e tim e  exterio riz ing  o f the  se lf th rough  its d isp lacem ent, one 
p erfo rm s a u then tica lly  po litica l touchin and draw ing o f borders, th a t 
d is tingu ish ing  w hich S chm itt was concerned w ith  in his 
conceptua liza tion  o f the po litica l. Only in  ju d g in g  these borders are 
porous, m ore  like m em branes than  like w alls and fences. We d raw  them  
only to  step over them , we exclude some perspectives to  include some 
o the rs , w h ile  co nsta n tly  redefin ing  those th a t we deem  va lid . For th is, 
h ow ever we never have a guide or guidance outside the  fram e form ed 
by th e  presence o f o thers in th is  world.
The fa c t th a t Kant's idea of aesthetic  ju d g m e n t un ites  the  uniqueness o f 
m an w ith  the  inalienable cond ition  o f hum an p lu ra lity  is p robably w hat 
drew  A re nd t to  K ant:
[S o c ia b ility  is the  v e ry  essence o f men in so fa r as they 
are  o f this w orld  on ly. This is a rad ica l d ep a rtu re  from  a ll 
those theories th a t stress hum an in terdependence as 
dependence on our fe llow  men fo r  o u r needs  and wants.
Kant stresses th a t a t least one o f our m ental faculties, 
th e  facu lty  o f  ju d g m e n t, presupposes th e  presence o f 
o the rs . [LKPP, 7 4 ]
Sensus communis as a p red ica te  o f ju d g m e n t corresponds to  A rend t's  
re fu ta tio n  o f all on to log ies  based on the s in g u la rity  o f m an  or 
u n ive rsa lity  o f M an. I t  suggests th a t, insofar o n to log y  is a t all 
m ea n in g fu l, it m ust en ta il p lu ra l d im ension, w hich  in  a ce rta in  sense 
inscribes po ten tia l fo r  the  po litica l in to  the  v e ry  no tion  o f hum an 
e x is te n ce /b e in g .110
108 "It does not indulge the fiction th a t "one can know what actually goes on in [another's] 
mind,” an assimilationist fantasy by which I make myself so a t home in your position that 
I erase the differences between us. As a visitor, I think my own thoughts but from the 
place of somebody else, permitting myself to  experience the disorientation necessary for 
understanding how the world looks different to th a t person.” Oisch, in Calhoun and 
McGowan, 1997:136
109 It is essential for understanding tha t it is the world tha t is invited and visited, and not 
the O ther. It could be argued that Arendt is concerned with o therness, insofar it is related 
to plurality, but not in the  Other, which is ju s t the other side of the coin of self, not the 
Other of sovereignty, but the O ther caught in identity of its own o therness.
110 This is not to say tha t politics is all of existence or tha t everything is political -  which is 
the s ta te  of totality of the political th a t for Arendt m ust be equated  with totalitarianism -
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But th e  princip le  o f  c o m m u n ity  as reta ined in sensus communis  is a lso  
the  m os t co n ten tious  p o in t o f A rend t's  Kantian th e o ry  o f ju d g m e n t, 
w hich  exposes the  th e o ry  to  c ritic ism  both  from  th e  co m m un ita rian  and 
ind iv id u a lis t perspectives. From the c o m m u n ita ria n  end, enlarged 
m e n ta lity  and co m m on  sense a re  seen as
transcendental categories: th ey  d o n 't connect ju d g m e n ts  
o f tas te  to  any  e m p ir ic a l sociability ... bu t m e re ly  specify 
conditions o f in te rs u b je c tiv e  v a lid ity  th a t a re  presum ed 
when an in d iv id u a l s u b je c t presum es to  ju d g e  som eth ing  
beautifu l by re fle c tin g  on i t  without necessarily  consu lting  
the  opin ions o r expe riences o f o th e r ju d g in g  ind iv idua ls. 
[B e iner, 1 9 8 3 :9 6 ]
In  o th e r  w ords, en la rged  m e n ta lity  is no th ing  b u t a fo rm a l condition  o f 
ju d g m e n t, w hich  ca n n o t s u b s titu te  d ia log ica l/d iscu rs ive  practices b u t 
rem ains m onolog leal. A rg u a b ly , how ever, A rend t is precise ly in terested  
in th e  formal condition  because h e r in q u iry  into  ju d g m e n t is d riven  by 
the  concern  fo r  th e  w o rk in g s  o f hum an m ind beh ind actions in the  
s itu a tio ns  when th e  p ra c tices  o f con tinuous co m m u n a l exchange a re  
som ehow  d isturbed  o r  a lto g e th e r absent. Such w as the s itua tion  o f  
E ichm ann, b u t if th e re  is th e  fo rm a l co nd itio n , th a n  th e  actor cannot be 
absolved o f resp on s ib ility  fo r  his actions desp ite  the  s itu a tio n .
I t  does no t help h o w e v e r to  try  and su p p o rt A re n d t's  concept o f  
ju d g m e n t by fo llow ing  B enhab ib 's  H aberm asian in te rp re ta tio n  th a t 
re la tes A rendt's  th e o ry  to  p ub lic  d e libe ra tion , nor b y  reso rt to  Young's 
a sym m etrica l rec ip ro c ity  o f ju d g m e n t w hich  precludes the  possib ility  o f 
tak ing  som eone e lse 's p o s itio n  bu t em phasizes the  respect o f 
irre d u c ib ility  o f th e  o th e r  to  th e  one, and Insists on opening, lis ten ing , 
takrng in te re s t.111 B o th  a re  n am e ly  about practices  and clearly, A rend t's
but th a t the possibility of the  political is inscribed into us through the impossibility of our 
ontological sovereignty. This inscription, on the o ther hand, cannot be read to sta te  tha t 
'mAn is political/ which would be counter-intuitive to Arendt's insistence on politics as 
tha t which happens betw een m en, in plurality tha t is: *[M]an is apolitical. Politics arises 
betw een men, and so quite outside of man. There is therefore no real political substance. 
Politics arises in what lies betw een  men and is established as relationships." [PP2:95] 
Judging, as a mental operation inside a man, cannot be equated w ith the political. What it 
is, insofar it presupposes com m unity and com m onness, it is a hum an potential for the  
political, ju s t as the hum an capacity  to begin generates potential for political action. 
This however is only a prem onition of th e  argum ent to be pu t forht in the following 
chapters though it dem onstra tes th a t the methodological m ove to  be taken, the 
interpretation beyond A rendt in o rder to  develop a possibility of different ontology has its 
strong grounding in A rendt's thinking.
111 Both tex ts  in Beiner and Nedelsky, 2001. As a detour, it could be argued th a t Young's 
reasoning would be closer to  A rendt than Benhabib's firstly because Arendt's 
understanding of judging is underlain by her understanding of m an 's  finitude before the 
uniqueness of others, which precludes any reducibility of one to  the other and any 
appropriation of one by th e  other. On the  other hand, contrary to  Young's thought, Arendt 
would not be convinced by the  idea of firmly allocated positions in the world as summed 
up in the  following quotation: "In a heterogeneous public, differences are publicly 
recognized and acknowledged as irreducible, by which I m ean th a t  persons from one 
perspective or history can never com pletely understand and adop t the point of view of
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th e o ry  refers to  a m en ta l opera tion : w hile one could question  the 
r ig id ity  o f th is  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  m ental opera tions and practices and 
broaden the u nders tand ing  o f practices, A rendt's  fram e w o rk  re ta ins the 
d is tin c tio n  e xp lic itly .
A d iffe re n t s trand  o f c r it ic is m  would accept A rend t's  in ten tion  to 
estab lish  the  fo rm a l co n d itio n  reconciling ind iv idua l responsib ility  and 
p lu ra lity  as the  hum an co nd itio n  but would p rob lem atise  precisely the 
presence o f c o m m u n ity  in th e  process o f ju d g in g . Enlarged m en ta lity  
exercised  by the  ju d g in g  su b jec t calls into  presence the subject's  
co m m u n ity  th ro ug h  the  act o f representa tion :
One judges  a lw ays as a m em ber o f co m m un ity , guided 
by one's c o m m u n ity  sense, one's sensus communis. But 
in the  last ana lys is  one is a m em be r o f a world 
co m m un ity  by the  sh ee r fact o f being hum an; this is 
one's 'co sm op o lita n  e x is te n ce / W hen one judges and 
when one acts in po litica l m atters, one is supposed to  
take one's bearings fro m  the idea, not th e  actua lity , o f 
being a w orld  c itizen  and, th e re fo re , also a 
Weltbetrachter, a w orld  spectator. [LKPP, 7 5 -7 6 ]
The underp inn ing  o f th is idea is the  condition o f m an who judges as a 
m e m b e r o f p a rtic u la r c o m m u n ity . But th e  view  acquired th rough  the 
exercise  o f en larged m e n ta lity  is so to say synchron ic, it maps w ha t is 
a lready g iven, a lb e it th ro u g h  d iffe ren t angles b u t s till angles defined by 
the space o f th e  specific  com m un ity . T he re fo re  to  call an absent 
co m m u n ity  in to  presence th ro u g h  judging a lready im plies a decision on 
assuming  a co m m u n ity , even  if absent: a decision a lready politica l and 
p rob lem atic .
A rend t's  theo ry  o f  ju d g m e n t is thus rendered h igh ly  p roblem atic 
th ro u g h  its core p rinc ip le : en larged m en ta lity , w h ich  involves a certa in 
p rinc ip le  o f inc lus ion /exc lus ion  o r  o f draw ing borders and d iscrim inating  
aga inst some w o rld -pe rspe c tives , which suggests th a t it is grounded on 
a ce rta in  p rinc ip le  o f c o m m u n ity  -  in o th e r w ords, assumes a 
com m un ity . The question  is therefore  w h e th e r com m un ity  can be 
assum ed and, even if so, w h a t com m un ity  is thus assumed -  w ho is 
in v ite d /v is ite d  in th e  process o f representa tion?  The princ ip le  o f 
co m m u n ity  in en larged m e n ta lity  is there fore  u nder-de fined .
From the  ind iv id u a lis t end b u t not only, th e  key p rob lem  is the danger 
o f c o n fo rm ism : how  is one is to  relate c ritica lly  to  one 's  co m m un ity  and 
avoid fa lling  into  (p o litic a l)  conform ism  when ju d g in g , succum bing to 
the b lind ing  e ffec t o f  nearness?112
those with other group-based perspectives and histories." [Young, 1989:258] In Arendt's 
view, informed by the revelatory understanding of action, this would suggest social and 
experiential pre-determ ination of people in denial of freedom th a t enables everyone to be 
more th an  one's circumstances and identity.
112 This is not the problem of prejudice. In the series of earlier lectures titled Introduction 
into Politics, Arendt is careful to  point out the difference betw een judgm ents and 
prejudices, although prejudices once grew out of judgm ents and are used in quotidian life
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In  o th e r w ords, th o u g h  one  m ay a b s tra c t onese lf from  one 's  ow n  
p riva te  cond ition  and d e ta ch  oneself fro m  one 's circum stances and 
a ffilia tion s , how is one  to  a b s tra c t onese lf from  one 's  own co m m un ity?  
Even if  one believes, as A re n d t d id , th a t hum an beings reta in  ca pa c ity  
to  act aga inst th e ir  c o n te x ts , th ey  rem ain  the  beings always s itua ted  in 
th e ir  here and now , so : "H o w  can one a b s tra c t onese lf from  th is  specific  
em bodied being to  inc lude  cons idera tion  o f th e  d ifferences o f th e  
'concre te  O th e r'? " [D ip ro se , 1 9 9 4 :1 4 ] I t  is the  question  o f th e  
a u to no m y o f ju d g m e n t, and one th a t m u s t have rung very loudly fo r  
A rend t in E ichm ann 's ju s t if ic a tio n  o f his conduct by " th e  sim ple fa c t th a t 
he could see no one , no one a t a ll, w ho a c tua lly  was aga inst th e  Final 
S o lu tio n ." [EJ, 116 ]
For an a c to r to  be a b le  to  a c t in to  her co m m u n ity  as its m em ber ye t so 
th a t she can change  th e  co m m un ity , ju d g m e n t would have to  
incorpora te  both th e  ins ig h t in to  th a t w h ich  and th a t w hich is -n o t, on  
the one hand, and on  the o th e r  -  to  see th a t w hich m ay o r m ay not be 
but is n o t g iven  in e ith e r  is o r  is -no t. This is not th e  problem  o f a c to r 
and sp e c ta to r b u t ra th e r  th e  problem  o f the  gap betw een the  pariah 
and the  ac to r, the  one w ho can re late  to  co m m u n ity  as if, o r precise ly  
because outs ide  it, and the one acting  in ( to )  it as its m em ber.
In  responding to  th e se  tw o , v ita l concerns how ever Kantian th e o ry  o f  
ju d g m e n t can help o n ly  p a rtly . The c o m m u n ita ria n  c ritique  o f th e  
inerad icable  /n tra -s u b je c itiv ity  o f ju d g m e n t, o f its con finem en t to  th e  
'in te rn a l' w orld  as opposed to  the  phenom enal w o rld , its unre la tedness 
to  th e  a c tua l practices o f d e lib e ra tio n  and d iscussion w ould not be va lid  
critic ism  fo r e ith e r K ant o r A re n d t. Nam ely, both o f th em  are In te rested  
in pursu ing  th a t in  m an w h ich  fits  h im  in the  w o r ld .113 T he re fo re  
A rend t's  p rim ary  concern  in d issecting th e  w ork ings o f ju d g m e n t, th e  
process o f ju d g in g  itse lf, is to  understand how th is  internaf m en ta l 
opera tion  is o f the  w orld  and how it re fu te s  the  d ua lism  o f th e  w orld , 
how it denies a bso lu te ly  and irrevers ib ly  the  s in g u la rity  o f m an . The 
im portance  o f c o m m u n ic a b ility  o f ju d g m e n t as the  e n d -re su lt o f ju d g in g  
is so g re a tly  em phasized and insisted upon by A rend t precisely because 
ju d g m e n t as a p ro d u c t o f ju d g in g  is not an  e n d -p ro d u c t. In  the S ocratic  
sp irit, A re nd t conceives o f o p in io n  as p e rfo rm ative  and d is tingu ishes, as 
McClure points o u t, "b e tw e e n  opinion as som eth ing  forged th ro u g h  
public e xam in a tion , and o p in ion  as som eth ing  b ro u g h t to  pub lic  
d e b a te ." [C alhoun and McGowan, 1 9 9 7 :6 4 ] One n e ve r jud ge s  fo r  one 's 
own sake: w hile  one th in k s  in silence and o ften  preserves th ough ts  to  
oneself, the  fina l d e s tin a tio n  o f ju d g m e n t m ust a lw ays be th e  pub lic  *1
as standards for passing judgm ents . By contrast, th e  judgm ent which Arendt seeks to 
understand is judgm ent without standards, in the face of an entirely new situation. 
[PP2:102, 151-152] However, this judgm ent is passed in the  exercise of enlarged 
mentality, which does not necessarily m ean tha t the judging subject will rely on prejudice 
yet the  borders of community will be observed since one judges as its mem ber, as an 
insider.
111 However, there rem ains one im portant difference between Arendt and Kant indicating 
that A rendt's thinking is never divorced from the concern with the  world in-between men 
w hereas Kant's preoccupation rem ains the human mind.
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sphere , w hich m an inhab its  by w ay of speech and action . Judgm ents 
are th e  ve ry  te x tu re  of speech. For this reason, ju d g m e n t m ust always 
be m ad e  com m unicab le .
The ind iv idua lis t c ritique  is po ten tia lly  m ore serious. Kant's so lu tion  
h ow eve r proves to  be too  K antian  fo r A rendtian  a p p ro p ria tio n . For Kant, 
m an 's  com m on sense as th e  sense o f the  com m on, flows not from  
m em bersh ip  in a c o m m u n ity  but from  the fu nd am e n ta l idea o f 
m an k in d . W hat should not o n ly  un ite  ac to r and sp e c ta to r bu t g ive them  
an in s ig h t into  the  world fro m  th e  distance (tho ug h  not im potence) o f 
pariah, w hile  not rendering  th em  im poten t as pariah  o fte n  is, is the 
s tandard  o f ju d g in g , w hich resonates Kant's ca tegorica l im pera tive  from  
his p ractica l philosophy, th e  precept tha t action and ju d g m e n t m us t be 
such so as to  be genera lizab le  in to  universal law.
I t  Is by v irtu e  of th is  idea of m ankind, p re sen t in every 
single  m an, th a t m a n  are human, and th ey  can be catted 
civilized o r hum an to  th e  exten t th a t th is idea becomes 
the princip le  o f th e ir  ac tions as well as th e ir  ju d g m e n ts . I t  
is a t this p o in t th a t a c to r and specta to r becom e united...
[LKPP, 75]
W ith  th is  notion  o f cosm opo litan  citizenship, Kant b rings his c ritiq ue  o f 
ju d g m e n t in harm ony w ith  his en tire  philosophical system  but A rend t 
does not fo llow  h im  in th a t pro ject. She d ism isses th e  un iversa lis t 
so lu tio n  and turns to  a d iffe re n t pathw ay w ith in  K ant's  th o u g h t th a t she 
considers 'b y  fa r m ore  v a lu a b le /114 [LKPP, 7 6 ] The closing pages o f  the  
Lectures  thus prob lem atize  th e  em bedding o f p o litica l via aesthetica l 
ju d g m e n t in to  the overa ll K an t's  system , and A re n d t seeks to  find  the  
s tandard  o f ju d g m e n t w hich  w ou ld  not be a re fuge  in abso lu tes .115 A t 
the  sam e tim e , the  a lte rn a tiv e  so lu tion  has to  be re la ted  to  Kant unless 
the  e n tire  construc tion  o f A re n d t's  Kant-inspired th e o ry  o f  ju d g m e n t is 
to  co llapse.
A re nd t's  answ er th e re fo re , th ou gh  undeveloped, e x p lic it ly  po ints to  
K ant's  concept o f exam ple  and related exemplary validity  o f ju d g m e n t. 
E xam ple  "is  and rem ains a p a rticu la r th a t in its  v e ry  p a rticu la rity  
reveals the  g en e ra lity  th a t o the rw ise  could no t be defined."[LK P P , 77] 
The a n sw e r to  p a rticu la rity  is itse lf a particu la r. W ha t guides th e  one 
ju d g in g  cannot be conta ined  in  general ru les bu t in  exam ples w hich  are 
n e ith e r particu la r n o r g en e ra l. I t  is there fore  th e  p a rtic u la r th a t has
114 Therefore, the concluding pages of Arendt's Lectures refute th e  following Bernstein's 
criticism: HWe may desperately w ant to  believe tha t there is som ething about human 
beings th a t cannot be transform ed, som ething deep about the hum an self, the voice of 
conscience, or our sense of responsibility tha t cannot be obliterated. After totalitarianism, 
we can no longer hold on to this belief.” [Calhoun and McGowan, 1997: 317-318]
115 One might dare to  speculate/assum e that, in thinking through th e  implications of 
judgm ent conceived of within Kant's entire philosophy and in relation to  the categorical 
imperative, Arendt never lost out of sight Eichmann’s claim to have acted on the Kantian 
principle of categorical im perative and th e  easiness with which the principle got distorted 
into the diktat of obedience, suggesting from the depths of historical experience th a t one 
may not so easily rely on the idea of attachm ent to th e  world and cosmopolitan 
citizenship. [EJ, 136-137]
1 5 2
acquired v a lid ity  fo r  o th e r p a rticu la rs , it has becom e som ething o f  a 
gu ide  o r, to  em p loy  A re n d t's  and Kant's te rm , a schema. [RJ, 1 4 3 -1 4 4 ] 
As a schem a, th e  p a r tic u la r  h is to rica l person (o r  e ven t) th a t acqu ires 
e xe m p la ry  v a lid ity , loses th e  d e p th  and to ta lity  o f an inhab itan t o f 
h is to rica l place and tim e , and  becom es an e p itom e  o f one v irtu e  o r v ice , 
so m eth ing  o f a m e ta p h o r in  flesh  and blood o f th a t v irtu e  o r v ice  w hich  
beacons above e v e ry d a y  and  a llow s us to  recognize, w ith o u t ru les, 
these po litica l a n d /o r  m o ra l v irtu e s  and vices as such. Examples a re  
ava ilab le  to  e ve ryon e  and a re  w ith in  everyone 's  reach, w hich m eans 
th a t ju d g m e n t is n o t necessarily  predicated on th e  personal w isdom  via 
personal experience , b u t th e  experience  o f the  w orld  as a whole is 
treasured  in these  exam ples.
E xem plary  v a lid ity  a lso  responds to  th e  e a rlie r d iscussed co m m un ita rian  
c ritiq u e . I f  we are  n o t engag ing  in the  pub lic  d iscurs ive  practices in th e  
process o f ju d g in g , i f  th e  o th e rs  cannot c o rre c t o u r  jud g in g  by re lay ing  
to  us th e ir  pos itions in th e  w orld  and w ith  regard  to  us, i f  we a re  
abandoned to  o u r f in ite  se lves, A rend t's  idea o f gu idance by exam ples 
m eans th a t th ro u g h  e xam p le s  th e  ju d g m e n t o f th e  w orld w ill com e to  
us. Exam ples are  am a lg a m s o f s itu a tio ns , even ts  and actors th a t a re  
sources o f m ean ings and com m onness fo r  a p a rticu la r spa tia l and 
te m p o ra l co m m u n ity , th e  co m m o n  re ference p o in t to  be re -v is ited  in 
the search  fo r  answ ers to  questions posed by new  s itua tions. The 
exam ples th a t A re n d t q u o te s  to  illu s tra te  th e  concep t o f exam ple  a re  
p recise ly  heroic fig u re s , th a t is -  characters th a t g rew  g re a te r th a n  
th e ir im m e d ia te  h is to rica l in fluence  and have com e to  rep re sen t 
p rinc ip les, such as S ocra tes, Jesus o r  Achilleus.
The p rob lem  how ever is b ro ad e r, o r  deeper. N am ely , the prob lem  o f  
co n fo rm ism , te n ta tiv e ly  sp ea k in g , is w hat th e  ind iv id ua lis t c ritique  could 
touch  upon o r  in tu it b u t could n o t disclose e n tire ly  and expose its core  
because the  actua l p ro b le m  in all its d ep th  em erges from  w ith in  
A rend t's  th o u g h t-p ro je c t, w h ich  is n e ith e r ind iv idua lis t n o r 
co m m u n ita ria n . The p rob lem  is n o t a re flec tion  o f Lyotard 's c ritiq ue  o f  
all rep re se n ta tio n  as a lw ays  invo lv ing  th e  om iss ion , the  fo rg e ttin g , 
[L yo ta rd , 1 9 9 0 :2 8 -2 9 ] w h ich  im p lies th a t som eth ing  inev itab ly  slips 
th ro u g h  from  sensus com m unis  as predicated on rep resen ta tion . But it  
does som ehow , d is ta n tly , re la te  to  the idea o f th e  o m itte d , a lw ays 
o m itte d , not ca lcu la ted , not reckoned w ith , un fo reseen , the surp lus -  o f 
freedom . N am ely, one  m u s t reca ll the  m ain  re q u ire m e n t posed fo r th e  
source o f action  such w ould be in harm ony w ith  A re n d t's  understand ing  
o f th e  p o litica l w h ich  is p red ica ted  on a c tio n  as ena ctm e n t o f freedom  
th a t is b ring ing  a b o u t th e  new  in p lu ra lity . Ju dgm ent as A rend t 
conceptua lized it is p lu ra lity  inca rna ted  in m en ta l a c tiv ity  bu t it  rem ains 
rooted in the  past -  th e  e xa m p le s , w hich resona te  H eidegger's call fo r  
the  re tr ie v a l o f p o ss ib ilities  handed d ow n  by tra d itio n  as in th is  
re tr ie v a l, "D asein  m a y  choose its  heroes" [H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :3 5 2 ] 
-  and th e  present, th a t w h ich  is g iven  to th e  ju d g in g  sub ject here and 
now. S im p ly  p u t, how  is one  e ve r to  s igh t the  d if fe re n t and th e  new  
th a t is th e  de fin ing  d im en s ion  o f  action , th ro u g h  ju d g m e n t w h ich  re lies
on th a t which is -  the  circum stances o f one's co m m u n ity , and on th a t 
w hich  has been -  th e  exam ples?
I t  ind icates a fa ilu re  in A re n d t's  th o u g h t identical to  w ha t she herse lf 
d iagnosed as the  e m b arra ssm en t o f all philosophy -  the  appearance o f 
the  new  in the  w o rld . Does ju d g m e n t, as linked here to  exam ples and 
the p re sen t, not re fu te  th e  understand ing  o f action  as breaking o f the 
new in to  the g iven  and the  present? While the  past can th row  a 
revea ling  s p o t- lig h t on th e  p resen t, rendering its  im m ediacy m eaningfu l 
in a w id e r context, the  past does not g ive  b irth  to  th e  new, unless one 
is p repared  to  accept a causa l, de te rm in is tic  fram e w o rk , which A rendt is 
not. The present how ever a lw ays recoils back o n to  itself, as A rendt 
observed, the p ow er o f re a lity , its realness being the  product o f its 
a c tu a lity . [L M /II:1 3 8 -1 3 9 ] I f  how ever ju d g m e n t was related to  fu tu re , 
as w ill is, freedom  in a c tion  would be reduced to  the  necessity o f 
execu tion  o f p re m ed ita ted  design .
W hat is c lea r from  A rend t's  in q u iry  into  the  w orkings o f hum an m ind is 
the in te rp la y  o f m en ta l fa cu lties , th ink ing  tha t opens an in te rva l in the  
tim e  flo w , the in te rva l th a t the re  would never be i f  the re  w ere not the  
question  to  open the  p oss ib ility  o f the  non-g ivenness o f the  g iven; 
w illing  th a t th row s itse lf in to  the  fu tu re , and ju d g m e n t, which relates 
the p resen t to  th e  past n o t th rough  a u to m a tism  o f causa lity  but 
th ro u g h  the  w isdom  o f experience. Yet If the  new is to  come in to  the  
w orld , th e re  m ust be som eth ing  th a t in terconnects th e  three  and goes 
u ndernea th  and beyond th e  th re e  faculties, w ith o u t how ever reducing 
the th re e  faculties to  one o r  sub jecting  th em  to  one.
The p rob lem  o f th e  source o f  a c tion  thus reveals its e lf as the paradox o f 
the be ing  th a t m an  is, the  being bound by here and now and ye t the 
being, according to  A rend t, capable o f changing th a t here and now by 
bring ing  th e  new in to  it. The capacity  o f th e  m ind th a t could be behind 
action  would thus have to  be a capacity able to  s tep  beyond here and 
now w ith o u t how eve r negating  the  re a lity  as th e  cond ition  o f th is 
beyond. The capacity  o f such pow er m ay not necessarily, and m ost 
ce rta in ly  w ill not, o ffe r  a reso lu tion  o f the  paradox o f  hum an existence 
but cou ld  prove to  inco rpo ra te  and engage th e  dynam ics o f the  
paradox, the  dynam ics be tw een  freedom  and necessity  in hum an 
exis tence  which A rend t tr ie d  to  dem onstra te  and to  fo reground  in her 
th in k in g  o f the p o litica l. As it shall be argued in th e  fo llow ing chapter, 
H e idegger and A re nd t -  b o th  in  re lation to  Kant - o ffe r  interconnected 
in tu itio n s  and in tim a tio n s  a b o u t such capacity w h ich  both  h is to ry  o f 
ph ilosophy and q uo tid ian  life  know  by the  name o f im ag ina tion .
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C hapter Five:
IM A G IN IN G  A B EG IN N IN G
The th o u g h t o f im a g in a tio n  in tra d itio n  o f po litica l philosophy is m o s tly  
associated w ith  G ia m b a ttis ta  Vico and his th e o ry  o f ingenium  as th e  
response o f hum an be ings to  the  challenge o f th e ir  n a tu ra l 
e nv iro n m e n t. Vico in tro d u ce s  the no tion  o f poetic  w isdom  sp ring ing  
from  im agination  in to  so c io po litica l fram ing  o f the  w orld  -  o rdering  o f 
the  w orld  is not th e  w o rk  o f practical reason no m ore th a n  the  
understand ing  is th e  w o rk  o f a bs trac t reason: i t  is "th e  c rea tion  o f 
h u m a n k in d ." [V ico, 1 1 9 ] For Vico thus inventio  is p rim ary  to  Ratio. 
[G rassi, 2 0 0 1 :8 ]
Grassi fo llow s rh e to r ic a l tra d itio n  o f C icero and then  Vico, 
understand ing  the  so c io p o litica l sphere as c rea tion  no t unlike a rtis tic , 
by hum an  beings, th ro u g h  " th is  'in g e n io u s ' m etaphorica l and fa n ta s tic  
a c tiv ity  [...] not rea lized In th e  fra m e w o rk  o f ra tiona l logic bu t in 
'com m on sense' (sensus com m unis) th ro u g h  w h ich  we c o n tin u a lly  
tran s fo rm  rea lity  in the  hum an  co n te x t by m eans o f 'fa n ta s tic ' 
co nce p ts ." [2 0 0 1 :1 0 0 ] B ut th e  w ork ing  o f  im a g in a tio n  as Grassi defines 
it, th ro u g h  re ferences p r im a r ily  to  th e  classical conceptua liza tions o f 
th is m en ta l capacity , sp ring s  fro m  s im ilitu d e . Im a g in in g  is thus reduced 
to  a ra tio na l a lbe it insp ired  co n je c tu re  o f s im ila ritie s , and the pendu lum  
th a t im ag ina tion  is in K an tian  schem e o f th e  m ind , as a capacity equa lly  
close and rem ote  to  reason and senses, is m oved closer to  th e  m ore 
contro lled  end o f reason, th e  o rd e rly  crea tion  as opposed to  fa n ta s tic  
bliss, in  a b a nd on m e n t o f  V ico 's no tion  o f the  wildness o f  th is  
un tam ab le , te m p es tuo us  ca p a c ity  as reflected in  these  Vico's w ords : 
"F antasy co llects fro m  th e  senses and connects and enlarges to  
exaggera tion  the senso ry  e ffe c ts  o f na tu ra l appearances and m akes 
lum inous im ages fro m  th e m , in o rd e r to  sudden ly  b lind  the  m ind  w ith  
ligh tn ing  bolts and th e re b y  to  co n ju re  up hum an passions in the  ring ing  
and th u n d e r o f th is a s to n is h m e n t."  [G rassi, 2 0 0 1 :7 ]
Grassi re ta ins  the lin k  o f im a g in a tio n  to  freedom  as the  fundam enta l 
p rinc ip le  o f o u r ex is tence  in  th e  w orld , freedom  to  c rea te  and recrea te  
[2 0 0 1 :1 0 1 ] b u t h is ana lys is  shuns aw ay fro m  the  darkness o f 
im a g in a tio n , from  its  excess w hich  explodes in newness beyond any 
ra tiona l con jectura l m ech an ism . A rend t's  m ost e laborate  note  on 
im a g in a tio n  also rem ains v e ry  m uch tied to  th a t, in te llec tu a lis tic  and 
ra tio n a lis tic  concept o f  im a g in a tio n . I t  is only in the  sca tte red  
obse rva tions  e lsew here  (Lying in Politics) th a t h e r thoughts b e tra y  a 
g lance in to  th a t w h ich  H e idegger calls 'th e  abyss o f im a g in a tio n ,' 
im a g in a tio n  as o th e r th a n  ra tio n a lity . In  th a t sense, A re nd t's  th in k in g  o f
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im a g in a tio n  genea log ica lly  relates ra th e r to  K an t and Heidegger th a n  
th e  g re a t and u lt im a te ly  o p tim is tic  tra d itio n  o f classical hum anism .
H ow ever, w hile  th e  w o rk  so fa r presents the reading o f Hannah A rend t's  
th o u g h t, w ha t fo llow s th e re o f can on ly  p a rtly  be regarded as reading of, 
m uch  m ore is i t  reading from  A rendt inso far w h a t is read here -  has 
n e v e r ac tua lly  been w r itte n  by A rend t. W ha t is there  is ra th e r a 
co nste lla tion  o f  fra g m e n ts  and in tu itions, m o s tly  unconnected, which do  
be long  to  A rend t's  th o u g h t and w ork bu t rem a in  on the  m arg ins as is 
o fte n  th e  case w ith  those  thoughts th a t the  a u th o r herse lf fa ils  to  read 
th ro u g h  and th u s  sentences them  to  o b liv io n  o r silence o f h e r 
in te rp re te rs .
In  th a t sense, th is  ch a p te r presents m ethodo log ica lly  som eth ing  o f an 
excursus. I t  is not an in te rp re ta tive  reconstruction  but an a tte m p t to  
read from  and beyond A rend t's  p ro ject w ith  the  aid o f d im ensions 
m e re ly  in tu ited  by A re n d t although, if  w orked th rough, th e y  w ould 
s tren g the n  the  p ro je c t as a whole and deve lop its  a lm ost inconspicuous 
philosophical d im ens ion .
N am ely , it is w ide ly  held by Arendt scholarsh ip  th a t A rendt's  theo ry  o f  
ju d g m e n t was m eant to  crown the e n tire  opus as the  concept o f 
ju d g m e n t in A rend t's  understand ing , d raw n by and large fro m  Kant, 
linked  to g e th e r th e  u n iversa l and the p a rticu la r, the  world o f ideas and 
th e  w orld  o f appearances, the  necessary and the  spontaneous. Some 
A re n d t's  s ta te m e n ts  on h e r w ork add itiona lly  p rop  up th is reading o f h e r 
w o rk  on ju d g m e n t. I t  is undlsputable th a t A re nd t considered ju d g m e n t 
m o s t political o f a ll facu lties  and th e re fo re  m o s t re levan t fo r th e  
d iscussion o f the  source o f politica l ac tion .
Som e o f the  po ten tia ls  and lim ita tions o f th a t th e o ry  were explored in 
th e  previous c h a p te r in o rd e r to  argue th a t ju d g m e n t could close th e  
conceptua l gap betw een hum an mind and the  w orld , betw een th o u g h t 
and deed no m o re  th e n  th e  o the r tw o  facu lties o f th ink ing  and w illing  
cou ld . On the one hand, e ve ry  occurrence o f a c tion  as a coincidence o f 
th o u g h t and e v e n t in th e  w orld  is an e xp lic it re fu ta tio n  o f th is  dua lism . 
Yet, as A rend t a rgued, philosophy found a w ay around th is by  
in troduc ing  a d iv ide  be tw een  the tw o  aspects o r tw o  d im ensions o f 
a c tion , archein  and prattein, to  In itia te  and to  d o /execu te . [HC, 2 2 2 ] 
In it ia tin g  is re la ted  to  kn o w in g /th in k in g , w hereas action  is reduced to  
m ere  rea lisa tion  o f  th o u g h t. Hence it b y  itse lf is void o f any m eaning, 
its m eaning is exte rna lized  and placed in th e  idea to  w h ich  action  
m odels the  rea lity . I t  has been pointed o u t th a t th e  principal im p lica tion  
o f th e  conceptua l gap between th ink ing  and action  is th e  
m eaninglessness o f the  e n tire  political sphere as the  sphere o f action. 
The p rim ary  concern  o f  philosophy th e n  m u s t be th a t w hich  re ta ins 
m ean ing , the  idea, which how ever is located o u ts id e  the  po litica l. The 
po litica l on th e  o th e r hand becomes a v e ry  m arginal a ffa ir  fo r  
ph ilosophy. Political consequences are p o te n tia lly  even g raver - 
free do m  becomes only an op tion  o f co n te m p la tive  life, active  life  w hich 
also is a fo rm  hum an ex is tence  in the w orld  is destined  to  the  absence
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o f freedom , its acto rs  a re  d isem pow ered to  change  the  w ay  th e y  live  
to g e th e r in th e  w orld . T h in k in g , on th e  o th e r hand, d ivorced fro m  th e  
w orld  lapses in to  no th ing ne ss  o f u n lim ite d  p oss ib ilities  o f abs trac tion .
A re nd t's  d iscussion o f  ju d g m e n t c o n s titu te s  a n o th e r a tte m p t in th e  
h is to ry  o f ph ilosoph ica l e ffo r t to  overcom e th is  dua lism . T ra d itio n a lly , 
ph ilosophy has seen in  ju d g m e n t as a n o th e r conceptua l puzzle , 
a longside  action, in s o fa r it  could n o t have been confined e n tire ly  to  one 
o r  th e  o ther rea lm , e ith e r  to  the  ide a tio n a l o r  to  the  phenom ena l 
spheres. In  ju d g m e n t, th e  dua lism  o f fo rm  and  m a tte r  is overcom e in 
th e  coincidence o f the  p a rticu la r, th a t com es fro m  th e  sensible w o rld , 
and the  universa l, th a t belongs to  th e  w orld  o f  ideas. Bring ing to g e th e r 
ju d g m e n t and action  w ou ld  then  have  the  p o te n tia l o f  closing th e  
conceptua l d iv ide  be tw een  acting and th in k in g , fo rm  and m a tte r , 
p a rtic u la r and u n ive rsa l. B u t the p rev ious  c h a p te r has exposed the  
lim ita tio n s  o f ju d g m e n t as a source o f  ac tion  - ju d g m e n t does not a ffo rd  
th e  sighting  o f th e  new .
T h is  chap ter is th u s  g u ided  by an in tu ite d  possible  tra il in A re nd t's  
w ritin g , in A rend tian  scho larsh ip  m o s tly  in ta c t po te n tia l o f som e  
sca tte red  frag m en ts  o f th o u g h t o r th e  th o u g h t in frag m en ts . Reading 
fro m  Arendt and beyond , it  shall n o t and c a n n o t suggest th a t A re n d t 
w ou ld  have fo llow ed th e  tra il.  N everthe less it w ill seek to  develop th e  
p o te n tia l o f the in tu itio n s  and th e ir  im p lica tio n s  b y  contrasting  A re n d t's  
unsystem atic  o bse rva tion s  w ith  H e idegger's  w ork  on th e  
'transcendenta l p ow er o f  im a g in a tio n ' as th e  ro o t o f all cogn ition  and 
th e n  by co rre la ting  th e  uncovered to  C asto riad is ' 'd iscovery o f  
im a g ina tion .' W hat shou ld  fo llow  fro m  th e  excursus is n e ith e r a 
sys tem atic  nor com p re he ns ive  d iscussion o f th e  concept o f im a g in a tio n  
b u t an opening to  a d if fe re n t p h ilosophy and a d iffe re n t position  o f 
th in k in g  of the p o litica l w ith in  th a t new  p h ilosophy, recognized in th e  
concept o f im a g in a tio n  and pursued th ro u g h  A re nd t's  in tu itions  and 
C astoriad is ' th eo re tica l e xp lo ra tio n s .
The im portance o f th is q u e s tio n  by and large o ve rrid e s  its philosoph ica l 
co n te x t. This in q u iry  co inc ides w ith  th e  q ue stion  o f w h e th e r we have  
th e  capacity th a t w ould im p ly  th a t o u r fre e d o m  rem ains o u r ina lienab le  
capacity  despite h is to rica l instances o f c losu res, even to ta l closures 
such as to ta lita ria n ism , o f spaces fo r  a c tion , and th a t th is  capacity  can 
be contained bu t n o t e x te rm in a te d  fro m  hum an  c o m m u n ity . Yet a ny  
m ean ing fu l co nce p tu a liza tion  o f th e  source  o f a c tion  a t the  sam e tim e  
m u s t take into  a ccount th e  fa c t th a t th e re  is a c tion  sometimes  and 
som etim es -  the re  s im p ly  is not. In  o th e r  w o rds , the  question  o r  the  
p rob lem  m ust be posed o u ts id e  o r  beyond th e  causal fram ew orks  o f 
w o rld -un de rs tan d in g . A t th e  sam e tim e , since th e  question  is posed 
fro m  w ith in  the space occup ied  o r c la im ed  by A re n d t's  th ink ing  o f th e  
p o litica l, the  concept to  fil l th e  pos ition  o f th e  source  o f action  w ith in  
th a t space is requ ired  to  observe  th e  tw o  fu n d a m e n ta l requ irem en ts  -  
the  princip le  o f freedom  in a c tion  as th e  o rig in a tio n  o f the new and th e  
basic hum an cond ition  o f p lu ra lity .
1 5 7
R epresentational d im ension o f im agination
A re nd t's  fra g m e n t on im agination, published as appendix to  h e r 
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, has n o t d raw n much a tte n tio n  o f  
h e r in te rp re te rs . In  his in te rp re ta tio n  o f the  Lectures, Beiner seems to  
accen tua te  th e  im portance  o f th is  piece b u t p rim a rily  as 'a n  
ind ispensable piece in th e  puzzle ' o f reconstruc ting  'th e  full con tours  o f 
A rend t's  th e o ry  o f ju d g in g /  [LKPP, 7 9 ] N am ely, A rendt's  dw e lling  on  
im ag ina tion  in th is  fra g m e n t o f the  sem ina r notes is re levan t o n ly  
inso fa r it p rovides the  background fo r  in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  ro le  o f 
im ag ina tion  in th e  process o f jud g in g  by re la ting  to  the  source o f K ant's  
d o c trin e  o f schem atism  in his F irst C ritique .
The frag m en t indeed e labora tes w ha t is said o f  im agination  in  th e  m a in  
body o f the Lectures: th ro u g h  im ag ina tion , w h a t is absent is m ade  
p resen t, w hich  m eans th a t im ag ina tion  is, as argued by A rend t, a 
'fa c u lty ' or, in th e  language o f th is  p ro je c t, a ca pa c ity  o f rep re sen ta tion  
w hich  allows th e  su b jec t o f im ag ina tion  a c e rta in  d istance from  th e  
im agined ob ject, the  d is tance  th a t A rend t via K ant finds essentia l fo r  
im p a rtia lity  o f ju d g m e n t, its un invo lvem en t w ith  th e  o b je c t w hich  is 
now  present n o t d ire c tly  b u t as an im age, an im p rin t on one 's  
consciousness. [LKPP, 6 7 ]
R epresenta tion  how ever is em ployed not o n ly  in th is  fu n c tio n  o f 
d is tancing  the  ju d g in g  su b je c t from  th e  o b je c t o f  ju d g m e n t bu t a lso  
underlies a no the r, m o s t po litica l d im ens ion  o f ju d g m e n t r  th e  
d is tancing  o f th e  su b je c t fro m  its  own se lf, a b s tra c tio n  from  th e  p riva te  
in te res ts  and cond itions and assum ption  o f an  in te rsu b je c tive  pos ition . 
A rend t's  e labo ra tion  o f th e  concept o f com m on sense in th e  Lectures, 
on page 67 w here  she a lso  discusses im a g in a tio n , would suggest th a t 
com m on sense is, a longside im a g in a tio n , a n o th e r capacity  em ployed in  
ju d g in g , w hereby it  is im p lied  th a t th e  tw o  a re  d iffe re n t and separa te . 
In  her discussion o f en larged m e n ta lity , how eve r, A rendt e x p lic it ly  
evokes the  'fo rce  o f im a g in a tio n ' to  ca ll in to  presence no t o n ly  that 
which  is absent b u t a lso  those who a re  a bse n t: " i t  m akes th e  o the rs  
p resent and thus m oves in a space th a t is p o te n tia lly  public, open to  a ll 
sides... To th in k  w ith  an en larged  m e n ta lity  m eans th a t one tra in s  one 's  
im ag ina tion  to  go  v is it in g ."  [LKPP, 4 3 ] In  o th e r w ords, com m on sense 
and im agination  do  not re la te  as tw o  independen t capacities necessary 
fo r ju d g m e n t b u t w ith o u t th e  rep resen ta tiona l p ow er o f im a g in a tio n , 
com m on sense w ould  n o t be possible a t a ll.
As it has been argued in th e  previous ch a p te r, enlarged m e n ta lity  
canno t be equated w ith  e m p a th y  bu t n e ith e r is it  to  be understood  as 
an in terna lized 'p e rfo rm a n c e ' o f pub lic d e lib e ra tio n  though  A re n d t does 
speak o f 'p o te n tia lly  pub lic  space .' The voices th a t  com e to  th e  su b je c t 
th ro ug h  the exercise o f en la rged  m e n ta lity  are n o t voices o th e r th an  its  
own se lf because the  ju d g in g  se lf is noth ing b u t co nstitu te d  by com m on  
sense, w hich m akes one 's  ju d g m e n t public ra th e r than  personal. 
T herefo re  im ag ina tion  is th e  m en ta l fa cu lty  th a t s itua tes m an  in th e  
w orld  even in th e  cond ition  o f so litude  and th us , as it has been argued
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th ro u g h o u t, renders  th e  e n tire  d iscourse o f  sovereign s u b je c tiv ity  
m eaning less.
B u t th is  func tion  o f  im a g in a tio n  is not confined to  th e  process o f ju d g in g  
o n ly . C ontrary to  B e iner's  in te rp re ta tio n , im a g in a tio n  can be seen in a 
c o n te x t w id e r th a n  th e o ry  o f ju d g m e n t, and  th is  is dem anded by 
A re nd t's  w ork  ta ke n  as a w ho le , including th e  fragm ents o r  sca tte red  
obse rva tions  on im a g in a tio n . Those w ere  incorpora ted  in th e  a u th o r's  
w o rk  published d u rin g  h e r  life , as opposed to  th e  seem ingly rounded up 
p iece on im a g in a tio n  in B e ine r's  e d itio n  w hich how ever was ra th e r an 
asse t o f c la rifica tio n  m e a n t fo r  a series o f lec tu res. Nam ely, A re nd t 
e x p lic it ly  reads K a n t to  a rg u e  th a t p ow er o f im ag ina tion , th ro u g h  its 
m a in  product th a t is schem a, is the  fu n d a m e n t o f  a ll com m un ica tion  
and a ll cogn ition , and th is  is th e  core o f  Kant's d oc trine  o f schem atism , 
w h ich  in tu rn  is th e  core  o f  K ant's  First Critique, above all, b u t it is a lso  
c ruc ia l fo r his Critique o f  Judgment, th ro ug h  th e  concept o f  exam ple  
and exem pla ry  v a lid ity .
In  te rm s  o f A rend t's  in te n tio n  w ith  th is  fra g m e n t, exclusive ly w ith in  th e  
c o n te x t o f the Lectures, B e ine r's  in te rp re ta tio n  Is how ever in no sense 
m islead  o r  c o u n te r- in tu it iv e . A rend t ske tches o u t a ra th e r rough  
a ccount o f schem atism , rush in g  to  estab lish  a c lea r and e v id en t link  
be tw een schema  and e x a m p le , w hich  a t th e  end o f her Lectures  is 
iden tified  as the  p rin c ip a l and fu nd am e n ta l no rm a tive  standard  o f 
ju d g m e n t. In  the  schem a th a t is produced by im ag ina tion , concept as 
the  m ost abs trac t u n ive rsa l b lends w ith  in tu itio n  as the  m o s t concrete  
pa rticu la r. To recognize th e  p a rticu la r as ju s t that, to  u tte r  a ny  s ig n ifie r, 
f in a lly  -  to  see that w hen look ing  a t th e  m u ltitu d e  o f  various particu la rs  
and to  be able to  re la te  i t  to  the  specific  ling u is tic  fo rm  as th e  s ig n ifie r 
fo r  ju s t  that bu t a lso  any such  ju s t that, there  m u s t be "in  th e  back o f 
o u r m inds a 'sch e m a ' w hose  'shape ' is charac te ris tic  o f m an y  such 
p a rtic u la rs ." [LKPP, 8 3 ] As th is  schem a is essentia l fo r all percep tion  
and a ll cogn ition, so is it v ita l fo r com m un ica tion :
This schem atic  shape  is in the  back o f th e  m inds of m any 
d iffe ren t people... a ll s ing le  agreem ents o r  d isagreem ents 
presuppose th a t w e  a re  ta lk ing  about th e  sam e th ing -  
th a t we, w ho  a re  m a n y , agree , com e toge ther, on  
som ething th a t is o n e  and the sam e fo r a ll o f us. [LKPP,
83]
Here A rendt touches on th e  m o re  fundam enta l re la ting  o f co m m o n a lity  
o f com m on sense to  im a g in a tio n , w hich  is the source o f 
co m m un icab ility  -  im a g in a tio n  provides a person no t w ith  the  sense o f 
th e  com m on as th e  inescapab le  co nd itio n  o f the  person's ex istence in 
th e  w orld  but as c o n s titu tiv e  o f the  person 's ow n consciousness. This 
c lea rly  is the  aspect th a t is o f  g re a te s t in te res t to  A rendt in the  co n te x t 
o f h e r theo ry  o f ju d g m e n t.
The possib ility  th a t im a g in a tio n  underlies  a ll cogn ition  also d re w  
H eidegger to  Kant's  d o c trin e  o f schem atism . In  Kant and the Problem o f
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Metaphysics,116 H e idegger w orks th rough  p rim a rily  the  firs t ed ition  o f 
th e  F irs t C ritique  to  d em on s tra te  inter alia th a t cogn itive  faculties are  
a ll roo ted  in im a g in a tio n .
A re n d t, d raw ing  on Kant's  Critique o f Pure Reason, a ttr ib u te s  to  
im a g in a tio n  as a m en ta l faculty  its  g rounding  o f all percep tion , 
co gn itio n  and co m m un ica tion . This e n tire ly  coincides w ith  and 
corresponds to  H eidegger's in te rp re ta tion  o f Kant, m ore so than  to  
K a n t's  own reading o f his ow n work. N am ely, as Heidegger noted, th e  
second edition  o f the  F irst C ritique testifies  to  Kant's abandonm ent o f 
h is o rig in a l unders tand ing  o f im agination. [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 1 5 ] H e idegger 
h o w e ve r by and large ignores Kant's decision and considers th e  o rig in a l 
concep tua liza tion  o f im a g in a tio n  essential fo r  his en tire  p ro je c t and 
c ruc ia l fo r  unders tand ing  o f the  earlier w ritte n  Being and Time.
A lth o u g h  Heidegger's lec tu res  on Kant appeared o n ly  a fte r Being and  
Time, H eidegger rem arked  th a t they should be read as th e  p ro p e r 
in tro d u c tio n  to  his e a rlie r w ork. As the  t i t le  suggests, H eidegger's 
read ing  o f the F irs t C ritiq ue  is not guided by an In ten tion  to  reco ns tru c t 
'th e o ry  o f know ledge ' b u t the  in tu ition  th a t in th is  Critique Kant 
estab lishes th e  ground o f m etaphysics.117 As H eidegger exp la ins, 'th e  
p ro b le m  o f m e ta p h ys ics ' is the problem  o f th e  possibility  o f  
m etaphys ics , and Kant's discussion o f the  possib ility  o f  a priori 
s y n th e tic  ju d g m e n ts  is p recise ly an in q u iry  in to  th e  poss ib ility  o f  
m etaphys ics  re in te rp re te d  as fundam enta l o n to lo g y , the science o f 
being o f the beings. In  Heidegger's reading o f  Kant, the  poss ib ility  o f 
fo rm in g  'a  priori syn th e tic  ju d g m e n ts ' is essentia l fo r on to log ica l 
know ledge  as the  know ledge o f the 'B e ing  o f be ing s ' o r o f th e  being as 
such, regardless o f the  spec ific ity  o f each p a rticu la r being, [H e idegger, 
1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :5 -6 ] w hich  is the  task o f fu nd am e n ta l on to logy  th a t 
H e idegger is co ns truc tin g  in  his w ritings.
A t th is  point o f the  a rg u m e n t, it may be necessary to  s ta te  th a t it is o f 
no re levance fo r  th is  w o rk  to  establish to  w h a t e x ten t H eidegger 
trespasses the boundaries o f in te rp re ta tion  and ins trum enta lizes Kant's 
w o rk  fo r the  purposes o f his own p ro ject, w ith o u t respect fo r  th e  le tte r  
and the  sp irit o f  the  Critique  and d isregard ing  Kant's ow n  'Kehre' 
betw een  the f irs t and the  second ed ition . W hat is im p orta n t here is to  
understand  w here  H eidegger's  in te rp re ta tio n  takes him , how th is  
corresponds w ith  A re nd t's  in tu ited  understand ing  o f  im agination  and 
fin a lly  how the tw o  conceptua liza tions o f im a g in a tio n  part w ays.
H eidegger is aw are  o f th e  im portance  o f the  m ove  th a t he is p reparing  
to  ta k e , reading Kant a g a in s t Kantian ism , as it  flow s d irec tly  from  his
116 A series of lectures which followed after the publication of Being end Time where 
already in the Introduction Heidegger referred to Kant's doctrine of schematism as Kant's 
(undeveloped) intimation of th e  fundam ental connection betw een '1 th ink 'and tim e.
117 This distinction refers to the debate  between neo-Kantians and their epistemological 
interpretation of Kant and H eidegger's insistence on the ontological core meaning of the  
First Critique, the m ost famous disputation taking place in Davos between Casirrer and 
Heidegger. See Appendix IV to  Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 193-207.
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m ethod , indebted to  p henom eno logy  as o u tlin e d  in  Being and  Tim e: "To  
th e  th ings  th e m se lve s !" [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 8 ] He is inqu iry ing  about the  
poss ib ility  o f th e  know ledge  o f  the  e ssen tia l b u t he does so a fte r having  
grasped the fa tig u e  o f th e  tra d itio n  th a t p u rp o rte d  to  the  sam e in q u iry  
w ith  a t best ind iffe re nce  and a t w o rs t -  c o n te m p t fo r  existence. 
H eidegger's insistence on  g iv ing  e q u a l w e ig h t to  reason and senses 
th ro u g h o u t the  d iscussion o f im a g in a tio n  as th e  pow er th a t unites the  
tw o  reflects his e ffo rt to  abandon th e  d e a d -en ds  o f ph ilosoph ica l 
tra d itio n , which insisted on the  q ue st fo r th e  m eaning o f  ex istence 
w ith o u t ever touch ing  e x is ten ce  itse lf.
H eidegger exposes w h a t he considers th e  m ost o rig ina l and 
fundam enta l fin d ing  o f  K ant's  w ork : th a t  th e  p oss ib ility  o f  a priori o r 
on to log ica l know ledge lies in the  p ow er o f im a g in a tio n . As fa r  as Kant's 
own w ork is concerned , he points to  the  tran scen d en ta l pow er o f 
im ag ina tion  as the  m e d ia to r  betw een in tu it io n  and understand ing  th a t 
are the  tw o  e lem ents o f know ledge . H e id e g g e r ins is ts  how ever th a t the  
f irs t edition  o f the  w o rk  a ttr ib u te s  to  im a g in a tio n  m ore  than  a m ed ia ting  
s ta tu s : it is not ju s t  a n o th e r, connecting  e le m e n t o f know ledge equal to  
the  o th e r tw o , b u t is p rim a ry  to  th e m . Both th e  possib ility  o f in tu itio n  
and o f understand ing as w e ll as th e ir  m u tu a l connection  a re  rooted in 
th e  transcendenta l p o w e r o f im a g in a tio n . As such, transcenden ta l 
pow er o f im agination  is th e  g round o f 'th e  e ssen tia l un ity  o f on to log ica l 
know ledge ,' [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 3 7 ] th a t is -  th e  g ro u n d  o f understand ing  th e  
Being onto log ica lly , p r io r  to  and p rim a ry  to  a n y th in g  received th ro u g h  
th e  perception o f beings in  th e ir  m u ltitu d e .
Kant's 'tu rn ' betw een th e  tw o  e d ition s  o f  th e  F irs t C ritique  how ever 
invo lves, as H eidegger does m ake  e x p lic it , K a n t's  abandonm en t o f th is  
idea o f im ag ina tion  as th e  roo t o f in tu it io n  and  understand ing  and 
re tre a t to  'p u re  re a so n ' o r  u nd e rs ta nd in g  w h ich  assum es th is  
founda tiona l ro le  o f im a g in a tio n : "T h e  tra n sce n d e n ta l pow er o f 
im ag ina tion  no lon ge r fu n c tio n s  as in d e p e n d e n t g round ing  fa cu lty , 
m ed ia ting  in an o rig in a l w a y  betw een s e n s ib ility  and understand ing  in 
th e ir  possible u n ity . R a the r, th is  in te rm e d ia te  fa c u lty  now fa lls , so to  
speak, between th e  tw o  se pa ra te  g round ing  sources o f th e  m ind . I ts  
fu nc tio n  is re legated to  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g ."  [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 1 5 ]
H eidegger relates th is  K a n t's  tu rn  to  th e  cha llenge  th a t im a g in a tio n  as 
th e  foundation  o f reason w ould p re se n t fo r  the  entire  h is to ry  o f 
philosophy. H istory o f ph ilosophy is a h is to ry  o f the  suprem acy o f 
reason over se ns ib ility , and im a g in a tio n  in K a n t's  understand ing  is 
associated w ith  in tu itio n  o r  s e n s ib ility : "W h a t is to  happen w ith  the  
venerab le  tra d itio n , a ccord ing  to  w hich  Ratio and Logos have  claim ed 
the  centra l fu nc tio n  In th e  h is to ry  o f m e ta ph ys ics? " [H e idegger, 
1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 1 7 ] In  o th e r w o rd s , im a g in a tio n  as th e  g round o f reason 
w ould  m ean th a t reason is roo ted  in th e  'b a s e r fa c u lty : ' "H ow  is the  
baser facu lty  o f s e n s ib ility  to  be ab le  to  c o n s titu te  the essence o f 
reason? Does n o t e v e ry th in g  fa ll in to  co n fu s ion  i f  th e  low est takes the  
place o f  th e  h ighest? " [H e id e g g e r, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 1 7 ] This p resents the  
core  o f the  prob lem  w h ich  Kant e nco un te re d  fro m  w ith in  the  long
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tradition of philosophers' celebration of Reason ever since Plato: if 
Reason is rooted in imagination which unites reason with senses, the 
medium of non-appearing, eternal and absolute essences with 
receptivity of mere, illusory experience of the worldly chaos, then the 
Reason is degraded as the instrument through which men could be 
guided beyond ephemera and the fundamental understanding of men 
as rational beings, through reason as their d iffe ren tia  specifica , must be 
abandoned as well.
In  that sense, Heidegger's insistence on what he considers the original 
Kant's discovery is a rebellion against the 'tyranny of reason' as the 
source of the ontological knowledge in the philosophical tradition, which 
takes the form of theory of imagination. The implications reach beyond 
the possibility of the understanding of essences. Namely, Heidegger 
relates his findings on imagination to Kantian practical reason and thus 
to practical philosophy as a whole. Kant's doctrine of schematism, to 
which the concept of imagination is fundamental, is found both in his 
discussion of pure reason as in his practical philosophy ( C ritique o f  
Judgm ent). Just as a p r io r i synthetic judgments, so do aesthetic 
judgments present Kant with the difficulty of linking concepts, which 
unite many particulars in its oneness, to intuitions, which correspond to 
the multitude of particulars. What brings them into relation which 
subsumes many diverse intuitions as representation that affect the 
mind under one and the same concept? In response, Kant develops the 
concept of schema, which is the product of imagination, that relates the 
two. Thus also in aesthetic judgment imagination mediates between the 
universal rules of reason and aesthetic experiences.
As to the practical reason, which is concerned with ethical conduct, 
Kant adamantly excludes the working of imagination. Practical reason is 
principled on the categorical imperative, the law that is, and the moral 
o u g h t leaves no space for the unpredictable and the contingent, which 
is the proper m atter of imagination. But Heidegger, in a brief section, 
explains how practical reason just as the pure must be rooted in the 
transcendental power of imagination. Namely, the moral law is a m atter 
of 'pure spontaneity' (in the sense of self-affecting, self-determinatin, 
contrary to the reception or 'suffering' of external influence) insofar it is 
given by reason to itself. Moral law thus corresponds to pure concepts 
of pure reason, also coming from reason to itself. The respect for the 
moral law must then be pure receptivity, which corresponds to pure 
intuition insofar the subject does not receive the respected law from the 
outside but from within, from pure reason that gives the law to itself. 
Having demonstrated that, at least originally, Kant postulates that pure 
spontaneity and pure receptivity are united in the common root, which 
is the transcendental power of imagination, Heidegger concludes that 
practical reason would also have to be grounded in the transcendental 
power of imagination.
Since Kant demonstrated that the third mental capacity, that of 
judgm ent, is entirely predicated on imagination, what follows from  
Heidegger's 'violent' interpretation of Kant is therefore unity of the
•«a
1 6 2
Kantian architecture of mind through transcendental power of 
imagination.
What Heidegger explicated through the interpretation of Kant, Arendt 
performs implicitly, through her phenomenological analysis of the three  
faculties. I t  has already been observed that her notes on judgm ent 
base that capacity on imagination as the power to represent what is 
absent. The same is true of the other two capacities. As it was observed 
in Chapter Four, thinking is predicated on remembrance, which is a 
specific type of representing/recaDing of the occurrences in the past. 
Willing on the other hand, in the same chapter, is projecting into the  
future, which entails placing before the mind something that is absent, 
in other words -  presenting to the m ind:
Every m ental act rests on the mind's faculty of having 
present to itself what is absent from the senses. Re­
presentation, m aking present w hat is actually absent, is 
the mind's unique gift, and since our whole terminology Is 
based on metaphors drawn from  vision's experience, this 
gift is called im a g in a tio n ... [L M /I:7 5 -7 6 ]
Namely, imagination as the power to represent is crucial to all m ental 
operations insofar mind never deals directly w ith objects but only with 
their representations received through intuitions:
... all our intuition is nothing but the representation of 
phenomena... W hat may be the nature of objects 
considered as things in themselves and without reference 
to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to 
us. We know nothing more than our own mode of 
perceiving them... [Kant, 2 0 0 3 :3 5 ]
W hat follows thereof for Kant, as for Heidegger and Arendt (with the 
caveat that Arendt and Heidegger are not concerned with knowledge in 
the sense of science, the search for truth therefore, but rather the 
understanding as the quest for m eaning), is that all knowing is 
representing, insofar all knowledge is based on received intuitions of 
the given that are representations, not presentations. [Kant, 2 0 03 :1 ] 
This is the meaning of Heidegger's concept of finitude in his 
interpretation of Kant -  the closure of the mind in the framework of the  
already given, the inability of mind to  give to  itself the object of 
intuition and to know it directly, without mediation of representation -  
"inner dependency of thinking upon intuition," [Heidegger, 
1929 /1997 :41 ] which is a representation o f the objectively or 
materially present.
That all mental powers are predicated on our power to represent w hat 
is absent is not equal to reducing mind to imagination. Arendt strongly 
and explicitly opposed any reductionism in understanding man or 
anything of man outside the fundamental human condition of plurality: 
What is so rem arkable in all these theories and doctrines 
is their implicit monism, the claim th at behind the 
obvious plurality o f man's faculties and abilities, there
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must exist a oneness -  the old hen pan, 'the all is one' -  
either a single source or a single ruler. [L M /I:70 ]
But while all three capacities are interdependent and while Arendt seeks 
to evade monism, as does Heidegger [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :9 8 ], the order of 
priority can nevertheless be established: the power of representation or 
imagination preconditions all mental activity. Neither thinking nor 
willing nor judging are imagining or about imagining only but are only 
possible through imagining. Thereof the peculiar, dynamic though not 
determinative, relationship of imagination to other mental activities, 
engendered by the peculiar position of imagination as it "does not 
belong to the realm of logos, which presupposes it."118 [Castoriadis, 
1997:242]
Arendt finds that this "peculiar nonconnectedness [of transcendental 
power of imagination] to the being" [Heidegger, 1 9 29 /1 9 97 :9 1 ]  
establishes a very close relationship between imagination and 
metaphysics as the philosophical project of transcending the given and 
grasping that which is not materially present, the essences behind the  
existents. Arendt further observes that it is this ability of imagination, 
"to make present to the mind what is absent from sense perception" 
that places it at the heart of metaphysics which seeks to capture a 
"glimpse of the nonvisible," which is the reality that does not appear, 
the reality of Being behind appearances.119 [LKPP, 80]
Imagination therefore occupies this extraordinary position in-between  
of mental faculties. This In-betweenness is the simultaneous 'receptive 
spontaneity' and 'spontaneous receptivity' of imagination, its being an 
intuition that however intuits without the need for the presence of the 
intuitable, that is -  of phenomena or beings, while at the same time 
attaching to the multitude of the intuited an abstract unity of a concept, 
which allows existents to be observed and recognized as units of a 
certain genus or category. [Heidegger, 1929 /1 9 97 :9 0 -9 1 ]
But Heidegger also intuits one other potential of imagination when he 
writes of Kant's notion of 'formative power' or the faculty of forming, 
asserting that imagination is " a faculty which is not dependent upon 
the presence of the intuitable, it fulfills itself, i.e ., it creates and forms 
the image." [Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :9 1 ] W hat Heidegger touches on 
here is the unique capacity of imagination not simply to reproduce what 
has already been stored in memory (representation) nor to connect 
(association and comparison), therefore not its function of a bond 
between the given, the present, but its ability to present what is not.
118 Castoriadis further elaborates this peculiar position of imagination in history of 
philosophy. While Plato, reducing imagination to 'imaging' that is imitation of ideational 
forms, places it under the sway of reason, both Aristotle and Kant associated it with 
sense/intuition.
119 Arendt's note succinctly recapitulates the whole of Heidegger's project in the 
interpretation of Kant -  to lead philosophizing away from metaphysics, which is 
concerned with the Other or the Beyond of the material reality as a whole, to ontology, as 
Arendt says -  "the science of Being" or the understanding of the being/existence of 
beings.
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Imagination thus enables us to transcend reality, hence Heidegger's 
consistent reference, not to imagination but to the 'transcendental 
power of im agination/ suggesting therefore th a t imagination is the 'root 
of transcendence/ [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 3 7 ]
At the same tim e, the power of transcendence also renders the 
relationship between metaphysics and imagination ambivalent insofar 
metaphysics is not concerned with the beyond of phenomenal reality in 
the pursuit of the non-being but in the quest for Being, that which is 
the true and eternal, ever-present in the beings appearing in the world, 
mutating, finally disappearing. Imagination however produces images, 
which are neither particles o f objective, phenomenal reality nor eternal 
essences but mediating between these two 'rea lities / Images are no 
longer lasting than beings, often less. They are elusive and fluid. This 
means that "imagination both empowers and inhibits the metaphysical 
drive to presence." [Sallis, 1995:7] I t  is an instrument of metaphysics 
insofar it reaches the invisible but at the same tim e, it Is an instrument 
th at refutes the drive of metaphysical inquiry, "the ideal of presence," 
[Sallis, 1995:27] by its blurring of the distinction between the present 
and the non-present.
The workings of imagination are peculiar and possibly even inherently 
contradictory, unless we settle for two types of imagination as 
Castoriadis proposes in his D iscovery o f  the  Im a g in a tio n . [Castoriadis, 
1997 :2 1 3 -2 4 5] The definite article in the title  already suggests that 
Castoriadis' purpots to deal with the  imagination properly so, 
imagination as a creative power, which Castoriadis opposes to 
imagination that merely represents. Yet it m ay be that such sharp 
distinction is useful only analytically and one should not let it slip out of 
sight that imagination is never e ither/or -  it represents in order to 
recreate, it recreates when representing.
Castoriadis explains this problematized/problematic role of imagination 
in philosophy through its dualistic nature. Metaphysics instrumentalizes 
representational imagination but it also seeks to reduce imagination to 
th at instrumental role as a means to 'occultation' of 'radical 
im agination/ [Castoriadis, 1997:214] Just as Kant shun away from  
primacy of imagination to understanding or reason, so did Aristotle -  
from imagination not as a power to represent but as a power to bring to 
sight that which has never been and m ay never be.120
Imagination thus stands beyond affirmation and negation. While its 
representational or reproductive power may be the instrument or, as 
Heidegger argues, the 'roo t' which is the predicate of all workings of the 
mind, imagination is not reduced to recollecting and reordering 
representations of reality. Transcendental power of imagination which 
Heidegger foregrounds then is not exhausted in the ability of human
120 Castoriadis however emphasizes that Aristotle nevertheless suggested how 
imagination was neither thought nor sense insofar both thought and sense fell under the 
laws of truth and falsity, whereas true and false were meaningless categories for both the 
fabric and the fruits of imagination. [Castoriadis, 1997:242]
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beings to near the 'Being' behind the reality of appearance, to  bring the 
being that already is, though invisibly, to some mode of presence. I t  is 
not about transcending the present as the phenomenal but the present 
as the given. That imagination is the ability of man to be independent 
of givenness or detemninacy of the present, unmediated and mediated, 
in Castoriadis' economy of the term, which is the definition of freedom.
Thus what Castoriadis recognizes as a "scandal of imagination" 
[1 9 9 7 :24 5 ] is inextricably tied with what Arendt diagnoses as 
'embarrassment' of philosophy with the possibility of occurrence of the  
new in the world, against the laws of necessity and causality. 
[L M /II:29-30] Expanding our discussion of imagination at this point in 
order to include Castoriadis' work is therefore not justified only by 
Castoriadis' autonomous theoretical treatm ent of imagination but also 
by this connection between his and Arendt's thought of freedom, the 
connection that Castoriadis never explicitly acknowledged but which has 
been elegantly uncovered and explored in Linda Zerilli's piece on the  
'problem of the new.' [2 0 0 2 ] That connection points to the common 
ground between the two theorists that the problem of imagination 
should be read as the problem of freedom insofar imagination is the  
source of freedom within human being.
Originary dimension of imagination
Genealogy of the concept of imagination according to Castoriadis is the  
history of its 'occultation' in the mainstream philosophical tradition 
which is "the elaboration of Reason, homologous to the positing of 
being as being-determined, or determinacy." Even when the concept of 
imagination which resists this detemninacy bursts into the works of 
philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant, [Castoriadis, 1997:213] the 
problem is solved through its subordination to a higher capacity, as 
Heidegger demonstrated in his interpretation of Kant. As to Heidegger's 
attem pt to systematically develop the concept of imagination beyond 
the silence of tradition, Castoriadis acknowledges that Heidegger's work 
on Kant reopened the question but that this re-discovery ends up in 
silencing of the question. [Castoriadis, 1997:215]
Namely, Heidegger does not omit to acknowledge what he considers to 
be a 'productive' quality o f imagination, which must be distinguished 
from its reproductive or representational capacity. But Heidegger's 
productive imagination is also distinct from Castoriadis' creative 
imagination. In Heidegger's interpretation of mental powers, 
imagination is Intuition, therefore creative imagination would 
necessarily be creative intuition. However Heidegger argues that such 
intuition could be attributable only to a non-finite, divine being insofar it 
does not intuit the given Intuitable but "creates the being itself in the 
intuiting." [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :92 ] By contrast, productivity of imagination does 
not of itself give reality to its presentations, it does not materialize 
them, It is not fabrication of the image in reality:
The productive power of imagination forms only the look 
of an object which is possible and which, under certain
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conditions, is perhaps also producible, i.e ., one which can 
be brought to presence. The imagining itself, however, 
never accomplishes this production. [Heidegger, 
1929 /1997 :92 ]
This explanation of the distinction between the productive and the 
creative imagination in Heidegger's discussion seems obvious to the 
point of being unnecessary. The fabric th at imagination uses in 
production is always already given, implies the prior existence of reality 
into which imagination inspires the potentiality of difference but only 
inspires, breathes-in, without ability to actually place something into it. 
Imagination does not give to the mind the objects of sensibility, the  
objects are already there.
But this is not to say that imagination does not give anything to reality. 
Imagination is not entirely cut off from reality, it communicates with 
reality although the imaginary is not real in the sense of being 
actual(ized). The workings of imagination are not bound by reality, they  
are neither determined nor caused. What is given by imagination 
breaks the confines of reality as the given. Im agination allows for 
relating what could be in and of this reality, thus opening the space for 
the new which cannot be reduced to either rearrangement of the  
existing or its negation. As Heidegger argues, being a mental capacity - 
imagination does not i ts e lf  produce or create. But Heidegger overlooks 
the fact that imagination originates or generates creation, which is not 
reality but comes about o r acquires reality through another human 
capacity -  action.
Unlike Heidegger, however, Arendt touched on this particular relating of 
imagination to reality, the relating wherefrom all causal determinations 
are absent in her observations on lying. The observations are indeed 
fragmentary and unsystematic, found in B e t w e e n  P ast and Future  and 
in the essay on the crisis over the Pentagon Papers and the problem of 
nontruthfulness o f politics. Yet they convey an important 'discovery' of 
Arendt's, a common root of the two occurrences of the public sphere, 
lying and acting: Both lying and acting are possible only because there  
is imagination: " In  other words, the deliberate denial of factual truth -  
the ability to lie -  and the capacity to change facts -  the ability to act -  
are interconnected; they owe their existence to the same source: 
imagination." [CR, 5]
In  th at sense, imagination is originary insofar it is conducive to the  
phenomenon which, as it was argued In Chapter Three, brings 
something new into the reality, places something that however is not 
an object into the world -  human action:
He [the liar] is an actor by nature; he says what is not so 
because he wants things to be different from  what they 
are -  that is, he wants to change the world. He takes 
advantage of the undeniable affinity of our capacity for 
action, for changing the reality, with this mysterious 
faculty of ours that enables us to say, "The sun is
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shining/' when it is raining cats and dogs. [...] In other 
words, our ability to lie [...] belongs among the few 
obvious, demonstrable data that confirm human freedom.
That we can change the circumstances under which we 
live at all is because we are relatively free from them and 
it is this freedom that is abused and perverted through 
mendacity. [BPF, 250]
Both lying and acting place human being among all beings in particular 
and unique relationship to reality as both the limit and the potential to 
be worked with. The distinction between lying and acting is grounded in 
the distinction between telling and doing the difference. Lying does not 
effect any difference nor does it change anything in the fabric of the 
world. I t  denies, often parodies and ridicules reality but never leaves a 
m ark on it. Action by contrast always spells change to the pattern of 
any given situation: "A characteristic of human action is that it always 
begins something new." [CR, 5]
By rooting acting, as lying, in imagination, Arendt in fact relates 
imagination and freedom, since action is the appearance of freedom in 
the world. Action is a manifestation of man's ability to be conditioned 
by his situation but not bound by it. But this ability to free ourselves or 
to be free from the given, as we see here, is indebted to the freedom of 
mind that rests in one of its faculties yet neither thinking nor willing nor 
judging on which Arendt's investigation in The L ife o f  The M ind  centred. 
The finding crucial for Arendt's inquiry into the source of action, and by 
and large ignored by the interpretive literature, is the conclusion that 
without freedom of the mind, which is imagination, practical freedom  
would not be possible either:
We are fre e  to change the world and to start something 
new in it. Without the mental freedom to deny or affirm  
existence, to say 'yes' or 'no' -  not just to statements or 
propositions in order to express agreement or 
disagreement, but to things as they are given, beyond 
agreement or disagreement, to our organs of perception 
and cognition -  no action would be possible, and action is 
of course the very stuff politics are made of. [CR, pp. 5-
6]
Imagination creates an opening for a break with reality by disclosing 
the contingent fabric which reality is made of. I t  uncovers the given as 
contingent by showing that "things might as well be different from what 
they actually are." [CR, p. 5] This is achieved through estrangem ent, a 
concept employed in literary theory to describe the deautomatization of 
perception. Around this concept, Victor Shklovsky [1 9 8 9] developed his 
modern theoretical appropriation of Aristotle's notion of poetic language 
as characterized by "something foreign, something outlandish about 
it."121 What is foregrounded by artistic performance is not the familiar 
that is the ground for recognition but the unfamiliar in objects, that
1:1 Quotations here are taken from the first chapter A r t  a s  D e v i c e ,  pp. 1*14.
1 6 8
allows for what Shklovsky calls the 'vision' of object or phenomenon. In  
harmony with his literary approach to interpretation as reception of art 
liberated of the traditional non-literary dimensions and elements of 
in terpreta tion /22 Shklovsky postulates the purpose of this artistic 
device as the very process of perception, where perception is not a 
passive but an active process, fully engaging human creativity, 
demanding and labourious:
O stranenie  is a form of world wonder, of an acute and 
heightened perception of the world. This term  
presupposes the existence of so-called content 
(soderzhan ie) if we understand by 'content' deferred, 
slowed-down, attentive examination of the world.12 23
In  her recent piece which relates art theory to political thought through 
the concept of estrangem ent, Svetlana Boym [2005] explores political 
meaning of estrangem ent in much greater depth that it can be done 
here. Boym develops the political genealogy of estrangement as artistic 
device in Victor Shklovsky's work in contrast to Ginzburg's 
interpretation of estrangement as an escape from reality, removal from  
the world. Thus Boym argues that the distinction must be established 
and observed between estrangement fro m  the world and estrangement 
fo r  the world which overrides art as fram ework and becomes the device 
of public life in totalitarian states. [2 0 0 5 :58 4 ]
Estrangement fro m  the world is historically rooted in the Stoic 
philosophy and then transmitted through Christian and romantic 
detachment from the world and withdrawal into man's inner spaces or 
spaces of inner freedom .124 Estrangement fo r  the world, by contrast, Is 
w hat Boym finds to be the core of Shklovsky's philosophy of art but 
also wider, existential and political underpinning of his literary theory. 
The world is not abandoned -  estrangement precisely arises out o f the  
constraints imposed by the world, the constraints that would compel 
paralysis were it not for the possibility of the "Knight's move" or moving 
sideways when the straight is banned. [Boym, 20 05 :5 8 9 ]
The perception and ultim ately cognition thus produced differ from the 
perception and cognition that are the subject m atter of various theories 
of cognition, namely cognition as re-cognition, subsuming the 
unfamiliar manifold particulars of the phenomenal world under the 
fam iliar singular universal of the conceptual apparatus. This alternative
122 While the limitations of this text do now allow for developing this theme, it is worth 
noting the parallel between Shklovsky's and Arendt's projects of liberating literature and 
the political of extraneous influences, the restoration or institution of autonomy of literary 
and political enterprises. The common thread seems to be that of freedom.
123 Shklovsky, quoted in Boym [2005:599].
1 2 4  Boym does not note the possible distinction between the two kinds of estrangement, 
which could be represented as Machiavellian distinction, elaborated in Arendt's works, 
between ethical-theological and political dimensions of the same concept. Namely, the 
detachment performed in estrangement from the world phenomenologically resonates the 
distance established between the subject and the world in thinking which gives rise to 
ethical considerations as distinct from political engagement which involves the subject 
with the world.
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perception is creative or recreative, it engages with reality by bursting 
through it, by doing aw ay with its realness, by abandoning the 
conventional for "an exercise of wonder, of thinking of the world as a 
question, not as a staging of a grand answer." [Boym, 2005:587] Such 
perception is 'labourious' and demanding. The Vision,' placed in 
inverted commas also by Shklovsky, is not sighting in the sense of the 
metaphysical vision that captures the true essence but observing the 
new in the existing, as if through special lens. Through this vision, the 
phenomenon or the object is recreated by author and it originates again 
as the new, thus requiring another creation, or re-creation by the art 
spectator in the afterm ath of the artist's creation.
Towards the end of his life, Shklovsky restated his conceptualization of 
estrangement, seeing in it "the resonance of beginning" or a 
"cornerstone of artistic unpredictability and freedom that reflected the 
transformations of the modern world." [Boym, 2005:582] This allows 
Boym to bring estrangement as artistic device in direct relation to the 
political in Arendt's conceptualization as a realm of freedom but she 
does not pursue the parallels between estrangement and political 
freedom any further. Nam ely, Boym's argument is primarily though not 
exclusively historical: under modern condition which for both Arendt 
and Shklovsky is characterized by automatization, homogenization, 
routinization to the point o f numbness, the condition that culminates in 
totalitarianism but, as it has been argued here, is not exhausted in 
totalitarianism, under such condition freedom is  (as) estrangement.
Boym does offer a valuable conceptual insight though -  that 
estrangement Is "a way o f seeing the world anew, a possibility of a new 
beginning that is fundam ental for aesthetic experience, critical 
judgm ent, and political action." [2005:602] Estrangement can thus be 
read as that what allows for freedom, not merely an artistic or aesthetic 
device employed politically under specific historical circumstances, but 
the fundamental m odus o p e ran d i of imagination as release from the 
determinism of the present. In  that sense, the sense that is not 
elaborated in Boym's article, freedom is not reduced to estrangement -  
since political freedom is not about perception of the world but acting it 
into it. Nor do the two m erely coincide historically. Rather, freedom is 
'freed' as our capacity through the working of imagination that is 
estrangement. Estrangement therefore is what allows us to perform  
our appropriation of the world which is given to us, not ours yet meant 
for us and it becomes so through our acting into it.
W hat this exactly means within the horizon of the political and thus 
what it means in the sense o f imagination as a political capacity, that is, 
what it means to overcome the given, to trespass the frontiers of the 
present, can be clarified only through clarification of the concept of the 
given, hence: what is the given, how to define the given? The given to 
actor is defined or delimited by the situational and the subjective. In  
other words, the confines of human existence are the world and the
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subject, neither of which we give to ourselves. Overcoming the given12S 
thus means transcending the boundaries of the world as it is here and 
now for us and the boundaries of subjectivity.
Recalling that for Arendt action means the opposite of inertia, ju s t as 
artistic estrangement leads to the de-autom atization of perception so 
does estrangement in p ra x is  spell the de-automatization of behaviour. 
I t  allows for the overcoming of the given by demonstrating the  
contingent foundations of that which is considered the given. The 
demonstration is mediated through the imaging of something th at is 
not really and actually, it is not properly present and given to the 
senses and to the mind through the senses. I t  entails therefore  
removing the grip of the ' is /  of the being, and stepping out o f the 
present as the entrapm ent by the existing.
In  that sense, imagination must be distinguished from both the  
Aristotelian phronesis  and Machiavellian v ir tù , as both presume th at 
judgm ent "does justice to  the situation at hand." [Vetlesen, 2 0 0 6 :7 8 ]  
By contrast, imagination does justice both to the possibilities and the  
impossibilities of the situation at hand. What does it mean? We m ust 
recall Heidegger's observation on the principal feature, and power, of 
imagination -  that "peculiar nonconnectedness to the being." I t  means 
taking account of the unbelievable, reading the unwritten, between the 
lines of reality. In  that sense, we recall the first requirement posed on 
the source of political action -  that it incarnates the principle of freedom  
as the appearance of the new in the world. Im agination is the power of 
mind that allows for the appearance of freedom in the world.
I t  could however be asked what distinguishes the estrangement by 
imagination from the transcendent quality of other mental capacities, 
following Arendt's architecture -  thinking, willing, judging? Thinking is 
abstracted from reality, willing is the capacity th at projects what is not 
and what will be, judgm ent is the situ of representation of the absent, 
th at Is -  the transcendence of subjectivity in the mind. I t  has been 
argued in the previous section that imagination underlies them  all, that 
the power of transcendence that these three capacities possess is 
sourced by imagination. Does it then hold th at transcendence is not 
actually achieved by imagination but that, in Kant's understanding, 
imagination mediates between the three faculties of reason thereby  
facilitating transcendence but not possessing the capacity itself?
The distinction is most pronounced against willing of which, as Arendt 
insists, political freedom is not a phenomenon, in other words -  will 
does not generate political freedom. [BPF, 151] Willing is equated with 
command yet imagination is never compelling. Imagination does not 
push the actor towards the actual goal or destination, as it does not
125 Overcoming here must not be understood as doing away with the given. The given 
returns always, as the novelty of yesterday is solidified through habitual routine into a 
pattern. Overcoming in that sense is more like transgressing, that is always in the 
dynamics of going astray (in its positive as in negative connotations) and coming back to 
the set path, only to go astray again.
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unfold before her the actual course of action through rationalization. 
Imagining is a window into a different reality, without however 
compelling the subject to move in that specific direction, as it is the 
case with willing. The sight of the different is not a model or a goal but 
the sight of the very possibility of the existing being different. I t  neither 
is nor has-been nor will-be but a m ay-be.
Unlike will that is about determining the goal and unlike rationalization 
that is about determining the path towards the goal, imagination has no 
determinative dimension. I t  does not reckon with consequences, and 
imagining is not an exercise of consequentialist reasoning. Imagination  
merely opens up the space of possibilities and impossibilities, breaking 
the enchainment to the present and the given. But there is no 
automatic translation into action. Imagining generates a fracture in 
reality, however what will be brought into being, as Arendt says, is 
given neither to cognition nor imagination. [BPF, 151] But it is through 
the uncovering of the invisible fabric of reality th at the new can come 
into being, because the new itself is that which is invisible in the old:
I t  is in the very nature of every new beginning that it 
breaks into the world as an 'infinite improbability,' and 
yet it is precisely this infinitely improbable which actually 
constitutes the very texture of everything we call real.
[BPF, 169]
In that sense, what action is to Arendt, creating ex n ih ilo  is for 
Castoriadis. This understanding of creating anew m ay seem to stand In 
contradiction with Arendt's assertion that, while action is beginning of 
the new, "this does not mean to start a b  ovo , to create ex n i h i l o [CR,
5] But the two thinkers are actually referring to the same. Arendt 
highlights that to begin anew does not mean that we begin in a void of 
past, and Castoriadis, who defines human community as social- 
h is to rica l, thus emphasizing that the temporal framework is not only 
important but is constitutive of community, would not disagree.
To create ex n ih ilo  for Castoriadis means not the absence of the past 
but a negation of determinism in creation that would reduce creation to 
production and reproduction, reminiscent of Arendt's critique of 
substituting making for acting: "something is new when it is the 
position of a form neither producible nor deducible from other forms." 
[Castoriadis, 1997:392] This definition of the new is in close 
correspondence with Arendt's insistence on the miraculous quality of 
new beginning, which is never "bound into a reliable chain of cause and 
effect" and always is "as though it came out of nowhere in either time 
and space." [OR, 206] In  other words, both Castoriadis and Arendt seek 
to refute the causal determinism through their definitions of the new, 
which embody the understanding of the conditionality of human 
existence as "conditions of possibility, not necessity." [Zerilli, 
2002 :544 ]
Arguably however philosophy has always known this removal from  
reality, through thinking. Thinking itself is unbound by reality, it is
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removed from being in the world in the sense of the Socratic inner 
soliloquy. Yet it remains bound by the fundamental law of that dialogue, 
the law of non-contradiction, which establishes the unity of oneself, 
identity of self with self. I t  may be argued as Heidegger did that this 
identity in fact rests in difference, that I  is I implies that oneness is in 
fact interrupted by this 'is ' and that sameness is in fact unity. But the 
requirement of unity is not removed nor is it invalidated despite the 
thinking interruption. Im agination on the other hand knows of no such 
constraints. One can imagine oneself out of oneself just as one can 
imagine oneself out of a certain situation or imagine an object or a 
phenomenon away. Unlike thinking that seeks to reconcile one with 
oneself, imagination places one in the void o f identity, identity as 
recognition exerted by oneself to oneself.
I t  follows thereof that the 'peculiar unconnected ness to being' of 
imagination which Heidegger notes can be read not only as the flight of 
imagination from the deterministic framework o f the present situation 
but involves also the unconnectedness to the being of the self, the 
subjective as it was term ed here, the actor as s /he is, who s/he is.
Imagination is often related to expression of artistic subjectivity 
however. I t  would follow thereof that imagination is not the source of 
removal from self but the epitome of self brought into the world. 
Castoriadis however foregrounds the desubjectivized concept of 
imagination or imagination as the property of community, not of the 
creative individuality. Castoriadis draws his examples mainly from arts 
in order to Illustrate the peculiar workings of imagination which seem to 
create ex nih ifo . However it is not artistic creation that he is concerned 
with nor does he believe that such creation is the sole privilege of arts 
and individual artists. He is concerned with the creation of the world by 
those who live in it, the creation which was treated in the history of 
philosophy as being of lower order, a deficient creation therefore not 
creation at all, but mere production, the repetitive emulation of ever 
the same forms.
Castoriadis reads the creation proper from the social-historical forms 
through which a com m unity emerges, lives and understands itself, be it 
culture, laws, institutions as "the very object o f praxis is the new, and 
this cannot be reduced to the simply materialized tracing of a pre- 
established rational order." [Castoriadis, 1 9 87 :77 ] Praxis in that sense 
is about "the intention of transforming the real, guided by a 
representation of the meaning of this transformation, taking into 
consideration the actual conditions and inspiring an activity." The same 
understanding of this originating capacity of human plurality is more 
than explicit in Arendt's concept of action as innovation which generates 
power to call something into being only through acting in concert, not 
through individual acts of individuals.
The notion of creation or origination as properties of community m ay be 
the only response to the one question that gapes wide open in any 
discussion of imagination - whether, by resort to Imagination, in all its
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indeterminacy, we are not pushed to the verge of irrationality in 
political doing. Imagination is not a m atter of decision nor a m atter of 
competence, by contrast to thinking or judging.126 However the problem 
with the latter remains their implicit intellectualism, and Arendt's 
thinking seems both ambivalent and ambiguous on that. 
Thoughtlessness of Eichmann on which Arendt insisted m ay have 
seemed plausible but it additionally problematized the concept of 
judgm ent: if judgment belongs to everyone as a power of human mind, 
how can it be that Eichmann did not exercise it or, implicitly, did not 
possess it? I f  however it does not belong to everyone, can we at all 
postulate anything like moral responsibility without assessment of the 
competence of judgment?
Im agination by contrast, while also a capacity of intellect, seems not to 
be exactly in te lle c tu a l. Being seated in between sense and 
understanding, as Kant observed, imagination is not ruled and directed 
by intentionality. As it works in images, it eludes any control. I t  strikes 
the consciousness and its power similes that of the power of revelatory 
vision. That uncontrollability, suddenness and force of vision is the 
strength of imagination but also that which makes it only a response 
but not an answer to the problem of action. I t  cannot be called forth, 
and while it can be engaged, it cannot easily be harnessed. Positing 
imagination as the source of political action then amounts to not much 
more than a return to Kierkegaard's madness of moment, to Benjamin's 
awaiting of Messiah, to Derrida's playful undecided in all decisions.
But if Castoriadis' creative or Arendtian (as not exactly Arendt's or only 
implicitly so) originary imagination is not the question of individual 
power, neither is it to be understood within the psychological 
fram ework but social and historical, the spatial and temporal framework 
that is a community. I t  does not mean that imagination is not exercised 
by individuals but that it is not a private affair, not a m atter of loose 
and amorphous fantasizing but a m atter of 'socially constituted' 
individuals [Castoriadis, 19 87 :1 7 8 ] just as action is not a m atter of 
individual, singled out heroic figures but a m atter of the 'web of human 
relationships.' [HC, 183]
An imperfect response to  the limits or rather uncertainties of 
imagination this however is. Imagination is a refutation of 
intellectualism and elitism In the theory of human agency. Freedom can 
be only free, "political freedom is  the leap," and "always surprises 
itself," [Nancy, 1 9 88 /1 9 93 :7 8 , 82] and there can be no premeditation 
of free act. Yet this makes imagination only a response, not a solution 
to the problem of the source of human action, and it is also something 
of a betrayal of this very project insofar it is no more controllable than 
arbitrary will, not only a "step into the open, with no guarantee about
‘“ "Though man is the thinking animal, to engage in thinking, in the strong sense of 
letting thinking take its own course, without being able to tell, let alone control where 
that course will eventually end, is not something every individual is likely to do." 
[Vetlesen, 2006:64]
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the final outcome" [Z izek, 2002:152] but also that which cannot be 
called forth.
This precisely is Arendt's fundamental argum ent on action and 
Castoriadis' principal thesis on imagination: they are freedom incarnate 
where freedom is the end of certainty and beginning of responsibility. 
As De Beauvoir observes, the absence of divine being as the ultim ate, 
the absolute that inspires meaning into the world and existence does 
not abandon man to the nihilistic, overpowering and unlimited license 
but gives birth to freedom  in the sense of "definitive, absolute 
engagements" of man with the world which renders man responsible. 
[1 9 7 6 :1 6 ] Man is responsible for that which he himself m ay not have 
created as a physical entity but has recreated or reshaped through the 
institution of community and its perpetuation, as both Arendt and 
Castoriadis argued.
But this argument then begs the question, how imagination is different 
to judgm ent which, as Arendt argues, is about abstracting from one's 
own perspective in order to broaden the vision, to 'enlarge thought' 
beyond the confines o f the subject. In other words, how does 
imagination better respond to the requirement posed by the condition 
of plurality as the condition of all political than judgment? Arendt in her 
work does not go very far from bare instrumentalization of imagination 
in the function of judgm ent. Forsaking her revelatory remarks on the  
originary quality of imagination as the root o f action, Arendt asserts 
that "the power of imagination is linked most closely with that wider 
m anner of thinking [judgm ent] which is political thinking p a r  
excellence, because it enables us to 'put ourselves In the minds of other 
m en."127
In  the previous chapter, judgm ent was problematized as constrained by 
the present situation which involves the subject's community. In  
harmony with her understanding of plurality as the ineradicable human 
condition, Arendt cannot conceive of subject in any other way but as 
constituted by her community, and, as has been argued in Chapter 
Three, she considers the divide between individual and community non­
sensical both empirically and theoretically, much as Castoriadis does:
But how could we think of society as the  coexistence or 
the composition of elements that are held to pre-exist or 
that are supposed to be determined [...] from elsewhere, 
when these so-called elements do exist as such and are 
only what they are in and through society? One could not 
compose a society -  if this expression were meaningful -  
except with individuals, who themselves would already 
have to be social, who would already contain the social 
within themselves. [1987:178] *207
127 The quote is taken from Arendt's essay on F r e e d o m  a n d  P o l i t i c s ,  in Hunold, A (ed.): 
Freedom and Serfdom: An Anthology of Western Thought (Dordrecht; D. Reidel, 1961), p.
207, here quoted from Beiner, 1983:14.
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Yet what constitutes the subject is not the world in totality but a share 
of the world which mediates the presence of the world in the life of 
individuals, the specific social-historical as Castoriadis termed it or 
specific community in the specific space and tim e. The limits of that 
specific community in specific space and time are the limits of judgm ent 
and the judging subject -  the limits that imagination however does not 
know.
But the transcendence of subjectivity through imaginary estrangement 
which, as was argued here, is the mode of working of imagination and 
the form of its relating to reality that must be distinguished from  
enlarged thought or enlarged mentality insofar as it does not assume 
that one can ever know the position of the other. In  other words, 
imaginary estrangement accepts the limits of recognition. W hat it does 
is not to project one into the place of the other but to dis-place the one. 
Displacement is not dislocation in the sense of movement but in the 
sense of baring one of the situation, detachment that transforms the 
fam iliar into the unfamiliar and thereby challenges the embeddedness 
of subject into one's 'own' situation and subjectivity. I t  uproots the 
subject and pushes the subject into reality that is now a te rra  incogn ita . 
Then both the one and the other become the other, both are alien to 
where they are and who they are. I t  is the situation of the two main 
characters of Orhan Pamuk's novel The White Castie  [2002] who are 
pushed towards each other from two alien(ated) worlds, the 'Occident' 
and the 'Orient' and who do not have the common ground to build on 
nor do they succeed in reaching each other through logos , through the 
discourse which only entrenches them deeper in their own positions and 
their own subjectivity. The two are finally brought together through 
jo int venturing into that which is uncommon and new to both.128
In her historical and philosophical interpretation of the American 
Revolution and the beginning anew vindicated precisely through its 
newness, Arendt singles out a historical Incident that, as argued earlier 
on, best exemplifies the emergence of the political bond and the 
foundation of a new political, that is common space not from the 
commonality of roots. But the common is discovered through venture  
into the unknown generating the new tim e series, as Arendt described 
it, or the new era established by the very venturing.
It  could be retorted of course that it was neither the roots nor the 
uncommon but the commonality of situation, as it is argued by a rather 
well established theory of the rise of American polity (to abstain from  
following its meandering into diverse variations and conceding that this 
reference in passing fails to do justice to the body of literature). But the 
situation was precisely recognized as shared by the actors of the 
political scene in becoming, through estrangement of the 'given' which 
was the British sovereignty. Once the possibility was sighted that the
128 Paradoxically somewhat, white the venturing into the new brings the two characters 
into the together, that together dissolves into a mere exchange of subjectivities, where 
the self becomes the other and vice versa but it also becomes ironically, if not also 
tragically, clear that being-other is done in the same way as being-self.
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British monarchy m ight have been but did not have to  be  the  
framework of their living together, the would-be founders of the new 
polity recreated their m ovem ent, from rebellion to revolution, from  
contesting what the actors saw as the violation of normative framework 
to contesting the fram ework itself and its ground. [OR, 44 ] This novel 
situation and the novel response to it constituted the new ground for a 
new political space.
In  the sense o f Arendt's political project therefore, foregrounding 
imagination distances Arendt's political theory from both rationalistic 
and voluntaristic accounts of action and from  the deadlock of this 
opposition in political philosophy. Political action does not come about 
either through rational calculation or through blind force or through 
pale blending of the two. I t  is generated by the ability of human mind 
to be in the world and yet see it not as given and unalterable but as 
always embodying a possibility of originating the new, the distinct. 
Imagination is the m ental capacity which communicates with the two 
fundaments of the political as Arendt understands it, the principle of 
freedom as the overcoming of the given and the condition of plurality as 
the necessary prerogative of all action.
Following Kant's assertion that "the denial of transcendental freedom  
[would] involve the elimination of all practical freedom /'129 Heidegger 
seems to have come very close to the same conclusion of Arendt's in 
the development of transcendental power of imagination: "We have 
already observed that positive freedom, considered in its practical 
sense, is equivalent to autonom y. Its possibility is grounded in absolute 
spontaneity (transcendental freedom )." [1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :19 ] But 
Heidegger's discussion o f imagination as transcendental power remains 
captive to the discourse of 'representational productivity' or 
re productivity, in denial o f this originating power that Arendt discovers.
Castoriadis recognizes In Heidegger's reduction of imagination to 
production the fallacy that has always plagued metaphysics, the 
paradoxical obsession o f the science of the transcendental with physical 
creation, the m atter that is. That production never reaches the heights 
of creation, reserved for deity , is the idea that gave birth to the idea of 
finiteness of m an: "Man is a 'finite being' because he can crea te  
n o th in g ." From this idea o f finiteness of man as the consequence of his 
lack of creativity, Castoriadis reads the ultimate limit of metaphysical 
thought: the idea that creation proper is only naturalized creation, 
creation of m atter in m atter. Paradoxically therefore, metaphysics as 
the science of the transcendental, science th at purported to reach 
beyond the phenomenal world or the world o f m atter, recognized as 
creation only natural creation: "All the rest, which he makes exist out of 
nothing, does not count; the standard of being, for these non- 
m aterialist philosophers, is a speck of m atter." [Castoriadis, 1987:199]
Thus Castoriadis' critique of the 'occultatlon' of philosophy discloses
129 Quoted in Heidegger, 1930/2002: 20.
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itself as the critique of the philosophical objectification of creation, the  
insistence of metaphysical ontology on the quest for the essence of the  
rigid naturals and its oblivion for the 'artifacts' of human interaction, be 
those works of art or frameworks and patterns of relating within a 
community. However plausible this critique may seem in terms of the 
metaphysical tradition of philosophy yet it does not hold entirely for 
Heidegger's thought. Namely, while earlier Heidegger's works seem to  
insist on work as the modus of engaging with the world, that is 
mediated through the use of things present-at-hand or tools and 
objects as material, his later writings foreground much more strongly 
and explicitly works of art and even more, language. In  Heidegger's 
explorations of the ways of unconcealment of Being, references to pofis  
are not rare either. I t  is therefore misleading to accuse Heidegger of 
entertaining the paradoxical metaphysical obsession with the being as 
the tangible, material reality.
Rather, as the following chapter will attem pt to demonstrate, the  
reason for Heidegger's blindness to the originary quality of imagination 
is related to the essence of Heidegger's attem pt to overcome the  
tradition of metaphysics and establish fundamental ontology in the  
sense of the inquiry into being beyond all beings.
Namely, overcoming of metaphysics for Heidegger is entwined with  
overcoming of M etaphysics Speciaiis as the knowledge of beings, the 
knowledge that passes over the question or problem of being  which is 
beyond but also within all specific beings without being a be in g , an 
entity or appearance In the sense of object. This overcoming in 
Heidegger's work takes the form of return to M etaphysica GeneraUs, 
which is ontology proper concerned with ens, th at is being as such or 
existence as such regardless of the forms of existents or existing 
entities [19 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :5 -6 ]
Heidegger propounds that such ontological knowledge is predicated on 
the existence of transcendental imagination or imagination as 
transcendental power. The m atter of the possibility of ontological 
knowledge, that is -  transcendental cognition independent of 
experience of specific beings, is for Heidegger a m atter of the possibility 
of all philosophy [Heidegger, 1 9 29 /1 9 97 :7 -9 ], as ontology Is not only 
the foundation of philosophy but "philosophy is ontological" or must be 
reconstructed into ontology as inquiry into being, not into specific 
beings "because philosophy in principle does not relate to beings." 130 
[Heidegger, 1 9 27 /1982 :11 ]
The ground of the transcendental power of imagination as the 
prerogative of ontology and hence all philosophy, the ground therefore 10
110 History of philosophy is for Heidegger the history of oblivion of being as such, the 
question of what it means to be and what it is to be, [1927/1982:14-15] and he sees his 
task in renovation of the origins of philosophy as a way to retrieving philosophy 
[Poggeler, 2005:89], in the sense of questioning of existence beyond concentric cognitive 
circles of scientific mapping of beings as objects.
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of the possibility to know being as being not as a being or to know of 
existence without the existent and thereof also the existent, is time or 
rather, tem porality. Heidegger's interpretation of Kant thus culminates 
in the discovery that "the transcendental power of imagination is 
original tim e," the essence of which is "developed primarily from the 
future." [Heidegger, 1929/1997:131]Transcendence or freedom can 
thus only be understood through the concept of original time.
I f  however the transcendental power of imagination, as argued, cannot 
be reduced to representation only but must be seen in its originating 
dimension as well, as a potential source of the new, what is its root 
then, and what are the implications for philosophy? Would then  
ontology thus rendered possible not be different from Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology and would it not effectively embody the principle 
of the political o r the w hat Arendt defines as the fundamental principle 
of the political -  bringing about of the new In the world? In other words, 
would this not be a p o lit ic a l ontology if the power of transcendence is 
the power to originate th e  new?
Heidegger's analysis o f the transcendental power of imagination is 
based on his fundam ental ontological proposition. Espousing Kant's 
notions of transcendence of imagination in the form of pure synthetic 
judgm ents, which allow for judgments beyond those reached through 
reasoning on the experienced reality, Heidegger develops the argument 
that the transcendental power of imagination or its power of 
transcendence is possible because of the roots of imagination in tim e. 
Tim e is the ground of all understanding as it "needs no further horizon 
in order to m ake sense." [Blattner, 1999:25] Temporality is the totality 
in which beings are given whereas temporality itself is not as a being, 
does not exist as an entity, either a creature or an object, but 
'temporalizes' itself'. W hat would be, and could there be, the ontological 
ground to assert the originary power of imagination as derived from  
Arendt's intuitions?
The following chapter will demonstrate that beneath the originary 
dimension of im agination there runs a different kind of temporality to 
that which Heidegger conceptualizes. This different temporality Is that 
of the human existence understood as the beginning, the breakthrough 
of the new. As such, it tesitifies to the primordiality of knowledge, 
understood in its broadest sense as relating to the existing - the ontic 
for Heidegger - which lies not in receiving or interpreting of the  
received in affirmation but in acting into the world. Ultimately, this 
entails a different course of philosophy that flows from the principle of 
the political as the sphere of freedom to act.
179
Chapter Six:
BEING-IN AND BEING-TO THE WORLD
The trails of Arendt's and Heidegger's explorations of imagination have 
run entwined and then parted on the creative or originary dimension of 
this m ental capacity, as the line of argument in Chapter Five sought to 
demonstrate. Namely, the fundament of Heidegger's understanding of 
human existence is the concept of finitude, the inescapable condition of 
givenness of man in denial even of artistic creation, which is a creation 
of no lower order than the material or rather, biological creation, as 
Castoriadis argues in his critique of the narrowness of metaphysical 
understanding of creating. The last chapter ended on the question, why 
Heidegger cannot see it differently, why is it that his analysis of 
imagination -  arguably, more systematic than either that of Arendt or 
Castoriadis and certainly more ontological -  is somehow aborted on this 
point?
The form of this question, perhaps its tone as well, could be misleading 
insofar it seems to place Heidegger a t the centre of the following 
inquiry, suggesting a transformation of this dialogue with Hannah 
Arendt in the pursuit of philosophy of freedom into hermeneutic 
dwelling within the horizon of Heidegger's thought. However, enclosed 
inside the 'shell' of this question there lurks the question of the entire 
metaphysical tradition of philosophy -  what is it that blinds 
metaphysical philosophy to the human capacity of freedom, seated in 
originary imagination and manifested through action? Why is it that 
metaphysics could not and cannot see and recognize the originating, 
creative potential of human existence? Finally, how can philosophy 
escape the entanglement into the web of metaphysical errors and 
omissions?
Heidegger, as the one who attempted the overcoming of metaphysics 
without overcoming philosophy as a tradition of thought, constitutes the 
most logical point of the inquiry, particularly in the light of his 
foregrounding of imagination and even more so -  of freedom:
Freedom is  the co n d itio n  o f  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  
m anifestness o f  the  be ing  o f  beings, o f the  understand ing  
o f  being. [...] The question concerning the essence of 
freedom is the fu nd a m e n ta l p rob lem  of philosophy, even 
if the lead ing question  thereof consists in the question of 
being. [Heidegger, 1 9 30 /2 0 02 :2 0 7 ]
The key to this problematic tension, which also leads to unlocking the 
hidden potential of philosophy, should be sought through Heidegger's 
analysis of imagination which, while oblivious to  its originary capacity,
tm m w m n uiJUJWff!
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also proceeds to a more fundamental level than  either Castoriadis o r 
Arendt in the sense of investigating the ontological, as opposed to both 
anthropological and psychological, roots of imagination.
Time and imagination
In  moving his analysis beyond Kant, Heidegger shows how  
transcendence/freedom th at lies in imagination and is manifested in the  
world through the connection between imagination and action, is 
grounded in original tim e. I t  is in this sense th at Heidegger's work on 
Kant's conceptualization of imagination can fully be grasped only if seen 
as preparatory for the B eing  and  Tim e .
W e must recall that what Heidegger Is looking for is the possibility of 
the pure, ontological knowledge which is his term for Kant's 'pure  
synthetic judgm ents,' th at is -  judgments th at receive nothing from  
experience but form the basis of all experiencing or are the condition of 
all experience. Heidegger's analysis has shown that pure intuition and 
pure understanding, that are the two elements of pure cognition as 
intuition and understanding are elements of all cognition, emerge from  
the transcendental power of imagination. This transcendental power of 
imagination is in Kant's system a synthetic power -  its conjoins the  
m ultitude and the oneness, multitude being th at which is the material 
of intuitions and the oneness being the corresponding concept.
As Kant conceives of it, the synthesis can occur In three modes: 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition, which Kant relates to three  
elem ents of all knowledge: intuition, imagination, understanding.131 
Heidegger then proceeds by following what he considers the principal 
trail in Kant's analysis of the three modes of synthesis, of which "the  
proper goal [...] lies In demonstrating their intrinsic and essential 
belonging together in the essence of pure synthesis as such." 
[Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 2 5 ] The breakthrough in Heidegger's 
interpretation lies in the following question: i f  a ll representations a re  
u n ite d  in  th is th re e fo ld  syn thes is  and i f  each o f  th e  th ree m odes o f  
syn thes is  p roduces rep resen ta tions, which are the fabric o f all our 
knowledge as it is precluded from direct access to any entities, and i f  
t im e  is  a t  the b o tto m  o f  a ll rep resen ta tions, according to Kant's 
argum ent from the C ritique  o f  Pure Reason [2 8 ], is  i t  n o t then  th a t i t  is  
"the t im e -ch a ra c te r o f  th is  syn thes is  which m akes  everyth ing  u n ifo rm ly  
su b m iss ive  in  advance?" [Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 2 5 ] What Heidegger 
is asking here is w hether it is not time that grounds what for Kant is 
pure synthetic judgm ent and for him - ontological knowledge.
131 Heidegger points out Kant's inconsistent use of the term i m a g i n a t i o n  which was 
previously treated as a root of the other two elements whereas here it becomes again 
"just one faculty among others." tn order to be able to pursue his own project, Heidegger 
states that this imagination as element of knowledge must not be equated with the 
transcendental power of imagination as the root of sensibility and understanding as 
elements of knowledge. [1929/1997:124]
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In  developing the argum ent out of this intuition, Heidegger analyses the 
three modes of synthesis through explication of their 'time-forming  
character/ Heidegger finds Kant sufficiently explicit on the tim e- 
character of apprehension and reproduction: apprehension forms the 
now and reproduction is dependent on mind's 'ability to retain', which 
presupposes bringing together the conception of the earlier tim e with 
the now. [Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 2 6 -1 2 7 ] The third mode -  
recognition, which is the m ode of synthesis that comes about from pure 
thinking or understanding, does not have tim e-character in Kant's 
analysis, because pure reason cannot be temporal. Kant asserts that its 
propositions must be universally valid regardless of tim e, which 
compels Heidegger to a painstaking analysis. W hat he discovers 
through that analysis is more than the time-forming character of 
synthesis as recognition o r its related ness to future -  the discovery for 
him confirms the primacy of future for the notion of original tim e, the 
discovery that forms the basis of his fundam ental ontology as worked 
out in the Being a n d  Time.
In  order for the unity of synthesis to be achieved however the three 
dimensions must be linked:
And yet, when the mind again returns from  its going- 
back into the past, when it returns again to the directly 
present being In order to set the form er in unity with the  
latter, who then tells it that this being which is now 
present is the sam e as that which it previously, 
abandoned...? [Heidegger, 1 9 29 /1997 :129 ]
The link is provided through concept -  It is a function of concept to 
bring together a multitude o f diverse perceived entities or phenomena. 
Concept is produced by thinktng/understanding. But it must be 
produced prior to representations or else it is not pure. This means that 
the synthesis of reproduction is primordial to other two modes of 
synthesis: it forms for them the horizon of identification, i.e. recognition 
of the beings they grasp and allows the perceived to be recognized as 
the once a lready  or previously perceived:
Kant gives this synthesis of identification a most 
appropriate name: Its unifying is a reconnoitering. I t  
explores in advance and is 'watching out for' what must 
be held before us in advance as the same in order that 
the apprehending and reproducing syntheses in general 
can find a closed, circumscribed field of beings within 
which they can attach to what they bring forth and 
encounter, so to speak, and them in stride as beings. 
[Heidegger, 1 9 2 9 /1 9 97 :1 3 0 ]
The meaning of recognition here is not cognition repeated but 
reconnaissance, advance o f cognition whereas cognition is then re­
cognition of that already given by concept in what is encountered, 
perceived, grasped. This means that the concept an tic ip a te s  what is not 
already there and has not ye t been -  the tim e-character of recognition 
Is therefore future. Heidegger thus concludes that the unity of synthesis
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is allowed by the unity o f tim e, that is: "the transcendental power of 
imagination is original tim e," the essence of which is "developed 
primarily from the fu ture." [1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 3 1 ]
Heidegger may appear concerned here with finding the ground of 
'ontological knowledge' on which the very possibility of metaphysics is 
predicated. But Heidegger's primary concern is not metaphysics or 
rather, It is metaphysics but only insofar he shares with Kant the 
conviction that "the grounding of metaphysics precisely [is] a return to 
human nature." [1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :1 4 2 ] Namely, in The Essence o f  Hum an  
Freedom  man is distinguished from other beings through as "by virtue 
of the fact that he knows himself," [1 9 3 0 /2 0 0 2 :1 7 2 ] which echoes the  
famous line from B eing  a n d  T im e  that Dasein is question to itself. Being  
a n d  T im e  is exposition of this question as the question of Being behind 
beings or the question of the meaning of existence, which should be the 
proper task of metaphysics as Heidegger understands it. So the  
possibility of ontological knowledge is more than the possibility of 
metaphysics, and it reaches beyond neo-Kantian epistemological 
readings of Kant, which Heidegger refutes in K a n t a n d  the Problem  o f  
M etaphysics. I t  is the  possibility of being authentically -  In awareness of 
being, that is. That is the highest stake of Heidegger's analysis of 
imagination.
Having exposed the rootedness of image as the power of transcendence 
in the unity of original tim e, Heidegger performs the final move of the 
argum ent -  the original tim e is self. To prove this, Heideger does not 
start from the assertion th at self is time but that time is self. The 
verification process goes back to the elem entary proposition of Kant's 
Transcendental Analytic th at tim e is a pure intuition. I f  it is pure, It 
cannot come to mind through experience, that is - from the outside. 
That means that it affects the mind, Impresses it, from the inside. 
However, it cannot be conceived of as existing alongside the self, 
separate to it and other to it, since that would again mean that it is 
external to it and is formed outside and as such it is a subject m atter of 
experience and does not exist a p rio ri. Therefore it can only be that 
time is formed through self affecting itself:
Inner sense does not receive 'from w ithout,' but rather 
from the self. In  pure taking-in-stride, the inner affection 
must come forth from  out of the pure self; i.e . it must be 
formed in the essence of selfhood as such, and therefore 
it must constitute this self in the first place. 
[1 9 2 9 /1 9 9 7 :1 3 4 ]
By arguing that tim e constitutes self, Heidegger accomplishes what he 
has set out to do when approaching Kant's First Critique as the ground 
for, if not ground of, metaphysics: he has constructed substantive 
introduction to B eing  a n d  Tim e  by disclosing the fundamental 
connection between being and time through ontological, not 
anthropological analysis. W hat Heidegger's interpretation of Kant on 
imagination has shown is th at the fundamental connection between 
being and transcendence as freedom runs through the concept of time,
*
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revealing therefore that the question of the Being of beings is rooted in 
the triangle freedom -being-tim e. Investigating the sources of 
imagination, Heidegger constructs an ontological argument, as opposed 
to the psychological argument (or, in Heidegger's terms, 
an th ropo log ica l) which we find in Castoriadis' explorations of radical 
imagination.
I f  we now recall the grounds of Arendt's political thought in the principle 
of natality (as it was elaborated in here in Chapter Three), we observe 
the contours of a similar triangle -  man Is occurrence of freedom 
manifested in the breaking of the time continuum through birth which 
inspires man as a being with capacity to begin anew in the world. What 
can this mean -  that Arendt's project is a political implication of 
Heidegger's? On the contrary -  if it is taken only in this genealogical 
sense, it would suggest the grounding of the entire edifice of Arendt's 
political thought in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the science of 
the Being, Into which, according to Arendt, metaphysics developed.132 
In  that case, Arendt's critique of metaphysical legacy in philosophy 
would be contradicted by her own project: it would mean that of the 
world of human affairs one can speak meaningfully only through the 
reference to the working of some ’ invisible hand.' [L M /II: 179-180]
Or would this suggest that Heidegger's fundam ental ontology is 
essentially political? That the question of Being is the question of 
freedom and that the question of freedom is the fundamental question 
of all philosophy, does it not cast a very different light on Heidegger's 
project of asking the  qu es tion  o f  Being , demanding of us to ignore 
Heidegger's (albeit rare) remarks, such as the one in the L e tte r on  
H um anism  on thinking that is n o t  to tell us how to live, thinking beyond 
and aside of p rax is , as of th eo ria . [1993:259]
Zizek offers a reading of Heidegger that responds to this question 
affirmatively:
Heidegger's ontology is... in fact ’political'... his endeavour 
to break through traditional ontology, and to assert as 
the key to the ’sense of being' man's decision to adopt a 
’project' by means of which he actively assumes his 
’throwness' into a finite historical situation, locates the 
historico-political act of decision in the very heart of 
ontology itself: the very choice of the historical form of 
Dasein  is in a sense ’political', it consists in an abyssal 
decision not grounded in any universal ontological 
structure. [Zizek, 2 0 0 0 :2 0 ]133
132 *[B]y looking at appearances... one becomes aware of, gets a glimpse of, something 
that does not appear. This something is Being as such. Hence, metaphysics, the discipline 
that treates of what lies beyond physical reality and still, in a mysterious way, is given to 
the mind as the nonappearance in the appearances, becomes ontology, the science of 
Being." [LKPP, 80]
133 Ziiek here argues against now almost standing criticism of Heidegger's project 
presented in B e i n g  a n d  T i m e  as "still caught in the transcendental-subjecitivist procedure 
of first establishing the ’conditions of possibility' of the sense of Being via the analysis of 
D a s e i n [2iiek, 2000:23]
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Zizek's interpretation of Heidegger's early project concurs to a certain 
degree with Nancy's understanding of Heidegger's late concept of 
G elassenheit as active: "Letting be, which is always the contrary of 
'laissez-faire' or Metting-happen,' will ceaselessly have to decide, a t 
every moment, its 'ethical' relation to the existence its lets-be." 
[1 9 8 8 /1 9 9 3 :1 4 3 ] While it could be argued that Zizek allows not entirely  
valid reduction of all Heidegger to B eing  and  Tim e  and, also early, 
analysis of Kant, Nancy's argument is more attentive to late  
Heidegger's thought. In  another piece, Nancy argues that: "Fare-senso 
non e ' quindi fare del senso,134 ma far essere l'essere, fasciarlo  essere 
(... secondo l'ambivalenza del lassen  tedesco: bauen lassen, fa r  
constru ire= lascia re, donare all'ativita' di costruire come tale; se in  
lassen, lasciar essere= dona re, consegnare all'attività' d'essere in 
quanto tale). Il lasciar-essere non e' una passività', ma e', appunto, 
l'agire stesso. E' l'essenza dell'agire in quanto l'agire e ' l'essenza 
dell'essere." [Nancy, 2 0 0 5 :2 0 -2 1 ] In  other words, Gelassenheit or 
letting-be is not a passive condition of being along other beings but 
action of all actions or even action for all acting -  in translation, it is 
"the essence of acting insofar as acting is the essence of existence."
Acting and relating as essence of all existence necessitates a different 
understanding of fundam ental ontology which uncovers its fundament 
as essentially ethical. Giving sense to existence is entirely in opening 
and relating of Dasein, not passive conducing of the (pre)given sense o f 
(the) Being through man. [Nancy, 2 0 0 5 :3 8 -3 9 , 4 2 ] Nancy's placement 
of ethics in the centre of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology 
admittedly presents a voyage much beyond Heidegger's writings but it 
is a t the same tim e a deeply Heideggerian voyage pervaded by 
Heidegger's work even if w ider and further-reaching. [Nancy, 2 0 0 5 :3 1 -  
32]
In  the light of this interpretation of Heidegger however Arendt's 
philosophical contribution can hardly be read as a critique of Heidegger 
and her own explicit critique of Heidegger in the second volume of V ie
¿ilek 's critique of Heidegger focuses rather on Heidegger's escape from the madness 
inherent to modern subjectivity, the failure -  characteristic of the tradition of philosophy 
-  to recognize and incorporate into his philosophy athe point of 'madness' that 
characterizes the Cartesian subjectivity, the self*withdrawal of the c o g i t o  into itself, the 
eclipse of the world." [2000 :63] ¿iiek 's  interpretation of Heidegger's ommision is not 
however Freudian but Lacanian: it is not the Unconscious as wild, untamable, animalistic 
and obscure dimension of human being that resists capture and comprehension by l o g o s ,  
and that ontological discussions silence but the rational, disembodied ego, ego without its 
worldtiness, bared of existence in the here and now.
134 Nancy's understanding of sense remains true to Heidegger's insistence on removing 
the silt of epistemology over ontology. Sense is not that "in terms of which something 
becomes intelligible as something" [Blattner, 1999:151], it is not a matter of 
comprehension, not a property of the 'object' of understanding, "less [...] something to 
be discovered and more [...] an i n v e s t m e n t  you make in selective activities and events." 
[Connolly, 2002:168] Sense is a matter of p r a x i s ,  the giving of sense, acting and relating: 
"Essere e ' fare senso [...] Questo 'fare' non e', pero\ un 'produrre'. E’ agire o condursi." 
[Nancy, 2005:17]
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Life  o f  the  M ind  is entirely misplaced. According to Nancy, Heidegger 
does offer the ontology o f Dasein as acting and relating being, which 
would imply that Arendt's project within the fram ework of philosophy is 
simply a translation of this p ra x i-ca i core of existentialism into political 
theory or frames of political p ra x is .
However there remains a fundamental difference between the 
p o litic iz e d  or even political ontology that Arendt offers and the ontology 
with e th ica l core. The sense that is given to existence in Nancy's 
reading of Heidegger recoils back to Dasein, whereas political ontology 
grasps that acting involves not mere relating but changing, bringing 
about the new, doing something to the world. The difference between 
ethics and politics as core of fundamental ontology is the difference 
between Dasein as constituted by Mitdasein or of which the world is 
constitutive, and Arendt's notion of man as beginning and beginner, the 
one not only constituted of world but constituting the world. While both 
ethics and politics are forms of praxis, and forms of interpreting prax is , 
the distinction between the two is the distinction between p ra x is  as 
comportment and p ra x is  as acting out the new, giving the new to the 
world.
The strength and originality of Arendt's foundation or source of a 
difference, in p ra x is  rooted philosophical thought lies therefore in 
Arendt's grasp of the primordiality of newness, as the tangible presence 
of freedom in the world, for man's rapport with the world. Prior to 
man's relating to the world through giving sense to his existence, man 
does to  the world by his very appearance.
Nancy's interpretation of Heidegger is legitimate insofar it is placed on 
the horizon of ethics. While that is an important step out of the 
metaphysical confines of traditional ontology, it does not reach far 
enough, out of the confines of ontological subjectivity in the quest for 
meaning: the centre is still Dasein. That is where also Zizek errs in 
proclaiming Heidegger's fundamental ontology -  political: the decision 
by D ase in , on which Zizek bases his argument on politicality, remains a 
decision for Dasein while nothing is changed in the world. The 
A ugenb lick  is only a m oment of giving the meaning but it is a meaning 
for the subjectivity, irrespectively of whether it is understood as an 
individual entity or a collective one since both are oneness opposed to 
the plurality of the world. A con tra rio , Arendt introduces ontological 
thinking of the meaning for the world as a totality of human singularity, 
human plurality and the historical community o f the two. Arendt's 
teaching, much quoted here, "to think what we are doing" must 
therefore be read as to  th in k  w hat we are do ing to  th e  world  which is 
entirely woven of our actions and us as being us through those actions. 
This constitutes Arendt's contribution to post-metaphysical philosophy 
beyond Heidegger, which can be derived from the analysis of the 
contrasting concepts of tim e found in the centre of Arendt's and 
Heidegger's ontologies.
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Towards thinking of time
The concept of original tim e or primordial time in Heidegger's 
early /earlier writings is usually interpreted as antipode to vulgar or 
ordinary time. To retrieve oneself from this ordinary time, Dasein m ust 
enter anticipatory resoluteness through the mood of A ngs t, anxiety  
which is "disclosive attunem ent" revealing to Dasein that though being 
in the world, it is not a t  h o m e  in the world. W hy Dasein is not at home 
in the world, fundam entally and ontologically, can be understood only in 
terms of the connection between throwness into existence, into some 
unchosen, unwilled th e re  and some unchosen, unwilled be ing, and on 
the other hand -  finitude of this unwilled, given existence for, as 
worldly as this being is, its final destination in the world is the 
departure from it.
To be gripped by this unhomeliness of thrown and finite being leads 
Dasein to what would seem as a nihilistic understanding of itself as a 
being whose ultim ate possibility is "the impossibility of existence in 
general" [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 6 2 ] and yet whose essence is this absurd 
existence towards non-existence. The way to live, the mode of being 
that arises from the mood of anxiety, is by being towards non-being, 
which is the meaning of resoluteness. What this means is firstly to  
accept and affirm existence as a path to nothingness and then, more  
importantly, to derive its course and meaning from its finiteness. The  
resolve thus is a leap towards the possibilities arising from the ultimate 
existential impossibility, the possibilities that uncover themselves only 
to the sighting from the grasped impossibility.
In  everyday life, in the present as the portion of chronological tim e, 
those possibilities are not visible to Dasein th at concerns itself with  
things of which the world is made, not with itself and its existence in its 
most fundamental sense. Anticipatory resoluteness of Dasein is rooted 
in this way of being as always being-ahead-of-itself as from the  
m oment of birth, Dasein is moving forward, in the direction of its end. 
However, in the inauthentic mode of being, that is - everyday life in the 
midst of various concerns and preoccupations, this end is concealed 
from Dasein, it is left to fall into oblivion. But precisely as the m atter of 
evasion, forgetting, constant effort of Dasein to conceal from itself w hat 
is its ultimate certainty, it remains present in human existence. 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 5 9 ]
How is then this being-in-the-world that is Dasein then in the world, 
what is the mode of its being in the world? The being of Dasein is 
care,[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :1 9 1 ] which means that Dasein is not simply in the 
world by the side o f other things and beings but that is concerned with 
them , it handles them , it takes care. Care is constituted of 
understanding, attunem ent/m ood and falling prey. These three  
constituent dimensions of care correspond to the three modes of 
temporality -  future, past and present, bearing in mind though that 
Heidegger is reluctant to employ these three concepts except in relation 
to inauthentic tem porality, the meaning of which is precisely in oblivion 
and obscuration of past as the always open having-been  -  not the
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closed was, future as a head-of and not as a non-presence of not-yet, 
and the present as the knot of threads from having-been and from  
ahead-of in situation ra ther than a reality of a given instant.
Neither understanding nor attunem ent is resoluteness that is the taking 
up of Dasein's potentiality. And the dimension of care that is a mode of 
Dasein's most active involvem ent with the world, however, is the one 
which takes Dasein farthest away from its being disclosed as thrown 
and finite: falling prey, which always entails th at Dasein is concerned 
with beings and things in the world other than its own being. I t  is the  
being-in-the-world in which Dasein forgets itself and hides from itself 
what determines it -  its powerlessness over its natality and its mortality 
but also its power that is in-between.
But Heidegger interprets this in-between or the present of falling prey 
as entrapment of Dasein. The fallness into the present "creates the 
impression that things could not be otherwise than they are, there is 
nothing else to disclose. Practices and understandings that are in fact 
contingent take on the appearance of naturalness." [Villa, 1996:128] 
Heidegger is thus trying to escape the entrapm ent by present which is 
always the present, a t-hand , en-present-m ent as the prison of the 
given, which is taken as it is, without anticipation of the destination 
point and thereof retrieval of its possibilities. In  this, Heidegger 
explicitly follows Hegel's (critical) understanding of 'now' as 
'enormously privileged.' The question for Heidegger is therefore why 
philosophy ignores tem porality as a whole of past, present and future 
that Dasein, as extension in time but also retention, is:
But the time focused upon for understanding the meaning 
of Being is a specific time understood as the constant 
presence of the present. This poses for Heidegger the  
question of knowing why the present is being privileged 
in this fashion. 'W hy can't the past and the future claim  
such a right? Shouldn't Being be understood from  
temporality as a whole?'13S
Taminiaux's question here strikes an important cord of Heidegger's 
inquiry -  the concern with the wholeness of Dasein. In  exploring the 
being of Dasein, Heidegger finds Dasein a being whose being is in 
becoming, as always coming-into-presence and still always not-yet. 
This unwholeness is not a missing of a part but, as Heidegger argues, 
the being of Dasein, what it is, is always not-yet:
And if existence determines the being of Dasein and if its 
existence is also constituted by potentiality-of-being, 
then, as long as Dasein exists, it must always, as such a 
potentiality, n o t y e t  be  something? A being whose 
essence is made up of existence essentially resists the 
possibility of being comprehended as a total being. 
[192 7 /1 9 9 6 :23 3 ]
135 Taminiaux, 1997:7. Further on (p. 43), Taminiaux quotes Heidegger's lecture course 
on 77ie F u n d a m e n t a l  C o n c e p t s  o f  G r e e k  P h i l o s o p h y  in support of this argument.
Of
I t  must also be differentiated from 'any imperfection of cogn itive  
fa c u lt ie s /  [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 3 6 ] I t  is unwhole not as a whole that can be 
completed but through the negation of wholeness. The whole is a 
property, as Heidegger argues, of the between birth and death, the 
'connection of life' which ties together the two ends of existence. 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6:37 3 ] This Heidegger's notion o f unwholeness is present in 
Arendt's refutation of given, substantive identity and location of the 
whole who only in the stories that emerge in remembrance of the who.
But behind Heidegger's understanding of unwholeness as the being of 
Dasein there lies the assumption th at "a wholeness constituted by 
being-toward-the-end is possible in Dasein itself, in accordance with its 
structure of being" [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 4 0 ], and the inquiry is driven by the 
ambition to uncover the possibility of Dasein as a whole: "And have we 
actually exhausted all the possibilities of making Dasein accessible in its 
totality?," [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 3 7 ] is the question from which Heidegger 
develops his argum ent of death as the utm ost ontological possibility of 
Dasein to grasp itself:
Thus the task arises of placing Dasein as a whole in our 
fore-having. However, that means th at we must first 
unpack the question of this being's potentiality-for-being- 
a-whole. As long as Dasein is, something is always still 
outstanding, what it can and will be. But the 'end' itself 
belongs to what is outstanding. The ’end' of being-in-the- 
world is death. This end, belonging to  the potentlality-of- 
being, that is, to existence, limits and defines the 
possible totality of Dasein. [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 3 3 ]
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis seeks to abandon this 
enpresentment by uncovering primordiality of future even for the 
inauthentically existing Dasein that never is content with being in the 
now, always reckoning with what will be and weighing the now on the 
scale of what will become of this now in the now that is yet to come. 
This means th at future is primordial fo r Dasein, regardless of 
inauthenticity or authenticity of its mode of being.
For the inauthentic Dasein however this focus on the future is 
restrained by w hat is given in the present. Future appears in the guise 
of consequences and goals, which set the standard for the being of 
Dasein in the present but are at the sam e time derived from the 
present possibilities. Although it seems th at the choice of goals 
determines the options of the now, the inauthentic Dasein actually 
derives the goals from the options th a t offer themselves in the now, the 
obvious ones. Heidegger's insistence on reversing this relationship and 
interpreting the future as not derivative to the present but the source of 
the present can thus be read as a critique of utilitarianism. To project 
oneself into the future does not m ean to reckon and calculate in 
utilitarian terms but to  cast both past and present in a different light, 
drawing them from concealment and uncovering the undercurrents of
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possibilities hidden by the obvious possibilities of any now. To say 
therefore that Dasein is futural does not mean simplistically that Dasein 
is determined by its m ortality but that it defines itself in the present 
through the recourse to future, to what it wants to become. Also, to say 
that Dasein is futural however does not mean that Dasein is not also 
through being from the past and being in the present. But the meaning 
of past and its bearing on the present are derived from future, the 
primary context or horizon of interpretation is future. Recourse to 
future is a break through the fetters of the ever-present present.
For the resolute Dasein there open up possibilities concealed by the 
present. Dasein focused on the present covers up to itself these 
possibilities as it is essentially an unwhole being. This is not to say, or 
not only, that Dasein is blinded by the noisy, colourful spectacle of the 
'innerworldly things' but because its vision narrowed to the present is 
deprived of the sight of the nullity at the core of its very existence. That 
about Dasein which is not but can only be anticipated ahead of its every 
now, ahead of the entire nowness is what Dasein is about and what 
gives it wholeness.
Why can these possibilities not be seen in the present? Because they 
are not presen t, they are neither things nor facts whose existence 
would be independent of Dasein and of its way of being in the world 
and to itself. Exitence which sights the ultimate point of its existence as 
its fundamental impossibility likens a ray of light refracted in water, 
revealing that which never has been there, and even as it shows itself, 
it is not the re , but belongs to the resolute Dasein.
Seemingly paradoxically, although not present, the possibilities 
revealed to the resolute Dasein have always already been. The sighting 
of the present by the Dasein projected into the future is not direct but 
runs through past, the sight is mediated by what was given to Dasein 
when it was thrown into existence. [1 9 2 7 /1996:385 ] The gift of 
throwness is the gift of existence -  Dasein does not come into being by 
itself, it always owes itself. W hat this suggests is that interpretation of 
Heidegger's being towards death cannot be grasped unless the 
wholeness of Dasein Is understood as coming from being towards birth 
as much as being towards death. To be towards birth is to take up the 
gift o f existence, to receive the unwanted gift of existence as a being- 
in-the-world. To be towards birth is to hear the call back which 
discloses Dasein to itself as a being guilty -  "the 'voice' of conscience 
somehow speaks of 'guilt'." [192 7 /1 9 9 6 :28 0 ] Heidegger insists on the 
close kinship between the words 'guilt' and 'indebtedness,' giving the 
word g u ilt  meaning of debt for existence not willed and not brought 
about by the one who exists.
In anticipatory resoluteness therefore existence is grasped and seized 
by Dasein as a whole in resistance to the lostness of Dasein in the 
everyday flow of instants. To grasp the existence as a whole does not 
mean encounter with death, which is a very common understanding of 
Heidegger, but the grasp of the totality of existence in resistance to the
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everyday, successive tem porality. Oasein is therefore not only called 
forth, towards recognition of its finitude and retrieval of its true, 
concealed possibilities for it as a being-in-the-world, as opposed to 
those possibilities th at present themselves in everyday. Dasein is not 
only summoned to see its fallness into the They . I t  Is also called back, 
into the understanding of its own throwness into existence, its 
givenness of itself to itself which Dasein has to accept in order to be 
able to reappropriate the limits of givenness as possibilities of 
existence:
The summons calls back by calling forth: fo rth  to the 
possibility of taking over in existence the thrown being 
that it is, back  to throwness in order to understand it as 
the null ground that it has to take up into existence. 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 8 7 ]
I t  follows therefore that the resolute choice or decision is never 
breaking with the past for the past is not closed to Dasein, nor is it 
behind it - as it "does not fo llo w  a fte r  Dasein but rather always already 
goes ahead of it."  [Heidegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 0 ] This is why Heidegger 
insists on terming this mode of temporality having-been: unlike the 
past, which passed, having-been has not passed but enters the present 
of Dasein in the form  of uncovered possibilities, given insofar as Dasein 
is given, chosen in so far only Dasein can recall them back and 
recognize them as possibilities.
In  the In tro du c tio n  to B eing  a n d  Tim e  however Heidegger speaks of a 
different past, that is the tradition:
... Dasein is also entangled in a tradition which it more or 
less explicitly grasps. This tradition deprives Dasein of its 
own leadership in questioning and choosing. [...] The 
tradition th at thereby gains dominance makes what it 
'transmits' so little accessible that initially and for the 
most part it covers it over instead... it bars access to 
those original 'wellsprings' out of which the traditional 
categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :21 ]
How is then possible that tradition or the shared heritage, wherein the 
origins of Dasein and its possibilities rest, at the same time covers over 
the genuine possibilities of Dasein and, on the other hand, guides 
Dasein, as a source of its actions? The answer is not to be sought in the 
concept of tradition but in the notion of the resolute Dasein. Dasein 
existing inauthentically is not without past or without its having-been, 
its existence is rooted in the world into which it was thrown, therefore 
in the world as it has been, but those roots are dead, ossified frames 
which perpetuate the oblivion of Dasein to its existence as a road into 
nothingness. The 'wellsprings' of inherited but untaken possibilities 
remain hidden to Dasein th at lives by taking care of things, by handling 
and producing things, not by asking questions. The wellsprings become 
visible as the wellsprings of possibilities only to the Dasein gripped by 
anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein is 'dispersed' in the everyday
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concerns and can be concentrated only through anticipation: "Only 
being free fo r  death gives Dasein its absolute goal and pushes existence 
into its finitude." [Heidegger, 1927 /1 9 96 :3 8 4 ] Death is the framework 
of existence, and as such, it is not only an expected cessation of 
existence but the of direction for existence, and to be free for death is 
to let oneself be as a finite being, the possibilities of which are always 
different to those of the being that would understand itself as infinite. I t  
follows thereof that to push existence to its finitude is not to live to the 
end, through succession of instants as they come, but to exist from this 
finitude, where finitude is the womb of existence and not only its final 
point.
How does then this Dasein occupy the place in the world, how does it 
appropriate its generation as its historical locus, retrieving and 
repeating its inherited possibilities, evading the conservation that would 
petrify the past? Heidegger argues that Dasein that takes up its 
inherited possibilities only then is  "for its tim e."136 [1927/1996:385] 
Bringing its past/having-been into its present/now-time via  future, 
recalling and retrieving itself from the indifferent flow of time, Dasein is 
whole.
The first section of the Second Division of Dasein on The Possible Being- 
a-W hole o f Dasein and B e in g -tow ard -D e a th , where death is defined not 
as the fact of physis  but as the ownmost no nre la tion a l possibility of 
Dasein [Taminiaux, 1 9 97 :8 ], thus constitutes the centre of Being and  
Time. [Adorno, 1 9 6 4 /2 0 0 3 :1 1 8 ] For Adorno, Heidegger's obsession 
with wholeness as ultim ately totalitarian and fascist: "that which 
tolerates nothing beyond itself is understood to be the whole. The least 
trace which went beyond such identity would be as unbearable as 
anyone who insists on his own individuality is to the fascist -  no matter 
what remote corner of the world." [1 9 6 4 /2 0 0 3 :1 1 4 ] But it is also, as 
Adorno points out, a return to metaphysics of the one, identical to 
itself, complete, whole, final and present. I t  is the framework that 
cannot grasp what Heidegger has defined as the essence of human 16
116 Guignon observes that crucial for understanding of this resolute Dasein that is for its 
time is the notion of s i t u a t i o n .  [Dreyfuss and Hall, 1992:139] Once again, 
therefore, Heidegger denies the objectification or being-at-hand of existentiell 
categories, insisting that it is through resoluteness of Dasein that they are called forth, 
Dasein does not recognize the situation as independent to itself but it puts itself Into a 
situation, wherefrom it reads its possibilities.
Situation for Heidegger has two meanings, which blend in the notion of the 'held 
moment.' The primordial, ontological and 'borderline situation' is being-towards-death, it 
is the situation of finite existence. [Heidegger, 1927/1996:308] But there is also the 
actual situation, between ahead-of and having-been, which however cannot be equated 
with the 'state of affairs' [Dreyfuss and Hall, 1992:139] that is the ground of reckoning 
with in the everyday life of Dasein:
F o r  t h e  t h e y ,  h o w e v e r ,  s i t u a t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  c l o s e d  o f f .  The they 
knows only the ' g e n e r a l  s i t u a t i o n , '  loses itself in the nearest 
'opportunities,' and settles its Dasein by calculating the 'accidents' 
which it fails to recognize, deems its own achievement and passes off as 
such. [Heidegger, 1927/1996:300]
The situation therefore is not something that is t h e r e  but it is the reading by Dasein of the 
"world-historical in its actual situation." [Heidegger, 1927/1996:391]
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existence -  always becoming, beyond unpremeditated change th at 
however defines human existence. In other words, Heidegger's project 
is rendered problematic not in terms of its political implications -  th at 
never were of much bearing for Heidegger's work -  but philosophically, 
as an inquiry into the meaning of Being of beings that seeks to abandon 
the legacy of metaphysics.
While Heidegger's concern with wholeness of Oasein is problematic, 
there remains the possibility that his fundamental ontology as a project 
is thereby not rendered fu tile . The problem behind Heidegger's notion 
of Dasein is not th at he is concerned, as so many before him were, with  
the wholeness of human existence. It  is rather that wholeness is closed 
off as a possibility to hum an existence, and this points to Heidegger's 
fundam ental misunderstanding of how human existence exists.
Arendt's entire thought stands in refutation o f Heidegger's idea of 
wholeness of existence. To assume wholeness as possibility of human 
existence is to fail to grasp the paradox fundamental to human beings: 
as a being, one is finite but capable of doing the deeds that will be as 
infinite in their consequences as is infinite the diversity of human 
beings. In  that sense, Heidegger's fundamental ontology appears as 
retreat back into metaphysics whereas Arendt, through the notion of 
beginning that succeeds in capturing the paradox of human condition: 
the finitude of man as a natural being and the infiniteness of man as an 
acting being, manifested in the unpredictability of both their actions and 
the consequences and effects of those actions which develop endlessly, 
rendering the future infinitely open and any attem pt at control or 
command of the course o f events -  futile. For, as finite as Arendt's 
actor is, s/he is not a whole in the sense that whatever is brought into 
the world through his/her action, is always new and will have a course 
uncontrollable by its author. The only certainty th at remains is that the 
appearance of actor always renders the world changed, which is the 
dimension of human existence that Heidegger does not grasp and 
allows his fundamental ontology to slip back into metaphysics.
Thinking time and being
Arendt's concept of beginning pervades her understanding of the  
meaning of human being. In  that sense, the meaning of human being is 
for Arendt, as for Heidegger, inextricably tied with time. The parallels 
are most evident in the rupturous nature of both the AugenbUck and 
the m om ent of action. A rendt and Heidegger share the attem pt to  
conceptualize time against the conceptualization offered by the  
metaphysical tradition of philosophy or metaphysics of presence: "Time 
as such, however fluid and even fugitive its flowing, is held fast for all 
of philosophy in the dimension and grasp of presence (the having-been- 
present, the being-present, the being-present-to-come)." [Nancy, 
1 9 8 8 /1 9 9 3 :1 1 1 ] For Arendt as well as Heidegger, the Moment entails 
going out of the ordinary flow , out of the inertia.
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H eidegger con tras ts  th e  Augenbfick  to  the tim e  o f every day ness as 
s tre tch ing  fro m  the  p re sen t in  which Dasein loses its e lf:
The M om ent "te m p o ra lize s  its e lf prim arily  from  the  
fu tu re . H ow ever, th e  vu lg a r u nders tand ing  o f tim e  sees 
the fu nd am e n ta l phenom enon o f  tim e  in th e  now, and 
indeed in the  p u re  now , cut o ff in its co m p le te  s truc tu re , 
tha t is called the  "p re s e n t."  One can g a th e r fro m  this th a t 
there  is in p rinc ip le  no prospect o f exp la in ing  o r even 
deriv ing  the  e cs ta tic  and horizonal phenom enon o f the  
Moment th a t be longs to  a u th en tic  te m p o ra lity  from this 
now. [...] The now  is no t p regnan t w ith  th e  n o t-ye t-n o w , 
but ra th e r the  p re se n t arises from  the  fu tu re  in th e  
p rim ord ia l, e cs ta tic  u n ity  o f the tem pora liz ing  o f 
te m p o ra lity . [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :4 2 6 ]
There  rem ains fo r H e idegger the  question  o f the  passage from  the 
ina u the n tic  to  a u th e n tic . A t f irs t s ight, H eidegger's own response m ay 
seem  m isleading since he notes tha t th e  M om ent can never be derived 
from  the now. [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :4 2 7 ] Yet w hile  the  M om ent is n o t in the 
now, Dasein can be p ro je c te d  ou t o f the  now, in to  the  M om ent, th rough 
a n tic ipa tion  o f death  and th e  call o f conscience w h ich  it invokes.
H eidegger's d is tin c tion  b e tw e en  the a u th en tic  and the inauthentic  
te m p o ra lity  is n o t an a na lo g y  o r a re flec tion  o f th e  ancient opposition  
betw een  chronos  and kairos. W hen he argues th a t th e  M om ent th a t is 
the  Augenbfick  cannot be derived  fro m  the o rd in a ry  tim e, which is 
ob jec tifie d  in th e  w orld  as an endless sequences o f nows and is 
m easurab le , H eidegger is preparing th e  g round  fo r  his u ltim ate  
a sse rtion : th a t the  te m p o ra lity  w h ich  'te m p o ra liz e s '137 itse lf as 
Augenbfick  is the  p rim o rd ia l te m p o ra lity  w h e re fro m  te m p ora lity  
understood  as tim e , the t im e  o f  everyday life  is d e rive d .
For A rend t, the  m o m e n t o f  beginning is also som ehow  d is tin c t o r  
d is tingu ishes its e lf from  h is to rica l tim e . The w ay A re n d t conceives o f 
the m o m e n t o f ac tion , as und e te rm ine d  by e ith e r its  m otives, i.e . past, 
or its goals, i.e. fu tu re  [BPF, 151 ] suggests th a t th e  m om en t o f action 
som ehow  steps o u t o f th e  te m p o ra l flow . In  the lig h t o f A rend t's  critique 
o f th e  trad ition  o f  p o litica l ph ilosophy as hostile  to  m ove m e n t and 
eph em era lity , th is  s tepp ing  o u t cannot be equated w ith  the nunc stans 
th a t overcom es a ll te m p o ra lity  trans fo rm ing  it  in to  m otion less point: 
"F o r A rend t, te m p o ra lity , fa r  from  having to  be overcom e fo r  man to  
be, is the source o f his poss ib ility  fo r  action in w h ich  his being is 
in te n s ifie d ."138 [Y oung-B rueh l, 1 9 8 2 :4 9 5 ] *130
137 Temporality i s  not, the verb t o - b e  is meaningless for time because time is not an 
object in the world nor does it have being but can be understood only as temporalizing, 
as 'being' in its own distinct mode of appearance. [Heidegger, 1927/1996:328]
130 That being is intensified through action however presents a misrepresentation of 
Arendt's non-foundationalist, performative notion of man as acquiring a w h o  only through 
appearance in the world, the appearance that appears through action. Acting is more than 
intensification of a pre-existing being, acting brings human being into existence as a 
human being not a simply an entity, an object in existence that can be depicted through
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In  te rm s  o f re la ting  to  te m p o ra lity  th e re fo re , A re n d t departs bo th  fro m  
the  philosophies o f e te rn ity  -  by em bracing tim e  as the p ro pe r site o f 
po litics  understood  th ro u g h  action , and fro m  the  m odern  po litica l 
th eo ries  o f the u n in te rru p te d , a u to m a tic  processes dictated b y  the  law s 
o f necessity . The la t te r  d e p a rtu re  is pe rfo rm ed  by locating po litica l 
a c tio n  in th e  m o m e n t w h ich  in te rru p ts  a u to m a tis m , to  open to  the  new . 
The new  is s itua ted  in  th e  horizon  m ade up  o f th e  past and its  possible 
fu tu re s , as in K afka 's  parab le . But it is som eth ing  th a t no o th e r th ing  In 
the  w o rld  has e v e r before  been -  n o r could it have  been expected as it  
had n e ve r been n ece ss ita te d . This is th e  sense o f beginning ex nihifo: 
th e  new comes fro m  som eone, n o t fro m  n o -one  and n o t o u t o f 
no th ingness, but it  is w he re  noth ing  has been and nothing has been 
fo re see n  to  be. B eg inn ings, as o rig ins, have  th u s  a lw ays been th e  fa b ric  
o f m ys te rie s , she p o in ts  o u t, and could never be incorporated in to  th e  
o rd in a ry  tim e  flow , to  be an  ins tan t am ong o th e r ins tan ts :
I t  is in th e  v e ry  n a tu re  o f a beg inning  to  ca rry  w ith  itse lf 
a m easure o f co m p le te  a rb itra rin ess . N ot on ly  is it n o t 
bound in to  a re liab le  chain o f cause and e ffe c t, a chain In 
w hich  each e ffe c t im m e d ia te ly  tu rn s  in to  the  cause fo r  
fu tu re  d eve lo p m e n ts , the  beginning has, as it w ere, 
noth ing w h a tso e ve r to  hold on to ; it is as though it cam e 
o u t o f now here  in e ith e r  tim e  o r  space. For a m om ent, 
the  m o m e n t o f beg inn ing , it is as th o u g h  the beg inner 
had abolished the  sequence o f te m p o ra lity  itself, o r as 
though  the  actors  w ere  th ro w n  o u t o f th e  tem pora l o rd e r 
and its  c o n tin u ity . [O R , 206 ]
The no tion  o f a d if fe re n t te m p o ra lity  b rings A re n d t close to  H eidegger's  
d iscourse  o f in a u th e n tic /a u th e n tic , and A rend t a lso  em ploys th e  te rm s  
'o rd in a ry ' and 'e x tra o rd in a ry ' in her phenom enolog ica l analysis o f 
a c tion . Thus th e  n o tio n  o f  action  is rendered  in te rm s o f th e  
e x tra o rd in a ry  as opposed to  th e  e ve ryd a y : " i t  is In its  nature  to  b re ak  
th ro u g h  th e  co m m on ly  accepted and reach in to  the  e x tra o rd in a ry , 
w he re  w ha te ve r is tru e  in com m on and e ve ryd a y  life  no longer applies 
because every th ing  th a t e x is ts  is unique and sui g e n e r i s [HC, 2 0 5 ]
D evelop ing th is  n o tio n  o f th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  A re n d t relates p rim a rily  to  
the  experience  o f th e  G reek w orld  a fte r H om er, w here  action  rem ains 
the  one proper w ay o f d is tin gu ish in g  onese lf fro m  th e  others b u t sheds 
its hero ic  d im ension  th ro u g h  th e  fo un da tio n  o f po/is. The poiis  was th e  
place fo r  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  tra n s la te d  o r  inco rp o ra ted  in to  the  o rd in a ry , 
w he re  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  w as the  o rd in a ry : " fro m  beginning to  end its  
fo re m o s t a im  was to  m ake  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  an o rd in a ry  occurrence o f  
e ve ryd a y  life ."  [H C , 1 97 ] O n th is  basis, it  could be argued th a t A rend t 
does n o t share w ith  H eidegger th e  o n to log ica l d iv ide  betw een th e  
a u th e n tic  and the  in a u th e n tic . On the  o th e r  hand how ever, it is not so
answers to the question wh a t  but a w h o  that appears through the drama of acting and 
relating.
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c e rta in  th a t H e idegger h im s e lf insists on the  d iv ide . H eidegger's claim  is 
th a t the a u th en tic  ca n n o t be derived from  the inauthentic  b u t the tw o  
a re  necessarily en tw ine d  and conjoined in the  m ode o f being o f Dasein, 
ju s t  as po litica l action  as understood  by A rendt is a break in the tim e  
flow  and m ay seem  as stepp ing  out o f  the  co n tin uu m , w hile  it ac tua lly  
does not e x tra c t m an fro m  e ithe r th e  world o r  tim e  bu t d iscontinues 
one tim e-series  on ly  to  s ta rt a new  one th a t w ill once again be 
d iscontinued b y  hum an a c tio n .
Both  in H eidegger and in  A rend t th e re fo re  the  in a u th e n tic /o rd in a ry  and 
a u th e n tic /e x tra o rd in a ry  c a n n o t necessarily be grasped fu lly  in  the  fo rm  
o f opposition , as Villa obse rves , bu t as a dynam ic, [1 9 9 6 :1 3 0 ] between 
th e  tw o  inseparab le  m odes o f  being concerned w ith  th e  w orld :
In  fa lling  p rey, n o th in g  o th e r than  o u r p o te n tia lity  fo r 
b e in g -in -th e -w o rld  is the issue, even if  in th e  m ode o f 
ina u the n tic ity , D asein can fa ll prey on ly  because it is 
concerned w ith  u nders tand ing , a ttuned  b e in g -in -th e - 
w orld . On th e  o th e r  hand, authentic  ex is tence  Is noth ing  
which hovers o v e r entang led everydayness, bu t is 
e x is ten tia lly  o n ly  a m odified grasp o f  everydayness. 
[H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :1 7 9 ]
Equally so, A rend t's  m irac les  are the fa b ric  o f ex is tence , [BPF, 169 ] the  
e x tra o rd in a ry  bears th e  m eaning  o f th e  o rd in a ry . N am ely, th ro ug h  th is  
breaking in and breaking  th ro u g h  tim e , the  tim e  as ind iffe re n t, neutra l 
flow  is abo lished, and th e  process em erg ing  fro m  th e  m om en t o f 
beginning is no longe r an irres is tib le  flu x  o f tim e  b u t m an 's  bond to  the  
w orld , m an's a c tive  p resence In the  w orld  th ro u g h  th is  inves tm en t, 
w hich  never is com p le te , rounded up, su bs ta n tive , b u t a lw ays continues 
and dem ands fu rth e r a c tion s . H ow ever A rendt's  concept o f action  as 
beginning m us t be th o u g h t not on ly  as opening in to  th e  fu tu re  but as 
seizing the  po ten tia ls  o f th e  past neve r closed. Thus every m om en t o f 
ac tion  is not ju s t  an in s ta n t o r a p o in t on the  passage fro m  past to  
fu tu re  but the  ce n te r fro m  which both  past and fu tu re  rad ia te  in a 
d iffe re n t ligh t, cast by th e  new beg inn ing, and m an y  d iverse  facets o f 
the  w orld , m any o f its h idden  po tentia ls  would re m a in  invisib le  w itho u t 
the  beginning anew.
The present in w hich  th e  past has to  be recognized is how ever never 
g iven fo r A rend tian  a c to r, ju s t  as it is not fo r  Heidegger's resolute 
D asein: the  a c to r calls fo r th  a s itu a tio n , as it  was th e  case w ith  the  
A m erican R evolution, w hen  an  event o f  rebellion deve loped, th rough  
actions of m en, in to  a re v o lu tio n  th a t ins titu te d  an  e n tire ly  new world 
o rd e r by founding a new body politic . [O R ]
I t  is th e re fo re  no t an a cc id en t th a t A rend t never ceased to  re v is it the  
exam ple  o f the  A m erican  R evolution. I t  rem arkab ly  em bodies her 
notion  o f action  as th e  b reak ing  point in th e  p resen t. The breaking point 
is paradoxica lly  rooted in th e  possib ilities o f the  pas t -  which in th is 
case w ere  the  exam ples o f  th e  orig inary  experience o f  th e  po litica l, the  
liv ing  and doing o f th e  political such was unknow n to  the
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contem pora ries  o f th e  Founding Fathers -  b u t it inserts the  new th a t 
becom es the g round  o f th e  fu tu re  o f th a t h is to rica l com m unity , th e  
fu tu re  th a t no exerc ise  in th in k in g  and reckoning  could have envisaged 
b e fo re  th e  action to o k  place.
In  th a t  sense, A re n d t's  co nce p t o f beg inn ing  can also be read as a 
p re ced en t -  as th a t w h ich , by d raw ing  on  the  energ ies o f the  past and 
th e  o pp o rtu n ities  o f  change fa llen  in to  o b liv io n , steps out o f the  course  
o f t im e  and forces e ven ts  in a d iffe re n t d ire c tio n , though n o t s im p ly  as 
an unexpected s tim u lu s  b u t as a new fo u n d a tio n  fo r  the new . In  th is  
co nce p t o f p o litica l a c tio n  as p re ced en t, there  blend th e  
H e id eg ge ria n /B en jam in ia n  se izu re  o f th e  'm issed  possib ilities ' o f th e  
p a s t, M achiavellian m o m e n t o f  response to  th e  w ork ings o f Fortuna in 
th e  p re sen t and Rom an a c t o f found ing  no t th e  fu tu re  b u t fo r th e  
fu tu re .
Precise ly  at this p o in t how ever, the  p o in t o f th e  new Inserted into th e  
p re se n t to  open up fu tu re , A re n d t and H e idegger d iverge. The new is 
w h a t happens in A re n d t's  m o m e n t o f b eg in n in g , the  new via action  is 
the  co n te n ts  o f th e  A re nd tlan  m om en t. In  Being and Time, H e idegger 
re la tes  resoluteness to  a c tion  th a t responds to  the  s itu a tio n : 
"U nderstand ing  th e  ca ll, Dasein lets its o w n m o s t s e lf take action in itse if 
in te rm s  o f its chosen p o te n tia lity -o f-b e in g ."  [1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 8 8 ] B u t 
e ssen tia l fo r b ring ing  Being and Time in to  th e  co n te x t o f H eidegger's 
la te (r)  w orks and u n d e rs ta n d in g , pa radox ica lly , b o th  Arendt's closeness 
to  and departu re  fro m  H e idegger is the  idea o f 'a c tio n  in its e lf. ' W h a t 
th is  a c tion  is, becom es c le a re r fro m  th e  fo llo w in g : "Resolute, Dasein is 
a lre a d y  a c t i n g [H e id eg ge r, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :3 0 0 ] G u ign on  in te rpre ts  th is  as 
a u th e n tic  action, w h ich :
... calls fo r  a c lea r-s igh te d  sense b o th  o f one 's 
indebtedness to  the  repea tab le  p oss ib ilities  o f h istory and 
o f one's ac tions  as w ove n  in to  th e  'm is s io n ' shared w ith  a 
w ide r c o m m u n ity . In  H eidegger's a cco u n t o f au then tic  
action, th e re  is the  su ggestion  th a t  such a c tio n  involves a 
b reak o r a r if t  -  a severing  o f ties  w ith  th a t crowd in 
o rder to ta k e  a feap in to  th e  fu tu re .[...] B u t i t  is im p orta n t 
to  keep un m ind  th a t, fo r  H eidegger, a u th e n tic  actions 
are s till bound up w ith  th e  shared  und e rta k in gs  o f a 
h istorical co m m u n ity . [D rey fuss  and Hall, 1 9 9 2 :1 4 1 ]
The b reak, the  reca ll o f h is to rica l poss ib ilities  (B en jam in ian  missed), th e  
response to  the h is to rica l as opposed to  m e re ly  th e  cu rren t s itu a tio n  o f 
the  co m m un ity  -  a ll these  no tions c o m m u n ica te  m ost closely w ith  
A re n d t's  concept o f action  as beg inn ing , w h ich , as argued, is a lways a 
p re ceden t, th a t w h ich  in th e  p re sen t opens to  th e  fu tu re  by responding 
to  th e  past. A lthough, as it has been a rg ue d , A rend t is indebted to  
M achiave lli fo r  the  idea o f virtù, A rend tian  a c to r does m ore th a n  
responding  to  the  w h irls  o f F ortuna , w h ich  a lw a ys  is a m a tte r  o f th e  
c u rre n t s ituation, o f the  p re sen t. H e idegger and A rend t both recognize
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th a t the  fabric  o f the p re s e n t is w oven o f th a t th a t has been, w hich has 
to  be recognized in  th e  p re s e n t.
Yet th e  Augenblick  o n ly  ho lds  its e lf to  th e  open, w here  the  em phasis is 
n o t on  holding as h a ltin g , th e  absence o f action  bu t on the  open , which 
m eans noth ing else b u t ta k in g  up its  groundlessness, the  n u llity  o f 
existence th a t has no essence and is  th ro u g h  th e  rush to  its own 
ann ih ila tio n , spends its e lf; to  be held in the  open is n o t to  co ve r up th is  
n u llity  but also to  u n c o v e r th e  possib ilities o f ex is tence  h idden by the  
everyday fo rg e ttin g  o f one 's  own rush in to  dea th : "A u the n tic  
d isclosedness, in o th e r w o rd s , n e ithe r rem oves its e lf from  its 'th e re ' no r 
creates a world o f its o w n ; ra th er, it is a m ode o f a c tiv ity  and 
understand ing  th a t b re a th e s  new life  in to  th e  fa m ilia r ."  [V illa , 
1 99 6 :1 3 2 ] H eidegger th e re fo re  speaks o f 'm o de  o f a c tiv ity ' in re lation 
to the  conten t o f Augenblick  bu t the verbs th a t he uses in describ ing 
w ha t fills th is m om en t a re  a ll suggestive  o f p ass iv ity  in the  sense o f 
im m o b ility  -  holding, ha lting , being held. N am ely , H e idegger insists 
th a t the  Augenblick  Is n o t a s ite  o f happen ing , in a sense, it is more 
about a d -ven t th a n  e ve n t:
In  resoluteness, th e  presen t is not o n ly  b ro ug h t back 
from  the d ispers ion  in w ha t is taken  care  o f nearest a t 
hand, but is held in th e  fu tu re  and hav ing -be en . 'In  th e  
M om ent' noth ing  can happen, b u t as an a u th e n tic  p resen t 
it lets us encounter fo r the First time w h a t can be " in  a 
tim e " as so m e th in g  a t hand o r  o b je c tiv e ly  present. 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :3 3 7 ]
I t  is no t to  say th a t H e idegger's  m om en t is n o t a b o u t ra p tu ro u s , even 
abso lu te  change b u t it seem s th a t it all a b o u t a pecu lia r change 
entering  Dasein, n o t the  w o rld , as P. Poellner e xp la in s : " . .  an absolute 
d isco n tin u ity , the Augenblick, in  w hich th e  w orld  as a whole changes fo r 
Dasein , w hile  noth ing  within  th e  w orld has changed a t a ll."  [Friese, 
2 0 0 1 :7 0 ] Dasein th e re fo re  does not d e p a rt from  th e  w orld , does not 
abandon its inau thentic  e x is tence  ye t, from  Augenbtick, th e  world 
em erges in ta c t.139
The prob lem  arises in try in g  to  reconcile th is  absence o f change in the 
world w ith  w hat seem ed to  have been H eidegger's  understand ing  of
139 It may seem that the words of Karl Jaspers best bridge the gap between the two lines 
of thought, Arendt's and Heidegger's, bringing together moment of action and moment of 
vision: "Where a development in time seems to have given us possession of it, all can still 
be betrayed in a moment. Conversely, where a man's past seems to be mere factuality, 
weighing him down under endless contingencies to the point of annihilation, he can 
nevertheless at any moment being as it were from the beginning through sudden 
awareness of the unconditional." [1951/2003:58] While these words testify to the 
freedom of man against the time flow and continuum of events, the statement is 
nevertheless strongly tilted towards the remaining metaphysical and theological traces in 
philosophy through the reference to the unconditional and the vision, suggesting 
something alien to both Heidegger and Arendt -  the Being behind existence as an entity, 
as something that is independent of existence, graspable as other than existence and 
attributed to it.
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re tr ie v in g  " in  o rd e r to  tra n s fo rm  it in to  a b e g in n in g ."140 W hat is then  th e  
a c tiv ity  th a t H eidegger speaks o f in Being and Time  where sum m oning  
o f D ase in  to  its tru e  p o te n tia l is read as acting  b y  Dasein? I t  is " to  hear 
th e  ca ll a u th e n tic a lly  m ea ns  to  bring  o n e se lf to  factical a c tio n ." 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 9 4 ] The  a n s w e r lies in H eidegger's  understand ing o f 
a c tiv ity . A lready in th is  e a rly  w ork , there  is the  in tu itio n  th a t H eidegger 
w ill e ve n tu a lly  m ove  to w a rd s  understand ing  o f th in k in g  itse lf as acting : 
"R eso lu te , Dasein is a lready  in acting . We are  purpose ly  avoiding th e  
te rm  'a c tio n . ' For in  the f ir s t  place, It w ould have  to  be so broad ly 
conce ived th a t a c tiv ity  a lso  encom passes the  pass iv ity  o f res is tance ." 
[1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :3 0 0 ]
As A re n d t argues in  her la s t com pleted w ork , H e idegger o f th e  Being 
and Time thus in tu its  h is  la te r connection  betw een th ink ing  and 
th an k ing  o r th ink ing  as th a n k in g : "a  th in k in g  th a t  expresses g ra titu d e  
th a t th e  'naked T h a t' has been  g iven a t a ll . "  [L M /I I :1 8 5 ] The being th a t 
th in k s  is a being indebted fo r  its  own, g ive n  ex is tence  and in th ink ing , i t  
is th a n k in g  fo r  being g iven  a t a ll. The c lim a x  o f D ase in 's response to the  
ca ll th e re fo re  becom es n o t a c ting  in fu ll consciousness o f its ow n m o s t 
p oss ib ilities  as a th ro w n  and fin ite  b e in g -in -th e -w o rld . W hat Dasein 
does  is to  g ra te fu lly  th in k  o f  the  Being: "T h a t the  a ttitu d e  o f m an , 
co n fron te d  w ith  Being, shou ld  be thanking can be seen as a va rian t o f 
P lato 's thaumazein , the  beg inn ing  p rinc ip le  o f p h ilo so p h y .' [L M /II:1 8 5 ]
H eidegger's  understand ing  o f th ink ing  as a c tiv ity  a t th e  core  of his 
n o tio n  o f Augenblick  leads A re n d t to  conclude th a t, in his p ro ject o f 
o vercom ing  m etaphysics, H e idegger a c tua lly  re tu rn s  to  the  ideal o f 
P la ton ic  ph ilosophers, the  s ilence  o f v is ion  and th e  silence in v is ion . 
H eidegger's  p ro je c t o f o vercom ing  the m e ta ph ys ica l trad ition  tu rn s  o u t 
to  be th e  reversal in to  tra d it io n , w hich h o w e ve r seem s to  have been 
in e v ita b le  from  th e  m o m e n t H eidegger asked the  question  of the  
m ean ing  o f Dasein as the  q u e s tio n  o f Being.
The question  rem ains h o w e ve r w hy H eidegger, a lb e it concerned w ith  
und e rs ta nd in g  being fro m  w ith in  existence th a t a lw ays Is in becom ing 
th e re fo re  changing , does n o t g rasp  freedom  o f m a n  in te rm s o f  acting. 
This p rob lem  can be approached fro m  m o re  than  one angle in 
H e idegger's  w ork. One s ig n ifica n t cue is fo un d  in the mode o f 
te m p o ra lity  w here from  th e  te m p ora liza tion  o f Augenblick  o rig ina tes. 
The Augenblick  te m p ora lize s  itse lf out o f fu tu re  - its source lies in th e  
fin ite  fu tu re  o f Dasein. T he  m om en t o f beg inn ing  em erges from  th e  
p re se n t. In  A rend t's  w ork on action, fu tu re  does not speak to th e  
p re se n t n o r is the fu tu re  bespoken  to  th e  p re sen t, it m ust ra th e r be the  
p re se n t to  speak into  the  fu tu re , w hich is the  p ro pe r m eaning of th e  
a lre a d y  analysed concept o f  prom ise. N oth ing  can be derived fro m  
fu tu re  b u t fu tu re  its e lf has to  re ly  on th e  p re sen t to  m ake  it, the  fu tu re , 
be.
lTO Guignon analyzes the quote from Heidegger's I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M e t a p h y s i c s  (1935) 
which suggests that retrieval is not simply a reinterpretation but a creative interpretation. 
[Dreyfuss and Hall, 1992:138-139]
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This how ever does n o t m ean  th a t the  present as Arendt conceives o f it  
is a lw ays h e re /the re  and  th e  m om en t is placed w ith in  th e  p resen t th a t 
a lw ays is a lready th e re . This m etaphysica l no tion  o f the p re sen t present 
is a lien  to  A rend t's  und ers ta nd in g  o f the  hum an condition  as insertion  
be tw een  past and fu tu re .
A rend tian  present as th e  space betw een past and fu tu re  is th e  figh ting  
g ro u n d 141 tha t, w ith o u t m an , would erode u n d e r the tide  o f both past 
and fu tu re , th e re  w ould  be no m arked now, o n ly  a flow  o f fu tu re  in to  
th e  past. The presen t o r  th is  now in betw een is presenced o n ly  th rough  
th e  ba ttle  o f m an to  keep the past and the fu tu re  a pa rt in o rder to  
in se rt his own presence in to  the  tim e -flo w . Man's insertion  is th e  proper 
occupation  of the  space betw een the no longer and th e  no t y e t not as 
som eth ing  th a t is p re sen t, always the re , ava ilab le , fo r hum an beings, 
bu t th a t em erges on ly  th ro u g h  the b reak. The present is th e  mode o f 
te m p o ra lity  w here  action  does not occur but, as A rendt understands it, 
it is itse lf b rough t a b o u t by hum an action. A rend tian  p resen t is the  
g round  to  be w on.
E xis ten tia lly , th e  p re sen t is the  insertion  o f m an 's  presence between 
tw o  absences, th e  b e fo re -b ir th  and the a fte r-d e a th . As an insertion , it 
in te rru p ts  the a u to m a tis m  o f flow  betw een past and fu tu re  In denia l o f  
all a u tom atism . Since m a n  is to  be understood as such an in te rru p tive  
inse rtion  herself, the  p rim o rd ia l te m p ora lity , th e  te m p o ra lity  th rough  
w hich  human being m eans, fo r A rendt is th e re fo re  not o ne  o f the  
m odes of chronologica l te m p o ra lity  bu t th e  ve ry  in te rru p tio n  as such in  
the  fo rm  o f beg inning. Yet in  the  fo rm  o f  beg inning, in te rru p tio n  is m ore 
th an  ju s t  an in te rru p tio n : it is the  ve ry  d iscontinuous o f the  tem pora l 
co n tin uu m  w he re from  th e  co n tin u ity  unfo lds. The present o r  the in - 
betw een is thus th e  p layground  o f possib ilities fo r  m en. In  th a t, the  
p re sen t itse lf is o n ly  a p oss ib ility , not som eth ing  g iven , n o t Hegel's 
p riv ileged  now th a t is u nco nd itio n a lly  a lw ays th e re  and w hich H eidegger 
appropria tes  to  c ritic ize  th e  predom inance o f th e  presen t in philosophy.
A fte r the  in te rru p tio n , th a t  can take place o n ly  betw een p a s t and 
fu tu re , as the  past and th e  fu tu re  do n o t lend them selves to  hum an 
in te rven tion , noth ing  rem a ins  th e  sam e. T hrough the  p re sen t th a t 
appears in action  m an m an  touch th e  past and th e  fu tu re  o f th a t 
p resen t, and as th e  one is re to ld  and th e  o th e r fo re to ld , the  flo w  is no 
longe r directed fro m  th e  p a s t tow ards th e  fu tu re  o r fro m  the  fu tu re  to  
the  past, but th e y  bo th  s tre a m  from  th e  p resent o f the  hum an action, 
w hich  is the source o f th e  m ean ing . I f  how ever action  in the  presen t is 
g rounded u ltim a te ly  in th e  fu tu re  and th a t fu tu re  is fin ite , closed, done, 
[H e idegger, 1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :3 3 0 ] s tre tch ing  its e lf n o t fo rw ard  b u t back, in to  
the past, then the  a c tion  can only be a ffirm a tive  o f w h a t is revealed as 
fu tu re  -  sources o f th e  new  a re  sealed by th is  closed fu tu re .








In  th e  concept o f  beg inn ing  A rend t th u s  ca p tu re s  the  paradox o f 
e x is ten ce , o f ex-sistere  as s tand ing  in appearance , em erg ing and 
becom ing  w hich invo lves th e  d u ra tio n  o f th is  becom ing as m ode o f  
be ing , the  c o n tin u ity  o f th e  ru p tu re  to  c o n tin u ity . The underp inning o f 
A re nd t's  po litica l co nce p tu a liza tion  o f action  as beginning is here  
revealed  as e x is te n tia l.
The q ue stion  m u s t fin a lly  be asked: w hy ca n n o t H eidegger see th e  
te m p o ra l m ode o f p resen t as any th ing  b u t the  p re se n t, confined to  th e  
lim its  o f the  g iven? T he  a nsw er reaches to  H eidegger's m o s t 
fu n d a m e n ta l onto log ica l p ro p o s itio n , h is u nd e rs ta nd in g  o f Dasein: fo r  
H eidegger, Dasein is a b e in g -IN -th e -w o rld . U nderstand ing  m an th ro u g h  
b eg inn ing , how ever, A re nd t can o ffe r h e r own 'fu n d a m e n ta l o n to log ica l' 
p ro po s ition , to use H eidegger's  ph ilosoph ica l language a ltho ug h  
c o u n te r- in tu it iv e ly  to  A re n d t's  ow n id iom . A re n d t's  p ropos ition  is th a t o f 
a m an  as a b e ing -T O -th e -w orld  th a t never ceases to  bring  new in to  th e  
w o rld , ju s t  as his own b a re  appearance in th e  w orld  has been an 
abso lu te  nove lty . N am ely, in  the  concept o f m an  as beg inn ing, A rend t 
o ffe rs  a re in te rp re ta tio n  o f  Dasein as a b e in g -ln -th e -w o rld , arguing  th a t 
th o u g h  m an is in th e  w orld , he is so in the  p a rtic u la r  w ay th a t re flects  
the  g if t  o f freedom  bestow ed upon him  th ro u g h  b ir th  -  "b y  th e  initium  
m an is inso fa r as he is an a c tin g  be ing" [BPF, 1 7 0 ], th e re fo re  chang ing , 
fo r in  action  "a We is a lw ays engaged in chang ing  o u r com m on w o rld ."  
[L M /I I :2 0 0 ] Freedom  thus m u s t be understood  n o t as the  cond ition  o f 
openness bu t as the  act o f m a n . By c o n tra s t to  H e idegger w ho  "loca tes  
in d iv id u a lity , and indeed fre e d o m , on th e  leve l o f  be ing , A rend t locates 
these  notions on th e  level o f  a c tio n ."  [V etlesen , 2 0 0 6 :7 6 ]
In  o th e r  w ords, H eidegger's  concept o f tim e  as se lf-a ffe c ting  o f m in d , 
w h ich  re ta ins  the  seed o f h is  K antian  d e lib e ra tio n s , fa ils  to  captu re  th e  
fu n d a m e n t o f m an 's  e x is te n ce : m an appears am o ng  o thers and a ffects  
th e  w orld  before h e r m ind can a ffec t itse lf. P r im o rd ia lity  does no t lie in  
th e  m in d  b u t in th e  w orld , w h ic h  how ever does n o t suggest th a t tim e  is 
'o b je c tiv e ' bu t th a t tim e  c a n n o t be equated e ith e r  w ith  's e lf ' or th e  
w orld  b u t on ly  w ith  th e ir  re la tin g  to  each o th e r, w ith  m an as b e ing -to - 
th e  w orld  th a t genera tes t im e  th ro u g h  th is  b e in g -to .
The a rg u m e n t in C hapter 6  suggested  how  it w as possible  fo r A re nd t to  
g rasp  th is  inescapab ility  o f a c ting  in hum an co n d itio n : it is the  concept 
o f t im e  n o t as "tra n sce n d e n ta l su b je c tiv ity  [w h ic h ] transcends itse lf in 
o rd e r to  create the  p oss ib ility  o f the  o b jec tify in g  e n co u n te r, the  opening 
up to w ards  o th e r e n titie s " [B ou rd ieu , 1 9 9 1 :6 1 ] b u t as a co n tinuum  
broken  by hum an appearance , o r ra th e r -  the  c o n tin u u m  created o n ly  
by th e  in te rru p tio n  which tra n s fo rm s  the  shee r shapeless f lu id ity  o f 
course  in to  past and fu tu re , b roken  and a t the  sa m e  tim e  linked by th e  
p re sen t as in te rru p tio n , the  p re sen t not as a ty ra n n ic a l now b u t as th e  
g round  beaten by acting  o f m en .
A lth ou g h  perhaps o f all H e idegger's  d iscip les, she is m o s t d is tan t to  th e  
kind o f inq u iry  th a t H e idegger considered p ro p e rly  philosoph ica l, th a t is 
-  o n to log ica l, A re nd t deve lops a p ro je c t th a t  o ffe rs  a m ove m e n t beyond
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m etaphysics, thus th e  p ro je c t th a t was H eidegger's p rinc ipa l 
philosophical a m b itio n . N am ely, A re nd t's  w ork  constitu tes  a 
reconstruction  o f ph ilosophy beyond m e taphys ics , a reconstruction  
grounded in the p o litica l as the  on to log ica l -  n o t in the  on to log ica l as 
the  p o litica l.142
The inqu iry  o f po litica l o n to lo g y  is not an  in q u iry  in to  the  to ta lity . I t  was 
th e  tru ly  p rob lem atic  p rob lem  fo r ph ilosophy, as Heidegger did and 
ta u g h t it, to  reduce the q ue s tion  o f hum an fre e d o m  to  substantives and 
to ta lity , failing to  see th a t freedom  is not th e  re latedness as a s ta tic  
p ro p e rty  o r an a ttr ib u te  w hich  'b e lo n g s ' to  b e ing s , and so can only be 
investiga ted  in re la tin g , n o t in solid and unm ova b le  essences. Political 
o n to logy  as understood and p u t fo rth  here th u s  never asks 'w h a t is ../ 
questions. Not th ro u g h  d eco nstru c tion  th e re fo re  b u t only th ro ug h  the 
d is location  o f q uestions  can philosophy leave  the confines o f 
m etaphysics.
142 The question that cannot be raised here is the question whether one ought to 
substitute political philosophy here with practical philosophy in general. Following Arendt's 
understanding of human existence would however suggest the contrary. Namely, what 
Arendt Is saying is that fundamental to b e i n g  i n  and b e i n g  t o  the world, which is defining 
of being as human being, is the political, not the ethical. This argument could be 
confronted with Nancy's understanding of existence, which ex-lsts insofar it cannot be but 
projected outwards: unlike Being, there is no being, no existant in concealment from this 
outwardness. In other words, the ethical, the relation to the Other which is inclining, is 
already in the being "whose exemplary reality is that of 'my' face always exposed to 
others... never facing myself/ [Nancy, 1991/2004rXXXVIIIJ In that sense, the ethical is 
necessarily there before the political although Nancy reads the above as "the archi- 
original impossibility of Narcissus that opens straightaway onto the possibility of the 
political/ Nancy thus points to the way of understanding the political as contained in the 
inevitable exposure to the other, as always there.
But in Arendt's thought the political is not contained in being-in-common but in acting-in­
common. While this mediated presencing, through alterity, invests in the moment of 
political community the ethical dimension, going outside itself, being-towards the other, It 
conceals a certain necessity in the ethical, which distinguishes it from the political. The 
ethical can be both passive and active, one always stands in relation to others, one i s  to 
others, whereas the political is emergence from this necessity of being to others, towards 
the freedom of acting this relation out. In that sense, even non-ethical is ethical insofar it 
is tied to the inescapable exposure to the Other even of the one who murders the Other, 
the ethical is n e c e s s a r i l y ,  whereas the non-political can never subsumed under the 
political but the political emerges only if there is (also) the possibility of non-political. The 
political is that which happens when there Is a possibility of both non-political and 
political, in that friction which is an opening towards a decision towards taking up the 
being-in-common, taking up of existence in*common without entrapment into either 
sovereignty of autonomous individual or necessity of community. In other words, the 
political is about freedom, which defines human existence.
2 0 2
C hapter S e v e n :
TOWARDS A DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHY
W hat pervades A rend t's  e n tire  p ro je c t is th e  com prehension  th a t th e  
m e ta ph ys ica l tra d itio n  can be overcom e o n ly  th ro u g h  d isp lacem ent o f 
th e  fu n d a m e n ta l ph ilosoph ica l questions, n o t th ro u g h  th e  reconstruction  
o f th ose  questions w ith in  th e  m e ta ph ys ica l fra m e w o rk , w hich is how  
H e idegger approached the  p ro b le m . The v e ry  a c t o f  asking the  question  
th a t invo lves is im p lies  acceptance o f th e  m e taphys ica l tra d itio n  which 
v io la tes  o r  overlooks the fu nd am e n ta l fa c t o f hum an cond ition  upon 
w h ich  A rend t bases her p ro je c t: before m an is, she is-to-th e -w o rld , 
e very  being as hum an is a lrea d y  and a lw ays b e in g -to .
I t  fo llow s th e re o f th a t th e  fu n d a m e n ta l questions  o f the  hum an 
co nd itio n  are the  questions o f th e  do ing . As A re n d t defines it in th e  
Human Condition, th e  dem and upon th in k in g  is to  " th in k  w ha t we are  
d o in g / ' This question  fo rm u la te d  in th e  p re sen t continuous tense, 
suggestive  o f now and n o t a s tand ing , e te rna l now , but a specific 
h is to rica l now o f th e  specific , h is to rica l we w ho a re  doing, con trasts  
sh a rp ly  w ith  H eidegger's q ue s tion  o f the  Being o f th e  being. H eidegger's 
q uestion , though  aware o f the  consp icuous presence o f is, rem ains 
trapped  w ith in  th a t is, th e  co nsta n t, su b s ta n tive  presence o f 
m e taphys ics . Following th e  im p lica tions o f A re nd t's  understand ing  
th ro u g h , an in q u iry  in to  m eaning  m u s t be based on th e  acceptance th a t 
"you  beg in  to  experience  m ean ing  less as so m eth ing  to  be d iscovered 
and m o re  as an investm ent you  m ake in se lective  activ ities  and 
e v e n ts ."  [C onno lly , 2 0 0 2 :1 6 8 ]
In  a sense th e re fo re , the d e p a rtu re  p o in t fo r  H eidegger's and A rend t's  
inqu iries  is the  sam e -  in  H eidegger's w o rds , "T o  th e  th ings 
th e m s e lv e s !"  Both share th e  idea o f th e  fu nd a m e n ta l, and centra l, 
q ue s tion  o f ph ilosophy: fre e d o m , and freedom  w h ich  is m anifested in 
hum an  engagem en t w ith  th e  w orld . H eidegger and Arendt a lso share 
the  o n to log ica l fram e w o rk  w he re fro m  th ey  read th e  m eaning o f m an o r, 
c loser to  A rend t's  language, the  m eaning o f  being in hum an cond ition , 
w hich  is tim e .
B ut th e re  H eidegger's and A rend t's  inqu iries  p a r t ways. H eidegger's 
m ain  p reoccupa tion  is the  Being, o f w hich Dasein o r  hum an existence is 
on ly  one m ed ium  o f unconcea lm ent (and co nce a lm en t). Even i f  a t th e  
beg inn ing  o f his ph ilosoph ica l w ork , H eidegger poses the  question  from  
the  p o s itio n  o f Dasein, his la te r tu rn  leads h im  to  asking the question  
fro m  th e  Being itse lf. In  ha rm ony w ith  his in te res t in Eastern 
ph ilosoph ies, v is ib le  p a rticu la rly  in his la te  d ia logues on language and 
th in k in g , H eidegger's ph ilosophy begins to  d is tance  its e lf from  European 
p h ilosophy ju s t  as Eastern p a in tin g  d is tingu ishes its e lf from  European.
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The figu re  o f m an  assum es its  na tu ra l d im ensions aga inst o th e r entities 
th a t populate the  w o rld  and na tu re , the c e n tra lity  o f his figure  
abandoned or a t least d is tu rb e d .
From  th e  ve ry  beg inn ing  o f  his in q u iry  in to  possible  th in k in g  beyond 
m etaphys ics , H eidegger has p rob lem atized  the  'is>ness' o f Being, o r the  
understand ing  o f the  Being o f beings In term s o f th e  presentness such 
as th a t o f the beings as e n titie s  o r  occurrences o f th e  w orld . The 
p a instak ing  e ffo rt to  re m o v e  his th ink ing  fro m  the  m etaphysica l 
language  o f the  tra d itio n a l th in k in g  o f th e  Being in te rm s o f  being, is 
now here  so e v id e n t as in  H eidegger's Dialogue on Language, 
[1 9 5 9 /1 9 8 2 ] w here  th ro u g h  th e  recourse to  Japanese, th e  language as 
re m o te  as possible from  " o u r  W estern languages [ th a t]  are languages 
o f m etaphys ica l th in k in g ,"  [H e idegger, 1 9 5 7 /2 0 0 2 :7 3 ] H eidegger seeks 
to  rem ove  h im se lf from  th e  tra p  o f m etaphysics.
In  th e  Discourse on Thinking  H e idegger takes on th e  ro le  o f the  
Teacher, the  ro le  w hich  a lso  pervades the p a rt o f In q u ire r  in the  
Dialogue on Language w h e re  he m ay asking questions but is e ffective ly  
a m e n to r in the  b roader c o n te x t o f th e  v e n tu re  tow ards a d iffe ren t 
language ju s t as in the Discourse  he leads on the  p a th  to  new th ink ing . 
I t  is o f course one and th e  sam e p ro jec t o f transcend ing  representa tion . 
At th e  same tim e  and d e sp ite  his ro le  o f the  one w ho has stepped 
ahead, the  guide, H e idegger appears as p ro found ly  bew ildered him self 
by th a t he can nam e y e t n o t describe, th a t is - th e  openness or the  
reg ion  in which e very  being is encountered. [H e idegger, 1 9 5 9 /1 9 6 6 :6 7 ]
Follow ing Heidegger's in tu it io n  in exp loring  a d iffe re n t language, 
D errida  explores the  p o te n tia lit ie s  o f Es gibt, [D e rrid a , 1 9 9 2 :1 9 -2 2 ] as 
d is t in c t to  the  there is, re la tin g  th e  fo rm e r to  g iv in g  n o t In the  sense o f 
g ivenness, th a t is -  the p re s e n t as cond ition ing  and d e te rm in in g , but in 
the  sense o f gift. Leaving a s ide  the  course o f D errida 's  e n tire  inqu iry , o f 
w h ich  th is  is on ly  a fra g m e n t, it  should be observed  th a t Derrida 's 
em phasis o f Es g ibt echoes H eidegger's la te  a tte m p t a t conceptualizing 
the openness o r th e  're g io n ' w h ich  is le ttin g -b e , w h ich  gives being and 
tim e  to  each o th e r  In a w a y  th a t does no t present th em  in the  
m etaphys ica l sense, does n o t jo in  them  to  the  beings p roper o r  beings 
p re sen t. This g iv ing  is Ereignis  o r  event o r  the e v e n t o f  appropria tion, 
w h ich  indicates th a t H e idegger has never abandoned his o rig ina l pro ject 
o f overcom ing  th e  th ink ing  in  te rm s  o f presence, o f  be ing . To th in k  the  
being as com ing fro m  e v e n t is the  cu lm ina tion  o f  th a t p ro je c t. There is 
no e ve n t, event o n ly  com es.
One could ask, w he th e r it  Is n o t th a t in th is  onto log ica l understand ing o f 
free do m  as le tting  beings be b y  seeking to  see th e m , seeking to  allow 
th em  to  appear fo r w ha t th e y  are , H eidegger is n o t -  in ten tion a lly  or 
u n in te n tio n a lly  -  laying th e  ground fo r  p ractica l freedom  such is 
exercised in ju d g m e n t, as A re n d t conceptualizes it, freedom  to  free  the  
beings o f the w orld  to  th e m se lve s , in th e  sense o f libera ting  th e ir 
m eaning  as opposed to  th e ir  sheer being. In  its p rac tica l in te rp re ta tio n , 
th is freedom  becomes se lf-re sp o n s ib ility , w hich re la tes  to  Heidegger's
&  ■•£*-**
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concept o f  a u th e n tic ity  as ta k in g  up o f one 's  e x is ten ce  in w ha t is m o s t 
its ow n .
B ut it  is c lear fro m  these  H eidegger's la te  'co m m u n in g s ' th a t Ereignis 
a ltho ug h  dem anding  to  be th o u g h t as co m in g , happening, is not an  
e ven t in  th e  sense o f  a c tu a lity . I ts  happening happens th ro ug h  th in k in g  
th a t is w aiting  in re lea se m e n t. R eleasem ent m u s t be understood as 
'h ig h e r  a c tin g ' -  h ig h e r th a n  "fou nd  in a ll th e  a c tio n s  w ith in  th e  w orld  
and in the  m ach in a tion s  o f all m ank ind ... y e t no a c t iv ity ."  
[1 9 5 9 /1 9 6 6 :6 1 ] W hat H eidegger th ro u g h  th e  n o tio n  o f action  w ith o u t 
a c tiv ity  seeks to  th in k  is th e  action  u n re la ted  to  w ill -  a p rob lem  th a t 
fo r  Hannah A rend t's  e xp lo ra tio n s  was no less im p o rta n t. As A re nd t 
noted in her fin a l c r it ic a l in te rp re ta tio n  o f H eidegger's p ro je c t, 
H e idegger's flig h t fro m  w ill, w hich  assum es th e  su b jec t's  g rip  o f th e  
w orld  as an ob jec t, leads h im  to  the  abso lu te  d en ia l o f  w ill.
W hy is w ill so p ro b le m a tic  fo r  Heidegger? A re n d t contends th a t " [ i ] n  
H eidegger's  understand ing , th e  w ill to  ru le  and to  d om in a te  is a kind o f 
o rig in a l s in ."  [L M /II :1 7 3 ] For H eidegger a fte r  th e  'tu rn ',  w illing  belongs 
to  th e  sam e dom ain  as th in k in g  predicated on rep re sen ta tion . I t  is th e  
dom ain  o f S ubject, w hich H eidegger fin a lly  cam e  to  equate w ith  th e  
dom ain  o f u n freedom  and to  co n tras t w ith  the  reg ion  w here from  th e  
Being is com ing. T he  rep re sen ta tion a l th in k in g  ca p tu re s  and im poses its  
schem es o f values on th e  w o rld , o b je c tify in g  In o rd e r  to  g rasp  o f th e  
su b jec t. W illing p ro je c ts , ru les, com m ands, im poses, denying  In 
a c tu a lity  and n o t o n ly  in  co nce p tu a liza tion  th e  a u th en tic , im m e d ia te  
beingness o f beings as th e y  a re , w ith o u t th e  S u b je c t. The w orld and th e  
Being are then  in the  p ow er o f  th e  a ll-p o w e rfu l S u b je c t, w hich m u s t be 
understood  as the  fu n d a m e n ta l m etaphys ica l c a te g o ry . The S ub jec t 
em bodies the  abso lu te  and u ltim a te  p rinc ip le  o f  va lu in g  a ll th a t is, in  
denia l o f freedom  o f all o th e r  beings to  be le t to  be : "E very  va lu in g , 
even w here  it va lues pos itive ly , is a s u b je c tiv iz in g . I t  does not le t 
be ings: be. Rather, va lu ing  le ts beings: be va lid  -  so le ly  as th e  ob jec ts  
o f its  d o in g ." [1 9 9 3 :2 5 1 ]
In  o rd e r to  pursue fu r th e r  his p ro ject o f asking the  question  o f th e  
m eaning o f Being, H eidegger has th e re fo re  fin a lly  abandoned the w ay 
o f th in k in g  beyond m e taphys ics  th rough  th in k in g  m a n  as the o n ly  being 
th a t can ask th is q uestion , find ing  th a t m a n  ask ing  the  question  o f th e  
Being can only be 'th ro w n  back upon h im se lf' to  a sk  w h a t he h im se lf is. 
[L M / I I : 173 ] A rend t's  reca p itu la tio n  o f th e  m o v e m e n t o f H e idegger's  
in q u iry  captures th e  essence o f the  m uch d iscussed tu rn  in his w o rk . 
Asking the  question  o f th e  Being th e re o f becom es im possible fo r  
H e idegger from  w ith in  the  language o f th e  s u b je c t o r the se lf. The 
Being m u s t be a llowed to  com e fo rth  and be lis tened to .143
143 The quoted Arendt's recapitulation runs directly against not so Infrequent criticism of 
Heidegger's work, and also against the distinction between his work and her thought, on 
the ground of solipsism in the core of this philosophy, "the fundamental solipsism entailed 
in the Heideggerian notion of p r a x i s  as being-in-the-world." Taminiaux, 1997:14.
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For th a t, th in k in g  m ust h um b le  itse lf by abandoning its rep resen ta tiona l 
fram e w o rks , in o rd e r to  re tu rn  to  the  "region, an enchanted region 
w here  e ve ry th ing  belonging  th e re  re tu rns  to  th a t in w hich  it res ts ." 
[H e idegger, 1 9 5 9 /1 9 6 6 :6 5 ] The region is equa ted  w ith  openness th a t 
frees all beings to  them se lves and to  th in k  fro m  w ith in  the  reg ion  is n o t 
to  present th a t which is th o u g h t bu t to  let it com e  to th e  th o u g h t. To 
th in k  in a ffirm a tio n  o f  th is  openness, w hich  is not a locus o r an 
o ccu rre n ce /e n tity  b u t a sh e e r even t o f opening and o ffe ring  th e  being, 
a being itse lf to  th e  w orld , m eans to  ta ke  the  p a th  tow ards overcom ing  
o f the  fin itud e  o f  m an, th e  fin itu d e  understood  here no t in  te rm s o f 
death  b u t in te rm s o f th e  d e fic ie n cy  o f m an  as th e  sub ject.
T h ink ing  in th a t sense s itu a te s  its e lf " in  the  re g io n  [w h e re ] eve ry th in g  
is in  th e  best o rd e r o n ly  i f  it  has been no one 's  d o in g ." H eidegger, 
1 9 5 9 /1 9 6 6 :7 1 ] The reg ion  o f  no-one's doing m eans the reg ion  beyond 
the  su b jec t's  in te rv e n tio n  and  in terference  w ith  beingness o f o th e r 
beings. I t  is the  reg ion  o f  hum bleness o f th in k in g  and ph ilosophy th a t 
could possibly spring  fo rth , o f w hich  H eidegger is by no m eans certa in , 
bu t should th is ph ilosophy happen -  it w ould renounce  all a rrogance o f 
cap tu ring  th e  w orld  and th e  Being.
To th in k  the  Being is th e re fo re  to  th an k  in recogn ition  o f th row ness and 
indebtedness fo r ex is tence. T h ink ing  th e n  is no t even  the  inner d ia logue 
betw een the I and the se lf, as Arendt unders tands  th ink ing , b u t on ly  
the s ilen t call to  which Dasein should respond b y  silence. [H e idegger, 
1 9 2 7 /1 9 9 6 :2 9 6 ] So even th a t in n e r m ovem ent, o f  th ou gh ts , is halted in 
the m om en t o f ca ll, as A re n d t observes [L M / ir .1 8 5 ],  in receiving th e  
Being. The being th a t is th ro w n  into  the  w orld  rem ains there fore  
chained to  its givenness th a t it can only be aw are  o f but never change, 
it is g iven itse lf and it is g ive n  the  call to  th in k  itse lf and th a t which 
surrounds it.
Heidegger h im se lf has neve r exp lored  th e  im p lica tions  o f th is  th o u g h t o r 
th ink ing  fo r practica l ph ilosophy o r praxis  in genera l. He e xp lic itly  
renounced any such d im en s ion  o f philosophy in the  m uch quoted 
in te rv iew  to  Der Spiegel. Yet H eidegger's fu nd am e n ta l on to logy appears 
to  converse w ith  the  experience  o f the w orld  th a t had gone th ro u g h  the 
horrors o f the  Second W orld W ar. That a t least can be deduced from  a 
w ell-a rgued in te rp re ta tio n  p u t fo rth  by Caputo in his a tte m p t to  read a 
d iffe re n t. N on-m etaphys ica l philosophy fro m  the  tra d itio n  of 
herm eneutics derived from  th e  w orks o f K ie rkegaard, H eidegger and 
Derrida as representa tives o f rad ica l herm eneutics.
Nam ely, con tra ry  to  Lyo ta rd 's  critique  o f H eidegger's m etaphysica l 
fo rg e tting  o f 'je w s ,' o f th a t ungraspable  fo r a ll logos, H eidegger's 
concept o f Gelassenheit is roo ted  in th e  pro found understand ing  o f 
hum an fin itud e , the  in a b ility  to  com prehend w ith o u t v io la ting . In  th a t 
sense, it is related to  the K antian  understand ing o f fin itu d e  -  th a t man 
can know  on ly  ind irectly  as th e  one who does not c rea te  w hat is g iven 
to  his in tu ition , But it run s  to  even m ore  tra g ic  depth , th a t th is
206
m edia ted  co gn itio n  a lw ays necessarily  v io la tes  th e  Being o f beings, 
m o ld ing  the  w orld  to  th e  sh a p e  o f the  su b jec t's  consciousness.
Only a to uch  upon th ese  o bse rva tion s  can be incorpora ted  in to  th is  
d iscussion b u t a to u ch  th a t overrides in im p o rta n ce  m uch of w ha t has 
been said h ith e rto  inso fa r it  a llow s a p riv ileged  s ig h tin g  o f H eidegger's 
e n te rp rise , th e  s ig h tin g  s im ila r  in e ffe c t to  th e  passage o f th e  ray o f 
ligh t th ro u g h  dense m ass o f  d a rk  w a te rs . Getassenheit o r th e  fin a l 
re je c tio n  o f the  ru ling  s u b je c tiv ity  th a t o b je c tif ie s  existence o f a ll 
beings, th e  w orld , th in g s  and crea tures a like  (In o th e r  words, a ll th a t is 
o th e r th a n  th e  s u b je c t its e lf)  seems to  n ou rish  th e  potentia l fo r th e  
po litica l and th e  e th ica l o f  freedom  as le tt in g -b e , o f being free  by 
a llow ing  freedom  th ro u g h  re leasem ent. Th is  new  space of freedom  
em erges fro m  "a m y s te r io u s  reg ion w here  th e re  is noth ing  fo r which to  
be a n sw e ra b le ." [H e id eg ge r, 1 9 5 9 /1 9 6 6 :7 1 ]
Getassenheit thus becom es a m ove  w ith o u t m ove , o u t o f th e  
e n tra p m e n t o f h um an  e x is ten ce  w hich e x is ts  n o t only by tu rn in g  
o u tw a rd , exposing, 'b e in g -o u ts id e - its e lf ' [N ancy, 1 9 9 1 /2 0 0 4 :2 4 ] bu t a t 
the sam e tim e  d ra w in g  th a t  outside inw ards, w o rk in g  it like clay to  
a pp ro p ria te  it fo r th e  fin ite  b e ing . Except th a t the  o u ts id e  is not clay b u t 
has a being ind ep en d en t o f hum an in te rv e n tio n  and hence occluded o r  
silenced th ro u g h  th a t in te rv e n tio n . Getassenheit o r  le tting -be  is thus a 
ph ilosophical e ffo rt o f re tre a tin g  from  the  m e ta ph ys ica l ob jec tifica tion  
the  w o rld  and the  beings, reduc ing  the  d o m in io n  o f  consciousness o ve r 
the w o rld  and a d m ittin g  th e  lim itedness o f  th e  consciousness, w hile  
deve lop ing  th e  idea o f e x is ten ce  as openness, in th e  open and th ro u g h  
openness. I t  invo lves lis ten ing  to  the  Being o f be ings and n o t th e ir  
m an u fa c tu rin g .
In  th a t sense, H eidegger c lea rs  the  path  fo r  p o s t-m o d e rn  o r o th e r-th a n - 
m odern  p ractica l p h ilo so p h y , abandoning th e  e ffo r t  to  sub jugate  and 
co n tro l, to  understand  by fa b rica tin g  -  to o ls  o r concepts . Caputo in his 
reco ns tru c tive  in te rp re ta tio n  o f he rm eneutics  recognizes in th is  
H eidegger's 'keep ing  in ind e fin iten e ss ' th e  p oss ib ility  o f ph ilosophy 
beyond decis ion  o r, in D e rrid a 's  w ords, beyond a c tive  and passive. 
[1 9 8 2 :9 ] H eidegger m ov ing  beyond his ow n  e a rly  w o rk  thus m oves 
beyond th e  n ih ilis tic  den ia l, o f w hich B ourd ieu  accuses h im  in th e  
a tte m p t to  d em ask p o litica l tendencies o f H e idegger's o n to lo g y , 
[1 9 9 1 :3 3 ] tow ards  th e  a b so lu te  a ffirm a tio n  o f th e  Being as the m ode o f 
being, n o t as a reso lu te  dec is ion .
This read ing  o f H e idegger w ou ld  thus suggest th a t A rend t's  p ro je c t is a 
belated and even c o n tra d ic to ry  exercise in the  re v iv a l o f m odern ism . 
One cou ld  then  read from  A re n d t's  w ork m o d e rn is t tendencies o f new 
beg inning  [P u lkk inen , 2 0 0 3 :2 1 6 ] generated  by th e  perilous illusion o f 
poss ib ility  o f beg inn ing  a ne w . The peril arises fro m  the assum ed 
"s logan  o f the  genera l econom y th a t gove rns hell b y  imposing the  ru le  
o f fo rg e ttin g  and tu rn in g  th e  s p ir it exc lus ive ly , fo re c los in g ly , tow ard  th e  
fu tu re ."  T here  is a p o ss ib ility  o f the  "a lw a ys  n ew  because a lw ays 
fo rg o tte n ."  [L yo ta rd , 1 9 9 0 :4 7 -4 8 ]
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Is  th e n  H eidegger o ffe ring  a fu nd am e n ta l o n to lo g y  a ttuned  to  the on ly  
p o ss ib ility  o f praxis  in th e  w orld  a fte r A uschw itz : uncovering th e  Being 
n o t th ro u g h  any act o f s u b je c t, but th ro u g h  Being uncovering itself? 
[G u m b re c h t, 1 9 9 7 :4 5 1 ]
One could engage in a m ore  m elancholic  reading o f A rend t, and 
ju s tif ic a tio n s  o f such read ing  would abound. There  is unm istakab ly  a 
m ore  tra g ic  A rend t, such as portrayed  by Dana V illa, A rendt w ho  w rites 
th e  tra g ic  a fte r- th o u g h ts  o f the  h is to ry  o f fa iled  o r fo rg o tte n  'spaces o f 
fre e d o m ' aga inst th e  re ign  o f ine rtia , u n free d om , te rro r  and fe a r in o u r 
com m on  spaces. T hrough  th is  m ore m elancho lic  reading th e  centra l 
n o tio n  o f A rend t's  w o rk , ac tion  appears as no t m uch m ore  then 
ba lancing in a vo id  -  im possib le  a c tiv ity  in  re jection  o f its own 
im p o ss ib ility .
There  is h ow ever a n o th e r ang le  o f reading A re nd t's  p ro ject. In  his 
a tte m p t to  hum ble  th in k in g  and the th in k e r and a llow  the event o f 
free do m , H eidegger seem s to  be blinded to  the  im p lica tion  o f a rrogance 
o f th e  ph ilosopher w ho is th e  lis tener o f  the  Being. A rendt a rgues th a t 
h ow eve r asked, th e  question  o f Being is g rounded in the  no tion  o f the 
'in v is ib le  hand' behind th e  chaotic tra ils  o f hum an doing and the 
presence o f the  hand exp la ins  and m oves w h a t o therw ise  w ould  be an 
u n in te llig ib le  w h irl o f unconnected  e ven ts : "  'B e in g 's  h is to ry ' secre tly 
inspires and guides w ha t happens on th e  su rface ..." [L M /II:1 8 6 ] The 
m eaning  is th e re fo re  revealed to  the th in k e r and it is acted o u t only 
inso fa r th ink ing  is an a c tiv ity : " th e re  is a som ebody w ho acts out the  
hidden m eaning o f Being and thus provides the  d isastrous course o f 
events w ith  a co u n te r-c u rre n t o f w holesom eness... bestows m eaning on 
w ha t fa c tu a lly , b u t in its e lf m eaning lessly  and co n tin ge n tly  /s." 
[L M /I I :1 8 7 ] To be a u th e n tic  and acknow ledge the  onto logica l 
indebtedness the re fo re  m eans to  listen to  the  Being. Beings are  guided 
by th e  Being, not on ly  if th e y  tu rn  to w ards  it b u t even if tu rn ing  away 
from  it. To the  Being, th e re  is no change, it is e ith e r concealed or 
revea led, negated o r  a ffirm e d , b u t never is it d iffe re n t.
In  th a t sense, A rendt's  c r itica l analysis o f the  place o f beings in the 
world o f w hich  the  m eaning is the  Being th e re fo re  exposes Heidegger's 
overa ll p ro je c t o f fu nd am e n ta l o n to logy  as a re tu rn  to  Platonic 
ph ilosophy, reversa l in to  th e  m etaphys ics  o f Being th a t philosopher 
nears o n ly  in con tem p la tion , by transcend ing  the  w orld  and 'ta k in g  on 
the c o lo u r o f the  d e a d / As A rendt in te rp re ts  Heidegger's final 
ph ilosoph ica l m ovem ent - once again in th e  h is to ry  o f philosophy: " [ t ]o  
act is to  e rr, to  go a s tra y ."  [L M /II :1 9 4 ]
This c ritic ism  as presented by A re nd t is based on A rendt's  
p ro b le m a tiza tio n  o f the  tra d itio n a l task o f ph ilosophy and philosophers 
but here  it receives m ore spec ific  and tang ib le  co n to u rs . A rendt's  w ork 
as a w ho le  suggests th a t H eidegger's fu nd am e n ta l on to logy seeks to  
conceal and thus negate th e  defin ing  paradox o f hum an cond ition, 
w hich res is ts  capture  in H eidegger's notion  o f openness. The 'keep ing  in
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¡n de fin ite ne ss ' m ay be a f l ig h t  fro m  th e  o v e rp o w e rfu l sub jec t-agen t and  
the  d o m in a ting  re p re s e n ta tio n  by Dasein th a t occludes the Being, b u t 
A re n d t's  p ro ject te s tifie s  to  h e r deep u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f hum an exis tence  
as being a bo u t d ec id ing , d isc rim in a tin g , d is tin g u ish in g , cu ttin g , and 
being responsible fo r  it a ll -  and th e re o f th e  p o litica l em erges. G ra v ity  
and a m b ig u ity  o f decis ion  is g re a te r than  th e  g ra v ity  o f open abyss, on  
w h ich  C aputo's in te rp re ta tio n  is cen tred . P o litica l philosophy and th e  
p o litica l itse lf m ust m a in ta in  them se lves a lw ays  in  th e  play betw een th e  
abyss and decision, as does hum an e x is ten ce . The real, irrem ed iab le  
d is to r tio n  o f our ex is tence  lies thus  in dec is ion  and action, n o t in th e  
u nd e c id a b ility  o f w a itin g  in  openness.
Man in A rend t's  u n d e rs ta nd in g  can never escape his own in te rv e n tio n  
as m a n 's  a rriva l in to  th is  w orld  is a lready  in e v ita b ly  d isrup tion  and  
in te rru p tio n . The d is ru p tio n  ends and the  d is rup tive ne ss  o f existence is 
ove rcom e  on ly  in d e a th  w h ich  can be read n o t as th e  abandonm ent o f  
th e  w orld  bu t its  a bso lu te  acceptance and  renouncem ent o f  
in te rv e n tio n . But to  th e  e x is ten ce  o f hum an  be ing , there  can  be no 
co nso la tion  in openness as openness is tra g ic a lly  foreclosed fo r  hum an 
e x is ten ce . As Arendt, u nders tands  ex istence, th e re  can never been th e  
in f in ity  o f openness, on ly  th e  in fin ity  o f a lw ays beg inn ing, closing o f f  
(o th e r  possible beg innings) and opening up (o f one  possible course) a t 
the  sam e tim e .
In  o th e r  w ords, A rend t ca p tu re s  the  de fin ing  a m b ig u ity  o f hum an being 
-  by v irtu e  o f m an 's  appearance in the  w o rld , th e  Insertion  th a t Is 
im m e d ia te ly  also an in te rv e n tio n  and in te rfe re n ce  w ith  the  w ays o f th e  
w o rld , m an  does and leaves th e  w orld  ch anged , m a n  cannot ju s t  be  in  
the  w o rld  and w ait fo r  the Being to  com e fo rth . M an is a d is rup tion  and 
in te rru p tio n  to  the w orld  and th e re  can be no re m e d y  to  th is co n d itio n , 
th e re  can on ly  be a response to  i t  -  in c o n tin u a tio n  o f responsive and 
responsib le  doing, and th is  is the  s u b tle ty  th a t A rend t's  th o u g h t 
ca p tu re s  -  the  pointlessness o f delusion th a t m a n  -  the  in trus ion  and 
in tru d e r  as one is -  can be tra n s fo rm e d  in to  a s ile n t lis tener.
Thus change to  the  w orld  is th e  conten t o f A re n d tia n  m om en t o f ac tion , 
and th is  change is n e ith e r in awareness n o r in m e re  re in te rp re ta tio n  o f  
the  e x is tin g  but in th e  appearance  o f so m eth ing  e n tire ly  new. Man m ay 
be th ro w n  in to  the  w orld b u t as such, th e  appearance o f m an  neve r 
leaves th e  world unchanged, th ro u g h  th is  th ro w -in , som ething is a lw ays 
done to  the  world. This d o in g -to -th e -w o rld  is so m e th in g  th a t m an has 
th e  ca p a c ity  to  e xe rt aga in  and again, n o t in  th e  sense o f m ere  ta k in g  
care  o f  th in g s  in th e  w orld  b u t by d ire c tly  in te rv e n in g  in to  th e  w orld  to  
change  it. The th row ness  in to  th e  w orld  is th u s  a t the  sam e tim e  
th ro w n e ss  in to  freedom  to  a c t and change.
The m ean ing  and s ign ificance  o f A rend t's  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  a d iffe re n t 
p h ilosophy the re fo re  is th is  re trieva l o f praxis  n o t as m ere  do ing , 
re la tin g , opening b u t all th a t w ith  the p re p o s itio n  to, the  p repos ition  
th a t com p le tes the m osaic o f  th e  m eaning o f acting  as being. W hile h e r 
co nn ec tio n  to  e x is ten tia lism  as ph ilosophy o f re la tin g  and acting  as
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opposed to  being c a n n o t be overlooked, A re n d t a lso  m oves beyond 
e x is te n tia lism  -  and o ne  w ou ld  be tem p ted  here  to  explore fu r th e r  h e r 
d e b t to  Marx w hich has never been p ro p e rly  understood and 
acknow ledged -  p rec ise ly  th ro u g h  th is  p reposition  to , w hich locks g iv ing  
and rece iv ing  ends in th e  incessant b ir th  o f th e  new . O nto logy thus , i f  i t  
is to  re ta in  m eaning fo r  th e  w orld , receives th e  d ire c tio n  o f its  enquiries 
n o t fro m  substantives b u t fro m  th is  re la tiona l w o rd , th e  p reposition  th a t 
m a rk s  existence n o t o n ly  as being o r  as b e ing -in  o r  b e ing -w ith  but as 
b e in g -to  which ties  to g e th e r a ll those th ro ug h  th e  surp lus o f the  new 
th a t sp rings  from  th a t tie .
I t  could  be argued h o w e ve r th a t th is  opening to  th e  new p ro je c t o f 
ph ilosophy th rough  p o litic a l philosophy, even i f  it succeeds in 
resu sc ita tio n  o f p h iloso ph y, exhausts th e  s tre n g th  o f po litical 
ph ilosophy. Political ph iloso ph y  thus undergoes a m etam orphosis, 
ana logous to  th a t Kafk ian  - o f a m an in to  an insect w ith  a hum an 
confined  in it. The m etam orphosis  tu rns it in to  a gro tesque, 
d ys func tiona l, n e lth e r/n o r quasi-modo  philosophical endeavour, w ith  a 
hard sh e ll under w hich  o n to lo g y  rem ains hidden th ou gh . Such politica l 
ph ilosophy then overcom es noth ing and m oreover, It is drained of Its 
liv ing  essence th a t is p rec ise ly  about draw ing a plan fo r th e  political 
ed ifice .
All o f A rendt's  opus  h o w e v e r stands as a cavea t aga inst a political 
p h ilosophy th a t w ou ld  do th e  politica l on beha lf o f  po litica l ac to rs . The 
co n s tru c tio n  o f p o litica l ed ifice  is the  task o f p o litica l doing, not o f 
p o litica l ph ilosophy, o r e lse  the re  w ill rem ain  no space, w hich  is th e  
space o f freedom , fo r e re c ting  It. The ta sk  o f p o litica l philosophy then 
m u s t be in co nstan tly  re tr ie v in g  the fabric  o f th is  po litica l doing anew, 
by understand ing  it, que stion in g , e xp lo ring , challenging, in the  
e n co u n te r w ith  th e  experience  o f its here and now  as well as o ther 
heres and o ther now s. Po litica l philosophy cannot do th e  w ork  fo r  or o f 
po litics. I t  can o n ly  seek to  incessantly rem ind  th e  po litica l o f Its 
fu nd am e n ta l rootedness in being as hum an th a t is b e lng -to -th e -w orld  
and to  understand w ha t th is  rootedness m eans fo r  th e  politica l.
I t  m ay  seem  th a t th is  understand ing  o f m an as a b e ing -to -th e -w orld  
re lates A rendt to  th e  French ex is ten tia lis ts  and, as Canovan observes, 
brings h e r closer to  them  th a n  to  e ithe r o f her teachers , H eidegger o r 
Jaspers. [1 9 9 5 :2 6 3 ] N am ely , confronted w ith  a b su rd ity  o f hum an 
ex is tence , the French E x is ten tia lis ts  seek th e  w ay o u t th rough  the  leap 
in to  a c tio n : answers to  q ue stion s  posed by the  w orld  and life  to  man 
canno t be found in ph ilosoph ic  speculations but o n ly  th ro ug h  the  'leap ' 
in to  a c tio n  w hereof sa lva tio n  w ill come. [E IU :4 3 7 -4 3 8 ]
H ow ever, A rendt's  w o rk  in tu its  th a t ph ilosophy is n o t doom ed and 
w h a te v e r used to be the  m a tte r  o f  philosophy need be dislocated in to  
po litics  b u t th a t ph ilosophy ca n  be m eaningfu l aga in , in  its  questions as 
in its answ ers, if  it g rounds its  pursuits anew  in th e  conception  o f  man 
as a be ing  o f action and free do m  in the  w orld .
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By conce iv ing  o f m an  as a b e in g -to -th e -w o rld , A rend t th u s  sets 
p h ilosophy as a p ro je c t on a n  e n tire ly  new tra c k  to w a rd s  overcom ing o f  
m e ta ph ys ica l tra d itio n . In  do ing  so, A re nd t has d ra w n  on H eidegger's 
p ro je c t inso fa r she has engaged in th e  d ia logue  w ith  philosophical 
tra d it io n , seeking to  take  up  its  silenced p o te n tia ls . As H eidegger, 
A re n d t th e re fo re  a lso  asks th e  'q u es tio n  n e v e r a s k e d /  the  question  o f  
m ean ing  o f ex is tence  in  hum an co nd itio n . In  H eidegger's
und e rs ta nd in g  o f th e  reso lu te  Dasein th ro u g h  ta k in g  up o f th e  g iven  
and th ro w n  existence, A re nd t finds th e  g round  to  th in k  freedom  fro m  
g ivenness  w ith in  th e  ve ry  g ivenness itse lf. This n o tio n  o f existence as 
bo th  g iv e n  and resis ting  g ivenness is A re n d t's  g rea test d e b t to  
H e idegger's  th o u g h t, and it is fu nd am e n ta l fo r  both  po litica l and 
ph ilosoph ica l planes o f  he r p ro je c t. But in reading th e  m eaning o f m an 
fro m  th is  freedom , A re n d t abandons the  m e ta p h ys ica l onto logy as th e  
fra m e w o rk  wherein  to  ask th is  question . N am ely , if m an is to  be 
und e rs to od  th rough  freedom  to  act, then  th e  q u e s tio n  o f the m eaning 
o f  m an 's  being canno t be asked w ith in  o n to lo g y  b u t w ith in  th e  
fra m e w o rk  o f the  ph ilosophy th a t seeks to  u nd e rs ta nd  hum an action  In 
p lu ra lity  o f ex is ten ts in the  w orld  -  fo llow ing  A re n d t's  in tu ition s , th is  
can be on ly  political o n to log y .
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W h at R e m a in s ?
W hen asked "What rem ains?* in an in te rv ie w , A re nd t rep lie d : "The 
language rem a in s ." [PHA, 1 2 ] The co n te x t o f th is  question , as o f its  
answ er, was ve ry  m uch d if fe re n t to  the  context in  w h ich  it is asked here 
and now. Hannah A rend t w as asked by G. Gauss w ha t rem ains both 
a fte r  the  collapse o f Europe as it was before  the  F inal So lution  and from  
Europe as it was in its days  o f g lory. To ask w h a t rem ains a fte r  th a t 
collapse, when an abyss opened as Arendt describes it, is n o t like 
asking w hat one was able to  save from  one's b u rn in g  house. I t  is ra th e r 
the  question  of w h a t one a llow ed  to  rem ain , to  s u rv iv e  the  co llapse and 
o u tlive  it -  unlike m any people  w hom  th a t and th e n  Europe dragged 
w ith  it to  the b o tto m  o f th e  abyss. U ltim a te ly , w h a t could have  been 
allowed to  continue  re la tin g  one to  th a t w h ich  engendered such 
abso lu te , to ta l, irrem ed iab le  catastrophe?
The circum stances in w hich  the  question above is asked here a re  not 
even rem ote ly  th a t d ra m a tic . They are th e  c ircum stances  o f a w ork 
com ing to  an end, as env isaged . At the  same tim e , th ey  are a lso  the  
circum stances o f the  w ork  end ing  w ith  its  p ro je c t rem ain ing  open o r 
opening up th ro ug h  the  v e ry  ending o f th e  w ork , th e  w o rk  th u s  th a t is 
only now  waking up to  its  o w n  im age in the  m ir ro r  -  an im age o f a 
ra th e r bushy, un trim m ed  p ro je c t th a t sp ills  o ver its  ow n  borders . But In 
the answ er th a t A re nd t g ave  - language rem ains, th e re  is h idden  an 
in tu itio n  th a t w ha t is a llow ed  to  live on  m u s t n o t be a re lic  o r a 
rem a in de r o r even o n ly  re m in d e r, as a souvenir, b u t som eth ing  liv ing  o f 
itse lf, som ething th a t, th o u g h  it lived once and th o u g h  th a t once gave 
b irth  to  its own d e s tru c tio n , can go on liv ing. The  princ ip le  behind 
A rend t's  answer m u s t have gu ided  her in w ritin g  on those th o u g h t-  
fragm en ts  th a t years on can  be recovered from  th e  depths o f h is to ry , 
not because they w ere  re s is ta n t to  the passage o f tim e  bu t because 
they gave  them selves to  change , the  'sea-change ', w h ich  b ro ug h t out 
o f them  the living essence. [M D T, 206 ] U ltim a te ly , th a t is the princ ip le  
th a t has guided A rend t th ro u g h o u t her th in k in g  and w rit in g : the 
princ ip le  o f arche o r  beg inn ing  never does end b u t lives on in w ha te ve r 
unfo lds from  it, preserved ju s t  because it changes.
In  th a t sense, to ask what rem ains?  at th is point o f a w o rk  d raw ing  to  a 
close should  th e re fo re  not be  gu ided  by th e  u rge  to  w ra p  up, to  t ie  the 
loose ends and shape a n ice ly  rounded w hole  b u t by  th e  princ ip le  o f 
arche -  w ha t rem ains, w h a t unfo lds from  here, w h a t lives o n , w hat 
should be allowed to  live  on? And b e tte r s till, w ha t ought  to  live on?
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The p reced ing  chap te rs  have  been w ritte n  in  th e  in te n tio n  to  uncover 
w h a t fro m  A rend t's  w o rk  o u g h t to  rem ain  fo r  p h ilosophy as a w hole. 
N eve rthe less Hannah A re nd t has a lw ays been and probably w ill 
c o n tin u e  to  be an odd re fe rence  in p h ilosophy p ro p e r. This m anuscrip t 
m ay have  o ffe red  som e openings tow ards a d iffe re n t understanding o f 
h e r w o rk  and its pos ition  in ph ilosophy bu t it has not dispelled 
num erous  d oub ts  and suspicions: A rend t w ill rem a in  a political th in k e r 
o r, as she has been re fe rred  to  here a t t im e s , a th in k e r  o f the politica l. 
Thus, w h ile  th is  w o rk  has been ded ica ted  to  unearth ing the  
ph ilosoph ica l laye r o f  A re nd t's  th o u g h t, I  ow e  to  A re n d t as the source o f 
th is  m a n u s c rip t, to  re v is it, a t least in these  fina l lines, w hat has been 
the  fo rce  behind her life -tim e  p ro je c t in th in k in g , its  s trongest cu rren t - 
the  conce rn  w ith  the  w orld , w ith  w ha t we a re  doing to  it and w ha t we 
can do to  it.
In  h e r th in k in g , in th is  concern  w ith  the w o rld , A re n d t is one o f those 
rare  p o litic a l th in ke rs  who evades "th e  p arad ox ica l position o f te lling  
people unchangeab le  tru th s  a b o u t w hat th e y  are do ing , In hopes o f 
g e ttin g  th e m  to  change w ha t th e y  are d o in g ."  [P itk in , 1 99 8 :2 4 2 ] Thus 
h e r co nce rn  w ith  th e  w orld  is not necessarily  fram ed as a tig h t 
th e o re tic a l co ns truc tio n  around w hich concre te  p o litica l pro jects should 
be b u ilt. T h ro u g h o u t it rem ains a reading o f m ean ings, the incessant 
n a rra tin g  th a t pervades all o f  h e r w ritin gs , th e  p rac tice  o f te lling sto ries 
behind ideas, reaw akening th e  liv ing substance  o f conceptua l language, 
w hich  m a rk s  her w ritin g s  o u t in  a ll o f ( tra d it io n a l)  ph ilosophy, as those 
o f an In tru d e r, insp iring  ye t th e  In tru d e r n eve rth e le ss .
I f  the  sam e  is a tte m p te d  w ith  th is  m an uscrip t, if  I  w ere to  read th is  
exerc ise  In ph ilosophy th ro u g h  A rendtian  lens, w h a t w ould I  be able to  
re tr ie ve  fro m  it  fo r th e  liv ing  In th e  w orld , n o t in a n y  prescrip tive  sense 
b u t in th e  sense o f m ean ing , and m eaning n o t as What does itm ean? iAA 
b u t: W hat does it mean to us, for us as beings who are to the world, or 
whose presence is in doing that necessarily changes the world?
The sam e  th a t was observed here fo r A re n d t's  w ritin gs , th a t the 
ph ilosoph ica l and the  po litica l a re  c o n s ta n tly  in te rlaced  all th ro ug h ou t 
h e r p ro je c t, could a lso  be said o f th is  w o rk . I t  is a com position  o f tw o 
in te rtw in in g  them es, the  p o litica l and th e  philosoph ica l, w here the 
in q u iry  in to  the  source o f p o litica l action in  a som ew ha t serend ip itous 
m a n n e r led to  p o litica l o n to lo g y  as a w a y  to  a sse rt onto logy and 
ph ilosophy beyond seem ing ly  a ll-encom passing  m etaphys ica l horizon. 
D elving in to  th e  inve s tiga tion  o f  m ind b ro u g h t to  l ig h t th e  w orkings o f a 
m e n ta l p o w e r to  ca ll fo rth  th e  new, th e  rad ica lly  and abso lu te ly
i 4 A  This question of meaning as such is that which Derrida condemns to metaphysical 
framework: "every time that a question of m e a n i n g  is posed, it must be posed within the 
closure of metaphysics. To put it summarily, one seeks in vain to extract the question of 
meaning (the meaning of time, or anything else) as such from metaphysics..." [1982:51] 
Dislocating meaning from metaphysics is precisely what Arendt's political ontology offers 
as all meanings are followed by the preposition t o ,  the preposition that places meaning in 
the specific here and now and relates it to the question-asking agent.
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d iffe re n t from  th e  e x is tin g , w ithou t a t the  sam e tim e  denying  the  
e x is tin g . Recognizing th is  o rig inary  p o te n tia l o f the  m enta l pow er o f 
im a g in a tio n  suggested th e  possib ility  o f d iffe re n t onto log ica l know ledge, 
th e  know ledge in b ring ing  o f the  new, a t the  ph ilosoph ica l p lane o f th is  
p ro je c t, inspiring thus the  e ffo rt a t exp lica tin g  a fundam enta l bond 
be tw een  o n to log y , as in q u iry  in to  m eaning, and praxis  o r acting  as the  
source o f newness in the  w orld , in o th e r w ords -  the  political.
I f  th is  w ork  how ever w ere to  take  a d iffe re n t ro u te  a t th a t po in t, to  take  
a m ore  A rendtian  rou te , as had been envisaged in its  early days, the 
in q u iry  would have been d irected in to  the  p o litica l as sourced by 
im a g in a tio n , to  th e  p oss ib ility  o f s tudy ing  the  p o litica l less as a science 
and m ore  as n a rra tio n , such as A rendt approached it. N am ely, if  
im a g in a tio n  is th e  source o f po litical agency, sc ien tific  e xp lanatory  
theories  born w ith in  ra tio n a lis t fram ew ork  becom e insu ffic ien t in the 
co llis ion  w ith  the  o ffsp ring  o f the  pow er so uncontro llab le , un law fu l, 
unp red ic tab le  such as im a g in a tio n . On th e  o th e r hand, th is m ovem ent 
ou t o f th e  borders o f ra tio na lism  cannot seek re fuge  in vo lun ta rism  
e ith e r, fo r im ag ina tion  does n o t render itse lf, its  un tam ed se lf, to  the 
n o rm a tive  fram e w o rks  designed to  guide the  w ill. In  o th e r w ords, both 
the ra tio n a lis t e xp la n a to ry  accounts and n o rm a tive  studies o f the 
po litica l prove inadequa te  in capturing  th e  flow  o f ac tion  engendered by 
im a g in a tio n , in rendering  it m eaningfu l.
W hat rem ains th e re fo re  is the  practice o f w rit in g , pervading the 
classical th ou gh t o f C icero, M achiavelli, la te r M ontesquieu, resurrected 
by A re n d t, w riting  up o f e ve n ts  in the m id s t o f s to ries  already w ritte n , 
w ith  m ean ing  o f th e  fo rm e r as o f  the  la tte r  o ccu rrin g , an event in itse lf, 
be tw een  the  w ritte n  and th e  read, be tw een th e  events o rig ina lly  
cap tu red  by the  s to ry  and those  in which the  reade r is caught and th a t 
called fo r th  the  s to ry  to  be re to ld . Finally a lso, m eaning  is enacted in- 
be tw een  a ll the  o th e r s to rie s  th a t w ill associate itse lf, un in ten tiona lly , 
on th e  sp u r o f th e  m o m e n t, w ith  the s to ry  read and the s to ry  in 
m ak ing , blend w ith  th em  o r  to u ch  w ith  a spark o n ly  to  part ways, like 
waves o f m eaning.
Should th a t route  have  been ta ke n  here, ano the r s to ry  m ig h t have been 
a llowed to  em erge fro m  behind the  scene w here I  staged the d ia logue 
be tw een  A rend t and H eidegger to  em ula te  and perhaps also incarnate 
th e  d ia logue  betw een the  p o litica l and the ph ilosoph ica l. The shadow of 
th a t s to ry  has m ore o ften  th a n  no t fallen o v e r these pages but the s to ry  
has not been allowed ou t o f th e  cobwebs o f a personal h istory. T ha t 
s to ry , paradoxica lly  as it is a lso personal, is one to ld  m any tim es and 
has taken  m any a h is to rica l shape. I t  is th e  s to ry  o f how the pow er o f 
hum an existence to  bring th e  new in to  the  w o rld  was silenced, 
incapac ita ted , and then  degenerated  in to  the fo rce  o f v io le n t 
subm ission  o f un ique  beings to  hom ogenization, e ith e r  as am orphous 
co lle c tive  corps o r as the  am orphous pile o f hum an corpses, o r m ostly  -  
one and th e n  the o th e r. The p a rticu la r s to ry  on these p a rticu la r m argins 
would have  been the  one o f th e  Bosnian experience o f th e  1990s, the  
expe rience  o f the  newness aborted  and o f th e  v ic to rio u s  inertia which
2 1 4
fin a lly  exploded in fe a r and violence and m ore  fe a r. T he reo f th e  
q u e s tio n  cam e -  n o t how it  happened, th e  s to ry  heard over and o v e r 
aga in  in  d ive rse  to n a litie s , b u t how the  s to ries  o f  ine rtia  could (h a ve ) 
becom e s to ries  o f th e  new , o f  breaking th ro u g h  th e  ossified p a tte rn s , 
w h a t it  is o f o u r p o litica l capacities th a t w e re ta in  in th e  m om ents o f th e  
co llaps ing  w orld  and in the  m om en ts  o f th e  p o litica l space su ffocated  
b e tw e en  *1' and those  w ho define  the w orld  fo r  th a t T . ' T ha t is th e  
q u e s tio n  th a t sends one to  A rend t as th e  vo ice  o f such po litica l 
m o m e n ts  and ye t sends one also beyond A rend t, to  c la im  th a t w ith  the  
d isso lu tio n  o f the  po litica l space not a ll o f o u r  po litica l potentia l is lost.
In  th a t  sense, perhaps, th is  en tire  s to ry  is h a rd ly  m ore th a n  a 
beg inn ing  o r  a p re face to  itse lf.
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